CFPH, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Apr 2, 2020

14968891 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/968,891 12/14/2015 Howard W. Lutnick 14-2433 9184
63710 7590 04/02/2020
INNOVATION DIVISION
CANTOR FITZGERALD, L.P.
110 EAST 59TH STREET (6TH FLOOR)
NEW YORK, NY 10022
EXAMINER
ALLEN, WILLIAM J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3625
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/02/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
lkorovich@cantor.com
patentdocketing@cantor.com
phowe@cantor.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte HOWARD W. LUTNICK, THOMAS D. BRADSHAW,
MILLER A. MARK, and GERARD PHELAN
____________________

Appeal 2019-0052421
Application 14/968,891
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOYCE CRAIG, and MATTHEW J. McNEILL,
Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to: (1) the Final Office Action mailed
October 19, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) the Appeal Brief filed March 13, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed May 3, 2019 (“Ans.”);
and the Reply Brief filed July 1, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).

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STATEMENT OF CASE
Introduction
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1 and 2. Claims 3–7, 9, 12–17, 18–24, and 26 have been withdrawn
as a result of the Examiner’s Restriction Requirement of February 1, 2018
(see Appeal Br. 6; Final Act. 2; see also Appeal Br. 15–20 (Claims
Appendix)). Claims 8, 10, 11, 18, 25, 27, and 28 have been canceled (see
Appeal Br. 6; Final Act. 2; see also Appeal Br. 16–18, 20 (Claims
Appendix)). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellant’s Disclosed and Claimed Invention
Appellant’s disclosed invention, entitled “Computer Implemented
Systems and Methods for Asset Transfer” (Spec. Title), provides consumers
of tangible goods, using computers connected to a database over the Internet,
an improved method of search for goods from providers of the goods (see
Spec. ¶ 7, 9). More specifically, Appellant’s disclosed and claimed
invention provides an escrow process for a transaction for tangible goods
(Spec. ¶ 7; claim 1; Abstract). Appellant’s invention computerizes the
search and transaction process for consumers (see Fig. 1; Spec. ¶¶ 41–47,
55–58 (describing Fig. 1)). Appellant’s Specification describes the process
as follows:

2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. “The word ‘applicant’ when used in this title refers to the
inventor or all of the joint inventors, or to the person applying for a patent as
provided in §§ 1.43, 1.45, or 1.46.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant
identifies the real party in interest as CFPH, LLC (see Appeal Br. 3).
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Accordingly, in some embodiments, a computer-implemented
system over a network may connect a plurality of providers of
commitments (e.g., loan commitments) to a plurality of
recipients (e.g., possible borrowers). Compared to conventional
systems, a computer-implemented system that networks a
plurality of providers and recipients achieves greater liquidity
and price transparency because it dramatically reduces the
amount of time and effort needed to shop for products and
services. The ability to electronically search a single database
having information organized in a consistent format is far
superior to bespoke methods of comparison shopping among
different vendors, which also consumes significant time for the
shopper and provider salespeople. Providers/lenders benefit by
reaching a larger base of potential customers/borrowers, and
borrowers/customers achieve greater price transparency and
product availability. With the greater availability resulting
from a larger number of participating lender/providers,
customers/borrowers who otherwise may not find a
loan/product that meets all of their specifications may find it
with the click of a few buttons on a search engine.
Spec. ¶ 7 (emphases added).
Substantially instantaneous communication offered by a
computer network linking providers, recipients, and
margin/escrow agents enables a transaction to be offered,
negotiated, and closed very quickly compared to conventional
systems. The greater speed further enables all parties to modify
their commitments and product/service specifications to
respond quickly to the market, e.g., a change in interest rate or a
change in the price of oil or another commodity. Effective
“prices” tend to be more accurate and more accurately reflect
the capabilities of each provider, and this further leads to
commitments that are more likely to be kept by providers.
Spec. ¶ 9 (emphases added).

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Exemplary Claim
Claims 1 and 2 are method claims, and contain commensurate
limitations relating to facilitating a financial transaction for goods with the
aid of a computer, database, and/or network (see claims 1, 2). Exemplary
claim 1 under appeal, with (i) bracketed lettering added to correspond to the
limitations in the body of the claim, and (ii) emphases added to key portions
of the claim at issue, reads as follows:
1. A method comprising:
[A] receiving, by at least one processor, a request from a
remote computer terminal for a tangible product, the request
comprising data indicative of parameters associated with the
tangible product, the parameters including a quantity parameter
and a date of delivery parameter;
[B] searching, by the at least one processor, a database
comprising commitments to provide a tangible good;
[C] transmitting, by the at least one processor, to the
remote computer terminal, data indicative of a commitment to
fulfill the request, in response to finding the commitment in the
database;
[D] receiving, by the at least one processor, indicia that a
portion of an amount of the tangible good will be physically
delivered to and held by an escrow associated with the
commitment to provide the tangible good;
[E] determining, by the at least one processor, a
commitment fee based on the portion held in escrow;
[F] causing, by the at least one processor, the
commitment fee to be paid to an account associated with a
provider of the tangible good;
[G] receiving, by the at least one processor, from the
remote computer terminal a request to accept the commitment
to provide the tangible good;
[H] receiving, by the at least one processor, from the
remote computer terminal a request for the provider to deliver
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the tangible good in an amount that satisfies the quantity
parameter;
[I] transmitting, by the at least one processor, to the
provider a request to physically deliver remaining portion of the
amount of the tangible good that is not held in escrow, the
remaining portion comprising an amount of the tangible good
that satisfies the quantity parameter less the portion of the
tangible good held in escrow;
[J] determining, by the at least one processor, that the
provider failed to transfer the remaining portion of the tangible
good before an expiration time pursuant to the delivery
parameter;
[K] responsive to determining that the provider failed to
deliver the remaining portion of the tangible good before the
expiration time, notifying, by the at least one processor, the
provider that at least a part of the portion held in escrow has
been forfeit by the provider; and
[L] after notifying the provider that at least a part of the
portion held in escrow has been forfeit by the provider,
transmitting, by the at least one processor, an instruction that
causes the at least part of the portion held in escrow to be
physically delivered to another location.

Appeal Br. 14–15, Claims Appendix (emphases and bracketed lettering
added).
Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 1 and 2 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed
to patent-ineligible subject matter (an abstract idea), without significantly
more. Final Act. 5–8; Ans. 3–7.
Appellant’s Contentions
With regard to the patent eligibility rejection, Appellant primarily
makes arguments regarding claim 1 (see Appeal Br. 7–11), and generally
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contends the claim is not directed to an abstract idea, but “to a technological
improvement” (Appeal Br. 9), e.g., a computer-implemented method of
facilitating financial/commercial transactions between consumers and
providers that “reduces the amount of time and effort needed to shop for
products and services” (Appeal Br. 9). Appellant also argues that the
Examiner has ignored the technical advantages of the claimed method
provided in paragraph 7 of the Specification (see Appeal Br. 10). Lastly,
Appellant argues (see Appeal Br. 10–11) that because the facts of the
decisions in Bancorp Services v. Sun Life3 and Credit Acceptance Corp. v.
Westlake Services4 do not correspond to the facts of the instant case on
appeal, the Examiner has not met the burden required by Berkenheimer v.
HP Inc.5 for showing limitations to be well-understood, routine, and
conventional.
Appellant makes only nominal arguments to dependent claim 2,
simply relying on the arguments presented for claim 1 as to the eligibility of
claim 2, and contending that claim 2 adds further distinction to the aspects of
claim 1 that recite patent eligible subject matter (see Appeal Br. 12). Such
conclusions are not considered a separate argument for patent eligibility.
See e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)(last sentence) (“A statement which
merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument

3 Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
4 Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
5 Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

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for separate patentability of the claim.”); In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating that interpreting 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1) to require a
more substantive argument than a naked assertion that the prior art fails to
teach limitation in order to address a claim separately, is not an unreasonable
interpretation of the rule); Ex parte Belinne, 2009 WL 2477843 at *4 (BPAI
2009) (informative) (“Appellants’ argument . . . repeatedly restates elements
of the claim language and simply argues that the elements are missing from
the reference. However, Appellants do not present any arguments to explain
why the Examiner’s explicit fact finding is in error.”). Additionally, any
arguments not presented are waived. See Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d
1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (informative).
Therefore, based on Appellant’s patent eligibility arguments, and
because claims 1 and 2 contain commensurate limitations, we select claim 1
as representative of claims 1 and 2 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for
patent-ineligibility.
Principal Issue on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (Appeal Br. 6–
13) and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2), the following issue is presented on
appeal:
Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting representative
claim 1, as well as claim 2 grouped therewith, under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (i.e., a judicial exception
such as an abstract idea), without significantly more)?

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ANALYSIS
Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
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determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
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omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).6 Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed.,
Rev. 08.2017, 2018) (“Step 2A, Prong 2”).7

6 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, updating and clarifying the Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
2019 Update”) (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df).
7 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55.
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (“Step 2B”).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
Even if the claim recites an abstract idea, the Federal Circuit explains
the “directed to” inquiry is not simply asking whether the claims involve a
patent-ineligible concept:
The “directed to” inquiry . . . cannot simply ask whether the
claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially
every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical
products and actions involves a law of nature and/or natural
phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.
See Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (“For all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas.”) Rather, the “directed to”
inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light
of the specification, based on whether “their character as a
whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see
also Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents’
claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole.”); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
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technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”).
Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, representative claim 1 recites “[a]
method” (see claim 1, preamble) for managing a financial transaction for
“tangible goods” by performing a series of steps (see claim 1, limitations A–
l) (emphasis added). Therefore, claim 1, as a method claim setting forth a
process having a series of steps, recites at least one of the enumerated
categories (e.g., a process) of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
As a result, as to claim 1, and claim 2 grouped therewith, we continue
our analysis under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance to determine whether
the representative claim (1) recites a judicial exception (a law of nature,
natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the enumerated groupings of
abstract ideas above); and (2) is patent-eligible.
Step 2A, Prong 1
At a high level, representative claim 1 recites a method for facilitating
management of a financial transaction for tangible goods (see claim 1).
More specifically, the Examiner determines, and we agree, that:
The concepts embodied by claim 1 are “directed to”
“certain methods of organizing human activity” in that claim 1
describes concepts relating to interpersonal and intrapersonal
activities, such as managing relationships or transactions
between people and satisfying or avoiding a legal obligation
(see: MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(11)). That is, claim 1 directs itself to
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a methodology of managing a transaction and implementing a
contractual agreement between parties, such as by receiving a
commitment from a provider to provide a quantity of a tangible
good to a receiving party, accepting the commitment by the
receiving part, and managing the fulfillment of the transaction
in accordance with the terms of the transaction. At least similar
concepts have been found to be abstract by in a number of
precedential decisions by the courts, most notably in buySAFE,
Inc. v. Google (Creating a contractual relationship), but also in
In re Comiskey (arbitration) and Accenture Global Services,
GmbH v. Guidewire Software (Generating rule-based tasks for
processing an insurance claim).
In addition to certain methods of organizing human
activity, claim 1 is also considered to be “directed to” a
“fundamental economic practice” in that claim 1 describes
concepts relating to the economy and commerce, such as
agreements between people in the form of contracts, legal
obligations, and business relations (see: MPEP
2106.04(a)(2)(1)).

Final Act. 6–7 (underlining emphases added).
Appellant describes the invention as a computer implemented method
for asset transfer (see Title) of goods from providers (Spec. ¶¶ 4, 7), to allow
consumers/recipients to find products meeting all of their specifications
“with the click of a few buttons on a search engine” (Spec. ¶ 7). Appellant
describes the main purposes of the recited invention are to (i) achieve great
liquidity and price transparency by reducing the amount of time and effort
needed for consumers/recipients to shop for products (see Spec. ¶ 7); (ii)
allow users to search a single database in which information is organized in
a consistent format to allow for better and faster comparison shopping
amongst plural vendors/providers (see Spec. ¶ 7); (iii) allow providers to
benefit by reaching a larger base of potential customers (see Spec. ¶ 7); (iv)
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“achieve greater price transparency and product availability” (Spec. ¶ 7); and
(v) provide almost instantaneous communication between providers and
customers/recipients to enable transactions to be offered “very quickly
compared to conventional systems” and with “greater speed” to “respond
quickly to the market” (Spec. ¶ 9).
In our view, claim 1 recites a combination of abstract ideas: (1) a
fundamental economic practice (i.e., managing a financial transaction
involving receiving a request for tangible goods as in limitation A, receiving
indicia of a commitment fee and an escrow being received from a provider
as in limitations D and E, receiving and transmitting offer and acceptance
information as in limitations G, H, and I, and alerting the provider of any
escrow forfeiture and delivering the escrowed goods to another location as in
limitations K and L); and (ii) a mental process (i.e., determining a
commitment fee as in limitation E, and determining that the provider failed
to transfer goods before an expiration time as in limitation J). Our reviewing
court has held that combining several abstract ideas does not render the
combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another
abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (patent-ineligible claims were directed to a combination of abstract
ideas).
Appellant contends that the claims “are directed to a technological
improvement” and are thus patent eligible (see Appeal Br. 2). This
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contention does not refute that the claims are abstract, and is unpersuasive of
Examiner error for at least the following reasons.
First, the determination of a commitment fee as in limitation E, and
the determination that the provider failed to transfer goods before an
expiration time as in limitation J, are mental processes, and can be
performed mentally or by a human with pen and paper. See Synopsys, 839
F.3d at 1146 (“While the Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since
CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, we continue to ‘treat[] analyzing
information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical
algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the
abstract-idea category.’”) (quoting Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354); see also
CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when
performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in
Gottschalk v. Benson.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. We find that the
determination of a commitment fee (claim 1, limitation E), and whether
goods have been transferred before a time deadline (claim 1, limitation J),
are mental processes involving evaluation, judgment, and/or opinion.
Second, our reviewing courts have often identified abstract ideas by
referring to earlier precedent, e.g., by comparing a claimed concept to the
concepts previously identified as abstract ideas by the courts. Amdocs
(Israel), Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016);
Enfish, 822 F.3d. at 1334. For example, in Alice, the Supreme Court
identified the claimed systems and methods as describing the concept of
intermediated settlement, and then compared this concept to the risk hedging
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concept identified as an abstract idea in Bilski. Because this comparison
revealed “no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in
Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here,” the Court
concluded that the concept of intermediated settlement was an abstract idea.
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356-57. Similarly, the Federal Circuit in Amdocs
compared the claims at issue with “eligible and ineligible claims of a similar
nature from past cases” as part of its eligibility analysis. 841 F.3d at 1295–
1300. In this light, we determine that the limitations of claim 1 are focused
on, and generally relate to a mental process for escrowing goods during a
transaction between a provider/vendor and a consumer/recipient, which is a
business relation between people and the organization of human activity (see
generally claim 1; Spec. ¶¶ 4, 7; Abstract). As such, the claimed invention
recites a mental process as well as a method of organizing human activity,
which is an abstract idea. See, e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed Bath &
Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that concept
of “local processing of payments for remotely purchased goods” is a
“fundamental economic practice, which Alice made clear is, without more,
outside the patent system.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839
F.3d 1138, 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A]nalyzing information by steps people
[can] go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more [are] mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”); Digitech
Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (holding that a process that starts with data, applies an algorithm, and
ends with a new form of data is directed to an abstract idea); Digitech
Information Sys., Inc. v. BMW Auto Leasing, LLC, 504 F. App’x 920 (mem.)
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(Fed. Cir. 2013) (rendering a decision based on data and mathematical
formulas and finding process of operating on information using
mathematical formulas/correlations patent ineligible); Clarilogic, Inc. v.
FormFree Holdings, Co., 681 F. App’x 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(gathering, analyzing, and outputting financial data/assessment is an abstract
idea that is patent ineligible).
Therefore, under Step 2A, Prong 1, we agree with the Examiner (see
Final Act. 6; Ans. 5) that the invention claimed in independent claim 1
recites an abstract idea, i.e., managing a financial transaction for tangible
goods, specifically a financial transaction that includes a commitment fee
and an escrow of goods, which we also conclude is a fundamental economic
practice or, alternatively, a method of organizing human activity.
Third, claim 1 recites not only a mental process, but also the
organization of human activity, such as business relations between people
(e.g., facilitating selling/purchasing of tangible goods remotely by managing
a commitment fee and escrow). See, e.g., Inventor Holdings, LLC v. Bed
Bath & Beyond, Inc., 876 F.3d 1372, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that
concept of “local processing of payments for remotely purchased goods” is a
“fundamental economic practice, which Alice made clear is, without more,
outside the patent system.” Clarilogic, Inc. v. Formfree Holdings Corp., 681
F. App’x. 950, 954–55 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (gathering, analyzing, and outputting
financial data/assessment is an abstract idea that is patent ineligible).
Receiving indicia of a commitment fee and an escrow being received from a
provider as in limitations D and E, receiving and transmitting offer and
acceptance information as in limitations G, H, and I, and alerting the
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provider of any escrow forfeiture and delivering the escrowed goods to
another location as in limitations K and L are all part of the business relation
and organization of human activity between consumers/recipients and
providers/vendors.
Fourth, with regard to limitations A, D, G, H (receiving data); C, I,
and L (transmitting data); limitation K (notifying the provider of results), of
claim 1, our reviewing court has also concluded that abstract ideas include
the concepts of collecting data, recognizing certain data within the collected
data set, storing the data in memory, and notifying the user of the results.
Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Ass’n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding
“claims directed to the collection, storage, and recognition of data are
directed to an abstract idea”). Moreover, our reviewing court has concluded
that acts of parsing, comparing, storing, and editing data are abstract ideas.
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2018). In addition,
the collection of information and analysis of information (e.g., recognizing
certain data within the dataset) are also abstract ideas. Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Similarly,
“collecting, displaying, and manipulating data” is an abstract idea.
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 850 F.3d 1332, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2017); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161,
1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[M]erely presenting the results of abstract processes
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of collecting and analyzing information . . . is abstract as an ancillary part of
such collection and analysis”).8
Fifth, as mentioned above, our reviewing court has held that
combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less
abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . . does
not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (patent-ineligible claims
were directed to a combination of abstract ideas).
In view of the foregoing, we conclude claim 1 recites (i) searching a
database (limitation B); and (ii) determining a commitment fee (limitation E)
and whether the provider failed to transfer the remaining portion of the
tangible good before an expiration time (limitation J), which are mental
processes. We also conclude claim 1 (limitations A–L) recites a method of
organizing human activity, such as a commercial or financial interaction,
sales/marketing interaction, and/or business relation between people, which
are fundamental activities. Because we conclude claim 1 recites an abstract
idea, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance to determine whether
claim 1 is “directed to” the judicial exception, by determining whether
additional elements of the claim integrate the abstract idea into a practical

8 We further note that, when generically claimed, storing and retrieving and
operating on information in memory and displaying information are
computer functions that have been recognized as either insignificant extra-
solution activity or well-understood, routine, conventional functions. MPEP
2106.05(d)(II)(i) (citing Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2015)).

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application. Such additional elements may reflect an improvement to a
technology or technical field. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Practical Application
Under Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not directed to the judicial exception.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “at least one
processor” and “a remote computer terminal” (see claim 1, limitation A),
and “a database” (claim 1, limitation B). Considering claim 1 as a whole,
none of the additional elements, alone or in any ordered combination,
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
But for the recitation of a generic “processor,” “database,” and
“computer terminal” for communicating with each other (see claim 1) to
search the database, we find the recited steps or acts (see e.g., claim 1,
limitations A, C–L), could be performed as mental steps.
As to limitations A, D, G, and H of claim 1, “merely selecting
information, by content or source, for collection [and] analysis . . . does
nothing significant to differentiate a process from ordinary mental
processes.” Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1355. Receiving and analyzing (or
identifying data), by itself, does not transform an otherwise-abstract process
or system of information collection and analysis. See id. Like the claims at
issue in Electric Power, we find Appellant’s claim 1 does not invoke “any
assertedly inventive programming” or an “arguably inventive set of
components or methods.” Id.
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As to limitation A and C–L of claim 1, these steps involve generic
computer/network functionality, like receiving/transmitting data or operating
on data to provide results by notification and instruction of certain criteria
being met. As to limitation B of claim 1, the step of searching a database
also involves generic computer/network functionality.
Appellant contends (Appeal Br. 9) that claim 1 is not directed to an
abstract idea, because claim 1 recites “various specific features” that provide
a technological improvement, such as providing the advantages outlined in
paragraph 7 of the Specification, namely (i) achieving great liquidity and
price transparency by reducing the amount of time and effort needed for
consumers/recipients to shop for products (see Spec. ¶ 7); (ii) allowing users
to search a single database in which information is organized in a consistent
format to allow for better and faster comparison shopping amongst plural
vendors/providers (see Spec. ¶ 7); (iii) allowing providers to benefit by
reaching a larger base of potential customers (see Spec. ¶ 7); and (iv)
“achiev[ing] greater price transparency and product availability” (Spec. ¶ 7).
We disagree with Appellant (see Appeal Br. 9) that the focus of claim
1 is on a technical improvement or solution (i.e., a practical application of
the abstract idea). The mere recitations of searching the database (e.g.,
limitation B), or receiving and transmitting data to make determinations
(e.g., limitations A and C–L) in claim 1 does not embody an improvement in
computer capabilities as in Enfish. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336 (“[T]he
plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to computer functionality
itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its
ordinary capacity.”). Rather, the focus of claim 1 is on managing a financial
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transaction between a provider and a consumer for tangible goods. This is
an improvement to help the provider to be notified if some of the escrow has
been forfeit, and help the consumer perform better searches, but not the
computer itself (or in the case of claim 1, the recited processor, computer
terminal, and/or database). Claim 1 does not recite a method of that
improves the speed or efficiency of the processor, computer terminal, or
database, reduces memory requirements of a database, or otherwise
improves a computer terminal. Claim 1 merely recites steps for managing a
financial transaction between a provider and a consumer for tangible goods
(see claim 1). We consider this idea to be abstract.
The claimed invention (see claim 1) receives data (limitations A, D,
G, H); transmits data (limitations C, I, and L); notifies of results (limitation
K), determines a commitment fee and the provider’s failure to transfer goods
before an expiration time (limitations E and J) – this is merely conventional
data gathering and analysis. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); OIP Techs., Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Elec. Power Grp.,
830 F.3d at 1354.
In addition, merely adding a programmed processor to perform
generic computer functions does not automatically overcome an eligibility
rejection. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223–24. Furthermore, the use of a general-
purpose computer to apply an otherwise ineligible algorithm does not
qualify as a particular machine. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent
Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (mere recitation of concrete or
tangible components is not an inventive concept); EON Corp. IP Holdings
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LLC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 785 F.3d 616, 623 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting
that Alappat’s rationale that an otherwise ineligible algorithm or software
could be made patent-eligible by merely adding a generic computer to the
claim was superseded by the Supreme Court’s Bilski and Alice decisions).
“[I]ntegration into a practical application” requires an additional
element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely
on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit
on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception. See Revised Guidance, at 54. In the
instant case before us on appeal, based on the record before us, we determine
that claimed invention in representative claim 1 is not integrated into a
practical application.
Appellant’s argument that the claimed method performs faster than
other methods by reducing the time and effort of shopping for products (see
Appeal Br. 9), is not persuasive, as the recited and disclosed method would
not provide an improvement to the computer itself. See, e.g., Versata Dev.
Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(explaining that in order for a machine to add significantly more, it must
“play a significant part in permitting the claimed method to be performed,
rather than function solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a
solution to be achieved more quickly”) (emphasis added); FairWarning IP,
LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (2016) (“While the claimed
system and method certainly purport to accelerate the process of analyzing
audit log data, the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a general-
purpose computer, rather than the patented method itself”); Bancorp Servs.,
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L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed
more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility
of the claimed subject matter”). In the instant case, using a computer and/or
processor to more quickly facilitate financial transaction management
involving a commitment fee and escrow is nothing more than the abstract
idea itself (i.e., managing a transaction for tangible goods, which is a
fundamental economic practice and mental process).
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude Appellant’s claim 1
(and claim 2 grouped therewith) invokes generic computer components (a
“processor” interacting with “a database” and “a remote computer terminal”
to provide a financial transaction) merely as a tool in which the computer
instructions apply the judicial exception and, thus, the abstract idea is not
integrated into a practical application. Because Appellant has not persuaded
us the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites an abstract idea under
Step 2A is in error, and claim 1 recites a judicial exception (i.e., the abstract
idea of a method of organizing human activity and/or mental process) that is
not integrated into a practical application, in accordance with the Guidance,
we conclude claims 1 and claim 1 grouped therewith, are directed to an
abstract idea under Step 2A, and the eligibility analysis with regard to claims
1 and 2 proceeds to Step 2B.
Step 2B – Inventive Concept
Having determined claim 1 and claim 2 grouped therewith are
directed to an abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application,
we now evaluate whether the additional elements add a specific limitation
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that is not well-understood, routine, or conventional activity in the field, or
simply append well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously
known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the abstract
idea. See generally Guidance.
Here, claim 1 recites the additional elements of “at least one
processor,” “a remote computer terminal” and “a database” (claim 1,
limitation A), and “a database” (see claim 1, limitation B). Considering
claim 1 as a whole, none of the additional elements applies or uses the
abstract idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception.
Appellant has not identified what it is about claim 1 (or claim 2) that
allegedly amounts to more than a conventional arrangement of limitations
for performing the abstract idea identified above. In other words, Appellant
does not persuasively argue any specific limitation or combination thereof is
not well-understood, routine, or conventional in the field (see generally
Appeal Br. 10–11). Nor does Appellant persuasively argue the Examiner
erred in that aspect. In particular, Appellant’s attorney arguments that the
subject matter in the claims is a technological improvement and meaningful
application of a judicial exception (see Appeal Br. 9), are unpersuasive,
because they are not supported by competent evidence. See In re Geisler,
116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775,
782 (Fed. Cir. 1977). In addition, Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br.
10–11) are, in essence, conclusory assertions that the claims are non-
conventional, and thus a technological improvement.
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The Examiner determines, and we agree, that the only elements
beyond the abstract idea are generic computer components (e.g., a processor,
remote computer terminal, and database) used to perform generic computer
functions (Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 6–7) — a determination that is supported by
the Specification, particularly paragraphs 41 through 47 and 55 through 58,
describing Figure 1 including server 2 and database 80, found in the
Specification (see Spec. ¶¶ 41–47, 55–58; Fig. 1). We note that paragraphs
41 through 47 and 55 through 58 and Figure 1 of Appellant’s Specification
also show and describes well-understood, routine, conventional computer
components used for facilitating financial transactions between parties using
computer terminals having processors and input/output devices in
combination with a database that are in a general purpose computing
environment in a manner that indicates the components and the functions
they perform were well-known in the art. See Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a
patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the
art”); see also USPTO, Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.) at 3 (Apr. 19, 2018), available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF (explaining that a specification that describes additional
elements “in a manner that indicates that the additional elements are
sufficiently well-known that the specification does not need to describe the
particulars of such additional elements to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)” can
show that the elements are well-understood, routine, and conventional);
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Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erie Indem. Co., 850 F.3d 1315, 1331 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (“The claimed mobile interface is so lacking in implementation
details that it amounts to merely a generic component (software, hardware,
or firmware) that permits the performance of the abstract idea, i.e., to
retrieve the user-specific resources.”).
Specifically, Appellant’s Specification describes the server, computer
terminals, and database shown in Figure 1 in the following manner,
indicating they are conventional and generic:
FIG. 1 depicts a system according to at least one embodiment
of the systems disclosed herein. System may comprise one or
more computers (e.g., in communication over a network) and
other computing elements coupled to databases and
programmed with software that instructs the computing
elements to perform the functions described herein.

Spec. ¶ 42;
The system 100 may comprise one or more servers 2 coupled to
one or more databases 80, one or more providers 8a-8n, one or
more recipients 10a-10n, and one or more agents, escrow, and
data entities 12 (collectively called "agents"). The providers 8a-
8n, recipients 10, agents 12, and server 2 may each
communicate with one other. Recipients 10a may also
communicate with other recipients 10b, and likewise providers
8a may communicate with other providers 8b, and agents 12a
may communicate with other agents 12b. Recipients 10 and
providers 8 may collectively be referred to herein as "users" of
the system.

Spec. ¶ 43;
Server 2 may comprise one or more processors, computers,
computer systems, computer networks, and or computer
databases. Server 2 may comprise modules. Server 2 may also
comprise one or more databases, such as databases 80. Server 2
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may communicate with recipients 10, providers 8, and agents
12. For instance, server 2 may communicate with a user 10, 8
computer, such as a browser of a user computer, e.g., over the
internet.

Spec. ¶ 45;
Databases 80 may comprise one or more processors, computers,
computer systems, computer networks, and/or computer
databases configured to store information. Each of databases 80
may communicate with server 2, e.g., via one or more modules
of server 2. For instance, server 2 and modules may store
information in databases 80 and may also use information
stored in databases 80.

Spec. ¶ 47;
Recipients 10a-10n may comprise one or more recipients, such
as borrowers, purchasers, acquirers, and traders. Recipients 10
may comprise one or more human persons, computers,
terminals, users, traders, trading entities, or other entities.
Recipients 10 may interact with agents 12, server 2, and/or
other recipients 10. As used in this application, recipients 10a-
10n may also refer to a user’s interface to other system 100
components (like server 2), such as a user’s PDA or computer
or a program running on a user’s computer such as a computer
web browser like Internet Explorer™, which may communicate
with providers 8, agents 12, and/or server 2.

Spec. ¶ 48;
The server 2 may comprise a computer, server, hub, central
processor, or other entity in a network, or other processor. The
server 2 may comprise input and output devices for
communicating with other various system 100 elements.

Spec. 55; and
As shown in FIG. 1, server 2 may comprise a plurality of
modules. Each module may comprise a processor as well as
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input and output devices for communicating with other
modules, databases, and other system elements.

Spec. 57.
These portions of the Specification provide evidence that the
computer terminal, processor, and database limitations recited in claim 1 are
well-known, routine, and/or conventional elements.
The Examiner also cites to prior court decisions (see Final Act. 7–8;
Ans. 9, 11) as evidence that the use of generic computer components to
perform generic functions in the business field is well-understood, routine,
or conventional activity in the field, and simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the abstract idea. See generally Guidance.
Appellant’s arguments (see Appeal Br. 10–11) that the facts of the
decisions in Bancorp Services v. Sun Life9 and Credit Acceptance Corp. v.
Westlake Services10 do not correspond to the facts of the instant case on
appeal are not persuasive. Appellant argues that “the claims at issue in
Bancorp were directed to managing a stable value protected life insurance
policy” (Appeal Br. 11), and “the claims at issue in Credit Acceptance were
drawn to a method for providing a financing source (Appeal Br. 11).
Although Bancorp involved computerizing “[a] method for managing
a life insurance policy on behalf of a policy holder” (Bancorp Servs., L.L.C.
v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d at 1270), the claims at

9 Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
10 Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services, 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir.
2017).
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issue in Bancorp simply used a (i) policy generator and calculators (i.e.,
computer/processor), and (ii) a digital storage element (i.e., a database) as
tools to facilitate the issuance of insurance policies (i.e., a financial
transaction) based on certain calculations made by the computer/processor.
Thus, the claims in Bancorp present similar issues as claim 1 on appeal,
namely that of using a computer and database to perform a method of
providing a financial product or service in a financial transaction.
And, Credit Acceptance involved a system for customers of products
from dealers that use a database, user terminal, and server to facilitate the
process of providing financial transactions for products to customers,
including allowing dealers of the products to provide an advance amount.
This is similar to the instant case on appeal, where a processor receives
requests from remote computer terminals and searches a database to
facilitate financial transactions for tangible goods, including allowing
providers of goods to provide a commitment fee. Credit Acceptance is
therefore applicable here, and stands for the proposition that merely
automating previously manual processing by using computers does not
qualify as an eligibility-rejection-defeating improvement (see Credit
Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Even if we were persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that the facts of
Bancorp and Credit Acceptance do not correspond to the facts of the instant
case on appeal, this alone would not show the Examiner erred in determining
certain claimed elements were well-understood, routine, and conventional.
This is because the Examiner additionally relies on (i) buySAFE, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2014), to show “that merely using a
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computer to perform more efficiently what could otherwise be accomplished
manually does not confer patent-eligibility” (Final Act. 8); and (ii) SiRF
Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2010), and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), to show
that “the recited additional elements function solely as an obvious
mechanism to achieve the claimed result more efficiently, which is
insufficient to save a claim from ineligibility” (Ans. 9).
In buySAFE, the claims were directed to the well-known practice of
creating a transaction performance guaranty, i.e., a contractual relationship,
which was determined to be an abstract idea, and which can be analogized to
the financial transaction process involving a commitment fee and escrow
(see buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)),
as in claims 1 and 2 on appeal in the instant case. Thus, buySAFE serves as
unrefuted evidence that the computer terminal, processor, and/or database in
claim 1 of the instant case on appeal were well-understood, routine, and
conventional.
In SiRF Technology, Inc., the claims involved a method of performing
calculations and estimations of position information to determine the
absolute position of a global positioning system (GPS) receiver (SiRF
Technology, Inc., 601 F.3d at 1332). Because the court in SiRF Technology,
Inc. agreed with the International Trade Commission that the claims were
tied to a specific machine, e.g., a GPS receiver, the court held that the claims
at issue in SiRF Technology, Inc. were directed to patentable subject matter.
Thus, SiRF Technology, Inc. does not serve as evidence that the computer
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terminal, processor, and/or database in claim 1 of the instant case on appeal
were well-understood, routine, and conventional.
In Alice, the claims involved a method for exchanging obligations
between parties (i.e., a financial or commercial transaction) using a
computer. The Supreme Court determined the concept of computerizing
such transactions to (i) be an abstract idea; (ii) to include certain methods of
organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices; and (iii)
thus, be patent ineligible (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20). Thus, Alice serves as
unrefuted evidence that the computer terminal, processor, and/or database in
claim 1 of the instant case on appeal were well-understood, routine, and
conventional.
Claims fall short of an inventive concept when they “simply instruct
the practitioner to implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional
activity.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir.
2014). In this case, we agree the Examiner’s findings and conclusions as to
Step B, and we cannot agree with Appellant (see Appeal Br. 10–11) that the
Examiner has not met the burden of showing the additional elements were
well-understood, routine, and conventional.
As a result, we are not persuaded that the operations recited in claim 1
are anything beyond generic computer functions as opposed to an
improvement to a fundamental economic practice and/or method of
organizing human activity. Considering the elements of claim 1 individually
and as an ordered combination, claim 1 does no more than simply instruct
the practitioner to implement the abstract idea on a generic computer
terminal, processer, and/or database. Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d
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1315, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Simply adding a ‘computer aided’
limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is
insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible.”).
Claim 1, as whole, is focused on an easier and more efficient process
for managing a financial transaction for tangible goods, invokes generic
computer components, and does not serve to improve the computing
system/components. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837
F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (the question is whether the claims as a
whole “focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery”). Claim
1 recites an abstract idea (i.e., a mental process and a fundamental economic
practice such as business relations and/or commercial practices), and “does
not include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). Instead, claim 1 merely requires generic computer
implementation and fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. Id.; see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of
Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1277–78 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (performance by
computer of operations that previously were performed manually or
mentally, albeit less efficiently, does not convert a known abstract idea into
eligible subject matter).
In view of the foregoing, Appellant has not persuaded us the
Examiner erred with respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at Step 2B. Accordingly, claim 1 does not recite an
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inventive concept because claim 1 simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the abstract idea.
Summary
As explained above, under the USPTO’s Revised Patent Eligibility
Guidance, based on the record before us, and informed by our governing
case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, Appellant has not shown the Examiner
erred in rejecting representative claim 1, as well as claim 2 grouped
therewith, as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter without
significantly more, and we sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 2 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.

CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons above, we hold as follows:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 2 101 Eligibility 1, 2

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 41.50(f), 41.52(b) (2013).

AFFIRMED