Christopher Armstrong et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardSep 30, 201914461587 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/461,587 08/18/2014 Christopher Armstrong 337334-US-CNT 7654 69316 7590 09/30/2019 MICROSOFT CORPORATION ONE MICROSOFT WAY REDMOND, WA 98052 EXAMINER AL HASHEMI, SANA A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2156 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/30/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): chriochs@microsoft.com usdocket@microsoft.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte CHRISTOPHER ARMSTRONG, ALAN KEISTER, LARK DUNHAM, JENNIFER GRANITO, STEVEN GREENBERG, RAKESH AGRAWAL, MICHAEL SOMMERS, and CAROL A. GLOVER ____________ Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 Technology Center 2100 ____________ Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1â20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Throughout this Decision, we use the word âAppellantâ to refer to âapplicantâ as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42 (2016). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Microsoft Technology Licensing LLC. App. Br. 3. Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Claimed Invention Appellantâs invention generally relates to âindicating recent content publication activity by a userâ in an online computer network environment. Spec. 1:10â11. According to the Specification, the context for Appellantâs invention is, for example, an instant messaging (âIMâ) environment, such as the well- known instant messaging platform historically operated by America Online (âAOLâ). See, e.g., Spec. 11:17â27, Fig. 1. In an exemplary embodiment, if a co-user engages in publication activity, âan icon indicating that [the] update took place may be displayed proximate to a screen name associated with the co-user in a list of co-users (e.g., an AOL or AIM Buddy List).â Spec. 11:21â24. By doing so, âother users in a social network may be notified of a co-userâs recent content publication activity without the co-user having to independently contact all of the users in the social network.â Spec. 11:24â27. According to the Specification, ârecent content publication activityâ includes many forms of online activity, including updating availability status, updating a user profile, adding photographs, creating a new journal or blog entry, posting a new message, etc. See, e.g., Spec. 13â 20. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal: 1. A method, comprising: accessing an online identifier for each of a plurality of co- users who populate a list, inclusion in which is directed by an online publisher; Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 3 selecting an identifier of a particular co-user from the list; and modifying an online identifier of the online publisher so as to indicate that the online publisher has recently engaged in content publication activity when a determination is made that the online publisher wants to share with the particular co-user recent content publication activity, based at least in part on a publication preference of the online publisher, and the particular co-user views either a profile of the online publisher or a feed of recent content publication activity of co-users associated with the particular co-user. App. Br. 20 (Claims Appendix). The Applied Reference The Examiner relies on the following reference as evidence of unpatentability of the claims on appeal: Sample US 2006/0230061 A1 Oct. 12, 2006 The Examinerâs Rejections The Examiner made the following rejections of the claims on appeal: Claims 1â20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being unpatentable over Sample. Final Act. 2â6. Claims 1â20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Ans. 3â8. The Examiner issued this rejection as a new ground of rejection in the Answer. Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 4 ANALYSIS2 Anticipation Rejection Appellant disputes the Examinerâs finding that Sample anticipates claims 1â20, including independent claims 1, 12, 13, 14, 18, and 19. App. Br. 12â18; Reply Br. 4â6. In particular, as to all independent claims, Appellant argues Sample does not disclose âaccessing an online identifier for each of a plurality of co-users who populate a listâ (âAccessing Limitationâ). App. Br. 16â17. As to independent claims 1, 13, 14, 18, and 19, Appellant argues Sample does not disclose âmodifying an online identifier of the online publisher so as to indicate that the online publisher has recently engaged in content publication activityâ (âModifying Limitationâ). App. Br. 17â18. Sample generally relates to âenabling a user to control a view of content recently posted [online] by a related content publisher, and enabling the content publisher to control which co-users are able to view recently published content.â Sample ¶ 2. In Sample, users of an online social network service interact via client user interface 320 shown in Figure 4, reproduced below. Sample ¶ 45. 2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered Appellantâs Appeal Brief filed September 12, 2018 (âApp. Br.â); Appellantâs Reply Brief filed August 29, 2018 (âReply Br.â); the Examinerâs Answer mailed June 29, 2018 (âAns.â); the Final Office Action mailed May 26, 2016 (âFinal Act.â); and Appellantâs Specification filed August 18, 2014 (âSpec.â). Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 5 Figure 4 of Sample shows a screen shot of client user interface 320, illustrating a sample home page with vitality section 322 for a receiving user of an online social network service. Sample ¶ 12. Vitality section 322 âdisplays the most recent posting of selected information from related co- Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 6 users.â Sample ¶ 45. âUpon logon or other event, a summary of content updates is provided to each receiving user that meets each content publisherâs required relationship.â Sample, Abstract. â[T]he content updates are delivered according to a selected delivery method from those content publishers that meet the relationship requirements of the receiving users.â Id. The means of delivering updates include âemail, instant message, RSS feeds, and the like.â Id. Accessing Limitation The Examiner finds Sample discloses different group names such as âfamilyâ and âclassmates,â and finds this corresponds to identifying a plurality of co-users in a list, and âclearly disclose[s] the relationship degree to the publisher and what kind of [information] a co-user can access.â Ans. 8â9 (citing Sample ¶¶ 54â55 (âFor desired co-users, the receiving user may specify relationship categories, such as family, classmate, fishing buddy, and the like.â), Fig. 4). The Examiner also finds Sample discloses â[a] user can control which group of co-users to access and share blogs posted by the user,â and âthe specified group of co-user[s] corresponds to [a] co-users identifier list as shown in Fig. 4, wherein âDon Donblaâ and ânealâ under [C]ontacts are the co-user[s] identifier list.â Ans. 9 (citing Sample ¶ 44 (â[A] publishing user can control which group(s) of co-users can access the publishing userâs blog.â)). The Examiner further finds these explicit disclosures in Sample describe âaccessing an online identifier for each of a plurality of co-users who populate a list,â as recited, for example, in claim 1. Appellant responds Sample does not disclose âany list populated by a plurality of co-users,â and â[a]s a result, any alleged accessing of any alleged online identifier(s) supposedly taught by Sample . . . is not âof a Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 7 plurality of co-users who populate a list.ââ App. Br. 16. Appellant further responds â[m]erely moving a member out of a contact list, for example, is not accessing âfor each of a plurality of co-users,ââ and âis not accessing any identifier,â but rather âcontrolling membership in a list is more akin to moving identifiers.â Reply Br. 6. We find Appellantâs arguments unpersuasive of Examiner error. âA patent claim is anticipated if a single prior art reference expressly or inherently discloses every limitation of the claim.â DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1252 (2014). Additionally, to anticipate, a prior art reference must disclose more than âmultiple, distinct teachings that the artisan might somehow combine to achieve the claimed invention.â Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also In re Arkley, 455 F.2d 586, 587 (CCPA 1972) (â[T]he [prior art] reference must clearly and unequivocally disclose the claimed [invention] or direct those skilled in the art to the [invention] without any need for picking, choosing, and combining various disclosures not directly related to each other by the teachings of the cited reference.â). But anticipation âis not an âipsissimis verbisâ test.â In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Here, as noted by the Examiner, Sampleâs Figure 4 discloses, inter alia, co-users âDon Donblaâ and ânealâ populating a list entitled âYahoo! 360° Friends,â and as broadly claimed, âaccessingâ each of these âonline identifiersâ or screen names at least for purposes of identifying them as part of the list, and for purposes of receiving the â[l]atest from my friends,â including both âDon Donblaâ and âneal.â See Ans. 8â9 (citing, e.g., Sample ¶¶ 44, 54â55, Fig. 4); Spec. 12:7 (âA screen name (or an identifier) is provided to identify the user.â). Appellant does not sufficiently define Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 8 âaccessing an online identifier,â other than to argue Sample does not disclose it, and does not substantively respond to the Examinerâs reliance on Figure 4, particularly the âYahoo! 360° Friendsâ listing with updates shown. See Reply Br. 6; App. Br. 16â17. Based on the foregoing, we find Appellant does not show persuasively that the Examiner erred in finding that Sample discloses âaccessing an online identifier for each of a plurality of co-users who populate a list,â as recited in claim 1. Modifying Limitation The Examiner finds Sample discloses that âco-user identifiers can be changed from the group list of recipient[s] based on the relationship degree,â and âsome names may be added or deleted from a group based on the relationship to the user.â Ans. 9. The Examiner also finds Sample discloses âthe user can control and update the receipt of a post and access to the user posts.â Ans. 9â10. The Examiner further finds these explicit disclosures in Sample describe âmodifying an online identifier of the online publisher so as to indicate that the online publisher has recently engaged in content publication activity,â as recited, for example, in claim 1. Appellant responds that in Sample âno alleged online identifier (or an alleged online identifier from the claimed list) changes,â rather âânotifications about new information posted by usersâ are presented.â App. Br. 18 (âNo alleged online identifier is modified in the vitality module 322.â). Appellant also responds that adding or removing names from a contact list âis neither âmodifying an online identifierâ nor â. . . so as to indicate that an online publisher has recently engaged in content publication activity,ââ and argues âthis alleged disclosure does not render the subject Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 9 features of independent claims 1, 12, 13, 14, 18, and 19 obvious [sic: anticipated].â We find Appellantâs arguments persuasive. Here, the Examiner does not provide sufficient evidence or technical reasoning to show Sample expressly or inherently discloses âmodifying an online identifier of the online publisher so as to indicate that the online publisher has recently engaged in content publication activity.â Indeed, the Examiner makes no express findings as to how Sampleâs modifying (adding or removing) identifiers in a list discloses modifying such identifiers so as to indicate recent content publication activity, and to the extent that the Examiner affords no weight to the âindicatingâ limitation, the Examiner also makes no express statements in this regard. Accordingly, constrained by the record before us,3 we do not sustain the Examinerâs rejection under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) of independent claim 1. Additionally, we do not sustain the Examinerâs rejection under pre- AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) of claim 20, which depends therefrom. For similar reasons, we do not sustain the Examinerâs rejections under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) of independent claims 12,4 13, 14, 18, and 19, which 3 Sample shows in Figure 4 the â[l]atest from my friends,â including a blog post snippet shown adjacent to user âDonâ and another blog post snippet shown adjacent user âneal,â both of which users are shown in an adjacent contact list. Figure 4 also shows these users with emoji or emoticons adjacent their usernames. Because the Examinerâs art rejection is based only on anticipation, we do not opine herein on whether these or other features in Sample would teach or at least fairly suggest (render obvious) any of claims 1â20. Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See MPEP § 1213.02. 4 In the Final Action, the Examiner noted âClaim 12 which is an independent claim was not amended the same way all other independent Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 10 recite commensurate limitations, and claims 2â11 and 15â17, which depend therefrom. Section 101 Rejection Appellant disputes the Examinerâs conclusion that the pending claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Reply Br. 2â4. In particular, Appellant argues the claims âencompass a specific solution to an Internet- centric problem relating to online publishing amongst friends and contacts,â and the claimed invention âis a solution to a âchallenge particular to the Internetâ, which has been found both not abstract and patent eligible.â Reply Br. 2 (citing DDR Holdings). Appellant also argues the Examiner oversimplifies the claims by concluding the steps of accessing an online identifier, selecting an identifier, and modifying an online identifier to indicate recent content publication activity (a) constitute an ââabstract idea of displaying an indication of published content based upon a distribution list,ââ and (b) amount to merely âcollect[ing] information, analyz[ing] that information, and display[ing] it.â Reply Br. 3; see Ans. 4. Rather, Appellant asserts the Examiner ignores âthe expressly recited features of claims were,â but nevertheless proceeded to reject claim 12 as part of an omnibus rejection of all independent claims. Final Act. 2â3, 6. Appellant notes that claim 12 recites âmodifying the selected identifier,â whereas claim 1 recites âmodifying an online identifier,â and argues the Examiner erred by not addressing this different language, but Appellant stops short of explaining any alleged difference. App. Br. 14â15; Reply Br. 4â6. However, in the Reply Brief, Appellant also argues Sample does not disclose âmodifying an online identifier,â and thus Sample does not anticipate any of the independent claims, including claim 12. See Reply Br. 6. Nevertheless, given we do not sustain the Examinerâs § 102(e) rejection of any claim based on the present record, we find the Examinerâs treatment of claim 12 harmless and moot. Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 11 modifying online identifiers based on two conditions precedent.â Reply Br. 3. We find Appellantâs arguments unpersuasive. The Supreme Courtâs two-step framework guides our analysis of patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Intâl, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014). In addition, the Office recently published revised guidance for evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, specifically with respect to applying the Alice framework. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (âOffice Guidanceâ). If a claim falls within one of the statutory categories of patent eligibility (i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter) then the first inquiry is whether the claim is directed to one of the judicially recognized exceptions (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea). Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. As part of this inquiry, we must âlook at the âfocus of the claimed advance over the prior artâ to determine if the claimâs âcharacter as a wholeâ is directed to excluded subject matter.â Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Per Office Guidance, this first inquiry has two prongs of analysis (i) does the claim recite a judicial exception (e.g., an abstract idea), and (ii) if so, is the judicial exception integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Under the Office Guidance, if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, see infra, the claim is patent eligible under § 101. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54â55. If the claim is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., recites a judicial exception and does not integrate the exception into a practical application), the next step is to determine whether any element, or combination of elements, amounts to Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 12 significantly more than the judicial exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, we conclude Appellantâs claims recite an abstract idea because they recite mental processes. If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers performance in the mind but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it is still in the mental processes category unless the claim cannot practically be performed in the mind. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (â[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.â); see also CyberSource Corp., 654 F.3d at 1375, 1372 (holding that the incidental use of âcomputerâ or âcomputer readable mediumâ does not make a claim otherwise directed to process that âcan be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paperâ patent eligible); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012) (explaining mental processes are not patentable); 84 Fed. Reg. at 52â53 nn.14â15. More specifically, Appellantâs claims generally are directed to determining recent content publication activity of publishers in the context of user-publishers in an Internet or online environment. This is consistent with how Appellant describes the claimed invention. See Spec. 1:10â11 (âThis application relates to indicating recent content publication activity by a user.â); see also, e.g., Spec. 1:20â21 (describing principle of invention as ârecent content publication activity by a publishing online identity is indicatedâ); Spec. 8:7â8 (describing performing the step of â[d]etermining that the publishing online identity has engaged in recent content publication Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 13 activityâ). Consistent with our Guidance and case law, we conclude that determining recent content publication activity of publishers is a mental process, namely, an observation, evaluation, and judgment, and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52; Content Extraction & Transmission v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that a concept that can be performed in the human mind like â1) collecting data, 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memoryâ is an abstract idea); see also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353â54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that âanalyzing information by steps people go through in their mindsâ is a mental process within the abstract idea category and concluding claims directed to âcollecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysisâ were abstract); accord In re BRCA1 & BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 763 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (concluding that the concept of âcomparing BRCA sequences and determining the existence of alterations,â like comparing past and recent profiles or postings and determining the existence of recent activity or alternations, is an âabstract mental processâ). Claim 1 is reproduced below with the claim limitations that recite determining recent content publication activity of publishers in the context of user-publishers in an Internet or online environment in italics: 1. A method, comprising: accessing an online identifier for each of a plurality of co- users who populate a list, inclusion in which is directed by an online publisher; selecting an identifier of a particular co-user from the list; and Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 14 modifying an online identifier of the online publisher so as to indicate that the online publisher has recently engaged in content publication activity when a determination is made that the online publisher wants to share with the particular co-user recent content publication activity, based at least in part on a publication preference of the online publisher, and the particular co-user views either a profile of the online publisher or a feed of recent content publication activity of co-users associated with the particular co-user. App. Br. 20 (Claims Appendix). More particularly, the concept of determining recent content publication activity of publishers in the context of user-publishers in an Internet or online environment comprises (i) identifying co-users (i.e., the claimed step of âaccessing an online identifier for each of a plurality of co- users who populate a list, inclusion in which is directed by an online publisherâ); (ii) selecting a co-user (i.e., the claimed steps of âselecting an identifier of a particular co-user from the listâ and âwhenâ condition of âview[ing] either a profile of the online publisher or a feed of recent content publication activity of co-users associated with the particular co-userâ); (iii) determining whether a co-user-publisher wants to share recent content publication activity with other co-users (i.e., the claimed âwhenâ condition of âa determination is made that the online publisher wants to share with the particular co-user recent content publication activity, based at least in part on a publication preference of the online publisherâ); and (iv) determining whether a co-user-publisher has recent content publication activity (i.e., the claimed step of âindicat[ing] that the online publisher has recently engaged in content publication activityâ embedded within the step of modifying an online identifier). Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 15 Because the claim recites a judicial exception, we next determine whether the claim integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, we identify whether there are âany additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)â and evaluate those elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 54â55 (emphasis added); see also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (âMPEPâ) § 2106.05(a)â(c), (e)â(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018). Here, we find the additional limitation(s) do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. More particularly, the claims do not recite (i) an improvement to the functionality of a computer or other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)); (ii) a âparticular machineâ to apply or use the judicial exception (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)); (iii) a particular transformation of an article to a different thing or state (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)); or (iv) any other meaningful limitation (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)). See 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. Rather, the step of presenting the results of determining recent content publication activity of publishers, namely, âmodifying an online identifier of the online publisherâ to indicate such activity, is the type of extra-solution activities (i.e., in addition to the judicial exception) the courts have determined insufficient to transform judicially excepted subject matter into a patent-eligible application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); see Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355 (explaining that âselecting information, by content or source, for collection analysis, and display does nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental processesâ); Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354 (recognizing Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 16 âthat merely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysisâ); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Can., 771 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1065 (E.D. Mo. 2011) affâd, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that âstoring, retrieving, and providing data . . . are inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post solution activityâ). Contrary to Appellantâs arguments (see, e.g., Reply Br. 2), the claims are not directed to a technological improvement. Although Appellant characterizes the claimed invention as âa specific solution to an Internet- centric problem relating to online publishing amongst friends and contacts,â Appellant does not identify the technological âproblemâ being solved. See Reply Br. 2â4. The purported improvement or âspecific solutionâ (determining and indicating recent content publication activity of publishers), however, relates to the abstract idea, and does not improve a computer, technology, or a technical field. See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (âWe . . . look to whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.â) (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Further, Appellant does not explain how the âonlineâ interactions with the Internet recited in claim 1, for example, are not merely the routine or conventional use of the Internet. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258â59 (âWe caution, however, that not all Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 17 claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.â). For at least the foregoing reasons, the claims do not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Because we determine the claims are directed to an abstract idea or combination of abstract ideas, we analyze the claims under step two of Alice to determine if there are additional limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure the claims amount to âsignificantly moreâ than the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217â18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72â 73, 77â79). As stated in the Office Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to âsignificantly moreâ under step two of the Alice framework are already considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Thus, at this point of our analysis, we determine if the claims add a specific limitation, or combination of limitations, that is not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities at a high level of generality. 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. Here, Appellantâs claims do not recite specific limitations (or a combination of limitations) that are not well-understood, routine, and conventional. Accessing, selecting, determining, modifying, and displaying data as in claim 1, for example, merely requires the well-understood function of a computer/computer network. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (âThat a computer receives and sends the information over a networkâwith no further specificationâis not even arguably inventive.â). In addition, we note Appellant describes the Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 18 components of the claimed invention at a high level of generality and the components perform generic functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. See, e.g., Spec. 27:19â23 (âEach of the client 1110 and the host 1130 may be implemented by, for example, a general-purpose computer capable of responding to and executing instructions in a defined manner . . . [or] other equipment or some combination thereof capable of responding to and executing instructions.â), Fig. 11. Additionally, to the extent Appellant contends the claims do not seek to tie-up (i.e., preempt) an abstract idea (see Reply Br. 2), we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. ââ[W]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.ââ FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362â63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (â[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.â). Further, â[w]here a patentâs claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.â Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379. For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examinerâs rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Further, we sustain the Examinerâs rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 2â20, which were not argued separately. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Appeal 2018-008683 Application 14/461,587 19 CONCLUSION Claims Rejected Basis Affirmed Reversed 1â20 35 U.S.C. § 102, Sample 1â20 1â20 35 U.S.C. § 101 1â20 Overall Outcome 1â20 Because we affirm at least one ground of rejection with respect to each claim on appeal, the Examinerâs decision rejecting claims 1â20 is affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation