CHOI, Seong Hyeog et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 17, 2020

13778396 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 17, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/778,396 02/27/2013 Seong Hyeog CHOI Q141563 7554
23373 7590 01/17/2020
SUGHRUE MION, PLLC
2000 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
SUITE 900
WASHINGTON, DC 20006
EXAMINER
YEW, CHIE W
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2131
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/17/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PPROCESSING@SUGHRUE.COM
USPTO@sughrue.com
sughrue@sughrue.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte SEONG HYEOG CHOI, JUN JIN KONG, JIN YEONG KIM,
HONG RAK SON, and YU HUN JEON1
____________________

Appeal 2019-001228
Application 13/778,396
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 through 13, 15, 16, and 18 through 20. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). According to Appellant, Samsung Electronics is the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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INVENTION
The invention is directed to a method for use with a memory
controller which includes storing a plurality of random sequences. The
method involves, selecting at least one random sequence among the plurality
of random sequences according to a data pattern of a data block, and
performing a conversion, using the selected at least one random sequence, to
at least one of randomizing the data block and derandomizing the
randomized data block using the selected at least one random sequence.
Spec., Abstract. Claim 1 is reproduced below.
1. A memory controller comprising:
a memory configured to store a plurality of random
sequences; and
a first converter configured to receive a data block
including first data, second data, and third data separate from
the second data, select random sequences according to a data
pattern of the data block, the selected random sequences being a
part of the plurality of random sequences and comprising a first
random sequence, a second random sequence and a third
random sequence, and perform at least one of randomizing the
data block using the selected random sequences and
derandomizing the randomized data block using the selected
random sequences,
wherein the first converter is configured to select the first
random sequence, the second random sequence, and the third
random sequence, according to the data pattern of the data
block, the data pattern indicating that the first data, on which a
single logical operation is performed by using the first random
sequence, is to be randomized, the second data, on which the
single logical operation is performed, together with the single
logical operation on the first random sequence, by using the
second random sequence, is not to be randomized, and the third
data, on which the single logical operation is performed,
together with the single logical operation on the first random
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sequence, by using the third random sequence, is not to be
randomized.

EXAMINER’S REJECTIONS2
The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 13, 15, 16, and 18 through 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Final Act. 8–12.
The Examiner rejected claims 7 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as
lacking written description. Final Act. 4.3
The Examiner rejected claims 1 through 13, 15, 16, and 18 through 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being indefinite. Final Act. 6–8.

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
We have reviewed Appellant’s arguments in the Briefs, the
Examiner’s rejections, and the Examiner’s response to Appellant’s
arguments. Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner’s rejection for the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Patent eligibility
under § 101 is a question of law that may contain underlying issues of fact.
Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 896 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). “We

2 Throughout this Decision we refer to the Appeal Brief filed July 20, 2018
(“Appeal Br.”); Reply Brief filed November 5, 2018 (“Reply Br.”); Final
Office Action mailed February 9, 2018 (“Final Act.”); and the Examiner’s
Answer mailed September 4, 2018 (“Ans.”)
3 The Examiner withdrew the written description rejection of claims 1, 10
and 12. Answer 12.
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review the district court’s ultimate conclusion on patent eligibility de novo.”
Id.; SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an
issue of law that we review de novo.”)

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims
before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use
of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”)
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Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
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If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office “USPTO” published
revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Memorandum”). Under that guidance, we first determine whether the
claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
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(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum.
DISCUSSION
The Judicial Exception
The Examiner determines the claims are not patent eligible because
they are directed to a judicial exception without reciting significantly more.
Final Act. 8–10. Specifically, the Examiner determines the claims recite
“steps [that] correspond to the concept of encoding and decoding image
data, which corresponds to concepts identified as an abstract idea[] by the
Courts.” Final Act. 9 (citing RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d
1322, (Fed. Cir. 2017)).
Appellant argues the claims are directed to randomizing and/or
derandomizing a data block which is not a mathematical relationship.
Appeal Br. 8–9. Further, Appellant acknowledges that the Examiner has
equated the concepts in the claims to those considered abstract in
RecogniCorp, and states that the claims are different as they represent an
improvement in existing memory controllers and methods. Appeal Br. 10,
16–19.
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection by these
arguments, and we concur with the Examiner that representative claim 1 sets
forth an abstract concept, a mathematical concept and a mental process.
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Representative claim 1 recites “receive a data block” (a data gathering or
observation element) and “select[ing a] random sequence[] according to a
data pattern of the data block” (both a data gathering and data
analysis/organization or evaluation element). These are steps of a mental
process. The claim further recites “randomizing the data block” or
“derandomizing the randomized data block.” Representative claim 1 recites
“the first data, on which a single logical operation is performed by using the
first random sequence, is to be randomized” and recites similar steps for
derandomizing. Appellant’s Specifications identifies the logical operation as
an XOR. Specification ¶ 14. We consider these steps to be similar to those
considered by the courts to be abstract mathematical concepts. See Digitech
Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (which held that “a process of taking two data sets and combining
them into a single data set” is “an ineligible abstract process of gathering and
combining data.”). Thus we consider representative claim 1 to recite
elements of two abstract ideas a mental process and a mathematical concept.
Merely combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination
any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea .
. . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC
v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining
the pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). Thus,
we conclude representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea.

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Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Appellant argues that the claim improves an existing technological
problem as it solves a problem in conventional industry practice. Appeal Br.
10–12 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016) and Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2016)). Appellant cites a published US patent application to Sharon as
describing a technological problem with memory deriving from a specific
source of error called “Program Disturb” or PD and randomizing the data
suppresses errors in nonvolatile flash memory. Appeal Br. 12–13 (citing
Sharon US 2008/0215798, ¶¶ 19, 20, 21, and 24), Reply Br. 3–4 (citing
Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed.
Cir. 2018)). Appellant argues that the randomization of metadata can cause
technical problems such as degradation in system performance. Appeal Br.
14, Reply Br. 6 –7. Thus, Appellant argues that the claimed invention in
which metadata can be partially randomized, increases data reliability.
Appeal Br. 14–15 (citing Specification ¶¶ 78, 79).
The Examiner finds that the additional claim limitations do not recite
an improvement to a technical field or a technology. Ans. 13. The
Examiner states:
In Enfish, the Federal Circuit noted that “the claims are directed
to an improvement of an existing technology is bolstered by the
specification’s teachings that the claimed invention achieves
over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster
search times, and smaller memory requirements”. In contrast to
Enfish, Appellant’s disclosure does not appear to disclose a
technological problem in the conventional industry practice
which is further evidenced by Appellant’s reliance on prior art
Sharon to identify a technological problem in conventional
industry.
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Ans. 13 (emphasis omitted). Further, the Examiner identifies that the claims
do not recite randomizing or derandomizing metadata and as such
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive as they are cot commensurate with
the claims. Ans. 14 (citing Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839
F.3d 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Similarly, the Examiner identifies that
Appellant’s arguments directed to enhancing reliability by reducing errors
due to phenomena such as Program Disturb, are not persuasive as
Appellant’s disclosure does not discuss this phenomena. Ans. 14–16.
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s arguments. As
discussed above, we concur with the Examiner that the claim recites an
abstract idea. Further, we do not consider the claim to be drawn to a
practical application of the abstract idea as we do not find that the claim
recites an improvement to the functioning of the computer or other
technology or otherwise tied to technology.
We are not persuaded of error by Appellant’s argument that the claims
recite an improvement to a technology. As identified by the Examiner
representative claim 1 does not recite partially randomizing metadata or
randomizing/derandomizing metadata separately, as discussed in paragraph
79 of Appellant’s Specification. Rather, representative claim 1 just recites a
data block including first, second and third data. Thus, Appellant’s
arguments are not commensurate with the scope of the claim. We are not
persuaded that Sharon demonstrates that the claimed randomizing recites an
improvement in technology. Sharon, discusses that the PD is a source of
error in flash memory type devices, specifically, floating gate flash memory
and reduces the probability of error by making sure that data written to the
memory is pseudorandom. Sharon ¶¶ 9, 10, 11 and 63. As identified by the
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Examiner, Appellant’s Specification makes no mention of PD. Ans. 14–16.
Further, we note that Appellant’s Specification identifies that the invention
may be implemented on any type of memory, i.e., it is not limited to flash
memory, and thus we do not see a nexus with the teachings of Sharon. See
Specification ¶ 38. Additionally, we note that Appellant’s Specification
identifies that a problem with randomization/derandomization being
performed without consideration of a change in firmware in the data storage
system.4 This problem is neither related to the teachings of Sharon (thus
further supporting the lack of a nexus to Sharon), nor is it related to the
claims (i.e., there is no discussion of firmware configuration change in
representative claim 1).
As such, we do not consider representative claim 1, to recite an
improvement to a technical field or a technology. But rather, when
interpreted in light of the Specification, merely recites use of a computer as a
tool to implement a mental process and mathematical concepts (an abstract
idea). See, e.g., RecogniCorp, 855 F.3d at 1327 (“Unlike Enfish, [the claim]
does not claim a software method that improves the functioning of a
computer . . . [but] claims a ‘process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for
which computers are invoked merely as a tool.’”) (Citation omitted). Thus,
we conclude representative claim 1 does not recite a practical application of
the judicial exception.

4 The Specification merely identifies this as a problem without identifying
how the inventor addresses the problem.
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Significantly More than the Abstract Idea
Under the Memorandum, only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial
exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Representative claim 1 recites the additional elements of a memory to
store sequences, a converter to receive data, select data and perform a logical
operation. The Examiner has found, that these elements do not amount to
significantly more and are merely well-understood, routine and conventional
activities. Final Act. 10–11.
Appellant contends that the “claimed memory controllers and method
are not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity.” Appeal Br. 20
(citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).
We concur with the Examiner. As discussed above Appellant’s
Specification does not identify a particular type of memory. Further, the
Sharon reference, cited by Appellant, further demonstrates that it is known
that memory stores data and that memory controllers can be used to
randomize data stored. See Sharon paragraph 34. Thus, we find ample
evidence to support the Examiner’s finding that the elements of the claim, in
addition to the abstract concept, represent well-understood, routine and
conventional activities.
In summary, Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us of error
in the Examiner’s determination that representative claim 1 is directed to an
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abstract idea; both a mental process and a mathematical concept. Further,
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us that the Examiner erred in
finding that the claim is not: directed to an improvement in the functioning
of the computer or to other technology or other technical field; directed to a
particular machine; directed to performing or affecting a transformation of
an article to a different state or thing; directed to using a judicial exception
in some meaningful way beyond linking the exception to a particular
technological environment such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort to monopolize the judicial exception. For these reasons, we
are unpersuaded that the claim recites additional elements that integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application. See Memorandum, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection, under 35
U.S.C. § 101, of representative claim 1 and claims 2 through 13, 15, 16, and
18 through 20 grouped with claim 1.

35 U.S.C. § 112(a) Rejection
The Examiner rejects claims 7 and 18 as the limitation of
“randomizing the first attribute data using the selected random sequences
and derandomizing the randomized first attribute data using the selected
random sequences” is not supported in the Specification. Final Act. 4. The
Examiner interprets the limitation as using the same selected random
sequences for the first data, second data, third data and first attribute data.
Final Act. 5.
Appellant argues that the rejection is in error as the Specification
provides support for the limitation. Reply Br. 8, citing Fig. 4 and Spec. ¶ 59.
We concur with Appellant and are persuaded of error in the
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Examiner’s rejection based upon 35 U.S.C. § 112. The written-description
requirement serves “to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the
filing date of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later
claimed by him; how the specification accomplishes this is not material.” In
re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 (CCPA 1976). We have reviewed
Appellant’s originally filed Specification and note that the originally filed
claims 7 and 18, include the disputed limitation. Thus, we find that the
originally filed Specification demonstrates that Appellant possessed the
invention as recited in claims 7 and 18 on the filing date of the application.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7 and 18
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking written description

35 U.S.C. § 112(b) Rejection
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 10 and 12 as the limitation of “at least
one of randomizing the data block using the selected random sequences and
derandomizing the randomized data block using the selected random
sequences” as indefinite in the context of the claim. Final Act. 6. The
Examiner states that this is interpreted as meaning the entire data block is
randomized, and since the second and third data are part of the same data
block it is unclear how the second a third data are both randomized and not
randomized. Final Act. 6.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection is in error as it “is well-
known in the art, and that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand
that the term ‘at least one of A and B’ encompasses A, B, or both A and B.
The Examiner improperly parsed the phrase and argues ‘at least’ modifies
‘data block.’” Appeal Br. 28, Reply Br. 8.
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We concur with the Examiner. Appellant’s argument misses the point
raised by the Examiner. The issue is not whether “at least one” of modifies
the “data block.” The Examiner’s rejection is based upon the claims’
recitation of randomizing the block, meaning the entire block is randomized.
The claim recites that the data block includes first, second and third data.
The claim further, recites that the first data is subjected to a logical operation
to be randomized, but that the second and third data are subject to a logical
operation but are not randomized. Thus, the claim recites that part of the
data block (the first data) is randomized and other parts of the data block are
not randomized ( the second and third data). This is in direct contradiction
to the limitation that the data block is at least one of randomized and
derandomized. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s indefiniteness
rejection of independent claims 1, 10, and 12 and the claims which depend
thereupon.
The Examiner additionally rejects claims 2 and 13 as the limitation of
selecting the random sequences based upon shifting the random sequences
by bit size corresponding to a command execution unit, is indefinite. Final
Act. 7. The Examiner notes that the claims from which claims 2 and 13
depend, claims 1 and 12, recite that the sequence is determined according to
the data pattern of the data block and thus there are two competing methods
to determine the random sequence. Final Act. 7.
Appellant argues that the claims 2 and 13, recitation of selecting the
random sequences further modifies the selection of random sequences
recited in independent claims 1 and 12. Reply Br. 9. Appellant states
claims 2 and 13 are intended to mean that the selected random
sequences according to a data pattern of the consecutive data
block are based on shifting the plurality of random sequences
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by a bit size corresponding to a command execution unit of a
command received from a processing unit.
Reply Br. 9.
We concur with the Appellant’s proffered interpretation of the claims.
The Examiner has not shown that the limitations of claims 2 and 13 conflict
with claims 1 and 12. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
additional rejection of claims 2 and 13 based upon the reasoning set forth on
page 7 of the Final Action.
The Examiner additionally rejects claims 5 and 19 as the limitation of
a command according to which the random sequences are to be selected as
indefinite. Final Act. 7–8. The Examiner notes that the claims from which
claims 2 and 13 depend, claims 1 and 12, recite that the sequence is
determined according to the data pattern of the data block and thus there are
two competing methods to determine the random sequence. Final Act. 7–8.
Appellant argues:
There is no conflict between “a first command, received from a
host, according to which the random sequences are selected”
and “select random sequences according to a data pattern of the
data block.” That is, the random sequences can be selected
according to a data pattern of the data block and also according
to a first command received from a host.
Reply Br. 9.
We concur with the Appellant’s proffered interpretation of the claim.
The Examiner has not shown that the limitations of claims 5 and 19 conflict
with claims 1 and 12. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
additional rejection of claims 5 and 19 based upon the reasoning set forth on
pages 7–8 of the Final Action.

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1–13, 15,
16, 18–
20
101 Eligibility 1–13, 15, 16, 18–20
7, 18 112(a) Written
Description
7, 18
1–13, 15,
16, 18–
20
112(b) Indefiniteness 1–13, 15, 16, 18–20
Overall
Outcome
1–13, 15, 16, 18–20

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED