Chrysler, LLC

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jan 6, 2010

354 N.L.R.B. 1032 (N.L.R.B. 2010)

354 NLRB No. 128
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Chrysler, LLC and Local 412, International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL–
CIO. Case 7–CA–51553
January 6, 2010
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBER SCHAUMBER
On May 1, 2009, Administrative Law Judge Ira San-
dron issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed
exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board1 has considered
the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and
brief and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, find-
ings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with
this decision and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified.
We adopt the judge’s findings that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to
comply with the Union’s information requests set forth in
its letters dated July 17, 18, and 28, 2008, concerning
Magna Corporation, MSX International, FEV Engine
Technology, EDAG Corporation, AMR Automotive Re-
search India Private Limited, INCAT, and A.R.D.C.2

1 Effective midnight December 28, 2007, Members Liebman,
Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh delegated to Members Liebman,
Schaumber, and Kirsanow, as a three-member group, all of the Board’s
powers in anticipation of the expiration of the terms of Members Kir-
sanow and Walsh on December 31, 2007. Pursuant to this delegation,
Chairman Liebman and Member Schaumber constitute a quorum of the
three-member group. As a quorum, they have the authority to issue
decisions and orders in unfair labor practice and representation cases.
See Sec. 3(b) of the Act. See Narricot Industries, L.P. v. NLRB, ___
F.3d ___, 2009 WL 4016113 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2009); Snell Island
SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed
78 U.S.L.W. 3130 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2009) (No. 09-328); New Process
Steel v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted ___ S.Ct.
___, 2009 WL 1468482 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2009); Northeastern Land Ser-
vices v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78
U.S.L.W. 3098 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2009) (No. 09-213); Teamsters Local
523 v. NLRB, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 4912300 (10th Cir. Dec. 22,
2009). But see Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB,
564 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed 78 U.S.L.W. 3185
(U.S. Sept. 29, 2009) (No. 09-377).
2 The Respondent has not argued, on exception, that the Union
waived its right to the information. Further, in adopting the judge’s
findings, we disavow his reliance on the Respondent’s failure to raise
lack of relevance in its communications with the Union about the in-
formation requests, to the extent the judge’s reliance on that factor can
be interpreted as shifting the burden from the Union to establish rele-
vance.
With respect to the Respondent’s argument that the complaint alle-
gations should be deferred to the parties’ grievance/arbitration proce-
However, we reverse the judge and find that the Respon-
dent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to
comply with the Union’s information request set forth in
its July 28, 2008 letter concerning the Respondent’s Envi
hybrid-vehicle program.
The Union sought the following information pertaining
to the Envi program: the program objectives; verification
that the International Union attended meetings to discuss
the start of the program; a Chrysler development system
breakdown, or timeline, of the program; a list of all de-
partments (union and nonunion) and organizations work-
ing on the program, including outside parties; and organ-
izational charts for each such department. The judge
found that the requested information was “largely” pre-
sumptively relevant. The remaining information, he
found, is essentially subcontracting information, which
the Board has held is not presumptively relevant. Citing
Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB 1256 (2007), he stated that
the burden therefore fell on the Union to establish the
relevance of this information. He concluded that the
Union made the required showing, by referencing the
collective-bargaining agreement and several memoranda
of understanding between the Respondent and the Inter-
national Union, and by stating that the information was
necessary to investigate possible violations of those
agreements. The Respondent excepts, contending that
the entire Envi request pertained to matters outside the
bargaining unit and the requested information was, there-

dure, under longstanding Board policy, allegations involving an em-
ployer’s refusal to furnish information requested by an exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative are not deferrable. See, e.g., Team
Clean, Inc., 348 NLRB 1231 fn. 1 (2006). See also DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 344 NLRB 1324 fn. 1 (2005); DaimlerChrysler Corp., 331
NLRB 1324 fn. 3 (2000), enfd. 288 F.3d 434 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Mem-
ber Schaumber views the information requests as covered by the par-
ties’ contractual arbitration clause and would defer the requests to
arbitration. He recognizes, however, that Board precedent is to the
contrary. Accordingly, for institutional reasons, he concurs in finding
that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by failing to furnish this re-
quested information.
In agreeing with the judge that the Respondent’s failure to comply
with the Union’s information requests does not warrant a broad order
restraining the Respondent from committing “any” violation of the Act,
Member Schaumber observes that the Board’s authority regarding
unfair labor practices does not include “authority to restrain generally
all other unlawful practices which it has neither found to have been
pursued nor persuasively to be related to the proven unlawful conduct.”
NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 433 (1941). Further, as
fully set forth in his dissenting opinion in Postal Service, 345 NLRB
409, 412–413 (2005), Member Schaumber notes that the Supreme
Court has made clear that broad orders must be reserved for egregious
cases in which the violations are so severe or so numerous and varied
as to truly manifest a general disregard for employees’ fundamental
employee rights. Hickmott Foods, Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). In
Member Schaumber’s view, the failure to respond to several informa-
tion requests in violation of a single subsection of Sec. 8(a) does not
meet the stringent Hickmott standard.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD2
fore, not presumptively relevant. The Respondent fur-
ther contends that the Union and the General Counsel
failed to meet their burden of establishing the relevance
of the information. We find merit in the Respondent’s
exceptions.
The information concerning the Envi program does not
pertain to employees in the bargaining unit. At the hear-
ing, Union Representative Michael Hayes testified: “I
know at this time and specifically at the time of the re-
quest and to the best of my knowledge at this time, no
union represented employee is working on the program.”
Accordingly, the information was not presumptively
relevant and the General Counsel was required to “pre-
sent evidence either (1) that the [U]nion demonstrated
relevance of the nonunit information, or (2) that the rele-
vance of the information should have been apparent to
the Respondent under the circumstances.” Disneyland
Park, supra at 1258 (footnote omitted).
The General Counsel failed to make such a showing.
The Respondent is a large corporation with manufactur-
ing facilities throughout the United States. There is no
record evidence that the Envi program, in whole or in
part, involved the subcontracting of work within the ju-
risdiction of the particular bargaining unit involved in
this case or that the program implicated unit employees’
terms and conditions of work. We therefore find that the
Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by failing to furnish the Union with the requested
information concerning the Envi program.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Chrys-
ler, LLC, Auburn Hills, Michigan, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in
the Order as modified.
1. Delete paragraph 2(b).
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
Dated, Washington, D.C. January 6, 2010
______________________________________
Wilma B. Liebman, Chairman
______________________________________
Peter C. Schaumber, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT refuse to provide information requested
by Local 412, International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW), AFL–CIO which is necessary for, and
relevant to the Union’s proper performance of its duties
as your exclusive collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL furnish the Union with the information it re-
quested on about July 17, 18, and 28, 2008, concerning
our outsourcing of work to Magna Corporation, MSX
International, FEV Engine Technology, EDAG Corpora-
tion, AMR Automotive Research India Private Limited,
INCAT, and A.R.D.C. at our Auburn Hills, Michigan
headquarters facility.
CHRYSLER, LLC
Donna M. Nixon, Esq., for the General Counsel.
K.C. Hortop, Esq. (Eastman & Smith Ltd.), of Novi, Michigan,
for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
IRA SANDRON, Administrative Law Judge. The complaint,
issued on December 9, 2008,1 stems from unfair labor practice
charges that Local 412, International Union, United Automo-
bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer-
ica (UAW), AFL–CIO (the Union) filed against Chrysler, LLC
(Respondent or Chrysler). The General Counsel alleges that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act) by failing and refusing to provide
the Union with information it requested that was necessary for,

1 All dates are in 2008, unless otherwise indicated.
CHRYSLER, LLC 3
and relevant to, the Union’s performance of its duties in repre-
senting employees.
Pursuant to notice, I conducted a trial in Detroit, Michigan,
on March 3, 2009, at which the parties had full opportunity to
be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to in-
troduce evidence. Respondent and the General Counsel filed
helpful posthearing brief that I have duly considered.
Issue
Did Respondent unlawfully fail and refuse to provide the
Union with information it requested on July 17, 18, and 28,
regarding Respondent’s use of outsourced companies, and in-
formation it requested on July 28 concerning Envi, Chrysler’s
new hybrid-vehicle program?
Witnesses
Michael Hayes, the Union’s chief steward for unit 1, testified
for the General Counsel. Respondent called Morris Simms,
Chrysler’s senior manager of labor relations.
I will address credibility in the facts section. Apropos of this
case, I note here the well-established precept that witnesses
may be found partially credible: “‘[N]othing is more common
in all kinds of judicial decisions than to believe some and not
all’ of a witness’ testimony.” Jerry Ryce Builders, 352 NLRB
1262 fn. 2 (2008), citing NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 179
F.2d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 1950), revd. on other grounds 340 U.S.
474 (1951). Rather, in evaluating its plausibility, a witness’
testimony is appropriately weighed with the evidence as a
whole. Golden Hours Convalescent Hospitals, 182 NLRB 796,
798–799 (1970).
Facts
Based on the entire record, including testimony, my observa-
tions of witness’ demeanor, documents, and stipulations, I find
the following.
Respondent, a corporation headquartered in Auburn Hills,
Michigan, has offices, plants, and places of business throughout
the United States, and is engaged in the manufacture, nonretail
sale, and distribution of automobiles and automotive products.
Jurisdiction has been admitted, and I so find.
Respondent’s Auburn Hills facility (the facility) is the sole
location germane to this proceeding. Thousands of employees
work there, including about 400 employees in the Union’s unit
1. The Union represents about 3500 persons in approximately
59 units, 19 of which consist of Chrysler employees. Units are
comprised of districts.
The International UAW (the International) and Chrysler have
been parties to a nationwide agreement for many years, the
most recent effective by its terms from October 29, 2007–
September 14, 2011.2
Since 1978, the International has assigned its representative
responsibilities to the Union. At all times relevant, Respondent
and the Union have been parties to a local supplemental agree-
ment covering unit 1.3 Page 18 thereof sets out some of unit
1’s occupational groups, in the categories of designers, layout,
and detailers. The Union’s requests for information (RFI’s) all

2 GC Exh. 18.
3 GC Exh. 19.
related principally to the 275–300 employees in these classifi-
cations.
The RFI’s
Chrysler regularly utilizes outside contractors to perform
outsourced work at the facility. On July 17, 18, and 28, Hayes,
in his capacity as steward for Local 412, unit 1, district 4, made
separate RFI’s concerning seven such contractors, to Todd
Frohner, then Respondent’s union relations representative.
They were for Magna Corporation, EDAG Corporation, FEV
Engine Technology, MSX International, AMR Automotive
Research India Private Limited, INCAT, and A.R.D.C.4
Aside from the company named, the RFI’s were identical in
key respects. Each opened with the statement that it was an
RFI pursuant to a grievance investigation pertaining to three
memoranda of understanding (MOU’s) in the collective-
bargaining agreement, and possibly to other provisions therein.
The cited MOU’s were: (M-3) joint activities; (M-6) new tech-
nology; and (M-10) sourcing.5 Hayes went on to state:
In order for the Union to properly prepare and process
for possible grievances, fulfill the unions [sic] contract
administration and bargaining responsibilities, and to
monitor and administer the collective bargaining agree-
ment we request the following information from the Com-
pany.
Please inform the Union the following information
pertaining to the engineering resource, [name of com-
pany], which is being utilized by Chrysler LLC.
This to include but not limited to:
A list of all programs and/or vehicles that engineering,
design, packaging and prototype tasks are being performed
for Chrysler LLC and its subsidiaries.
A complete Chrysler Development System (CDS)
breakdown of the program.
If the engineering resource is not supplying total vehi-
cle assistance and is just a component(s) resource please
provide a list of the components that they are involved
with.
For the six requests dated July 17 or 18, Hayes asked that the
information be provided by July 28; for the seventh, dated July
28 (A.R.D.C.), he requested the information by August 3.
Hayes made these RFI’s primarily to determine whether the
Company’s use of outsourcing violated any provisions of the
collective-bargaining agreement, particularly with respect to
performance of bargaining unit work.
Simms testified that Magna and MSX perform a great deal of
work for Chrysler outside of the scope of unit 1 or district 4.
He believed the same holds true for INCAT but was not knowl-
edgeable about EDAC or FEV.
Also on July 28, Hayes made an RFI to Frohner, either by
email or hand-delivery, for information pertaining to Chrysler’s
new Envi hybrid-vehicle program.6 Referring to the three

4 GC Exhs. 2–8. All were emailed, with the possible exception of
GC Exh. 8 (A.R.D.C.), which Hayes may have hand-delivered.
5 See GC Exh. 18 at 125–135, 143–147, & 201–214.
6 GC Exh. 9.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD4
MOU’s cited above, and repeating the same purposes as in the
other requests, he asked for the following:
The scope of the program objectives.
Verification that International UAW has attended
meetings to discuss the start of this program and all its in-
tentions. Including names, dates and documentation sup-
porting this notification.
A complete Chrysler Development System (CDS)
break-down of the program.
A complete list of all Departments (Union and Non-
union) and organizations currently working on this pro-
gram. This is to include Chrysler and any other outside
parties.
Organizational charts for each of the departments re-
quested in the previous bulletin item.
As with the RFI concerning A.R.D.C., Hayes asked Chrysler
to provide the information by August 3.
Events Prior to February 2009
Frohner responded by memorandum dated July 28, acknowl-
edging receipt of the July 17 and 18 RFI’s.7 He stated that he
was in the process of gathering information to respond and that
the Company’s final response would be provided “within a
reasonable period.” By memorandum dated July 31, he made
an identical response to the A.R.D.C. and Envi RFI’s.8
By an email of August 5 to Frohner, Hayes reiterated his
RFI’s with the exception of INCAT, the omission of which he
did not notice in Frohner’s memorandum.9 Hayes asked if all
or part of the requested information was available for the Union
to pick up.
Hayes testified without controversion, and I find, the follow-
ing. In July, he had conversations with Frohner in meetings on
unrelated matters, at which he asked the status of the requests.
He recalled two specifically. The first was in early August,
when Frohner replied that he had sent the requests to Chrysler’s
union relations department, which was working on obtaining
the information. The second was at an August 20 grievance
meeting, at which Frohner responded that said department was
still working on it. Frohner also said that he could not identify
AMR and asked if Hayes could recommend a point of contact
to discuss the RFI. Hayes suggested a particular director.
In a September 5 email concerning a variety of topics, in-
cluding Frohner’s upcoming transfer to another location, Hayes
asked Frohner the status of the RFI’s.10 Hayes, by a September
16 email to Jeff Lofay, who had taken over for Frohner as un-
ion relations representative, asked for any or all of the re-
quested information.11 He stated that in his last conversation
with Frohner, on September 9, the latter had said that a named
individual was still working on the project. By a September 18

7 GC Exh. 10. He apparently inadvertently omitted reference to the
INCAT RFI.
8 GC Exh. 11.
9 GC Exh. 12.
10 GC Exh. 13.
11 GC Exh. 14.
email, Union Chair Richard Harter asked Lofay about any pro-
gress in obtaining the information.12
On September 30, Hayes emailed Thomas Groechel, Chrys-
ler’s human resources director. He reiterated the RFI’s and
requested the information by October 3.13 In the last sentence,
he stated, “Please do not offer alternatives such as a meeting
with management or a discussion with Labor Relations. Labor
relations and Chrysler Union Relations departments have had
more than adequate time to obtain the requested data.” Hayes
testified that no one from Chrysler had previously made any
offers for alternatives; rather, he put in this last sentence be-
cause he did not want what he deemed further stalling by the
Company. I do believe that he considered Respondent to be
stalling. Nonetheless, I find it implausible that he would have
made this statement sua sponte and without some predicate in
the way of management initiation of the subject. Regardless,
no such management offers were put in writing or otherwise
formally presented to the Union as proposals.
Lofay sent Hayes an email on October 14, referencing six of
the RFI’s.14 He stated that the Company was “currently work-
ing to gather the previous information the Union requested” and
that he would contact the Union “[a]s soon as the information is
complied [sic].” This is the last written communication be-
tween the Union and Chrysler in evidence.
On October 7, the Union filed the charge underlying this
proceeding. Respondent does not dispute the fact that it never
provided the Union with any information in response to the
RFI’s.
Communications in February 2009
The trial was initially scheduled for February 4, 2009. Re-
spondent made an unopposed motion to postpone, which the
Regional Director granted in a February 6, 2009 order.15 At all
times during settlement discussions, the General Counsel in-
sisted on a formal Board settlement agreement and represented
this as the Union’s position.
Both Hayes and Simms testified about conversations they
had before and after the Regional Director’s postponement of
the trial to March 3, 2009. The first conversation was on the
late afternoon on about February 5, when Hayes called Simms
into his office.16 The second conversation was by telephone,
about 2 weeks later. Their respective versions of the contents
of their conversations were substantially similar, with one ma-
jor exception.
In the first conversation, Simms suggested that they identify
people who might be able to sit down and provide the requested
information. He stated that some of the requests were quite
broad, because Chrysler used companies such as Magna and
MSX in many facets of the different processes, and should be
narrowed. At one point, he gestured toward the stack of pur-
chase orders that the procurement and supply department had

12 GC Exh. 15.
13 GC Exh. 16. Attachments included the INCAT RFI.
14 GC Exh. 17. INCAT and A.R.D.C. were not included.
15 GC Exh. 1(f).
16 Based on Simms’ testimony on its foundation, which was more
detailed and unequivocal than Hayes’, who first indicated the conversa-
tion was in person but then stated that it was by telephone.
CHRYSLER, LLC 5
run off for him. He and Hayes agreed that they would not be
sufficient to satisfy the RFI’s.
Simms described the difficulties that he had encountered in
obtaining the information, including reductions in the union
relations staff and in the work force overall, and organizational
restructuring. In this regard, he asked Hayes if the Union
would agree to a postponement of the trial so that the Company
could have more time. Hayes replied that he was opposed to
this. Simms also discussed a potential informal settlement
agreement if the Company could get enough information to
satisfy Hayes.
Either at this meeting (Simms’ testimony), or in a phone
conversation about 2 weeks later (Hayes’ account), Simms
offered to set up meetings between Hayes and managers to
facilitate obtaining the information. Their testimony conflicted
on whether the offer was conditional, and Hayes’ response.
According to Simms, he imposed no conditions, and Hayes
responded that he would be interested in sitting down with the
managers. Simms testified that after he received word of the
postponement, he sent Hayes an email and asked if Hayes could
work on the list of managers with whom to meet because they
only had until March 3 (the new trial date) to start meeting, and
they needed to get going quickly. When I asked Simms if that
email was in the record, he answered, “I didn’t bring it. I wish
I had now.”17 Simms further testified that he sent subsequent
emails asking Hayes for the information but, again, none were
produced at trial. Thus, without a satisfactory explanation,
Respondent failed to provide documents in its possession that
would reasonably be assumed to be favorable to its position
(i.e., support Simms’ version that his offer was unconditional
and that Hayes agreed to it). Therefore, I draw an adverse in-
ference against the credibility of Simms’ testimony on this
matter. See PCC Fabricators, Inc., 352 NLRB 701 fn. 5
(2008); Martin Luther King Sr. Nursing Center, 231 NLRB 15
fn. 1 (1977).
Contrary to Simms, Hayes recounted that Simms conditioned
his offer upon the Union’s agreement to an informal Board
settlement agreement and/or a further postponement of the trial,
and Hayes told him no.
Under all the circumstances, I find more plausible Hayes’
version of Simms’ offer and his response. First, I note Respon-
dent’s failure to produce purported documents that would have
corroborated Simms’ account. Second, Simms initiated their
meeting on about February 5, when Respondent’s motion for a
postponement of the trial was pending, and Simms admittedly
asked the Union to agree to such. Accordingly, I find that
Simms’ offer was conditional on the Union’s agreement to an
informal Board settlement agreement and/or further postpone-
ment of the trial.
Analysis
An employer is obliged to supply information requested by a
collective-bargaining representative that is necessary and rele-
vant to the latter’s performance of its responsibilities to the
employees it represents. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385
U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).

17 Tr. 107.
The information must be furnished in a timely fashion. Beverly
California Corp., 326 NLRB 153, 157 (1991); Interstate Food
Processing, 283 NLRB 303, 306 (1987).
Respondent has raised several defenses. It first contends that
the matter should be deferred to the parties’ grievance-arbi-
tration procedure under the Collyer doctrine.18 However, the
Board in recent decisions has strongly reaffirmed its longstand-
ing policy of finding deferral inappropriate when the 8(a)(5)
allegations pertain to failure to provide information. See
Medco Health Solutions of Spokane, 352 NLRB 640 (2008);
Team Clean, Inc., 348 NLRB 1231 fn. 1 (2006).
Respondent’s brief cites (at 6) a single case in support of its
position: United Aircraft Corp., 204 NLRB 879 (1973), affd.
sub nom. Machinists Lodges 700, 743, 1746 v. NLRB, 525
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975). Seven years ago, Respondent cited
the same case to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, when it
sought Board deferral of another information-request case, in
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 288 F.3d 434 (2002). The court was
not persuaded, stating (at 445):
United Aircraft is an almost 30-year-old case that does not
represent the Board’s current policy of the application of Col-
lyer to information-request cases. And United Aircraft is the
only case cited by CD in support of its position. At oral ar-
gument before this court, DC’s counsel acknowledged that the
Board’s policy since United Aircraft has been entirely consis-
tent in holding that information cases will not be deferred un-
der Collyer . . . .
For those reasons, United Aircraft is not viable authority, and
Respondent’s deferral argument fails.
Alternatively, Respondent raises three contentions. I note
that at no time prior to February 2009, when the matter was
already scheduled for trial, did Respondent voice any objec-
tions to complying with the RFI’s.
The first is that a provision of MOU M-10 provides that the
Union has the right to written notification of any contemplated
outsourcing decision,19 and it therefore already received the
requested information. Since determining Respondent’s com-
pliance with MOU M-10 was one of the reasons for the RFI’s,
this contention warrants no serious consideration, especially
when Respondent has produced no evidence of any such notifi-
cation.
The second is that the Union failed to demonstrate relevance.
In analyzing relevance, the Board’s distinguishes between re-
quested information relating directly to the terms and condi-
tions of represented employees, and requested information
concerning matters outside of the bargaining unit.
The former is presumptively relevant. Beverly Health & Re-
habilitation Services, 328 NLRB 885, 888 (1999); Samaritan
Medical Center, 319 NLRB 392, 397 (1995). This includes
information pertinent to a union’s decision to file or process
grievances. Beth Abraham Health Services, 332 NLRB 1234
(2000); Bell Telephone Laboratories, 317 NLRB 802, 803
(1995), enfd. mem. 107 F.3d 862 (3d Cir. 1997). The Envi RFI
largely fell into this category.

18 See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB 837 (1971).
19 GC Exh. 18 at 212.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD6
As to the latter, a union bears the burden of establishing its
relevance and need. Racetrack Food Services, 353 NLRB No.
76 (2008); Tri-State Generation, 332 NLRB 910 (2000). This
includes information about the subcontracting of work, even if
it impacts on bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions
of employment. Disneyland Park, 350 NLRB 1257 (2007);
Richmond Health Care, 332 NLRB 1304, 1307 fn. 1 (2000);
Associated Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc., 318 NLRB 318 (1995),
enfd. 108 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1997); Ohio Power Co., 216
NLRB 987, 991 (1975), enfd. 531 F.2d 1381 (6th Cir. 1976).
Thus, the RFI’s concerning outsourced companies, and to the
Envi RFI, in part, were in this category.
In determining whether such a burden has been met at the
trial level, the Board applies a liberal, discovery-type standard.
Hamilton Sundstrand, 352 NLRB 482 (2008), Disneyland
Park, above. The General Counsel can establish relevance by
presenting evidence that either (1) the union demonstrated the
relevance of the information, or (2) the relevance of the infor-
mation should have been apparent to the employer under the
circumstances. Ibid. The burden is not “an exceptionally
heavy one, requiring only a showing be made of a ‘probability
that the requested information is relevant, and that it would be
of use to the union in carrying out its statutory duties and re-
sponsibilities.’” Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 323 NLRB
1182, 1186 (1997), enfd. 157 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 1998), quoting
Acme Industrial Co., supra at 437.
Here, the RFI’s referenced specific MOU’s in the collective-
bargaining agreement, requested certain types of information,
and stated that the Union sought the information for, inter alia,
possible grievances.
Respondent never raised lack of relevance as a basis for not
furnishing the information sought. Indeed, both in written
communications and orally, management repeatedly stated that
Chrysler was making efforts to obtain the information and
would provide it.
I conclude, therefore, that the requested information was
relevant and necessary to the Union’s representation of unit
employees, based both on the contents of the RFI’s, and Chrys-
ler’s responses. For the same reasons, I conclude that the pre-
sumptively relevant portions of the Envi RFI, if severed for
analysis, were relevant and necessary.
Finally, I turn to Respondent’s claim that its delay in furnish-
ing the information was justified due to the expansive nature of
the requests. At the February 2009 meeting, Simms alluded to
the broad scope of the RFI’s, in particular with regard to two of
the companies, and to the difficulties that his office had had in
compiling information. He did not state that obtaining the in-
formation would be “burdensome” as such. Assuming he had,
a mere assertion that the information request is overly broad to
the point of being burdensome does not suffice to relieve an
employer from the obligation to provide relevant information.
Rather, the employer must establish that the expense, labor, and
or resources required to fulfill the request rise to the level of
burdensome. Pulaski Construction Co., 345 NLRB 932, 938
(2005); Goodyear Atomic Corp., 266 NLRB 890, 891 (1983),
enfd. 738 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1984); Colgate Palmolive, 261
NLRB 90 (1982). Neither Simms in his conversations with
Hayes, nor Respondent at trial, offered any evidence showing
this.
I note that the situation here is distinguishable from those in
which an employer has at some point furnished all or some of
the information sought; Respondent has never provided any-
thing, timely or otherwise.
Accordingly, Respondent’s defenses fail. Absent demonstra-
tion of a valid defense, an employer is obliged to furnish infor-
mation found relevant. Beth Abraham Health Service, supra at
1235; Woodland Clinic, 331 NLRB 735, 737 (2000).
Based on all of the above, I conclude that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to furnish
to the Union the requested information.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By the following conduct, Respondent has engaged in un-
fair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and violated Section 8(a)(5) and
(1) of the Act:
(a) Failed and refused to provide to the Union information
that the Union requested about Respondent’s use of outsourced
companies at its headquarters facility.
(b) Failed and refused to provide to the Union information
that the Union requested about Respondent’s Envi hybrid-
vehicle program at its headquarters facility.
REMEDY
Because Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it
must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The General Counsel seeks a broad cease-and-desist order,
contending that Respondent has demonstrated a proclivity to
violate the Act by engaging in a pattern of failing to provide the
Union with information. The General Counsel cites the follow-
ing cases, in which Respondent was found to have so violated
Section 8(a)(5) (listed in order of issuance date, latest first, with
the particular units of the Union involved, and the dates of the
RFI’s):20
1. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 344 NLRB 1324
(2005) unit 53, 1999.
2. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 344 NLRB 772
(2005) units 4 and 21, April–September 2003.
3. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. NLRB, supra—unit
53, 1997 and 1998.
4. DaimlerChrysler Corp., JD–133–99 (1999)—
unit 1, 1998.
These cases concerned Respondent’s actions over a period
extending from 1997–2003, and going back as far as 12 years.
In view of their remoteness in time, I have conceptual difficulty

20 Because the fifth case cited by the General Counsel, Chrysler,
LLC, JD–48–08 (2008) (unit 1), is an ALJD pending before the Board
on Respondent’s exceptions, it is not a final adjudication that can be
considered for evidentiary purposes.
CHRYSLER, LLC 7
finding that they have a relevant nexus to the matter before me.
Moreover, the record is silent on how many information re-
quests the Union has made of Respondent since 1997, and the
number of occasions when Respondent provided information to
the Union’s satisfaction. As a result, the above violations can-
not be evaluated in any kind of meaningful context.
For these reasons, I conclude that the General Counsel has
not established that Respondent has engaged in recent years in
a pattern or practice of failing to provide the Union with re-
quested information or of otherwise violating the Act. Accord-
ingly, a broad cease-and-desist order is unwarranted, and I deny
the General Counsel’s request for such.
ORDER
The Respondent, Chrysler, LLC, Auburn Hills, Michigan, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with informa-
tion the Union requests that is relevant and necessary to its role
as the collective-bargaining representative of employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights Section 7 of
the Act guarantees to them.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Timely furnish the Union with the information it re-
quested about Respondent’s use of outsourced companies at its
Auburn Hills, Michigan headquarters operations.
(b) Timely furnish the Union with the information it re-
quested about Chrysler’s Envi hybrid-vehicle program at that
location.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Auburn Hills, Michigan, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”21 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of
business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings,

21 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy
of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since July 17, 2008.
(d) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. May 1, 2009
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
We recognize Local 412, International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW), AFL–CIO (the Union) as the bargaining rep-
resentative of employees described in our 2007–2011 collec-
tive-bargaining agreement with the International UAW, and in
local supplemental agreements.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to provide the Union with in-
formation it requests relating to our use of outsourced compa-
nies at our Auburn Hills, Michigan headquarters facility; our
Envi hybrid-vehicle program at that facility; or otherwise is
relevant and necessary for the Union’s performance of its duties
as your collective-bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, as set forth at the top of this notice.
WE WILL timely furnish the Union with the information it re-
quested about our use of outsourced companies at our Auburn
Hills, Michigan headquarters facility, and about our Envi hy-
brid-vehicle program at that facility.
CHRYSLER, LLC