Cecelia Anabel-Leigh. Price

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 30, 2019

15336200 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 30, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/336,200 10/27/2016 Cecelia Anabel-Leigh Price END920160423US1 4178
133758 7590 07/30/2019
Roberts Mlotkowski Safran Cole & Calderon, P.C.
Intellectual Property Department
P.O. Box 10064
McLean, VA 22102-8064
EXAMINER
KONG, SZE-HON
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3661
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/30/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Docketing@rmsc2.com
dbeltran@rmsc2.com
lgallaugher@rmsc2.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
__________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
__________

Ex parte CECELIA ANABEL-LEIGH PRICE
__________

Appeal 2018-009147
Application 15/336,200
Technology Center 3600
__________

Before MICHAEL L. HOELTER, ANNETTE R. REIMERS, and
LISA M. GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judges.

GUIJT, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection2 of claims 1, 3–14, 16–18, 20, 21, 23, and 24. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part and designate our affirmance of claims 1, 3–12, 18,
20, 21, and 23 as a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION and enter NEW
GROUNDS OF REJECTION of claims 13, 14, 16, 17, and 24 pursuant to
our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).

1 International Business Machines Corporation (“Appellant”) is the applicant
as provided under 37 C.F.R. § 1.46 and is identified as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 2.
2 Appeal is taken from the Final Office Action dated Jan. 12, 2018.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1, 13, and 18 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is exemplary of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A method for controlling an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV), comprising:
receiving, by a computer device, UAV data from a UAV;
displaying, by the computer device, a representation of the
UAV on a map based on the UAV data;
receiving, by the computer device, a user input to control
the UAV; and
transmitting, by the computer device, an authenticated
control signal to the UAV based on the received user input,
wherein the control signal is configured to override control of the
UAV from a UAV remote controller associated with the UAV,
wherein the UAV data comprises:
a Drone Identification Number (DIN) that is unique
to the UAV, wherein the DIN is a unique addressable
identifier by which the computer device addresses and
directs messages to the UAV via SMS-PP transmission;
a current GPS location of the UAV; and
a current altitude of the UAV.

THE REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Kotecha (US 2016/0371987 A1; published Dec. 22, 2016)
and Shehata (US 2015/0142211 A1; published May 21, 2015).3

3 Although the Examiner listed claims 8 and 22 in the header of this
rejection, claims 8 and 22 are not discussed in the body of this rejection.
Final Act. 6. We note that claim 8 is identified in a separate rejection and
claim 22 is canceled. See id. at 19.
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II. Claims 5–7, 13, 14, 16–18, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as unpatentable over Kotecha, Shehata, and Wang (US 2015/0147876
A1; published May 28, 2015).
III. Claim 8 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Kotecha, Shehata, and Tofte (US 9,563,201 B1; issued Feb. 7, 2017).
IV. Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Kotecha, Shehata, and Hamke (US 2010/0228406 A1; published Sept. 9,
2010).
V. Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Kotecha, Shehata, Wang, and Burema (US 2014/0303814 A1; published
Oct. 9, 2014).
VI. Claim 23 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Kotecha, Shehata, and Boria (US 2015/0292901 A1; published Oct. 15,
2015).
VII. Claim 24 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over
Kotecha, Shehata, Wang, and Tofte.

ANALYSIS
Rejection I
Appellant argues claims 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, and 12 as a group. Appeal Br.
4. We select claim 1 as representative, and claim 3, 4, 9, 11, and 12 stand or
fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Regarding independent claim 1, the Examiner finds, inter alia, that
Kotecha discloses a method for controlling an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) comprising receiving, by a computer device, UAV data from a UAV.
Final Act. 6 (citing Kotecha, ¶¶ 24, 40). The Examiner also finds that
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Kotecha discloses the claimed [] Drone Identification Number
(DIN) that is unique to the UAV (Paragraph 0041, where each of
the UAVs are being identified by the control and monitoring
system, each UAVs would have to transmit its unique IDs to the
control entity for the control and monitoring system to track and
identify which UAV is monitoring and in turn to control).
Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The Examiner finds that Shehata “also discloses
the computer control system receiving and identifying the IDs of the UAVs
for addressing and directing messages to the specific UAV.” Id. at 7–8
(citing Shehata, Abstract, ¶¶ 4, 9, 27, 32, 39). The Examiner acknowledges
that “Kotecha and Shehata do[] not explicitly disclose the communication is
via SMS-PP transmission.” Id. at 8. The Examiner reasons that “[h]owever,
SMS-PP is a well-known communication standard and one of ordinary skill
in the art would recognize the communications between the UAVs may use
any well-known type or standard communication methods or protocol for
communicating data.” Id.; see also Ans. 5–7.
Appellant contends that the Examiner incorrectly finds that the cited
prior art discloses the limitation “a Drone Identification Number (DIN) that
is unique to the UAV, wherein the DIN is a unique addressable identifier by
which the computer device addresses and directs messages to the UAV via
SMS-PP transmission.” Appeal Br. 5–6. In support for this contention,
Appellant argues that “[t]he Examiner readily admits that Kotecha and
Shehata do not disclose communication via SMS-PP transmission” and that
the Examiner’s assertion that “SMS-PP is a well-known communication
standard and one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the
communications between the UAVs may use any well-known type or
standard communication methods or protocol for communicating data” is not
supported by the evidence. Id. at 6. As such, Appellant argues that “the
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Examiner has resorted to speculation, unfounded assumption or hindsight
reconstruction to assert that it would have been obvious to modify Kotecha
to use communication via SMS-PP transmission.” Id. at 6–7; see also Reply
Br. 1–4.
Appellant’s contentions are unpersuasive. We understand that in
stating “SMS-PP is a well-known communication standard,” the Examiner is
taking Official Notice.4 Schrecker5, 6 evidences that “[p]ortable devices . . .
have become feverishly popular in part because of the convenient access
they provide to a multitude of computer-enabled tasks, services, and
functions” and that “[u]sers can . . . send SMS messages.” Schrecker, ¶ 25
(emphasis added). Sennett7, 8 discloses that “[s]ystems, methods, and
apparatuses may use an unmanned vehicle to communicate an alert such as
an emergency alert, to a region, such as one affected by a natural disaster.”
Sennett, Abstract (emphasis added). Notably, Sennett discloses that
“[c]ommunication device 103 may also include a cell broadcast center
(CBC) capable of communicating, alone or in conjunction with mobile base
station on unmanned vehicle 102, a short message service cell broadcast

4 “In certain circumstances where appropriate, an examiner may take official
notice of facts not in the record . . . .” “Official notice unsupported by
documentary evidence should only be taken by the examiner where the facts
asserted to be well-known, or to be common knowledge in the art are
capable of instant and unquestionable demonstration as being well-known.”
M.P.E.P. § 2144.03 (citing In re Ahlert, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (CCPA 1970)).
5 US 2013/0268767 A1; published Oct. 10, 2013.
6 Cited by Appellant as discussed infra. See Appeal Br. 14.
7 US 2016/0164619 A1; published June 9, 2016.
8 Cited by Examiner on PTO-892 form dated July 25, 2018.
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(SMS-CB)” (Sennett, ¶ 28 (emphasis added)), and that “[u]nmanned vehicle
102 may communicate an alert . . . . The alert may be transmitted as an SMS
point-to-point text message . . . or as an SMS cellular broadcast text
message” (id. at ¶ 52 (emphasis added)). See also id. at ¶ 37 (“An alert may
be comprised . . . text (e.g., a short message service (SMS) text message).”).
During prosecution,9 the following references were cited by the
Examiner, which evidence that short message service is a well-known
communication protocol: Avarhamy,10 Cili,11 Curzi,12 Sayers,13 and Smith.14
See for example, Avarahamy, ¶ 69; Cili, ¶ 19; Curzi, ¶ 35; Sayers, 15:14–21;
Smith, Abstract. Further, although the Examiner does not refer to Tofte in
this rejection, the Examiner cites Tofte in the rejection of claims 8 and 24 as
indicated supra. See Final Act. 19, 24. Tofte discloses controlling a UAV
and viewing feedback received from a UAV (Tofte, Abstract); “each of
UAV 102 [and] portable computing device 106 . . . may communicate with
one another directly or via communication network 104 using any suitable
number of wired and/or wireless links in conjunction with any suitable
number and/or type of communication protocols” (id. at 4:4–10 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 4:40–42, 50–52; 10:20–25; 16:42–65); and “window
404 may include one or more message sent by the UAV” (id. at 23:66–67
(emphasis added)). Thus, we do not agree with Appellant that “the

9 See PTO-892 forms dated July 25, 2018; Jan. 12, 2018; Aug. 24, 2017; and
Feb. 9, 2017.
10 US 2017/0086281 A1; published Mar. 23, 2017.
11 US 2015/0256986 A1; published Sept. 10, 2015.
12 US 2013/0173248 A1; published July 4, 2013.
13 US 6,729,929 B1; issued May 4, 2004.
14 US 2013/0210469 A1; published Aug. 15, 2013.
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Examiner has resorted to speculation, unfounded assumption or hindsight
reconstruction to assert that it would have been obvious to modify Kotecha
to use communication via SMS-PP transmission,” as argued by Appellant
supra.
Appellant contends that the Examiner “does not address the actual
language of the claim and fails to consider the claimed invention as a whole”
because “[t]he recited SMS-PP transmission from the computer device to the
UAV is addressed and directed to the UAV using the DIN that is received by
the computer device from the UAV.” Appeal Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 5–6.
However, with respect to the SMS-PP transmission, this argument is
unpersuasive in light of the discussion supra, wherein it is demonstrated that
SMS-PP transmission between devices that include unmanned vehicles is
well-known. See e.g., Sennett ¶¶ 28, 52.
Appellant contends that the Examiner incorrectly concludes that “each
UAVs [of Kotecha] would have to transmit its unique IDs to the control
entity.” Appeal Br. 10. However, Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive
because the Supreme Court has emphasized that “the [obviousness] analysis
need not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of
the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and
creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” KSR
Int’l v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). As noted by the Court in
KSR, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not
an automaton.” Id. at 421. “The combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” Id. at 416. See also In re Geisler, 116 F.3d
at 1470. Nothing in the record here suggests the Examiner’s proposed
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combination of known prior art elements according to their known functions
would involve more than routine engineering efforts.
The Specification discloses that “at least one regulation requires that
certain UAVs be manually marked with a unique registration number
similar to those numbers that appear on general aviation aircraft.” Spec., ¶ 2
(emphasis added). Notably, Kotecha discloses the need to override a UAV
operator, the need to identify a UAV, and the need to transmit the location of
the UAV. See Kotecha, ¶¶ 17, 24, 40, 41, 43. Shehata discloses “receiving
real-time vehicle status data from a plurality of unmanned aerial vehicles”
(Shehata, ¶ 4; see also id. at ¶ 18); “[e]ach status subpanel 215 consists of
indications of the vehicle’s name (or identifier) 220” (id. at ¶ 27), and that
Figure 3 shows that “the ground height indicator 130 shows UAVs ‘Scotty’
and ‘Jenny’ both at a ground height of 0” (id. at ¶ 65).15
Appellant’s Specification and claims do not define a “Drone
Identification Number” as an identification of UAVs or drones different
from the forms of identification discussed above. Because the Specification
and the cited prior art disclose a DIN, the need to identify a UAV, and that a
UAV and a computer device can communicate with each other using any
suitable number and/or type of communication protocols such as SMS-CB
and SMS-PP, we determine that it would have been obvious to modify the
method for controlling a UAV of Kotecha to use “a Drone Identification

15 We note that although the Examiner does not refer to Burema in this
rejection, the Examiner cites Burema in the rejection of claim 21 as
indicated supra. See Final Act. 23. Burema discloses “[e]ach aerial farm
robot is connected to a local network through a Wi-Fi link and is represented
as an independent network device with its own unique IP address.” Burema,
¶ 74 (emphasis added).
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Number (DIN) that is unique to the UAV, wherein the DIN is a unique
addressable identifier by which the computer device addresses and directs
messages to the UAV via SMS-PP transmission,” as claimed.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1, and claims 3, 4, 9, 11, and 12 depending therefrom. To the extent
we rely on reasoning that is not relied on by the Examiner in the rejection as
stated, we designate our affirmance as a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION
to provide Appellant with a fair opportunity to respond.

Rejection II
Dependent claims 5–7
Appellant contends that “[c]laims 5–7 each depend from claim 1 and
are distinguishable from the applied art for at least the same reasons as the
base claim.” Appeal Br. 11. As such, for the same reasons stated supra for
claim 1, we also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5–7 and
designate our affirmance as a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION.
Independent claim 13 and dependent claim 17
Claim 13 recites “A computer program product for controlling
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)” “comprising a computer readable storage
medium having program instructions embodied therewith, the program
instructions executable by a computing device to cause the computing
device to:” “. . . transmit a control signal that is authenticated by a digital
signature to the selected UAV based on the received user input.” Appeal Br.
26–27 (Claims App.; emphasis added).
Regarding independent claim 13, the Examiner finds, inter alia, that
Kotecha discloses a computer program product for UAVs comprising a
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computer readable storage medium having program instructions embodied
therewith, the program instructions executable by a computing device to
cause the computing device to transmit a control signal that is authenticated
by a digital signature to the selected UAV based on the received user input
because Kotecha discloses that control is authenticated based on privileges
or permission. Final Act. 12 (citing Kotecha, ¶¶ 17, 35, 36, 40); see also
Ans. 8–9.
Appellant disputes this finding by arguing that, at most, “Kotecha
discloses pass-word based authentication” and “makes no mention of
authentication by digital signal.” Appeal Br. 12 (citing Kotecha ¶ 35); see
also Reply Br. 6–7.
Kotecha discloses “[p]rocess 500 may include authenticating UAV
operators (block 510). The authentication may be performed using
password-based authentication or other authentication techniques.”
Kotecha ¶ 35 (emphasis added). The Specification does not define “digital
signature.” However, Appellant explains that a password-based
authentication is not the same as a digital signature as evidenced by
Teneboym,16 Schrecker,17 and oxforddictionaries.com. Appeal Br. 14.
Teneboym discloses that “[a] digital signature is a form of electronic
signature that is an indication associated with a message establishing that the
message is endorsed and adopted by the signer.” Teneboym 3:15–18.
oxforddictionaries.com defines “digital signature” as “[a] digital code
(generated and authenticated by public key encryption) which is attached to

16 US 8,954,731 B2; issued Feb. 10, 2015.
17 US 2013/0268767 A1; published Oct. 10, 2013.
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an electronically transmitted document to verify its contents and the sender’s
identity.”18 We thus agree with Appellant that Kotecha fails to disclose a
digital signature.
However, as Appellant points out, Schrecker discloses that
“authentication data can include a digital signature or certificate, token,
password, encryption key, or other authentication data.” Schrecker ¶ 30
(emphasis added); see also Appeal Br. 14. As such, Schrecker discloses that
digital signature authentication and password-based authentication are
known equivalents. “[W]hen a patent claims a structure already known in
the prior art that is altered by the mere substitution of one element for
another known in the field, the combination must do more than yield a
predictable result.” Id. at 416, citing United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39,
50–51 (1966); see also In re Fout, 675 F.2d 297, 301 (CCPA 1982).
Thus, we determine that it would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to substitute the known
equivalent of a password-based authentication, as disclosed by Kotecha,
with Schrecker’s digital signature authentication. Such a combination is
merely a “predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417. With the exception to the “digital
signature” as discussed above, we adopt the Examiner’s findings with
respect to Kotecha, Shehata, and Wang, and the rationales with respect to the
combination thereof. See Final Act. 12–13, 15–16.

18 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/digital_signature (last
accessed June 26, 2019).
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For the reasons discussed supra, we do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 13 and 17 as unpatentable over Kotecha, Shehata, and
Wang. However, for additional reasons discussed supra, we enter a NEW
GROUND OF REJECTION of independent claim 13, and claim 17
depending therefrom, as unpatentable over Kotecha, Shehata, Wang, and
Schrecker.
Dependent claims 14 and 16
Claims 14 and 16 depend from claim 13. Appeal Br. 27 (Claims
App.).
Regarding claim 14, Appellant makes the same argument as for claim
1 above. Appeal Br. 15–16; see also Reply Br. 7. Appellant’s contention is
unpersuasive for the reasons discussed supra.
Regarding claim 16, Appellant contends that “the applied art does not
teach the combination of features . . . including ‘the UAV data is received
via Short Message Service-Cell Broadcast (SMS-CB) protocol; and the
control signal is transmitted via Short Message Service-Point to
Point (SMS-PP) protocol.’” Appeal Br. 16; see also Reply Br. 7–8.
However, as pointed out supra, SMS-CB and SMS-PP are well-
known communication protocols in unmanned vehicles. See e.g., Sennett,
¶¶ 28, 52. In addition, the Examiner reasons that “[t]he uses of the known
communication protocols would provide the same and predictable result of
communications between communication systems using different
frequencies, taught by Wang to prevent interferences in simultaneous data
communications.” Final Act. 11. Appellant does not apprise us of error.
Appeal Br. 16; see also Reply Br. 7–8.
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As discussed above for claim 13, we agree with Appellant that
Kotecha fails to disclose a digital signature. However, Schrecker discloses
that digital signature authentication and password-based authentication are
known equivalents. See Schrecker ¶ 30; see also Appeal Br. 14. Thus, it
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention to substitute the known equivalent of a password-based
authentication, as disclosed by Kotecha, with Schrecker’s digital signature
authentication. Such a combination is merely a “predictable use of prior art
elements according to their established functions.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
With the exception to the “digital signature” as discussed above, we adopt
the Examiner’s findings with respect to Kotecha, Shehata, and Wang, and
the rationales with respect to the combination thereof. See Final Act. 11–15.
For the reasons discussed supra for claim 13, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 14 and 16 as unpatentable over Kotecha,
Shehata, and Wang. However, for additional reasons discussed supra, we
enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION of claims 14 and 16 as
unpatentable over Kotecha, Shehata, Wang, Schrecker, and Sennett.
Independent claim 18 and dependent claim 20
Claim 18 recites “[a] system, comprising: an unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) comprising:” “a transmitter configured to broadcast the DIN,” and “a
receiver . . . wherein: the transmitter broadcasts the DIN, the GPS location,
and the altitude via Short Message Service-Cell Broadcast (SMS-CB)
protocol; and the receiver receives the control signal from the computer
device via Short Message Service-Point to Point (SMS-PP) protocol.”
Appeal Br. 27–28 (Claims App.; emphasis added).
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Regarding independent claim 18, the Examiner makes similar findings
with respect to Kotecha and Shehata as discussed above for claim 1 and with
respect to Wang as discussed above for claim 16. Final Act. 16–18. The
Examiner acknowledges that “Kotecha does not specifically disclose the
UAV data is received via Short Message Service-Cell Broadcast (SMS-CB)
protocol; and the control signal is transmitted via Short Message Service-
Point to Point (SMS-PP) protocol.” Id. at 18. The Examiner reasons that
[h]owever, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill
in the art to employ any one of well-known and standard
communication frequencies or protocols such as the Short
Message Service-Cell Broadcast (SMS-CB) protocol and the
Short Message Service Point to Point (SMS-PP) protocol, which
are well-known and standard protocols in communications, for
receiving the UAV data and transmitting control signals.
Id.; see also Ans. 10.
Appellant contends that the Examiner’s findings and reasoning for
claim 18 are in error similarly as discussed above for claim 1. See Appeal
Br. 17–18; see also Reply Br. 8–9. Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive
for the reasons discussed supra. Appellant does not present separate
arguments for claim 20. See Appeal Br. 18.
Therefore, for the same reasons stated supra for claim 1, we also
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 18 and 20 and designate our
affirmance as a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION.

Rejection III
Claim 8 depends from claim 1. Appeal Br. 25 (Claims App.). The
Examiner acknowledges that Kotecha does not specifically disclose the
plural selectable objects of claim 8. Final Act. 20. The Examiner, however,
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concludes that “[i]t also would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in
the art [to modify Kotecha’s to have] more or less number of buttons
[which] would be available based on the design choice or need.” Final Act.
21; see also id. at 22.
Appellant contends that “none of the references teaches ‘a second
button, wherein the control signal is configured to cause the UAV to hover
at its current location and altitude for a specified time and land after the
hovering in response to the user input being a selection of the second button’
as recited in claim 8.” See Appeal Br. 19–20; see also Reply Br. 9–10.
Appellant’s contention is unpersuasive in that it does not address the
rejection as the Examiner finds that it would have been obvious to modify
the method of Kotecha to provide the buttons as claimed, as a matter of
design choice. Appellant does not provide persuasive arguments or evidence
to show that there is criticality in displaying one particular button over
another particular button for controlling a UAV. See Appeal Br. 19–20; see
also Reply Br. 9–10.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant contends that the Examiner’s inherency
argument to Kotecha in the Answer “does not address that the recited
hovering is ‘at its current location and altitude’ and ‘for a specified time.’”
Reply Br. 10.
In the Answer, the Examiner finds that “Kotecha would inherently
include a specified time due to time delay after the emergency landing
command is issued to stop and hover the UAV before landing.” Ans. 11; see
also Final Act. 21 (“[T]he command for instructing the UAV to stop and/or
to perform the emergency landing taught by Kotecha is interrupting the
current operation of the UAV, causing the UAV to hover and to land the
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UAV, an inherent time delay with a specified time, hovering the UAV
before landing.”). The Examiner reasons that a skilled artisan “would
recognize[] stopping the UAV by hovering before performing the landing
operation would be necessary to stabilize the dynamics of the vehicle before
it lands, reduces the chance of the UAV being unstable and crashes.” Ans.
11. Appellant does not provide persuasive evidence or argument apprising
us of error in the Examiner’s stated reasoning. Reply Br. 10.
Further, although the Examiner does not refer to Hamke in this
rejection, the Examiner cites Hamke in the rejection of claim 10 as indicated
supra. See Final Act. 22. Claim 10, which also depends from claim 1,
includes claim language similar to that of claim 8 regarding a control signal
configured “to cause the UAV to hover at its current location and altitude for
a specified time.” Appeal Br. 25, 26 (Claims App.).
For claim 10, the Examiner finds that “Kotecha discloses the control
signal is configured to cause the UAV to hover at its current location and
altitude (Paragraph 0023, 0024, 0028, stopping the UAV and/or emergency
landing).” Final Act. 22. According to the Examiner, “the command for
instructing the UAV to stop and/or to perform the emergency landing taught
by Kotecha is interrupting the current operation of the UAV, causing the
UAV to hover and to land the UAV, an inherent time delay with a specified
time, hovering the UAV before landing.” Id. The Examiner also finds that
“Kotecha does not specifically disclose the computer device permits a user
to adjust the specified time.” Id.; see also id. (Kotecha “does not explicitly
disclose the UAV hover[s] a specified time.”).
However, the Examiner finds that Hamke “discloses the user may
command the UAV to hover until another command is to be given
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(Paragraph 0061, 0062), which the user can decide and control the UAV to
hover for an adjustable and specified time.” Id. at 22–23. The Examiner
reasons that a skilled artisan would modify Kotecha’s invention to permit a
user to adjust the time the UAV maintains a hovering state before another
control command is to be performed, as taught by Hamke, “to allow [the]
operator to have more control freedom and provide a more programmable
UAV that fit[s] the operator’s desire.” Id. at 23. Appellant does not provide
persuasive evidence or argument apprising us of error in the Examiner’s
combined teachings of Kotecha and Hamke. Appeal Br. 20; see also Reply
Br. 10.
For these reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8. As
claim 8 depends from claim 1 and to the extent we rely on reasoning that is
not relied on by the Examiner in the rejection as stated, we designate our
affirmance as a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION

Rejections IV–VI
Claims 10, 21, and 23 depend from claims 1 and 18, respectively.
Appeal Br. 25–26, 29–30 (Claims App.).
For these claims, Appellant relies on the arguments made above for
claims 1 and 18. See Appeal Br. 20–21. Appellant’s contentions are
unpersuasive for the reasons discussed supra.
Therefore, for the same reasons stated supra for claims 1 and 18, we
also sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 10, 21, and 23 and designate
our affirmance as a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION.

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Rejection VII
Claim 24 depends from claim 13 and recites limitations similar to
claim 8. Appeal Br. 30 (Claims App.).
Appellant contends that the rejection of claim 24 is deficient in the
same manner as discussed above for claim 8. Appeal Br. 22; see also Reply
Br. 11. As discussed above for claim 8, Appellant’s contention does not
address the rejection as the Examiner finds that it would have been obvious
to modify the method of Kotecha to provide the buttons as claimed, as a
matter of design choice. Appellant does not provide persuasive arguments
or evidence to show that there is criticality in displaying one particular
button over another particular button for controlling a UAV. See Appeal Br.
19–20; see also Reply Br. 9–10. Also, for the same reasons discussed above
for claim 8, Appellant’s contention that the Examiner’s inherency argument
to Kotecha “does not address that the recited hovering is ‘at its current
location and altitude’ and ‘for a specified time.’” is not persuasive. See
Reply Br. 10; see also Final Act. 21–22; Ans. 11.
As discussed above for claim 13, we agree with Appellant that
Kotecha fails to disclose a digital signature. However, Schrecker discloses
that digital signature authentication and password-based authentication are
known equivalents. See Schrecker ¶ 30; see also Appeal Br. 14. Thus, it
would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time
of the invention to substitute the known equivalent of a password-based
authentication, as disclosed by Kotecha, with Schrecker’s digital signature
authentication. Such a combination is merely a “predictable use of prior art
elements according to their established functions.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
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As further discussed above in reference to claims 8 and 10, each of
which contains claim language to a control signal configured “to cause the
UAV to hover at its current location and altitude for a specified time”
(Appeal Br. 25, 26 (Claims App.)). Appellant does not provide persuasive
evidence or argument apprising us of error in the Examiner’s combined
teachings of Kotecha and Hamke. Appeal Br. 20; see also Reply Br. 10.
With the exception to the “digital signature” as discussed above, we adopt
the Examiner’s findings with respect to Kotecha, Shehata, Wang, and Tofte
and the rationales with respect to the combination thereof. See Final Act.
12–13, 25–28.
For the reasons discussed supra for claim 13, we do not sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 24 as unpatentable over Kotecha, Shehata,
Wang, and Tofte. However, for additional reasons discussed supra for
claims 8, 10, and 13, we enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION of claim
24 as unpatentable over Kotecha, Shehata, Wang, Schrecker, Tofte, and
Hamke.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1, 3–12, 18, 20, 21, and 23
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is AFFIRMED, and designated as a NEW
GROUND OF REJECTION.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 13, 14, 16, 17, and 24 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is REVERSED. We enter NEW GROUNDS OF
REJECTION of claims 13, 14, 16, 17, and 24.

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FINALITY OF DECISION
This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection pursuant
to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section
41.50(b) also provides:
When the Board enters such a non-final decision, the appellant,
within two months from the date of the decision, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new ground
of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected
claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence relating to
the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered
by the examiner, in which event the prosecution will be
remanded to the examiner. The new ground of rejection is
binding upon the examiner unless an amendment or new
Evidence not previously of Record is made which, in the opinion
of the examiner, overcomes the new ground of rejection
designated in the decision. Should the examiner reject the
claims, appellant may again appeal to the Board pursuant to this
subpart.
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same Record. The
request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection
and state with particularity the points believed to have been
misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of
rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing
is sought.

Further guidance on responding to new grounds of rejection can be
located in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1214.01.

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART; 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)