Carol A. Queen, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMay 12, 2006
01A53309 (E.E.O.C. May. 12, 2006)

01A53309

05-12-2006

Carol A. Queen, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Carol A. Queen,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A53309

Agency No. 4G-720-0090-03

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final decision concerning her

formal EEO complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42

U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R.

� 1614.405.

During the relevant time, complainant was employed as a Supervisor,

Customer Service at the agency's Jonesboro Carrier Annex in Jonesboro,

Arkansas. On April 7, 2003, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint.

Therein, complainant claimed that she was discriminated against on the

basis of sex (female)[1] when:

1) on January 13, 2003, she learned for the first time that the male

supervisors had two consecutive days off in a row, while her off-

days, as well as those of the other female supervisor, were split;

2) on January 27, 2003, she received a Letter of Warning for Failure

to Follow Instructions;

3) male supervisors were spoken to in a different tone and treated in

a "glad hand" manner compared to female supervisors who were spoken

to in a demanding manner;

4) female supervisors had been replaced with a male supervisor who was

less qualified to train ASP candidates; and

5) female supervisors were commanded, not asked, to give up their days

off while male supervisors were asked to work their day.

On May 2, 2003, the agency issued a document identified as "Partial

Acceptance/Partial Dismissal of Formal EEO Complaint." Therein, the agency

accepted for investigation claims (1) and (2). The agency dismissed claims

(3) - (5) pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) for failure to state a

claim, finding that complainant was not aggrieved regarding the matters

identified therein.

At the conclusion of the investigation of claims (1) and (2), complainant

was provided with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her

right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

Initially, complainant requested a hearing. Subsequently, complainant

withdrew her hearing request and requested that the agency issue a final

decision.

On February 20, 2005, the agency issued a final decision, finding no

discrimination. The agency found that complainant failed to establish a

prima facie case of sex discrimination because she failed to show that a

similarly situated person outside of her protected class was treated more

favorably. The agency found, however, that assuming complainant

established a prima facie case of sex discrimination, complainant failed to

show that management's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext

for discrimination.

With respect to claim (1), complainant asserted by affidavit during the

investigation that on January 13, 2003, the Postmaster,[2] in a "menacing

and demeaning" manner, told complainant and the other female supervisor

that they had "failed to do [their] jobs for which they were paid good

salaries to do," and added that "there will be no more days off for you

girls until you learn to do your jobs correctly." She said that the

Postmaster continued this "tirade" for about 15 minutes. She said that

sometime later, when she and the other female supervisor discussed this

incident, the other supervisor complained to her that it was unfair that

they were losing their days off when all the male supervisors not only were

keeping their off-days, but also had two consecutive days off, while theirs

were split. Complainant claimed that this was the first time she was aware

of the fact that the male supervisors had two consecutive days off.

The Postmaster, in his affidavit, stated that complainant's days off have

always been Sunday and Wednesday and "that is the same way the job was

posted 10/25/01." The Postmaster stated "although I could have given

[complainant] a change of schedule, she never asked for one." The

Postmaster conceded that some of the male supervisors had consecutive days

off but explained that "supervisor schedules are set to maximize

effectiveness and are for different functional areas." The Postmaster

stated that an identified male Tour One Supervisor's days off were Tuesday

and Wednesday because Tour One was the late night shift where it is

difficult to rest "so it is vital that he has days off together." The

Postmaster stated that an identified male employee in charge of Window

Services had days off on Saturday and Sunday so that he would be "available

during our heaviest business days - Monday through Friday." The Postmaster

stated that an identified male Maintenance Supervisor's days off were

variable because "he has not worked his regular job in some time as he has

been filling in on the plant tours as needed." Finally, the Postmaster

stated that he had a borrowed supervisor working for him who lived a

distance away. The Postmaster stated "I elected to assign the borrowed

supervisor from South Arkansas to Saturday and Sunday off so that he could

go home on the weekend and be with his family. That seemed the right thing

to do, since he was here to assist us."

With respect to claim (2), the former Acting Manager of Customer Services

(former Manager) stated that on January 3, 2003, he was detailed to the

Jonesboro Carrier Annex and that complainant reported to him during his

detail. The former Manager stated that he was the deciding official who

issued complainant a Letter of Warning (LOW) for "failure to follow

instructions." Specifically, the former Manager stated that complainant

was issued a LOW "for not properly maintaining the Rural Carriers PS Forms

3972." The former Manager stated that all of his management staff,

including complainant, "[had] been made aware on numerous occasions, the

requirement to maintain hardcopy 3972 information." The former Manager

stated that the Form 3972 was used as a tool to follow up and correct

attendance issues with employees. He stated that a review of the agency

records revealed that complainant had not completed the required forms from

November 2002 through January 2003. The former Manager said he had

requested a letter of warning for one of the male supervisors for the same

offense, but it was never issued because his detail expired prior to

receiving the necessary documentation from Labor Relations.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-party analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima facie

of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give

rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited

consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567

(1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to

persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency

acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v.

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie

case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue,

the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell

Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by

discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460

U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC

Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and

Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v.

Department of the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

After careful review of the record, including all statements submitted on

appeal, the Commission determines that agency management articulated

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions taken. With regard

to claim (1), while some male supervisors had consecutive days off, the

Postmaster articulated legitimate business reasons for the scheduling.

Moreover, complainant's off days were apparently established when she

assumed her position in 2001, and there is no evidence that complainant

ever requested a change in the schedule. With regard to claim (2), the

record establishes that the letter of warning was issued because

complainant failed to follow management instructions concerning the

maintenance of proper 3972 forms. Complainant has not established that she

did not commit this offense, and the record shows that a similarly situated

male supervisor would have also been issued a similar warning letter had

the former Manger's detail not ended. Furthermore, the investigation shows

that other male supervisors were issued disciplinary actions for other

infractions during this same period. Complainant has failed to produce

adequate evidence to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that these

articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.[3]

Therefore, the Commission determines that the agency's final decision

finding no discrimination concerning claims (1) and (2) was proper and is

AFFIRMED.

Claims (3) - (5)

Complainant claimed that she was discriminated against on the basis of sex

when: male supervisors are spoken to in a different tone and treated in a

"glad hand" manner compared to female supervisors being spoken to in a

demanding manner (claim (3)); female supervisors have been replaced with a

male supervisor who was less qualified to train ASP candidates (claim (4));

and female supervisors were commanded, not asked, to give up their days off

while male supervisors were asked to work their day (claim (5)). In its

May 2, 2003 partial dismissal, the agency dismissed claims (3) - (5)

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1) finding that complainant was not

aggrieved.

Upon review, we agree with the agency that the alleged incidents do not

address a personal loss or harm regarding a term, condition or privilege of

complainant's employment as a result of the alleged incidents. See Diaz v.

Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049 (April 21, 1994).

Therefore, we find that the agency properly dismissed claims (3) - (5) for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1).

Accordingly, the agency's dismissal of claims (3) - (5) was proper and is

AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case

if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous

interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29

C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and

arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C.

20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider

shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of

the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604.

The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other

party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in

very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the

defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head or

department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file

a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action

will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The

grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court.

Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed within

the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil

Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

May 12, 2006

__________________

Date

Carol A. Queen

2810 Finch Road

Paragould, AR 72450

C.B. Weiser

POB 427

Marshall, TX 75671

USPS Southwest

Mgr, EEO Compl. & Appl

POB 223863

Dallas, TX 75222

Attn: Terry Miller

-----------------------

[1] On appeal, complainant, through counsel, asserts that she attempted to

amend her complaint to add reprisal as a basis by stating in her affidavit

submitted during the investigation that the Postmaster was also motivated

to engage in the alleged adverse treatment described in her complaint by

retaliatory animus for her participation in an earlier sexual harassment

complaint filed against him. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.106(d) provides that a

complainant may amend her complaint at any time prior to the conclusion of

the investigation to include issues or claims like or related to those

raised in the complaint. It appears, however, that the agency, when it

issued its final decision did not recognize or address this amendment

sought by complainant. However, on appeal the agency stated that

complainant "also failed to offer any persuasive evidence to show that

management's explanation for its actions was untrue or otherwise a pretext

for reprisal."

[2] Complainant also said she had participated in an earlier sexual

harassment complaint against the Postmaster and he harbored retaliatory

animus towards her.

[3] With regard to complainant's attempt to add reprisal as a basis to her

complaint, the Commission will assume complainant established a prima facie

case of retaliation. However, this initial inference was rebutted by the

agency's articulation of legitimate reasons for the actions taken, which

complainant did not prove were pretext for unlawful retaliation.