0120121362
06-14-2012
Clarence E. Doster, Complainant, v. John M. McHugh, Secretary, Department of the Army, Agency.
Clarence E. Doster,
Complainant,
v.
John M. McHugh,
Secretary,
Department of the Army,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120121362
Hearing No. 471-2011-00059X
Agency No. ARTACOM09NOV05684
DECISION
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's appeal from the Agency's December 19, 2011 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Government Contractor for Booze Allen Hamilton at the Agency's TACOM Life Cycle Management Command facility in Warren, Michigan. On July 13, 2010, Complainant filed a formal complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of reprisal for prior protected EEO activity under Title VII when: on August 7, 2009 the Agency requested his removal from his contractor position.
At the conclusion of the investigation, Complainant was provided with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant requested a hearing within the time frame provided in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.108(f).
On November 29, 2011, the AJ issued a summary decision finding no discrimination. In reaching this decision, the AJ determined that even if Complainant could establish a prima facie case, the Agency had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The Agency stated that Complainant's overall, poor job performance led to management's recommendation that Complainant be removed. Further, the AJ found that there is no evidence in the record, and Complainant has not proffered any, to support an inference that the Agency's decision was based on retaliation for prior EEO activity.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate.
Upon review of the record we find that the AJ properly found that the instant complaint was suitable for summary judgment. The record is adequately developed and there are no disputes of material fact.
As this is an appeal from a decision issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(a), the agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). See EEOC Management Directive 110, Chapter 9, � VI.A. (November 9, 1999). (explaining that the de novo standard of review "requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision maker," and that EEOC "review the documents, statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission's own assessment of the record and its interpretation of the law").
To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).
Complainant asserts, inter alia, that the AJ improperly issued summary judgment in this matter. Complainant has not produced evidence to show that the Agency's explanations are a pretext for discrimination or identified material facts in dispute which could alter the adjudication of his claims.
After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final order, because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that discrimination occurred.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0610)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party. Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
June 14, 2012
__________________
Date
2
0120121362
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
2
0120121362