Carolyn A. Wilson, Appellant, Agency No. AR000940575 F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 18, 1999
05970991 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 18, 1999)

05970991

03-18-1999

Carolyn A. Wilson, Appellant, Agency No. AR000940575 F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary, Department of the Air Force, Agency.


Carolyn A. Wilson, )

Appellant, ) Request No. 05970991

) Appeal No. 01955269 v. )

Agency No. AR000940575 )

F. Whitten Peters, )

Acting Secretary, )

Department of the Air Force, )

Agency. )

________________________________)

DENIAL OF RECONSIDERATION

INTRODUCTION

On August 18, 1997, Carolyn A. Wilson (hereinafter referred to

as appellant) timely initiated a request to the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (the Commission) to reconsider the decision

in Wilson v. Dep't of the Air Force, EEOC Appeal No. 01955269 (July

29, 1997). EEOC regulations provide that the Commissioners may,

in their discretion, reconsider any previous Commission decision.

29 C.F.R. �1614.407(a). The party requesting reconsideration must

submit written argument or evidence which tends to establish one or

more of the following three criteria: new and material evidence is

available that was not readily available when the previous decision

was issued, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(1); the previous decision involved

an erroneous interpretation of law or regulation, or material fact,

or a misapplication of established policy, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(2);

and the decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications, 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c)(3). For the reasons

set forth herein, appellant's request is denied.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue presented is whether appellant's request meets any of the

statutory criteria for reconsideration.

BACKGROUND

The following is a summary of the relevant facts and procedural history

of this case.

Appellant filed an EEO complaint alleging sex (female) and race

(Caucasian) discrimination when she was harassed and sexually harassed

from August 1992 through November 1992. Appellant alleged that she

was subjected to repeated harassing comments, jokes, touching, and

other conduct by a co-worker (CW) and her first-level supervisor (S1).

Appellant further alleged that the working conditions caused her to

resign, effective November 20, 1992. Appellant's complaint included a

claim for compensatory damages.

In its final decision (FAD 1), the agency found that appellant was

discriminated against when she was harassed and sexually harassed in

the workplace by CW,<1> and when she was constructively discharged

from her position. The agency also addressed appellant's allegations

that her complaint was improperly processed. As a remedy for the

discrimination, the agency awarded equitable relief, including back

pay and benefits; attorney's fees and costs; and, payment of proven

compensatory damages. Appellant did not appeal from FAD 1.

Because the evidence was insufficient to allow a determination on

appellant's compensatory damages claim, the agency requested that

appellant submit additional evidence of the nature and amount of damages

claimed, as well evidence showing a nexus between the claimed damages

and the discrimination. Thereafter, the agency issued a final decision

(FAD 2) addressing appellant's compensatory damages claim and awarding

her a total of $50,745.01. Appellant appealed from FAD 2.

On appeal, the previous decision modified FAD 2 and awarded a total

of $53,745.01 in compensatory damages. The previous decision's

determinations regarding appellant's claims are summarized below:

Direct Pecuniary Damages

With respect to appellant's medical expenses, the previous decision

disagreed with the agency's determination that appellant had demonstrated

the necessary causal connection between the agency's discrimination and

the medical treatment which she received between December 10, 1993 and

February 22, 1994. The previous decision noted that appellant underwent

medical treatment from December 1992 until April 1993 and that there was

an overall improvement in her medical condition during that time. The

previous decision found no record of any further medical treatment until

appellant's visit with a second physician (P2) in December 1993.<2>

According to the previous decision, P2's medical report indicated that

appellant had discontinued her medication in July 1993 because of her

"'stable and improved emotional status,'" which continued until she

received a copy of the agency's investigative report, and that appellant

had not received any medical treatment since she left Okinawa in July

1993. A statement from appellant's husband similarly indicated that

appellant's condition significantly improved after she left Okinawa, but

began to decline again after her receipt of the agency's investigative

report. Nonetheless, the previous decision noted that the agency already

had agreed to pay $294.28 for medical expenses incurred during this

period, and allowed the award. The previous decision further found

that appellant had failed to establish a causal connection between

the unlawful discrimination and her claim for future medical expenses,

and denied the request for that reason.

With respect to administrative expenses, the previous decision found

that the agency properly denied those of appellant's claimed expenses

not supported by documentation and properly assessed the amount to be

awarded for her established expenses. The previous decision upheld the

agency's award of $450.73.

With respect to lost future earnings, the previous decision found that

the claim was more accurately characterized as a claim for front pay and,

as such, was a claim for equitable relief under 706(g) of Title VII and

not within the penumbra of a compensatory damages claim.<3>

Pecuniary Losses Due to Relocation

The previous decision found that appellant failed to establish the

requisite nexus between the agency's discrimination and appellant's

decision to relocate to the United States. In this regard, the previous

decision found that appellant remained on Okinawa from November 1992

until July 1993; CW, the co-worker who harassed her, left Okinawa in

December 1992; and, appellant was aware of CW's departure. The previous

decision found significant the fact that medical documentation from

this period indicated continuing improvement in appellant's condition

and failed to show that she ever informed her health care providers of

her alleged "overwhelming" fears during the time that she remained on

Okinawa. Consequently, the previous decision found that appellant was not

entitled to compensatory damages for losses resulting from her relocation.

Nonpecuniary Damages

The previous decision found that appellant established an entitlement

to nonpecuniary damages. The evidence showed that appellant was

depressed and had significant difficulty functioning at home after

the harassment began. The evidence also supported a causal connection

between the discrimination and the deterioration in appellant's health,

family life, and relationships with family members.<4> The previous

decision noted the agency's reliance on the Personal Injury Valuation

Handbooks (PIVH) and the PIVH jury verdict research evaluation guide in

deciding the amount of appellant's award. The previous decision disagreed

with the agency's decision to award appellant $50,000 in nonpecuniary

damages rather than the $53,000 indicated in the PIVH. Specifically, the

previous decision referred to the fact that the agency's discrimination

had caused appellant significant emotional distress and related health

problems, including "decreased libido." Based on the nature, severity,

and duration of the discrimination, and other factors considered, the

previous decision awarded appellant $53,000 in compensatory damages.

Appellant's total award was $53,745.01 ($745.01 in pecuniary damages

and $53,000 in nonpecuniary damages).

In her reconsideration request, appellant contends that her compensatory

damages award should be increased based on a July 1997 Social Security

Administration (SSA) decision regarding her claim for disability benefits.

Appellant also contends that she should receive additional compensatory

damages for "the pain and suffering" caused by the complaint process.

In support of her request, appellant submitted a copy of the SSA decision

and several other medical documents.

In response, the agency argues that appellant's request fails to meet

the criteria for reconsideration and should be denied for that reason.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider any previous decision

when the party requesting reconsideration submits written argument or

evidence which tends to establish that at least one of the criteria

of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c) is met. For a decision to be reconsidered,

the request must contain specific information that meets the criteria

referenced above.

Appellant requests an increase in her compensatory damages award based

on the July 1997 SSA decision and her pain and suffering caused by

litigating her EEO complaint.

The Commission finds that the 1997 SSA decision does not warrant a change

in the amount of appellant's compensatory damages award. Although the

decision states that "medical evidence confirms the existence of a

condition in 1992 that could have caused limitations as the claimant has

described...," this decision and the other medical documents submitted

by appellant<5> are insufficient to establish a causal connection between

her current condition and the agency's discrimination. As already noted,

appellant's condition had improved to the point that she was able to

discontinue medical treatment and declined only after her receipt of the

agency's investigative report. The Commission previously has held that

compensatory damages are not available to a complainant for emotional

distress and depression resulting from the stress of participating in

the EEO process. See Rountree v. Dep't of Agriculture, EEOC Request

No. 05950919 (February 15, 1996).

Having reviewed appellant's request and the record as a whole, we

find that the request fails to meet the criteria for reconsideration.

Further, our own review of the previous decision failed to show any

other reason for reconsidering that decision. Consequently, we deny

appellant's reconsideration request.

CONCLUSION

After a review of appellant's request for reconsideration, the agency's

response, the previous decision, and the entire record, the Commission

finds that appellant's request for reconsideration fails to meet the

criteria of 29 C.F.R. �1614.407(c), and the request hereby is DENIED.

The decision in EEOC Appeal No. 01955269 hereby is AFFIRMED.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to pay appellant $53,745.01 in compensatory damages,

if it has not already done so. A copy of the agency's letter to appellant

forwarding payment of the determined compensatory damages must be sent

to the Compliance Officer, as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 18, 1999

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

1The harassment consisted primarily of verbal conduct, including sexual

jokes and remarks, and derogatory racial comments of a sexual nature.

2In her reconsideration request, appellant submitted medical treatment

notes showing that she had a final visit with P1 in June 1993.

3As previously noted, appellant never appealed from FAD 1 in which the

agency found discrimination and ordered equitable relief.

4Although the evidence suggested that a prior sexual trauma also

contributed to appellant's depression, the previous decision found that

this was a factor to be considered in determining the amount of the

damages award.

5The July 18, 1995 letter from the psychologist had been submitted by

appellant in conjunction with her appeal.