Christine Schmidt, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 3, 2001
01A10581 (E.E.O.C. May. 3, 2001)

01A10581

05-03-2001

Christine Schmidt, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Christine Schmidt v. United States Postal Service

01A10581

May 3, 2001

.

Christine Schmidt,

Complainant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A10581

Agency No. 4-J-480-0056-98

Hearing No. 230-99-4166

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency action

concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant

alleges she was discriminated against on the bases of race (white), sex

(female), disability (perceived), and reprisal (prior EEO activity)<1>

when she was denied her request for reinstatement. For the following

reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND the agency's final action.

The record reveals that Complainant was employed at the agency's Royal

Oak General Mail facility in April 1985. In April 1992, complainant

transferred to the Marine City Post Office pursuant to a settlement

agreement resolving an EEO complaint she filed against individuals

within the Royal Oak General Mail facility. In September 1992, she

resigned from the agency due to the needs of her business. On August

12, 1994, April 4, 1996, June 3, 1996, and March 17, 1997, complainant

requested to be reinstated with the agency at the Royal Oak General

Mail facility. On March 20, 1997, the agency notified her that it had

reviewed her paperwork and denied her request for reinstatement due to

her attendance record. Report of Investigation, p. 62. On November

1, 1997, complainant notified the agency again that she wished to be

reinstated and that she believed her prior denial was in retaliation

of her prior EEO activity. On November 17, 1997, the agency denied her

request citing her unacceptable attendance record as the basis for the

denial. Complainant informed the agency by letter dated November 30,

1997, that her use of sick leave was based upon a �work incurred back

injury that [she] no longer suffered from.� Report of Investigation,

p. 66. The agency responded by noting that her attendance record

included her pattern of sick leave use, tardiness, and lost work days

due to suspensions. Again, the agency determined that complainant was

not the best qualified candidate and denied her request for reinstatement.

Believing she was a victim of discrimination, complainant sought EEO

counseling and, subsequently, filed a formal complaint on April 18, 1998.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided a

copy of the investigative file and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie

case of race and sex discrimination and retaliation. The AJ also

concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of

disability discrimination. The AJ found, in viewing the record in the

light most favorable for complainant, that she failed to show that she

was a qualified individual with a disability. Specifically, the AJ noted

that complainant did not demonstrate that she suffers from an impairment

which substantially limits one or more major life activities or that

the agency perceived her as having such an impairment. Accordingly,

the AJ determined that complainant is not afforded any protection from

the Rehabilitation Act.

Assuming arguendo that complainant established her prima facie cases, the

AJ then concluded that the agency proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for denying her request, namely, because of complainant's poor

attendance. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ noted that complainant

was disciplined on several occasions for poor attendance and that the

agency relied upon this information in reaching its decision to deny

her request for reinstatement. The AJ also concluded that complainant

failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that she was

discriminated against under any of her alleged bases.

The agency's final action implemented the AJ's decision. Complainant

made no new contentions on appeal. The agency stands on the record and

requests that we affirm its final action implementing the AJ's decision.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without

a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of

material fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment

procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where

a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary

standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment a court does not

sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non moving party must

be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences

must be drawn in the non moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of

fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder

could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103,

105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to

affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by

weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.

In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ

may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that

the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

The courts have been clear that summary judgment is not to be used as

a "trial by affidavit." Redmand v. Warrener, 516 F.2d 766, 768 (1st

Cir. 1975). The Commission has noted that when a party submits an

affidavit and credibility is at issue, "there is a need for strident

cross-examination and summary judgment on such evidence is improper."

Pedersen v. Department of Justice, EEOC Request No. 05940339 (February

24, 1995).

After a careful review of the record, we find that the AJ erred when he

concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact in this case.

In finding no discrimination, the AJ relied on the representations

of management officials as provided in their affidavits. The agency

officials stated that they relied upon complainant's poor attendance

record when they denied her request for reinstatement. Complainant

averred that the reasoning provided by the agency was pretextual.

In particular, complainant argued that the recommending officials (RO1 and

RO2) acted based on her prior EEO activity, a perceived disability, her

race, and her sex. Although RO1 and RO2 denied such claims, an evaluation

of complainant's request for reinstatement by RO1 appears contradictory.

In his evaluation, RO1 noted that complainant had unacceptable attendance

record, sustained carpal tunnel, and was involved in an EEO settlement.

Report of Investigation, p. 361. RO2's evaluation also contained similar

inconsistencies. In particular, RO2 noted on her evaluation form that

complainant had shoulder and lower back injuries and tendinitis in

both of her wrists. Report of Investigation, p. 356. Furthermore,

complainant contended that the disciplinary actions based on her

attendance record were removed from her file and, therefore, should not

have been considered. Report of Investigation, pp. 37 and 42. Finally,

complainant argued that her alleged attendance problems were due to an

injury she sustained. She stated that she was no longer injured and,

therefore, not expected to continue having leave problems. Based upon

a review of the record, the Commission finds that these inconsistencies

between the agency's reasons and complainant's contentions have not

been resolved.

We note that the hearing process is intended to be an extension of the

investigative process, designed to �ensure that the parties have a fair

and reasonable opportunity to explain and supplement the record and to

examine and cross-examine witnesses.� See EEOC Management Directive

(MD) 110, as revised, November 9, 1999, Chapter 6, page 6-1; see also

29 C.F.R. �� 1614.109(c) and (d). �Truncation of this process, while

material facts are still in dispute and the credibility of witnesses is

still ripe for challenge, improperly deprives complainant of a full and

fair investigation of her claims.� Mi S. Bang v. United States Postal

Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01961575 (March 26, 1998). See also Peavley

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950628 (October

31, 1996); Chronister v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05940578 (April 23, 1995). In summary, there are simply too many

unresolved issues which require an assessment as to the credibility of

the various management officials, co-workers, and complainant, herself.

Therefore, judgment as a matter of law for the agency should not have

been granted.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

arguments on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically discussed in this decision, the Commission REVERSES the

agency's final action and REMANDS the matter to the agency in accordance

with this decision and the ORDER below.

ORDER

The agency shall submit to the Hearings Unit of the appropriate EEOC field

office the request for a hearing within fifteen (15) calendar days of

the date this decision becomes final. The agency is directed to submit a

copy of the complaint file to the EEOC Hearings Unit within fifteen (15)

calendar days of the date this decision becomes final. The agency shall

provide written notification to the Compliance Officer at the address set

forth below that the request and complaint file have been transmitted

to the Hearings Unit. Thereafter, the Administrative Judge shall issue

a decision on the complaint in accordance with the regulation set forth

at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109 and the agency shall issue a final action in

accordance with the regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0900)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order

prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29

C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively,

the complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action

for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject

to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. � 2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the

complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0900)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 3, 2001

__________________

Date

1The record indicates that complainant filed two prior EEO complaints,

Agency Nos. 4-B-1131-91 and 4-B-1163-92.