Celinda L.,1 Complainant,v.James N. Mattis, Secretary, Department of Defense (Defense Logistics Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Mar 5, 2019

0120172629 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 5, 2019)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Celinda L.,1
Complainant,

v.

James N. Mattis,
Secretary,
Department of Defense
(Defense Logistics Agency),
Agency.

Appeal No. 0120172629

Agency No. DLAR150247

DECISION

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) accepts
Complainant’s appeal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s June 29, 2017
final decision concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

BACKGROUND

During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a Lead Customer Support Specialist (CSS),
GS-11, at the Agency’s Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) aviation facility in Jacksonville,
Florida.

On July 30, 2015, Complainant filed a formal EEO complaint, claiming that the Agency
subjected her to discrimination and harassment based on race (African-American), sex (female),
color (black), disability (physical), age (year of birth - 1962), and in reprisal for prior protected
EEO activity.

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.
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The Agency summarized Complainant’s claims as the following:

1. Was Complainant subjected to harassment and disparate treatment between May 2015
and July 2015 on the bases of her race, color, sex, age, disability, and reprisal when:

a) since May 2015, Complainant’s first line supervisor escalated her treatment of
Complainant, which included excessive micromanagement of her work,
sending demeaning emails, and making condescending remarks;

b) on May 21, 2015, Complainant’s first line supervisor attempted to schedule a
meeting with Complainant to discuss her reasonable accommodation request
without allowing Complainant time to have her union representative present;
and

c) on June 20, 2015, Complainant’s second line supervisor sent Complainant an
email directing her to return to her original duty area by June 23, 2015. The
email included a memorandum that had been previously sent to Complainant
on March 27, 2015, containing the same instructions.

2. Was Complainant denied a reasonable accommodation when DLA Human Resources
(HR) declined to reassign her to the following three positions in which she expressed
an interest: Job Opportunity Announcement (JOA) DLAAvn-15-1446794 - Contract
Specialist; JOA DLADispSvc-15-1461645-MP - Management and Program Analyst,
GS-0343-09; and JOA DLADispSvcs-15-1500864-MP - Management Program
Analyst, GS-0343-09.

After the investigation of the claims, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report
of investigation and notice of the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative
Judge or a final decision within thirty days of receipt of the correspondence. Complainant
requested a final decision.

On June 29, 2017, the Agency issued the instant final decision, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), finding no discrimination. The Agency also found no evidence that Complainant
was denied a reasonable accommodation.

The Agency indicated that Complainant’s formal complaint included four additional claims
which the Agency dismissed on procedural grounds in its August 14, 2015 partial acceptance of
Complainant’s formal complaint.2 Because Complainant raised these claims in a prior

2 The record indicates that Complainant initially alleged in a prior complaint (Agency No.
DLAR-15-0163) discrimination based on disability when management granted her a reasonable
accommodation that Complainant alleged was insufficient because: (1) management would only
grant Complainant 4 hours to telework instead of 8 hours from September to November 2014;
(2) management issued Complainant a Letter of Instruction, dated March 30, 2015, instructing
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complainant that she subsequently withdrew on April 24, 2015, the Agency dismissed the claims
from the instant formal complaint. The Agency affirmed its dismissal, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.107(a)(1), for raising claims which had previously been addressed by the Agency.3

The instant appeal followed. On appeal, Complainant states, through her attorney, that she is not
pursuing her claims of sex or age discrimination. Complainant reiterates her argument that the
Agency discriminated against her when it repeatedly failed to accommodate her disability
spanning approximately over one year from her initial September 2014 reasonable
accommodation request to November 16, 2015, when her reassignment transfer was granted.
Complainant further argues that the Agency discriminated against her and subjected her to a
hostile work environment based on her race, color, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Reasonable Accommodation Request

Under the Commission's regulations, an agency is required to make reasonable accommodation
to the known physical and mental limitations of a qualified individual with a disability unless the
agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)
and (p).

To establish that she was denied a reasonable accommodation, Complainant must show that: (1)
she is an individual with a disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) she is a “qualified”
individual with a disability pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the Agency failed to
provide her with a reasonable accommodation. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on
Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(Enforcement Guidance), EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002). A qualified person with a
disability is an individual who can perform the essential functions of the position with or without
an accommodation.

Complainant stated that she has a weak right leg due to January 2013 and August 2014 surgeries
on her right ankle and an October 2014 surgery on her right knee. Complainant further stated
that the August 2014 surgery was required because her ankle had not completely healed.
Complainant explained that these surgeries have “impede[d] her ability to stand on her feet for
any given period, to walk distances, to climb stairs, and driving.” Complainant further

Complainant to return to her regular duties and duty station on March 31, 2015; (3) management
prohibited Complainant from attending meetings via teleconference; and (4) management
provided Complainant with an electric cart to move around which was unsafe. However, on
April 24, 2015, Complainant withdrew this complaint from the EOO pre-complaints process.

3 On appeal, Complainant does not expressly challenge the Agency’s dismissal of these claims.
Therefore, we will not address this procedural ground further in our decision.

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explained that she uses a walking cane and electric grocery carts in stores to assist with her
mobility. Complainant stated that she experiences pain regardless of the distance she walks, she
is unable to climb stairs, her right leg is not strong enough for her to operate a vehicle, and she
takes pain medication daily. Based on this evidence, we presume, without so finding, that
Complainant is a qualified individual with a disability.

Complainant explained that from December 2013 through November 2015, she was a Lead
Customer Support Specialist (CSS) for the P3 aircraft line. As a Lead CSS, Complainant stated
that she provided customer support, coordinated work assignments to subordinate Customer
Support Specialists and Technicians, and attended daily meetings which were often held in other
buildings located over 100 feet away.

The record reflects that Complainant submitted several reasonable accommodation requests
during the period she worked as a Lead CSS. We note that the reasonable accommodation
requests requested after April 25, 2015, are the only reasonable accommodation requests at issue.
Reasonable accommodation requests made before April 25, 2015 were included in a prior
complaint which Complainant subsequently withdrew, as noted above. However, we include
these reasonable accommodation requests to refute Complainant’s contention on appeal that the
Agency took over one year to provide her with a reasonable accommodation.

On September 26, 2014, Complainant requested transfer to a sedentary position after she
returned to work following a September 22, 2014 recommendation from her physician that
Complainant should refrain from weightbearing activities (walking, standing, lifting, and
driving) following her August 2014 surgery. However, on December 1, 2014, Complainant
modified her reasonable accommodation request and indicated that she did “not wish to
downgrade to a GS-9.” Complainant stated that she conferred with “other HR professionals” and
she requested that the Agency “accommodate a temporary move for [her] while [she] recovered
from surgery.”

The record indicates that Complainant’s physician indicated, in a January 9, 2015 note, that
Complainant was cleared to return to light duty on January 13, 2015 but should “avoid excess
walking, prolonged standing, and no squatting or kneeling.” The record further indicates that
Complainant was provided a temporary assignment in another building where the printer, copier,
microwave, refrigerator, bathrooms, and parking spaces were closer and thereby reduced the
amount of excess walking. On February 27, 2015, Complainant requested that her temporary
assignment to this building be changed to permanent due to her medical condition. Complainant
further indicated that she did “not know of any other accommodations currently available to
support [her] physical condition.”

On May 21, 2015, Complainant’s first-line supervisor (“S1”) (Caucasian, white, female) denied
her reasonable accommodation request noting that Complainant’s reasonable accommodation
request would be ineffective, would cause an undue hardship, and would require lowering of
performance or production standards. In an attached memorandum, S1 explains that an April 8,
2015 physician assessment indicates that Complainant had long term impairments of walking
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(limited to up to 30 feet at a time), standing, climbing stairs, but the assessment failed to
“identify the extent of [Complainant’s] limitations.” S1 further stated that Complainant was
unable to perform the essential functions of her job while remaining in the other building.
Specifically, S1 determined that Complainant could not perform in-person contact with
customers and subordinates, attend customer meetings, and provide oversight of subordinates.
S1 explained that Complainant’s “physical presence is required for her to interact with customers
and to lead, direct, guide and train her subordinates,” and a customer specifically requested that a
DLA representative physically attend these meetings. S1 explained that for the preceding eight
months, other employees, including S1, have attended the scheduled daily supply meetings with
the customer on Complainant’s behalf. S1 also indicated that Complainant, as a Lead CCS, is
“responsible for presenting and explaining customer support issues and/or problems at internal
meetings.” S1 explained that Complainant is unable to effectively supervise and train her
subordinates via phone.

Finally, S1 stated that she has met with Complainant “multiple occasions to discuss potential
reasonable accommodations.” These potential accommodations included offering Complainant a
cart or scooter which would allow Complainant to drive between the buildings for meetings
instead of walking. S1 explained that Complainant’s medical documentation did not indicate
that she could not drive. S1, in response to Complainant’s safety concern, met with the
Occupation Safety and Health Specialist who determined that there have not been any safety
incidents involving electric scooters in the last year. However, S1 stated that Complainant has
not indicated whether she would accept the scooter or cart as a reasonable accommodation. S1
concluded her memorandum by offering an electric scooter or cart for Complainant to use to
travel between buildings, permitting Complainant to call into internal meetings, and suggesting
that Complainant consider reassignment to a vacant position at the same or lower grade if these
options are unacceptable.

Email correspondence in the record dated May 1, 5, 6, and 8, 2015, supports a determination that
S1 addressed Complainant’s safety concerns about using the electronic scooter and inquired from
Complainant whether this safety information changed Complainant’s consideration of this
accommodation. The email correspondence further indicates that Complainant did not respond
to whether she would accept the scooter as a reasonable accommodation in light of information
indicating that the vehicle was safe to use.

There is no indication in the record that S1 was aware of Complainant’s inability to drive prior to
issuing the May 21, 2015 denial of Complainant’s February 27, 2015 reasonable accommodation
request. A physical therapy note, dated July 7, 2015 and after S1 issued her denial, states that
Complainant “is, and will be, unable to drive to and from work until further notice, due to right
knee and right ankle problems.” The record also includes an undated note from Complainant’s
physician indicating that her “medical condition does not allow her to drive;” however, there is
no support that S1 received this information prior to issuing the May 21, 2015 decision.

On May 28, 2015, the Disability Program Manager emailed Complainant and informed
Complainant about the reassignment process. On September 3, 2015 Complainant submitted a
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reasonable accommodation request to be reassigned to “another GS-11 position at DLA Aviation
Jacksonville, FL.”

With respect to the three reassignment positions at issue, the Customer Account Manager
testified that in order for Complainant to be reassigned, she must be qualified for the job; the job
cannot have promotion potential; and the job must resolve Complainant’s reasonable
accommodation needs. The Customer Account Manager stated that human resources determined
that Complainant was not qualified for the Management and Program Analyst position, JOA
DLADispSvc-15-1461645-MP, because she “did not have [the] necessary qualifications.” The
Customer Account Manager further testified that human resources determined that Complainant
was not qualified for the Management Program Analyst position, JOA DLADispSvcs-15-
1500864-MP, because Complainant did not have “specialized experience in the financial,
budgetary and personnel liaison matters.”

However, the Customer Account Manager determined that Complainant was referred for the
Contract Specialist position, JOA DLAAvn-15-1446794, but the selecting official denied
reassignment stating that Complainant “was not a good fit for the position” and this matter is
elaborated as follows.

The Customer Account Manager emailed Complainant on July 25, 2015 and explained that the
selecting official decided not to hire Complainant for the Contract Specialist position. The
Customer Account Manager also indicated that he did not believe that reassignment would be an
“appropriate avenue” based on Complainant’s belief that the Contract Specialist position would
“serve [her] better because it did not require [her] to walk as much as [her] current position.”
The Customer Account Manager explained that if Complainant was reassigned, she “would be
requesting another reasonable accommodation to remain in the location [she was] in until after
[her] knee surgery was completed.” Accordingly, the Customer Account Manager determined
that the reassignment “would not resolve the current medical situation and would result in
another reasonable accommodation request.”

The Customer Account Manager further clarified in a July 26, 2015 email to Complainant that
the “director of the [Contract Specialist] position did not feel that based on [Complainant’s]
medical conditions, he could accommodate [Complainant’s] needs.” The Customer Account
Manager further indicated that he would “forward [her] resume to the CAM for distribution to
see if they [could] accommodate [Complainant].”

The record supports a determination that Complainant was offered assignment on November 6,
2015 as a Demand/Supply Chain Analyst, effective November 16, 2015.

Our review of the record supports that the Agency responded to Complainant’s reasonable
accommodation requests and processed Complainant’s reassignment without delay. We note
that the Customer Account Manager testified that the Agency had the “right to remove
[Complainant] after the initial 60-day job search was completed,” but choose to continue to work
with Complainant until the situation was resolved. In this case, the Agency not only had to find
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a qualifying vacant position, the Agency also had to find a position that would resolve
Complainant’s unique medical needs which, understandably took time. Thus, there is no
indication in the record that the Agency unduly delayed processing Complainant’s reassignment.

Based on this evidence, we find that Complainant has not shown that the Agency violated the
Rehabilitation Act in declining to reassign her to the three positions at issue.

Disparate Treatment/Hostile Work Environment

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis first enunciated in
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For complainant to prevail, she
must first establish a prima facie of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a
factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco
Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden,
the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance
of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally
consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases.
Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action
at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the agency’s actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service
Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of
Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health
and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department
of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Agency management articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Regarding claim 1a, S1 denied sending condescending remarks, demeaning emails, and she
denied micromanaging Complainant’s work. S1 explained that she communicated with
Complainant by email 90% of the time because she often could not reach Complainant by phone
or office communicator.4 S1 specifically referenced her April 29, 2015 email to Complainant
and explained that she was “requesting information and asking for results of findings with a
‘please and thank you’.” S1 further explained that she would copy all parties on emails to
“resolve issues, not lay blame.” S1 reiterated that she would ask Complainant “typical business

4 The office communicator is an Outlook feature which allows employees to send instant
messages to each other while using the Outlook program.
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questions” to determine what actions needed to be completed, and she also sought information
from Complainant so that she could be prepared to speak about issues when she attended
meetings in Complainant’s absence.

With respect to S1’s May 6, 2015 email, S1 stated that Complainant had “not attend[ed] a lot of
the weekly Order Fulfillment Training refresher classes” so S1 instructed another Lead employee
in the May 2015 email to inform Complainant about the steps to execute Overnight Requests. S1
further noted that it was “not unusual” for Leads to share their information. S1 listed several
instances in May 2015 where she emailed Complainant to provide information, request an
update, or requested information.

With respect to a July 1, 2015 email, S1 states that she emailed Complainant because
Complainant had indicated that she was taking leave that afternoon and would submit request
that day but failed to do so. S1 explained that she sent Complainant one email and one office
communicator message to remind Complainant to submit the leave request so that S1 could
ensure coverage for her area and plan accordingly.

The record contains copies of email correspondence between S1 to Complainant in May 2015
corroborating S1’s testimony regarding the content of this correspondence.

We note that the record indicates that S1 sent two emails to Complainant on July 1, 2015 at 7:07
am and 7:11 am and S1 sent one office communicator message at 7:10 am regarding S1’s request
that Complainant inform her about her leave for that day.

We further note that the record includes one witness statement in support of Complainant’s
allegation that she was discriminated against. The coworker (“CW1”) states that she believes
that S2 was “condescending” towards Complainant through her “tone of voice and words.” This
statement directly conflicts with S1’s testimony that she was not condescending towards
Complainant. Here, Complainant effectively waived her right to have this matter considered
before an EEOC AJ. If Complainant had indeed elected a hearing, then the AJ may have
developed the record more through discovery and cross-examination of witness. Moreover, we
lack the possible benefits of an EEOC AJ’s credibility determinations. We are left with
Complainant’s version of events and that of Agency management which are completely at odds.
As such, the evidence of record was at best, in equipoise. See Complainant v. Dep't of Health
and Human Servs., EEOC Appeal No. 0120122134 (Sep. 24, 2014) citing Lore v. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., EEOC Appeal No. 0120113283 (Sep. 13, 2013) and Brand v. Dep't of Agric.,
EEOC Appeal No. 0120102187 (Aug. 23, 2012).

Regarding claim 1b, S1 explained that she was unaware that Complainant requested union
representation for the meeting until S1 arrived at Complainant’s desk. Once notified, S1 stated
that she requested that Complainant contact the union representative; however, the representative
was unable to attend the meeting “because of such short notice.” S1 testified that the meeting
was rescheduled for later that afternoon.

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Regarding claim 1c, Complainant’s second-line supervisor (“S2”) (Mexican, Brown, Female)
stated that Complainant had requested a temporary reasonable accommodation on December 1,
2014 for additional time to heal from her surgery and included a physician’s note indicating that
Complainant could return to light duty on January 13, 2015. S2 explained that the temporary
reasonable accommodation involved exchanging Complainant’s duties with another Lead
employee for 6 weeks. This exchange allowed Complainant to work from Building 109 where
the printer, copier, microwave, refrigerator, bathrooms, and parking were closer. S2 stated that
after the 6 weeks, the other Lead CSS employee was ready to return to his initial job as agreed;
however, Complainant submitted a reasonable accommodation request, dated February 27, 2015,
requesting that the temporary accommodation be changed to permanent due to her medical
condition. S2 explained that she sent the June 20, 2015 email because Complainant refused to
return to her workplace; Complainant’s workplace was left without a Lead to attend daily
meetings; and S2 needed Complainant back at her workplace to resume her lead position duties
and responsibilities. S2 clarified that no further action was taken on this matter because
Complainant requested another reasonable accommodation on June 22, 2015 for a reassignment.

After careful consideration of the record, we conclude that neither during the investigation, nor
on appeal, has Complainant proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these proffered
reasons for the disputed actions were a pretext for unlawful discrimination based on
Complainant’s race, color, disability, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity.

To establish a claim of discriminatory hostile environment harassment, Complainant must show
that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2) she was subjected to harassment in the
form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving the protected class; (3) the harassment
complained of was based on her statutorily protected class; (4) the harassment affected a term or
condition of employment and/or had the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the
work environment and/or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and
(5) there is a basis for imputing liability. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.
1982).

In other words, to prove her harassment claim, Complainant must establish that she was
subjected to conduct that was either so severe or so pervasive that a “reasonable person” in
Complainant’s position would have found the conduct to be hostile or abusive. Complainant
must also prove that the conduct was taken because of her protected basis – in this case, her race,
color, disability, and reprisal for prior protected EEO activity. Only if Complainant establishes
both of those elements – hostility and motive – will the question of Agency liability present
itself. Here, as discussed above, Complainant simply has provided inadequate evidence to
support her claim that her treatment was the result of her race, color, disability, and reprisal for
prior protected EEO activity. We conclude that a case of discriminatory harassment is precluded
based on our finding that Complainant failed to establish that any of the actions taken by the
agency were motivated by her protected bases. See Oakley v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01982923 (Sept. 21, 2000).

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We AFFIRM the Agency’s final decision because the preponderance of the evidence of record
does not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or
department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do
so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
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file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The
court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter
the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to
File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

March 5, 2019
Date