Cassio Wallner et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 16, 2020

13335268 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 16, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/335,268 12/22/2011 Cassio Wallner RWF-4439-118 4850
23117 7590 06/16/2020
NIXON & VANDERHYE, PC
901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
EXAMINER
FISHER, PAUL R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/16/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com
pair_nixon@firsttofile.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte CASSIO WALLNER, PAULO ANCHIETA DA SILVA,
RICARDO ROGULSKI, RICARDO PINHEIRO RULLI, and
TOMAZ LAZANHA

Appeal 2020-001152
Application 13/335,268
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, FRANCISCO C. PRATS, and
JAMIE T. WISZ, Administrative Patent Judges.

LEBOVITZ, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
The Examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 102 as
anticipated, under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious, and under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
reciting patent ineligible subject matter. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a),
Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject the claims. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Embraer S.A.
Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Examiner finally rejected the claims as follows:
1. Claims 1, 10, 12, 13, 15, 22, 24, and 30 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious in view of Kent et al. (US 2004/0176887 A1, published
Sep. 9, 2004) (“Kent”), Torng (US 2009/0240468 A1, published Sep. 24,
2009) (“Torng”), Sinex (US 6,442,459 B1, issued Aug. 27, 2002) (“Sinex”),
Cerreta et al. (US 2010/0186519 A1, published Jul. 29, 2010) (“Cerreta”),
Nakagawa et al. (US 6,370,839 B1, issued Apr. 16, 2002) (“Nakagawa”).
Final Act. 5.
2. Claims 4 and 16 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in
view of Kent, Torng, Sinex, Cerreta, Nakagawa, and Sweeney et al. (US
2003/0111525 A1, published Jun. 19, 2003) (“Sweeney”). Final Act. 57.
3. Claims 8 and 20 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in
view of Kent, Torng, Sinex, Cerreta, Nakagawa, and Fields (US
2003/0088373 A1, published May 8, 2003) (“Fields”). Final Act. 63–64.
4. Claims 11 and 23 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in
view of Kent, Torng, Sinex, Cerreta, Nakagawa, and Isobe et al. (US
6,636,813 B1, issued Oct. 21, 2003) (“Isobe”). Final Act. 71–72.
5. Claims 31 and 33 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in
view of Kent, Torng, Sinex, Cerreta, Nakagawa, and Stothers et al. (US
2009/0070048 A1, published Mar. 12, 2009) (“Stothers”). Final Act. 76.
6. Claims 32, 35 and 36 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious
in view of Kent, Torng, Sinex, Cerreta, Nakagawa, and Giurgiutiu et al. (US
2010/0042338 A1, published Feb. 18, 2010) (“Giurgiutiu”). Final Act. 78–
79.
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7. Claim 34 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in view of
Kent, Torng, Sinex, Cerreta, Nakagawa, and Akdeniz et al. (US
2007/0056375 A1, published Mar. 15, 2007) (“Akdeniz”). Final Act. 81.
8. Claim 37 under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in view of
Kent, Torng, Sinex, Cerreta, Nakagawa, and Martin (US 4,888,076, issued
Dec. 19, 1989) (“Martin”). Final Act. 83.
9. Claims 1, 4, 8, 10-13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, and 30–37 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory
subject matter. Final Act. 2.
Independent claim 1 is representative and is reproduced below. The
claim is annotated with bracketed numbers for reference to the claim
limitations.
1. A method, implemented at least in part by at least one
computer including a processor, and a storage device coupled to
the processor, of analyzing and assessing structural damage to
an aircraft during operation of the aircraft, the method
comprising:
[1] sensing, with at least one sensor during operation of
the aircraft, aircraft structural damage data related to aircraft
structural damage sustained by the aircraft; and
[2] automatically, with at least one processor, analyzing
the sensed aircraft structural damage data and determining a
damage disposition based on results of the analyzing, including
automatically with the at least one processor:
[3] during operation of the aircraft, comparing the
sensed aircraft structural damage data with at least one
predetermined limit specified in structural repair manual
associated with the aircraft;
[4] based on the comparing, selectively performing
a specific structural analysis for detected damage considering
plural parameters including damage type, geometry and
dimensions of damaged areas, material parameters, and
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structure loads, wherein said specific structural analysis
includes static, fatigue and damage tolerance structural analysis;
[5] automatically determining, in response to the
comparing and results of the specific structural analysis, a
damage disposition including specifying categories as
allowable damage, fly-by, temporary repair, permanent repair,
and contacting the aircraft manufacturer for specific disposition,
said damage disposition determining including automatically
determining damage severity indicative of whether the aircraft
is in a condition for safe flight or alternatively whether the
aircraft needs to be removed from operation for repair, and
using results of the additional specific structural analysis to
automatically determine the number of flight cycles allowed
before repair when the at least one processor determines a
repair is needed; and
[6] generating an analysis results report based on
the determined damage disposition and results of the specific
structural analysis.

1. REJECTION BASED ON KENT, TORNG, SINEX, CERRATA,
AND NAKAGAWA
The Examiner found that Kent describes a method for “assessing
structural damage to an aircraft during operation of the aircraft” using a
computer as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 5–8. The Examiner found that
Kent’s method comprises the same steps as claim 1. Id. The Examiner found
that Kent does not explicitly teach “comparing the sensed aircraft structural
damage data with at least one predetermined limit” as recited in step [3] of
claim 1. Id. at 8–9. To meet this deficiency, the Examiner further relied upon
Torng for its teaching that “traditional aircraft structural integrity programs
(ASIP) damage tolerance requirements use a set of design standards to
determine the inspection and repair schedule.” Torng ¶ 44 (referenced at
Final Act. 9). The Examiner concluded that it would have been obvious to
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one of ordinary skill in the art to apply Torng’s teachings to Kent to
determine an inspection and repair schedule. Final Act. 9, 11.
The Examiner further found that neither Kent nor Torng describes
making the comparisons to a “structural repair manual” as recited in step [3]
of claim 1, but found that Sinex “teaches it is known to compare the assessed
data and damage to a Structural Repair Manual and to use this comparison to
suggest or select actions to be taken.” Final Act. 12. The Examiner
determined it would have obvious to apply Sinex to the teachings in Kent
and Torng to “ensure that the maintenance personnel in Kent comply with
the requirements set forth by the manufacturer of the aircraft and outlined in
the Structural Repair Manual.” Id.
The Examiner further relied on Cerreta for its disclosure of different
tests for damage, including static analysis (Final Act. 14–15) (step [4] of
claim 1) and Nakagawa for teaching contacting the aircraft manufacturer for
specific damage disposition (step [5] of claim 1) (Final Act. 16–18).

Discussion
Appellant traverses the rejection. We address the arguments below.
Appellant argues that Kent never uses the term “damage” as recited in
claim 1 nor discloses “any attempt to analyze or quantify structural
damage.” Appeal Br. 7. Rather, Appellant contends that Kent “is directed to
a different kind of analysis altogether: fault detection and fault prediction.”
Id. Appellant also argues that Kent does not have the ability to determine
and quantify the severity of structural damage. Id. Instead, Appellant asserts
“Kent merely discloses determining whether there is a fault or predicting
when a fault may occur in the future.” Id.
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Appellant’s argument is not supported by the evidence in this record.
The health management system described in Kent “relates to the structure of
the aircraft which monitors various system parameters, for example, but not
limited to, vibration, pressure, temperature, strain and moisture content of
the vehicle structure.” Kent ¶ 40. Kent further explains:
As shown in FIG. 2, the on-board ACAMS system 100 [Aircraft
Condition Analysis and Management System] accepts data from
a[n] on-board data bus 500, such as, but not limited to, an MIL
STD 1553 data bus, for real-time analysis. The data bus 500
receives signals from, for example, but not limited to, an engine
501, structure 502 of the aircraft, flight controls 503 of the
aircraft, avionics controls 504, and Global Positioning System
(GPS) 505. The ACAMS system 100 then uses information
fusion and onboard reasoning processes for diagnosis, prognosis,
fault isolation, and identification of component or components
responsible for faulty conditions to cue operators and/or
maintenance personnel to ensure that parts are available for
repair or replacement, appropriate maintenance is performed,
and assets are deployed in time for the next mission.
Kent ¶ 45 (emphasis added).
Paragraph 40 therefore provides evidence that the “structure” of the
aircraft is monitored.
The use of sensors and the type of faults that are identified using the
sensors is also described by Kent:
The information sources that are used for formulating the models
include, for example, but not limited to, . . . emerging sensors
128 to include new physical sensors including, but not limited to,
micro-electromechanical systems, fiber optics, ultrasonic
sensors, and acoustic emission sensors, for characterization of
component and system-level degradation, especially in
structural materials.
Kent ¶ 55 (emphasis added).
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Degradation in structural materials is therefore expressly described by
Kent. As explained below, the evidence supports the Examiner’s finding that
the “degradation” in structural material disclosed by Kent meets the claim
limitation of “structural damage.”
The Specification does not provide a definition of “structural
damage,” the limitation that Appellant asserts is not disclosed by Kent, but it
does provide guidance. Specifically, the Specification discloses:
Aircraft in service are susceptible to corrosion, fatigue and
accidental damages, which can be induced by service loads,
environmental conditions or accidental impacts. These structural
damages can be detected during a scheduled maintenance or
during the aircraft operation (walk[-]around inspections).
Spec. ¶ 4 (emphasis added).
Corrosion, which is “to eat or wear away gradually” or “to impair;
deteriorate”2 is reasonably interpreted to include “degradation” of structural
materials as described in Kent ¶ 55 (reproduced above). Consequently, while
Kent may teach various types of fault detection as asserted by Appellant
(Appeal Br. 7–9), Kent explicitly describes detecting degradation in
structural materials which is the same type of structural damage disclosed in
the Specification (¶ 4 reproduced above; ¶ 13 (“Measurement of structural
integrity degradation can be a complex task.).
Appellant also argues that Kent does not described what is disclosed
in “non-limiting embodiments” of the Specification:
In applicant’s non-limiting embodiments, in-service monitoring
determines when structural damage has occurred, automatically
assesses the extent of the damage, and then refers the situation to
the aircraft manufacturer when detected damage is out of limits
that can be handled by normal maintenance operations. See e.g.,

2 https://www.dictionary.com/browse/corrode
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para. 33. Kent discloses nothing like this. Furthermore, Kent fails
to suggest automatic deployment of specific structural analysis
in order to improve damage disposition as applicant provides at
e.g. para. 34.
Appeal Br. 9.
Appellant does not identify what limitations in the claim correspond
to these so-called “non-limiting embodiments.” However, it appears that
Appellant is arguing that Kent does not disclose step [2] of claim 1 of
“automatically, with at least one processor, analyzing the sensed aircraft
structural damage data and determining a damage disposition based on
results of the analyzing, including automatically with the at least one
processor” and limitation [5] of “contacting the aircraft manufacturer for
specific disposition.” We do not agree with Appellant that these limitations
are not described in the prior art cited by the Examiner.
The Examiner cited specific paragraphs in Kent where step [2] of the
claim is described. Final Act. 6–7 (citing Kent ¶¶ 49, 52, 55–57, 61).
Appellant did not sufficiently address these specific disclosures in asserting
that step [2] is not described by Kent. For example, paragraph 61 of Kent
describes the ACAS system as accepting data from multiple sources and as
containing “internal algorithms that relate tests derived from sensor
responses and other information sources to fault conditions within the
system of interest,” which indicates that the analysis is performed
automatically with a processor as required by the claim. Because Kent
describes collection of data about degradation in structural materials (Kent ¶
55), one of ordinary skill in the art would reasonably understand that the
“physical sensor data” used by the ACAMS system in paragraph 61 would
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include the data involving the degradation of structural materials.3 Appellant
has given no adequate reason why such a finding is not correct.
Kent also determines “damage disposition” as required by step [2] of
the claim. Kent describes determining which “components must be repaired
immediately . . . in accordance with in accordance with FAA guidelines of
the minimum equipment list necessary to operate and dispatch aircraft.”
Kent ¶ 61. Thus, Kent determines what to do about the damage once it is
detected.
Appellant contends that Kent does not describe assessing the severity
of damage. Appeal Br. 8 (see step [5] of claim 1 reciting “determining
damage severity indicative of whether the aircraft is in a condition for safe
flight”). However, the Examiner identified paragraphs 46, 49, and 61 of
Kent as teaching determining damage severity. Final Act. 25, 46–47. In
paragraph 61, Kent discloses determining equipment necessary to operate
and dispatch aircraft and complete mission and “[w]hen a fault condition
requiring immediate action (as defined by such user or regulatory authority
guidelines) is indicated, the health management system sends message to the
on-board datalink and a message that identifies the suspect component(s) is
sent to a maintenance or dispatch terminal, or decision-making authority.”
Thus, the skilled worker would reasonably understand that determining
whether a fault requires immediate attention or not is determining its
severity.

3 “As shown in FIG. 7, the ACAMS system accepts data from multiple
information sources, including, but not limited to, physical sensor data (e.g.,
strain, moisture, acceleration, vibration, pressure, temperature, wheel speed
and chemical by-products).”
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Kent does not just predict faults as asserted by Appellant (Final Act.
8); Kent also identifies them (¶ 41: “The ACAMS system 100 monitors the
various subsystems, identifies or predicts faults in the subsystem, and sends
data to an on-board datalink. The ACAMS system 100 then sends a
message, that identifies the suspect component(s), to a maintenance,
dispatch terminal or decision-making authority.”) As discussed above.
Appellant is reading “fault” too narrowly; Kent has specific disclosure in
detecting degradation in structural materials, and provides examples of
sensors that do so. Kent ¶ 55.
Appellant states that “Torng does not disclose any sensors or any
automatic means by which structural damage could be assessed during
operation.” Appeal Br. 10. However, the Examiner cited Kent for this
disclosure as discussed above. This argument thus has no merit.
Appellant also argues:
The Office Action does not adequately explain why one skilled
in the art would combine Torng’s risk assessment prediction
system with Kent's in-operation fault isolation and detection
system. The Examiner for example has not demonstrated that the
exceedingly complex analysis that Torng performs on a web
server based on multiple periodic inspections at deterministic
inspection intervals could be used by Kent's fault detection
system.
Appeal Br. 10.
Appellant further contends with respect to Torng that the Examiner
“has not demonstrated a prima facie case of how Kent could be modified
with Torng to meet applicant’s structural damage claim limitations.” Appeal
Br. 11. Appellant asks that, if Kent is able to detect structural damage, “why
would one skilled in the art combine Kent with Torng’s probabilistic
prediction system? He would not. Furthermore, Torng also does not detect
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structural damage but instead predicts when it may occur in the future and
thus schedules inspection before that occurs.” Id.
Appellant’s arguments with respect to Torng are not persuasive. The
Examiner cited Torng for teaching step [4] of “selectively performing a
specific structural analysis for detected damage considering plural
parameters including damage type, geometry and dimensions of damaged
areas, material parameters, and structure loads, wherein said specific
structural analysis includes static, fatigue and damage tolerance structural
analysis.” Final Act. 10. For this limitation, the Examiner cited paragraphs
32, 36–39, and 40–45 of Torng. Final Act. 10. While Torng does not
disclose specific sensors, Torng identifies several parameters of the aircraft’s
structure that are measured, including “material parameters, and stress
intensity solution (α=K/cσ).” Torng ¶ 32. See also Torng ¶ 41 (“Such input
data includes K/sigma versus a file (geometry), a fracture toughness
distribution, an initial crack size distribution, an a versus T file (a crack
growth curve), a maximum stress Gumbel distribution”). Thus, Torng
expressly teaches performing a structural analysis as required by the claim.
The reason that Torng does not describe the actual sensors that collect this
data is that Torng’s invention is not directed to how these measurements are
made. Appellant has not established that Torng combined with the sensors
described by Kent, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in that art,
was not enabled at the time of the invention to make the measurements
described in Torng.
Appellant’s argument that there was no reason to combine Torng with
Kent because Kent already detects structural damage is not persuasive. The
Examiner cited Torng, as explained above, for performing a type of
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structural analysis. That is, the Examiner cited Torng for its more detailed
structural analysis as described in paragraphs 32, 36–39, and 40–45 of
Torng. Final Act. 10. Appellant did not identify a deficiency in these
paragraphs as they relate to limitation [4] of claim 1. Appellant also did not
explain why Torng’s analysis, including the equations disclosed in it (Torng
¶¶ 41, 45) are not applicable to Kent when Kent also describes algorithms in
its structural analysis (Kent ¶¶ 52, 51).
The Examiner also provided a reason to apply Torng to Kent: “for the
purposes of establishing the expected strength of the component or part and
to determine the schedule for inspection and maintenance as taught in
Torng.” Final Act. 11. Appellant’s contention that Examiner’s reason was
inadequate is not persuasive because Appellant did not address the full
statement made by the Examiner, but rather quoted only a part of it. Appeal
Br. 11.
The Examiner cited Sinex to meet step [3] of claim 1 of “during
operation of the aircraft, comparing the sensed aircraft structural damage
data with at least one predetermined limit specified in structural repair
manual associated with the aircraft.” Final Act. 12. The Examiner reasoned
that it would have been obvious to compare the damage assessed in Kent to
the Structural Repair Manual described in Sinex because “Sinex is a required
document that is used to determine what tasks need to be performed” and
this “would ensure that the maintenance personnel in Kent comply with the
requirements set forth by the manufacturer of the aircraft and outlined in the
Structural Repair Manual.” Id.
Appellant argues that Sinex’s teachings “about managing and
scheduling maintenance tasks across an entire fleet of aircraft” and “a
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system that provides a structural repair manual online for reference by
maintenance personnel” “says nothing” about the disputed limitation.
Appeal Br. 12.
We do not agree. Sinex discloses that a tracking manager compares
data to the online manual (“MLB”; col. 1, ll. 35–56) to determine what tasks
to perform. Sinex, col. 4, ll. 28–34. Sinex teaches maintaining online
documents, including structural repair manuals (id. at col. 4, ll. 45–48; col.
15, ll. 15–43) to facilitate aircraft maintenance:
The present invention is a system for enabling an operator to
dynamically manage maintenance of an aircraft. The system
includes a program manager system, a tracking manager system
and a production manager system. The program manager system
is for extracting maintenance tasks from aircraft maintenance
publications, and for guiding the formation of maintenance tasks
groups.
Sinex, col. 3, ll. 29–35.
While Sinex does not expressly state using the tracking manager to
compare damage data to an online repair manual, Sinex compares data to a
manual to determine when maintenance tasks should be performed. Sinex,
col. 4, ll. 28–34. Thus, Sinex teaches using the manual as a reference to
maintain an aircraft in “airworthy condition” (Sinex, col. 1, ll. 29–33). Kent
and Torng teach a part of maintaining an aircraft in airworthy condition is
determining damage and the risk of failure. Thus, as found by the Examiner,
it would be obvious to use the repair manual to not only to determine when
to perform maintenance tasks, but also to assess and repair structural
damage, which is part of maintaining the condition of a plane. Consequently,
we find Appellant’s argument regarding Sinex to be unpersuasive.
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The Examiner cited Cerreta for describing various types of tests to be
performed on an aircraft, including teaching that the “specific structural
analysis includes static, fatigue and damage tolerance structural analysis” as
recited in step [4] of claim 1. Appellant argues that there is no proper basis
for combining the “huge test fixture for testing fuselage parts” of Cerreta.
Appeal Br. 12–13.
We are not persuaded by this argument that the Examiner erred. The
Specification does not provide any guidance on how the static and fatigue
analysis of step [4] is performed. Spec. ¶¶ 10, 35, 36. Appellant has not
adequately explained why the device in Ceretta which measures strain, load,
etc., has transducers, and has “electric cables for transferring data” (Ceretta
¶ 22) could not serve as the sensors to perform the required structural
analysis recited in the claim.
Appellant states the analysis must be performed when the aircraft is
“operating in flight.” Appeal Br. 13. We do not agree. The claim only
specifies that the damage is assessed “during operation of the aircraft,” not
that it must be in flight. Step [5] of the claim states the method determines
whether the “aircraft is in a condition for safe flight,” indicating that the
method covers instances where a determination is made as to whether the
aircraft will be dispatched for flight; therefore the aircraft cannot already be
in-flight. See also Spec ¶ 4 (“These structural damages can be detected
during a scheduled maintenance or during the aircraft operation (walk[-
]around inspections”; “when the damage is detected during the aircraft
operation, the damage severity will determine whether the aircraft is in a
condition for safe flight or whether it needs to be promptly removed from
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operation for repair.”).4 Based on the claim language and this disclosure in
the Specification, we interpret “during operation of the aircraft” to mean that
that the engine, for example, of the aircraft is operating.
Step [5] of claim 1 recites “damage disposition including specifying
categories as allowable damage, fly-by, temporary repair, permanent repair,
and contacting the aircraft manufacturer for specific disposition.” To meet
this limitation, the Examiner cited Nakagawa. Final Act. 16.
Appellant states the disclosure in Nakagawa has nothing to with
assessing structural damage in an aircraft. Appeal Br. 13.
This argument is not persuasive. The Examiner cited Nakagawa for its
teaching of contacting the manufacturer to determine damage disposition.
The Examiner found that “Nakagawa, like Kent talks about servicing
equipment, teaches it is known when servicing a piece of equipment to either
look into manuals for the proper disposition or to contact the manufacturer
for the specific instructions for the disposition.” Appeal Br. 16. The
Examiner cited column 2, lines 35–42 of Nakagawa which teaches, in part:
“Upon noticing the failure, the operator performs a recovery procedure
either by looking into the manuals, etc. for a proper operation corresponding
to the lamp indication or by contacting a manufacturer for instructions.”
Thus, the Examiner’s reason for citing Nakagawa is supported by the
evidence. “Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references
individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a

4 It is commonsense that a walk-around inspection performed during
“aircraft operation” cannot be performed while the aircraft is in–flight and in
the air.
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combination of references.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
For the foregoing reasons, the obviousness rejection of claim 1 is
affirmed. Claims 10, 12, 13, 15, 22, 24, and 30 were not argued separately
and fall with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

2. REJECTION FURTHER BASED ON SWEENEY
Appellant argues that Sweeney does not cure the deficiencies of Kent,
Torng, Sinex, Cerreta, and Nakagawa. Appeal Br. 14. We thus affirm the
rejection of claims 4 and 16 for the same reasons as described for claim 1.

3. REJECTION FURTHER BASED ON FIELDS
The Examiner further cited Fields to meet the limitation recited in
dependent claims 8 and 20 reciting “further including the at least one
processor selectively performing a static and fatigue analysis based on
tensile, compression, buckling, post-buckling, crippling and/or durability
failure criteria, and using the results of said static and fatigue analysis to
determine damage disposition.” The Examiner found that Fields describes
static and field analysis comprising measuring “buckling” as required by the
claims. Final Act. 65. The Examiner determined it would have been obvious
to one of ordinary skill in the art to perform Fields’s analysis in Kent “to
determine the acceptable margin of safety and determine if the component in
question can handle the forces being applied to it.” Final Act. 67. The
Examiner found that this analysis “would assist in ensuring that the
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components in their current state can continue to handle the stress applied to
them or they need to be replaced.” Id.
Appellant argues that the Examiner did not explain how Fields’s
“design system could be used in conjunction with damage detection on an
operating aircraft.” Appeal Br. 14. Appellant states that Fields “seems to not
use any actual input from operating aircraft but rather attempts to simulate
stresses on theoretical structures.” Id. Appellant also argues that there “is no
indication that either Kent or Torng would be interested in buckling for
example.” Id.
As explained above, the Examiner found that the skilled worker had
reason to apply Fields’s analysis to Kent to ensure the safety of the parts
used in the aircraft. Final Act. 65, 67. Appellant did not identify a defect in
this reasoning. Contrary to Appellant’s argument that Fields does not use
actual input, Fields teaches performing “actual stress” measurements using a
commercially available system. Fields ¶ 46. Fields also teaches the
importance of fatigue analysis “to determine if the elements can withstand
the extreme forces to which the aircraft is subjected over its lifetime” and
identifies buckling as part of the analysis (Fields ¶ 37), providing a reason to
apply to Kent to ensure aircraft safety as found by the Examiner.
The obviousness rejection of claims 8 and 20 is affirmed.

4. REJECTION FURTHER BASED ON ISOBE
The Examiner cited Isobe to meet the limitations in claims 11 and 23
of crack propagation and analysis. Final Act. 72. Appellant argues that
Isobe’s “use of manual inspection data on gas turbine crack location and size
does not inform one skilled in the art how to modify Kent and the other
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references along the line of the claimed invention.” Appeal Br. 15. This
argument is not persuasive. The Examiner explained why it would have been
obvious to apply Isobe to Kent. Final Act. 72–73. Appellant did not identify
a defect in this fact-based reasoning. The rejection is therefore affirmed for
the reasons given by the Examiner.

5. REJECTION FURTHER BASED ON STOTHERS
Appellant did not provide separate arguments for the patentability of
claims 31 and 33 further based on Stothers. Appeal Br. 15–16. Thus, these
claims fall with claim 1.

6. REJECTION FURTHER BASED ON GIURGIUTIU
The Examiner further rejected claims 32, 35, and 36 based on the
additionally cited publication by Giurgiutiu. Final Act. 78–79. Claim 32,
depends from claim 1, and further recites “wherein at least one sensor
operates to perform Non-Destructive Inspection based on measuring eddy
currents, xRays, die penetration or ultrasound.” Claims 35 and 36 depend
from claim 32. The Examiner found that “Giurgiutiu, which like Kent talks
about detecting structural damage, teaches it is known to collect data using
Non-Destructive Inspection comprising eddy currents, xRays, die
penetration or ultrasound, the sensor comprises a Lamb waves sensor, and
wherein the sensor senses electro-mechanical impedance (Abstract, page 1,
paragraph [0004].” Final Act. 79. The Examiner concluded that because
“Kent already detects structural damage it would have been obvious to use
any one of these known techniques to do so.” Id.
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Appellant states that the rejection is improper because how is the
oscilloscope of Giurgiutiu “supposed to be on board an aircraft”?” Appeal
Br. 16.
Giurgiutiu explains that an oscilloscope receives signals from the
sensors used to make the measurements. Giurgiutiu ¶ 28. The oscilloscope is
used to display the signals. Id. Appellant has not established that the
oscilloscope is necessary to analyze the signals received from the sensors or
that the display is necessary to perform the analysis described by Giurgiutiu.
Accordingly, Appellant’s argument is unavailing and the rejection is
affirmed.

7. REJECTION FURTHER BASED ON AKDENIZ
The Examiner further rejected claim 34 based on the additionally cited
publication by Akdeniz. Final Act. 81. Claim 34, depends from claim 1, and
further recites “wherein the at least one sensor performs comparative
vacuum monitoring.” The Examiner found that “Akdeniz, which like Kent
talks about determining structural damage, teaches it is known to perform
comparative vacuum monitoring to determine structural damage (Abstract,
Page 1, paragraph [0008]” and that “comparative vacuum monitoring is one
of several known ways of monitoring the structural health of airplanes.”
Final Act. 81. The Examiner concluded that because “Kent is monitoring the
structure of airplanes it would have been obvious to use these known
techniques to accomplish this goal.” Id.
Appellant argues there is no suggestion to combine Akdeniz with
Kent. Appeal Br. 16. Appellant also contends that, based on paragraph 4 of
Akdeniz, “one skilled in the art would never select Akdeniz’s vacuum sensor
teaching for an automatic inflight inspection system.” Id.
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We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred. The Examiner gave a
reason for combining Kent with Akdeniz. Appellant did not identify a flaw
in the reasoning and we find none. Paragraph 4 of Akdeniz describes a
sensor for determining the damage. Appellant did not provide a reason as to
why the sensor could not be used to monitor the aircraft during operation,
for example, when the engine is running. Appellant’s argument that it could
not be used for “inflight” operation reads a limitation that does not appear in
the claim. As discussed above, the claim does not require the aircraft to be
flying when the sensors perform the measurements.

8. REJECTION FURTHER BASED ON MARTIN
The Examiner further rejected claim 37 based on the additionally cited
publication by Martin. Final Act. 83. Claim 37, depends from claim 1, and
further recites “wherein the at least one sensor senses optical
characteristics.” The Examiner found that “Martin, which like Kent talks
about monitoring structural damage, teaches it is known to use optical
sensors . . . to determine if damage has occurred.” Final Act. 83. The
Examiner concluded because “Kent is monitoring the structure of airplanes
it would have been obvious to use these known techniques to accomplish
this goal.” Id.
Appellant argues “Martin's method for molding an optical fiber into
fiberglass is non-analogous to Kent’s real time aircraft fault monitoring” and
that the Examiner did not “demonstrate that Martin's technique could be
used to sense structural damage on board a modern aluminum frame
aircraft.” Appeal Br. 17.
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We do not agree. The Examiner cited Martin at column 4, line 64 to
column 5, line 11, for its teaching of using optical fibers to detect structural
damage. Appellant has provided no evidence that this technique could not be
applied to an aircraft. Because it is a technique used to assess damage and
Kent’s purpose is to assess damage to an aircraft, Martin is “reasonably
pertinent” to Kent and the claimed subject matter and therefore analogous
art.5 The rejection is affirmed.

REJECTION BASED ON 101
Principles of Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
However, not every discovery is eligible for patent protection. Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). “Excluded from such patent protection are
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Id. The Supreme
Court articulated a two-step analysis to determine whether a claim falls
within an excluded category of invention. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank

5 It is well-established that there are two criteria to be applied when
determining whether a reference is analogous prior art: (1) whether the
reference is from the “same field of endeavor” as the claimed invention, and
(2) if the reference is not within the same field of endeavor, “whether the
reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which
the inventor is involved.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658–59 (Fed. Cir.
1992). A reference is “reasonably pertinent” to the inventor’s particular
problem when the reference “is one which, because of the matter with which
it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in
considering his problem.” In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(citation omitted).

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Int’l, 134 S.Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs,
Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012).
In the first step, it is determined whether the claims at issue recited
one of those patent-ineligible concepts. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355. If it is
determined that the claims recite an ineligible concept, then the second step
of the two-part analysis is applied in which it is asked “[w]hat else is there in
the claims before us?” Id. The Court explained that this step involves
a search for an ‘inventive concept’ — i.e., an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’
Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2355 (citing from Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77).
Alice, relying on the analysis in Mayo of a claim directed to a law of
nature, stated that in the second part of the analysis, “the elements of each
claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” must be
considered “to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at
2355.
The PTO published guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101.
USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 51–57 (2019) (“Eligibility
Guidance”). This guidance provides additional direction on how to
implement the two-part analysis of Mayo and Alice.
Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Guidance, looks at the specific
limitations in the claim to determine whether the claim recites a judicial
exception to patent eligibility. In Step 2A, Prong Two, the claims are
examined to identify whether there are additional elements in the claims that
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integrate the exception in a practical application, namely, is there a
“meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed.
Reg. 54 (2. Prong Two).
If the claim recites a judicial exception that is not integrated into a
practical application, then as in the Mayo/Alice framework, Step 2B of the
Eligibility Guidance instructs us to determine whether there is a claimed
“inventive concept” to ensure that the claims define an invention that is
significantly more than the ineligible concept, itself. 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
With these guiding principles in mind, we proceed to determine
whether the claimed subject matter in this appeal is eligible for patent
protection under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Discussion
Claim 1 is directed to a “method.” Following the first step of the
Mayo/Alice analysis, we find that the claim is directed a “process,” and
therefore falls into one of the broad statutory categories of patent-eligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We thus proceed to Step 2A, Prong
One, of the Eligibility Guidance.
Step 2A, Prong One
In Step 2A, Prong One, of the Eligibility Guidance, the specific
limitations in the claim are examined to determine whether the claim recites
a judicial exception to patent eligibility, namely whether the claim recites an
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon.
The Final Action was mailed before the publication of the 2019
Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance; however, the
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Examiner’s Answer was mailed afterwards. Consequently, we shall refer to
the Answer which was published after the Eligibility Guidance.
In the Answer, the Examiner indicated that the recited “assessing can
be performed by human” and that the “computer is merely acting as a tool to
compare information after it is entered.” Ans. 8. Based on this discussion,
we understand the Examiner to be finding that at least some of the steps of
claim 1 can be performed in the human mind and therefore fall into the
category of mental processes listed in the Eligibility Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg.
52 “(c) Mental processes.”
We agree with the Examiner’s determination. We begin with the
claims.
Step [1] of the claim is sensing damage with a sensor. In step [2], the
damage data from the sensor is “automatically” analyzed with a processor
and a “damage disposition” is determined. Steps [3]–[5] are the steps in
claim 1 in which the disposition of the damage is determined.
Specifically, step [3] of the claim compares “the sensed aircraft
structural damage data with at least one predetermined limit specified in
structural repair manual associated with the aircraft.” This comparison could
be accomplished in the human mind by referring to the manual and then
determining how the damage compares to the damage limits listed in the
manual. It is therefore a mental step and an abstract idea. Once the
comparing is done, “a specific structural analysis for detected damage” is
done in step [4] which “includes static, fatigue and damage tolerance
structural analysis.” This step does not fall into any of the enumerated
categories of abstract ideas listed in the Eligibility Guidance.
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In step [5], the results of step [3] and [4] are used to determine a
“damage disposition.” The disposition includes “specifying categories as
allowable damage, fly-by, temporary repair, permanent repair, and
contacting the aircraft manufacturer for specific disposition,” a step which
could be done in the human mind because a human could make such a
comparison and evaluation in their mind. It is therefore a mental step and an
abstract idea.
The disposition also includes “determining including automatically
determining damage severity indicative of whether the aircraft is in a
condition for safe flight or alternatively whether the aircraft needs to be
removed from operation for repair.” The claim does not specify how this
result is accomplished. A human could look at the damage and then make
the mental judgement of whether the aircraft is safe for flight or whether it
needs repair. The Specification indicates that damage assessments were
conventionally done by humans. Spec. ¶ 6 (“Once damage is detected during
aircraft operation by means of the conventional inspection methods or
through SHM systems, a technical team performs a prompt damage
assessment, determining the damage severity and avoiding flight delay or
cancellation whenever safely possible.”). Thus, this aspect of step [5] could
also be performed in the human mind and is therefore a mental step.
In the last part of step [5], the claim recites “using results of the
additional specific structural analysis to automatically determine the number
of flight cycles allowed before repair when the at least one processor
determines a repair is needed.” In other words based on the structural
analysis, it is determined the number of flights cycles before a repair is
needed. The claim does not describe how this determination is made. Based
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on the evidence in Sinex, it appears that aircraft technical documents contain
such information and therefore this determination can be made by consulting
such a document. Sinex 1:40–50.
In sum, steps [3] and [5] of claim 1 are abstract ideas because they can
be performed in a human mind. Step [6] generates a report based on
disposition determined in step [5] and is not an abstract idea.
Appellant argues that the method is not an abstract idea because it is
performed automatically on a machine. Reply Br. 2.
This argument is not persuasive. The claimed method is performed on
a computer “processor.” While the steps are performed on a computer, this is
insufficient to confer eligibility on the abstract idea. As explained in
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed
Cir. 2016, “with the exception of generic computer-implemented steps, there
is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.” See also Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52 (n. 14). “Claims can recite a mental process even
if they are claimed as being performed on a computer.” October 2019
Update to Subject Matter Eligibility.6
In sum, for the foregoing reasons, we find that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea. Accordingly, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two, of the
Eligibility Guidance.

6 Available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df (last accessed Nov. 15, 2019) (“PEG Update”).

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Step 2A, Prong Two
Prong Two of Step 2A under the 2019 Eligibility Guidance asks
whether there are additional elements that integrate the exception into a
practical application. As in the Mayo/Alice framework, we must look at the
claim elements individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine
whether the additional elements integrate the recited abstract idea into a
practical application. The Eligibility Guidance explains that “[a] claim that
integrates a judicial exception in a practical application will apply, rely on,
or use the judicial exception in a manner that places a meaningful limit on
the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 54. Integration into a practical application is evaluated by
identifying whether there are additional elements individually, and in
combination, which go beyond the judicial exception. Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 54–55. Specifically, the Guidance describes several
considerations in determining whether the abstract idea is integrated into a
practical application:
An additional element reflects an improvement in the
functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other
technology or technical field
. . .
an additional element implements a judicial exception with, or
uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular
machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim
. . .
an additional element applies or uses the judicial exception in
some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of
the judicial exception to a particular technological environment,
such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception.
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84 Fed. Reg. 55.
The PEG Update explains that “first the specification should be
evaluated to determine if the disclosure provides sufficient details such that
one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as
providing an improvement.” PEG Update 12.
Appellant points to the Specification as describing the claimed
invention’s improvement over the prior art. Reply Br. 4–5. The
Specification states that there are inefficiencies in the prior art “such as the
long time spent by the airline technical team consulting the SRM [structural
repair manual] and assessing the damage based on its instructions.
Additionally, due to human factors, mistakes can occur during this activity
resulting in an incorrect damage disposition.” Spec. ¶ 12. The Specification
also describes another deficiency in the prior art:
One prior method currently used to assess the structural damage,
requires that the airline technical team consults the SRM
[structural repair manual] and assesses the damage based on its
instructions. There can be issues in this process, such as the long
time spent by the airline technical team during this activity and
the mistakes that can occur, due to human factors, resulting in an
incorrect damage disposition. Besides that, some prior systems
do not perform structural analysis in order to improve the damage
disposition or provide a rework and/or repair solution when the
damage is not within the limits specified in the SRM.
Spec. ¶ 14.
The Specification describes its improvement as a “computerized and
automated system specially developed in order to assess typical structural
damages and repairs will lead to cost and safety benefits.” Spec. ¶ 16. It
explains that “structural analysis automation allows the implementation of
more detailed and accurate analysis methodology that reflects the actual
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behavior of the damaged or repaired structure and consequently improves
the damage disposition.” Id. The Specification also discloses that its system
is “able to provide electronic disposition for structural damage that occurs
during the aircraft life.” Spec. ¶18.
The improvements described by Appellant do not constitute a patent-
eligible improvement to a technology or technical field. Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55 (reproduced above). Appellant also does not
identify an improvement in the way the computer functions, in how the
sensors are arranged or used to collect the data, or how the aircraft as a
machine interacts with the sensor or other aspects of the claimed method.
Specifically, the claims do not explain how the sensor works to collect data
(step [1], how comparisons are made [3], how the structural analysis is
performed (step [4]) or how the damage disposition is accomplished (step
[5]). None of the steps recited in the claim explain how the desired result is
achieved. Thus, the claims do not recite any of the hallmarks considered by
the courts to confer eligibility to a claim reciting an abstract idea. This is
explained in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
In McRO, the claims were directed to a “method for automatically
animating lip synchronization and facial expression of three-dimensional
characters.” McRO, 837 F.3d, 1307–08. The claim recited a series of steps
that “produce[d] lip synchronization and facial expression control of said
animated characters.” Id. The court found that the “claimed process uses a
combined order of specific rules that renders information into a specific
format that is then used and applied to create desired results: a sequence of
synchronized, animated characters.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315. Further, the
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court found that the recited rules “are limiting in that they define morph
weight sets as a function of the timing of phoneme sub-sequences.” McRO,
837 F.3d at 1313. The claims were found to be directed to a “technological
improvement over the existing, manual 3-D animation techniques.” McRO,
837 F.3d at 1316.
In finding the claim patent-eligible, McRO noted that the “abstract
idea exception has been applied to prevent patenting of claims that abstractly
cover results where ‘it matters not by what process or machinery the result is
accomplished.’ [O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113,]; see also
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1301.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. McRO stated that
therefore, a court must “look to whether the claims in these patents focus on
a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are
instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely
invoke generic processes and machinery.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314.
In this case, the steps of “comparing” and determining damage are not
required by the claim to be executed in a specific manner as they were in
McRO. The claimed steps, as a whole, recite the desired result, but not the
specific rules that enable the result, which would deter preemption of the
abstract idea of organizing human activity. In McRO, the court held that the
“limitations in claim 1 prevent preemption of all processes for achieving
automated lip-synchronization of 3–D characters.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315.
The court explained that “[t]he specific structure of the claimed rules would
prevent broad preemption of all rules-based means of automating lip
synchronization.” Id. Here, the steps in rejected claim 1 are recited in such
general terms that carrying out “analyzing and assessing structural damage
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to an aircraft during operation of the aircraft” would preempt the abstract
idea embodied in the claim.
Based on the discussion in the Specification, the claimed method
appears to be an improvement to the manual steps in which damage is
assessed, by instead, carrying out the steps on a computer. However, simply
automating a process using a computer is not sufficient to confer patent
eligibility. The steps of claim 1 do not recite how the result is achieved, but
rather just state that the intention of the claim is to accomplish the desired
result, such as making comparisons to a structural repair manual and
determining whether an aircraft is safe for flight or needs repair. The claim
does not even require that repair is done to the aircraft or that the aircraft,
after the analysis, is operated in-flight. Only a report is generated in the last
step of the claim. Unlike in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), where
the abstract idea was used to control a physical process by determining when
a compound was cured in order to automatically open the mold, the abstract
ideas in claim 1 are not applied in a practical way, but rather the end result is
to generate a report.
The rejected claims in this appeal have the same deficiency identified
in Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241 (2016), which were
held to be ineligible for a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they did
“not claim a particular way of programming or designing the software to
create menus that have these features, but instead merely claim the resulting
systems.” Likewise, the claims recite certain functions in steps [2]–[5], but
not how the functions are accomplished. A judicial exception is not
integrated into a practical application when the additional element “merely
uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea.” 84 Fed. Reg. 55.
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Step 2B
Because we determined that the judicial exception is not integrated
into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B of the Eligibility
Guidelines, which asks whether there is an inventive concept. In making this
Step 2B determination, we must consider whether there are specific
limitations or elements recited in the claim “that are not well-understood,
routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an
inventive concept may be present” or whether the claim “simply appends
well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception,
indicative that an inventive concept may not be present.” Eligibility
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56 (footnote omitted). We must also consider
whether the combination of steps are performed “in an unconventional way
and therefore include an ‘inventive step,’ rendering the claim eligible at Step
2B.” Id. In this part of the analysis, we consider “the elements of each claim
both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine “whether
the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217.
Appellant has not explained how the steps in the claimed method
operate in an inventive way to achieve the result of generating a report as in
step [6] of the claim. The sensors gather data and are used to perform
structural analysis in steps [2] and [4], respectively. But Appellant did not
establish that these steps cooperate with the other steps in the method to
achieve the analysis and assessment of the structural damage in the aircraft.
The Specification explains that the improvement is to the manual way of
accomplishing this result, but the claims in automating the process are not
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recited with sufficient specificity and we have not been directed to how the
combination performs any different from the manual process.
With respect to dependent claims 32–37 which recite specific sensor
types, Appellant argues that the Examiner did not provide evidence that such
claims are “not a practical implementation.” Appeal Br. 6. However, there is
no evidence in this record that the function or operation of the sensors
improves the abstract ideas recited in claim 1. For example in Thales
Visionix, Inc. v. U.S., 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the eligibility of
claims “for tracking the motion of an object relative to a moving reference
frame” which comprised inertial sensors was addressed. The court found that
the claims were eligible under § 101 because they “are directed to systems
and methods that use inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce
errors in measuring the relative position and orientation of a moving object
on a moving reference frame.” Id. at 1348. Here, Appellants did not
establish that the sensors are being used non-conventionally or are arranged
in a non-conventional manner to assess the aircraft damage.
For the foregoing reasons, the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of
claim 1 as lacking patent eligibility is affirmed. Claim 4, 8, 10–13, 15, 16,
20, 22, 23, 24, and 30–37 were not argued separately; they consequently fall
with claim 1. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

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CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 10, 12,
13, 15, 22,
24, 30
103 Kent, Torng,
Sinex, Cerreta,
Nakagawa
1, 10, 12,
13, 15, 22,
24, 30

4, 16 103 Kent, Torng,
Sinex, Cerreta,
Nakagawa,
Sweeney
4, 16
8, 20 103 Kent, Torng,
Sinex, Cerreta,
Nakagawa, Fields
8, 20
11, 23 103 Kent, Torng,
Sinex, Cerreta,
Nakagawa, Isobe
11, 23
31, 33, 103 Kent, Torng,
Sinex, Cerreta,
Nakagawa,
Stothers
31, 33
32, 35, 36 103 Kent, Torng,
Sinex, Cerreta,
Nakagawa,
Giurgiutiu
32, 35, 36
34 103 Kent, Torng,
Sinex, Cerreta,
Nakagawa,
Akdeniz
34
37 103 Kent, Torng,
Sinex, Cerreta,
Nakagawa, Martin
37
1, 4, 8, 10–
13, 15, 16,
20, 22, 23,
24, 30–37
101 Eligibility 1, 4, 8, 10–
13, 15, 16,
20, 22, 23,
24, 30–37

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Overall
Outcome
1, 4, 8, 10–
13, 15, 16,
20, 22, 23,
24, 30–37

TIME PERIOD
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED