Charlotte M. Pelleher, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 29, 1999
01971522 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 29, 1999)

01971522

04-29-1999

Charlotte M. Pelleher, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region), Agency.


Charlotte M. Pelleher, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01971522

) Agency No. 1C-451-1142-96

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region), )

Agency. )

___________________________________)

DECISION

Appellant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from a final agency

decision concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. This appeal is accepted in accordance with

EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the following reasons, the agency's final

decision is AFFIRMED.

During the period in question, appellant was employed as a Supervisor in

Distribution Operations at the agency's bulk mail center in Cincinnati,

Ohio. Appellant alleges that she was discriminated against on the bases

of sex (female) and in reprisal for testifying in another EEO case when

on April 11, 1996, she was denied leave.

On June 7, 1996, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint alleging that

the agency had discriminated against her as referenced above. The

agency accepted appellant's complaint and conducted an investigation.

Following the agency's investigation, appellant was issued a copy of

the investigative report and informed of her right to request a hearing

before an EEOC Administrative Judge or a final agency decision on

the record. Appellant received notice of her rights on September 18,

1996, but failed to request a hearing within the 30-day time period.

Thereafter, and in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110, the agency

issued a final decision finding no discrimination.

In its final decision, the agency found that appellant failed to

establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination because she was

unable to demonstrate that she had been treated differently than a

comparative employee in a similar situation. Specifically, the agency

found that the comparative employee identified by appellant reported

to a different manager and was thus not similarly situated to her.

The agency also concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima

facie case of retaliation, noting that she failed to submit evidence

of her alleged prior EEO participation or that her managers were aware

of her alleged prior EEO participation. Moreover, appellant could not

therefore demonstrate a causal connection between her alleged prior EEO

participation and the denial of her leave

Assuming, arguendo, appellant had established a prima facie case of

discrimination on all bases, the agency concluded that management

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Specifically, the agency explained that when a supervisor, like appellant,

requests leave, she asks the supervisor with whom she is partnered to

cover for her, and if the partner agrees, the leave is granted by the

manager. The agency stated that appellant was denied leave on April

11, 1996 because her partner could not cover for her and because she

was needed for service. As appellant was unable to show that other

supervisors under her manager's authority were allowed to leave under

similar circumstances, the agency concluded that appellant failed to

establish pretext. Thus, the agency determined that appellant failed

to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was a victim of

intentional discrimination.

After a careful review of the record,<1> and applying the legal standards

outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc.,

425 F. Supp 318 (D. Mass) aff'd 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying

McDonnell Douglas to retaliation cases), the Commission agrees with

the agency that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of

intentional discrimination.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the agency's final decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT

IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT

HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

April 29, 1999 ____________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director 1 We note

that neither party submitted a statement on appeal.