Changsheng Chen et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 16, 2019

13198316 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 16, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/198,316 08/04/2011 Changsheng Chen 180141-000300US 7556
101869 7590 08/16/2019
Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams & Aughtry,
P.C.
1200 Smith Street, 14th Floor
Houston, TX 77002
EXAMINER
PRATT, EHRIN LARMONT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3629
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/16/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Patents@chamberlainlaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CHANGSHENG CHEN, SYED MOHAMMED ALI,
ADAM HYDER, and KAM WING CHU
____________

Appeal 2018-0013631
Application 13/198,3162
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BRADLEY B. BAYAT, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1–5, 7, 10, and 11, which are all the claims pending in the
Application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to a system “for identifying a
job candidate.” Spec., Abstract.

1 Throughout this Decision, we refer to Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Br.”)
filed May 19, 2017, the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed July 1,
2016, and the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed July 24, 2017.
2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is “Jobvite, Inc.” Br. 4.
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Claim 1, the sole independent claim on appeal, is reproduced below
with added formatting and bracketed matter:
1. A system comprising:
[(a)] a job database comprising a plurality of job records
defining a plurality of jobs, wherein the plurality of job records
comprises data associated with a plurality of job messages, wherein
each of the plurality of job messages displays at least one active link
associated with at least one of the plurality of jobs, and wherein the
plurality of jobs comprises a new job and at least one old job;
[(b)] an application database comprising a plurality of
application records, wherein each application record, of the plurality
of application records, identifies a completed application for one of
the plurality of jobs, wherein the plurality of application records
comprises a plurality of sources identifying the communication
channels through which the plurality of jobs have been communicated
to a plurality of job candidates;
[(c)] a matching service coupled to the job database and the
application database, and programmed to:
[(1)] receive, from a web browser of a first job
candidate, a signal indicating activation of one of the
links associated with an old job of the at least one old job
displayed by a first job message;
[(2)] receive, from the first job candidate, a
completed application for the old job;
[(3)] generate a first application record, of the
plurality of application records, based on the completed
application;
[(4)] determine a plurality of new job
characteristics for a new job using a first job record, of
the plurality of job records, corresponding to the new job;
[(5)] identify the old job, of the at least one old
job, using the plurality of new job characteristics and a
plurality of old job characteristics, wherein the plurality
of old job characteristics are obtained from a second job
record, of the plurality of job records, corresponding to
the old job, wherein the old job is similar to the new job
and wherein a similarity between the old job and the new
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job is quantified using a job similarity factor, wherein the
job similarity factor is determined by:
[(i)] assigning a job characteristic
similarity value to each of the plurality of
old job characteristics to obtain a plurality of
job characteristic similarity values,
[(ii)] applying a weighting factor to each of
the plurality of job characteristic similarity
values to obtaining a plurality of weighted
job characteristic similarity values, and
[(iii)] determining the job similarity factor
using the plurality of weighted job
characteristic similarity values;
[(6)] identify a first set of job candidates
associated with a subset of the plurality of application
records, wherein the subset of the plurality of application
records corresponds to applications for the old job that
were completed by the first set of job candidates, wherein
the subset of the plurality of application records includes
the first application record, wherein the first set of job
candidates includes the first job candidate;
[(7)] determine, for each job candidate of the first
set of job candidates, a candidate matching factor for the
job candidate based on the old job, wherein the candidate
matching factor for the job candidate is determined based
on a job application stage the job candidate reached on
the old job, wherein the job application stage is one of a
plurality of job application stages, wherein a first job
application stage of the plurality of job application stages
is associated with the job candidate applying for the old
job and a second job application stage of the plurality of
job application stages is associated with the job candidate
being hired for the old job, wherein a candidate matching
factor associated with the first job application stage is
less than a candidate matching factor associated with a
second job application stage;
[(8)] determine, for each job candidate of the first set of
job candidates, a rating for the job candidate by combining the
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job similarity factor and the candidate matching factor for the
job candidate; and
[(9)] identify a second set of job candidates to contact
about the new job based on the rating, wherein the second set of
job candidates is a subset of the first set of job candidates; and
[(d)] a channel interface engine coupled to the matching service and
programmed to: send, to each of the second set of job candidates, a second
job message comprising a link associated with the new job.

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–5, 7, 10, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1, 4, 7, 10, and 11 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hyder et al. (U.S. 2006/0265270 A1, pub. Nov. 23, 2006)
(“Hyder”) and Pfenninger et al. (U.S. 2006/0235884 A1, pub. Oct. 19, 2006)
(“Pfenninger”).
Claims 2, 3, and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Hyder, Pfenninger, and Elman et al. (U.S. Patent
No. 8,504,559 B1, iss. Aug. 6, 2013) (“Elman”).

ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See id. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. “A claim that recites an
abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
After the mailing of the Answer and the filing of the Appeal Brief in
this case, the PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
50 (USPTO Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Revised Step 2A, Prong One, is an
evaluation of whether the claim recites (1) any judicial exceptions, including
certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., (a) mathematical concepts,
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(b) certain methods of organizing human activity, and (c) mental processes).
If so, Revised Step 2A, Prong Two, is an evaluation of whether (2) the
judicial exception is integrated a practical application (see MPEP
§§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)). Only if a
claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, we look to whether the claim (3) adds
a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. See Guidance Step 2B, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
In rejecting claims 1–5, 7, 10, and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the
Examiner determined that representative3 claim 1 is directed to a judicial
exception, an abstract idea. Final Act. 2. In particular, the Examiner
determined the claim is “directed to the abstract idea of matching job
candidates by [implementing limitations (c)(4)––(c)(9), which is] deemed a
method of organizing human activities, or (iv) a mathematical
relationship or formula and the idea itself.” Id. at 2–3. In concluding that
claim 1 is ineligible, the Examiner finds that the additional elements are
well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field. Id. at 4.
Does claim 1 recite a judicial exception?
There is no dispute that claim 1 is directed to a statutory category.
See Br. 8. As such, we first consider whether the claim recites a judicial

3 Appellants submit: “For the purpose of this Appeal, claims 1-5, 7, 10, and
11 stand or fall together. Independent claim 1 is representative of the group
including claims 1-5, 7, 10, and 11.” Br. 7.
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exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. The Guidance synthesizes key
concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas into three primary subject-
matter groupings: mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity, and mental processes. Id. at 52. The Guidance provides that
“[m]ental processes–concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion)” are abstract ideas. Id. We
determine that claim 1’s job candidate matching process recites a mental
process, and, therefore, is an abstract idea.
Claim 1 recites a system “for identifying a job candidate.” Spec. ¶ 36,
Abstract. In particular, claim 1 recites: (c)(4) “determin[ing] a plurality of
new job characteristics for a new job using a first job record, of the plurality
of job records, corresponding to the new job;” (c)(5) “identify[ing] the old
job, of the at least one old job, using the plurality of new job characteristics
and a plurality of old job characteristics . . . wherein the old job is similar to
the new job and wherein a similarity between the old job and the new job is
quantified using a job similarity factor . . . determined by” (i) “assigning a
job characteristic similarity value to each of the plurality of old job
characteristics to obtain a plurality of job characteristic similarity values,”
(ii) “applying a weighting factor to each of the plurality of job characteristic
similarity values to obtaining a plurality of weighted job characteristic
similarity values, and” (iii) “determining the job similarity factor using the
plurality of weighted job characteristic similarity values;”
(c)(6) “identify[ing] a first set of job candidates associated with a subset of
the plurality of application records;” (c)(7) “determin[ing], for each job
candidate of the first set of job candidates, a candidate matching factor for
the job candidate based on the old job;” (c)(8) “determin[ing], for each job
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candidate of the first set of job candidates, a rating for the job candidate by
combining the job similarity factor and the candidate matching factor for the
job candidate; and” (c)(9) “identify[ing] a second set of job candidates to
contact about the new job based on the rating, wherein the second set of job
candidates is a subset of the first set of job candidates.” Br. 19–21, Claims
App.
Under the broadest reasonable interpretation, steps (c)(4)–(c)(9) of
claim 1 describe activities that can be practically performed in the human
mind. For example, determining a plurality of job characteristics of a new
job (step (c)(4)) “may be obtained by extracting one or more job
characteristics from the corresponding job record” (Spec. ¶ 36), such as
“title, skills, education, and location.” Id. ¶ 39. To perform this step, a
human need only observe the job record to determine the title and location of
the new job. A job similarity factor for each old job is then determined in
step (c)(5) using the characteristics of the new job observed in step (c)(4).
Id. ¶ 37. One can determine the job similarity factor by: quantifying the
similarity between characteristics in the new job with characteristics in the
old job to obtain a job characteristic similarity value between 0 and 1, where
the larger the value the more similar the old job characteristics is to the new
job characteristics, applying a weighting factor to each of the job
characteristic similarity values to obtain weighted job characteristic
similarity values (e.g., the title is associated with the highest weighting
factor, wherein the weighting factors sum to 1), and summing the weighted
job characteristic similarity values to obtain a job similarity value. Id.
¶¶ 38–39. Step (c)(6) is performed by observing application records to
identify a job candidate. Id. ¶ 42. In step (c)(7) a candidate matching factor
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for a job candidate is determined using the job application stage (e.g.,
(i) applied and not interviewed, (ii) phone interview and no match, (iii) in-
person interview and no match, (iv) offer declined, and (v) hired) the job
candidate reached in the old job. Id. ¶ 43. For instance, each application
stage is associated with a numeric value from 1 and 10, where 1 represents
stage (i) and 10 represents stage (v). Id. In step (c)(8) a human can
calculate a job similarity rating for each identified candidate by “multiplying
the job similarity factor with the candidate matching factor to a numeric
value between 0 and 10.” Id. ¶ 44. Finally, in step (c)(9) one can identify
potential candidates for the new job by observing which job candidates had a
job similarity rating above a threshold job similarity rating of 5. Id. ¶ 45.
All together, limitations (c)(4) through (c)(9) encompass mental steps for
identifying prospective job candidates for a new job. These limitations
recite steps that, for example, a job recruiter or head-hunter would perform
to identify qualified job candidates for a new job.
Courts have used the phrase an idea of itself to describe an idea
standing alone such as an uninstantiated concept, plan or scheme, as well as
a mental process (thinking) that “can be performed in the human mind, or by
a human using a pen and paper.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions,
Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As the Federal Circuit
explained, “methods which can be performed mentally, or which are the
equivalent of human mental work, are unpatentable abstract ideas–the ‘basic
tools of scientific and technological work’ that are open to all.’” Id. at 1371
(citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)). “Courts have examined
claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the
underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper
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or in a person’s mind.” Versata Dev. Grp., v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306,
1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
For all the above reasons, claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Is claim 1“directed to” the recited judicial exception?
We look to whether the recited judicial exception of claim 1 is
integrated into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51. When
a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a
practical application, the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception. Id.
Claim 1 may integrate the judicial exception when, for example, it
reflects an improvement to technology or a technical field. Id. at 55. In
essence, Appellants’ invention helps in “identifying good job candidates.”
Spec. ¶ 1. In order to solve this non-technical problem, claim 1 uses
collected job and application records to identify potential qualified job
candidates. Claim 1, however, does not reflect a technological
improvement, but rather, is “directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke[s] generic processes and machinery.”
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Appellants have not offered any evidence or technical reasoning
that the computer implementation improves the functioning of the
computing system itself. See Ans. 10. In Enfish, for example, the court
noted that “[s]oftware can make non-abstract improvements to computer
technology just as hardware improvements can.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The court put the question as
“whether the focus of the claims is on [a] specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities . . . or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an
‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.” Id. at
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1335–36. The court found that the “plain focus of the claims” there was on
“an improvement to computer functionality itself, not on economic or other
tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.” Id. at 1336.
We find the focus of the claim as a whole here is on a task, because the
claimed system is merely invoked as a tool to identify job candidates.
We use the term “additional elements” for “claim features, limitations,
and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified judicial
exception.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 n.24. Here, the databases and
processors (e.g., engine, matching service) recited in limitations (a), (b),
(c)(1)–(c)(3), and (d) are additional elements.4 The presence of a database
or a generic processor (see Spec., Fig. 1) does not necessarily indicate a
technical solution. Using a database to store data in its ordinary capacity,
without more, does not integrate the abstract idea. See, e.g., Accenture Glob.
Servs. GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1343–44 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (explaining that the generic database components did not make
the claims patent eligible in that case). The claimed system, which includes
one or more processors, merely executes the mental process described
above. Particularly, “the invention may be implemented on virtually any
type of computer regardless of the platform being used.” Spec. ¶ 86.

4 “[E]mbodiments of the invention may be implemented on a distributed
system having a plurality of nodes, where each portion of the invention (e.g.,
service front-end, matching service, channel interface engine, job application
service, analytics engine, and the various database shown in FIG. 1) may be
located on a different node within the distributed system. In one embodiment
of the invention, the node corresponds to a computer system. Alternatively,
the node may correspond to a processor with associated physical memory.”
Spec. ¶ 87.
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Although a processor may perform comparison and calculations faster
than a human could mentally, using a computer to achieve a solution more
quickly may not be sufficient to show an improvement to computer
technology. See Versata, 793 F.3d at 1335; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)(II)
(instructing examiners that a “commonplace business method being applied
on a general purpose computer” may not be sufficient to show an
improvement). Here, claim 1 broadly recites determining values and
identifying candidates without any particular technical improvement to how
the system carries out these operations. In other words, the recited matching
service (processor) is merely used to perform activities (i.e., observations,
evaluations, calculations) that can practically be performed in the mind.
Thus, the claimed system does not use the recited matching service
processor, which is coupled to databases (a) and (b), in a way that indicates
that the judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application.
Does claim 1 provide an inventive concept?
To determine whether a claim provides an inventive concept, the
additional elements are considered—individually and in combination—to
determine whether they (1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field or
(2) simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
The Examiner found that the
additional claimed limitations such as ‘a channel interface
engine […] programmed to send’ and a database comprising
data and receiving information from a web browser are all
conventional uses of sending, receiving and storing information
which is not deemed significantly more specifically noted ¶ 87
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the computer system in general simply requires a processor,
input/output means to perform the invention. Additionally,
applicants amended limitations directed to the ‘application
database’ are further deemed insignificant as they simply
directed to storage of data.”

Final Act. 4.

Appellants argue that, when considered as an ordered combination,

independent claim 1 requires the determination and use of a job
similarity factor (between an old and new job) and a candidate
matching factor (between a job candidate and the old job) in the
unique sequence/arrangement recited by independent claim 1.
Contrary to the Examiner’s contentions, this is significantly
more than the allegedly present abstract ideas.
Br. 13.
We find Appellants’ argument unpersuasive because the
“determining” steps Appellants rely upon as significantly more are part of
the abstract idea itself. See supra. “It has been clear since Alice that a
claimed invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it is directed
cannot supply the inventive concept that renders the invention ‘significantly
more’ than that ineligible concept.” BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899
F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The limitations on the mental process do
not make claim 1 any less abstract. None of these limitations provide an
inventive concept in the non-abstract application realm. Indeed, this type of
activity has been found to be well-understood, routine, conventional activity
when they are claimed in a merely generic manner (e.g., at a high level of
generality). Cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362–
63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Determining an estimated outcome and setting a price).
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Finally, Appellants’ argument as to the lack of preemption (Br. 13) is
also unpersuasive. See OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–63 (“[T]hat the claims
do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization
in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). Although
“preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Ans. 12. “Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent
ineligible subject matter” under the Alice framework, “preemption concerns
are fully addressed and made moot.” Id.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under 35
U.S.C. § 101, including claims 2–5, 7, 10, and 11, which fall with claim 1.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
“For the purpose of this Appeal, claims 1–5, 7, [10, and 11] stand or
fall together. Independent claim 1 is representative of the group including
claims 1–5, 7, and 10–11.” Br. 14.
In contesting the rejection of claim 1 as obvious over Hyder and
Pfenninger, Appellants argue that Hyder, on which the Examiner relies, fails
to teach “identify[ing] the old job using the plurality of new job
characteristics and a plurality of old job characteristics, wherein the old job
is similar to the new job, and wherein a similarity between the old job and
the new job is quantified using a job similarity factor.” Br. 15. According
to Appellants
the Examiner is mapping the comparison between the 'apply
history' property of the job seeker profile (206) against
properties of a job profile (208), as described by Hyder, with
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the comparison between characteristics of an old job and
characteristics of a new job, as required by the above-recited
requirement of independent claim 1. See Action, p. 7.
Appellants respectfully assert this is improper.

Id. at 16. First, Appellants argue that “[o]f these three sub-properties
of the ‘apply history’ property, the list of job IDs is the only sub-
property that bears any relation to a property of a job profile (208).”
Id. Second, “none of the other properties of the job seeker profile
(206) may substantially substitute as the old job characteristics.” Id.
at 17.
In response to Appellants’ argument, the Examiner states:
As can be seen from Hyder in at least ¶ 0111, 0117,
0120, and 0175 the correlation module identifies potential other
jobs based on his/her applied for history. A listing of similar
jobs appears. Furthermore, in at least ¶ 0109 Hyder tracks all
jobs for which the job seeker has applied for otherwise
expressed interest in. Thus, the Examiner contends that a job
that seeker has previously applied too [sic] is not patentably
distinguishable from an old job is a job that (i) has a
corresponding job record in the jobs database and (ii) the
job record for the old job is present in the jobs database at
the time Step 304 is performed.
Ans. 15 (quoting Spec. ¶ 37).
We are not persuaded of error by Appellants’ arguments because
besides expressing disagreement with the Examiner’s findings, Appellants
offer no substantive arguments to rebut those specific underlying factual
findings made by the Examiner in support of the ultimate legal conclusion of
obviousness. Appellants’ arguments merely disagree that the features of job
profile 208 and job seeker profile 206 “bear any relation to” or “may
substantially substitute as” the claimed features without explaining why the
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Examiner’s findings in Hyder do not teach the claim limitation as
understood in light of the Specification. The Examiner has responded to
Appellants’ argument by explaining how the disputed limitation is
interpreted in light of Appellants’ Specification and disclosed by paragraphs
109, 111, 117, 120, and 175 of Hyder. See supra. Appellants have not
pointed to any particular teaching in the Specification that is inconsistent
with the Examiner’s interpretation.5 Appellants merely summarize various
aspects of Hyder’s teachings but do not specifically rebut the Examiner’s
findings or adequately address and point to errors in those findings. For
example, Figure 2A of Hyder shows various job related information stored
in profile builder 202 as part of the Job ID (e.g., job title, job description, job
location) for constructing job profile 208. Cf. Spec. ¶ 39 (“job
characteristics that are compared may include, but are not limited to, title,
skills, education, and location”). Although Appellants allege that none of
the job seeker profile properties correspond to old job characteristics,
Appellants fail to explain, for example, why the applied for Job ID and
associated timestamp (Hyder ¶ 54) cannot be considered characteristics of
the old job, especially considering that the Specification broadly provides
non-limiting examples of job characteristics. In other words, Appellants fail
to dispute the Examiner’s findings by pointing out specific errors or
distinctions over Hyder. And we decline to examine the claims sua sponte,
looking for distinctions over the prior art. Cf. In re Baxter Travenol Labs.,

5 “Examiner reads new jobs as jobs that haven't been recommended to the
user and old jobs that were recommend and applied for, as such if they use
the old job characteristics to determine a match of another job and it's job
characteristics this 'other job' is deemed the new job.” Final Act. 15.
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952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the function of this court to
examine the claims in greater detail than argued by an appellant, looking for
[patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”). In the absence of a more
detailed explanation, we are not persuaded of error on the part of the
Examiner. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d. 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has
long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged
error in the examiner’s rejections,” (citing Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d at
1072) (“The panel then reviews the obviousness rejection for error based
upon the issues identified by appellant, and in light of the arguments and
evidence produced thereon.”)).
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of independent claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a), including claims 2–5, 7, 10, and 11, which fall with
claim 1.
DECISION
The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED