Charles T. Jordan, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 4, 2002
01A22072_r (E.E.O.C. Sep. 4, 2002)

01A22072_r

09-04-2002

Charles T. Jordan, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Charles T. Jordan v. United States Postal Service

01A22072

September 4, 2002

.

Charles T. Jordan,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A22072

Agency No. 4-J-604-0176-00

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.405, the Commission accepts the complainant's

appeal from the agency's final order in the above-entitled matter.

Complainant filed a complaint in which he claimed that the agency

discriminated against him on the bases of his sex (male), age (52), race

(Black), and color (brown) when approval of his request for reassignment

was unreasonably delayed.

The agency investigated the complaint and thereafter referred the matter

to an Administrative Judge (AJ), pursuant to complainant's request for

a hearing. On December 10, 2001, complainant rescinded his request for a

hearing and instead requested an agency decision without a hearing. The

agency issued a decision finding that complainant failed to establish

a prima facie case of race, color, sex, and age discrimination. It is

from this final order that complainant now appeals.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). To ultimately

prevail, complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the agency's explanation is pretextual. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

This order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step

normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case,

need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue,

the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the

McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant

has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions

were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal Service Board of

Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department

of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900150 (June 28, 1990).

Assuming arguendo, that complainant established a prima facie case of

race, color, age, and sex discrimination, we shall examine the reasons

articulated by the agency for the delay in complainant's reassignment.

The agency stated that complainant requested a reassignment on July

1, 2000, to another facility as a full-time custodian. The agency

noted that there is a one-year service requirement for reassignment to

another facility and that complainant began working on August 1, 1999.

According to the agency, complainant's request for reassignment was

approved on September 13, 2000, with a starting date of September 23,

2000. The agency stated that Personnel Services subsequently notified

the Postmaster of complainant's facility on September 18, 2000, that

the desired release date for complainant's reassignment was October

7, 2000. According to the Postmaster, he suggested to complainant that

his release date be revised to November 4, 2000, because complainant was

in the midst of a project that both he and complainant expected would

take an additional thirty days to complete. The Postmaster stated that

complainant agreed to this request. According to the agency, complainant

was notified on October 30, 2000, that his reassignment would be effective

November 4, 2000. We find that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for the delay in complainant's reassignment.

A review of the record reveals that complainant has not established

that the agency's reasons for the delay in his reassignment were pretext

intended to mask discriminatory intent. Complainant has not refuted the

agency's position that he could not be reassigned until at least one year

after his employment began. Complainant has not demonstrated that the

delay in his reassignment date to November 4, 2000, was the result of

discriminatory actions. Complainant has not refuted the Postmaster's

statement that both he and complainant agreed on a release date of

November 4, 2000, due to their belief that it would take an additional

thirty days for complainant to complete his project. We find that

complainant has failed to show that the delay in his reassignment was

motivated by race, color, age, or sex discrimination.

After a review of the record in its entirety, it is the decision of the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the agency's final

order, because a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish

that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 4, 2002

__________________

Date