Carol A. Clopton, et al. Complainant,v.Michael Leavitt, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 14, 2004
01a24278 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 14, 2004)

01a24278

09-14-2004

Carol A. Clopton, et al. Complainant, v. Michael Leavitt, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency, Agency.


Carol A. Clopton, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency

01A24278

September 14, 2004

.

Carol A. Clopton, et al.

Complainant,

v.

Michael Leavitt,

Administrator,

Environmental Protection Agency,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A24278

Agency No. 2000-0096-R7

Hearing No. 280-A0-4324X

DECISION

Complainant, the putative class agent, timely initiated an appeal

from the agency's July 1, 2002 final order dismissing both her class

complaint and her individual complaint, which allege unlawful employment

discrimination on the basis of age (over 40 years old), in violation

of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended,

29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

On July 20, 2000, complainant and a co-worker, both GS-13 Grant

Specialists in the agency's Region VII Planning and Management Division,

located in Kansas City, Kansas, jointly filed a complaint claiming

discrimination on the basis of age. Specifically, complainant claimed

that the agency offered certain developmental and career enhancing

opportunities to a group of 52 predominately younger employees hired in

Region VII in 1998, but that it failed to offer these career enhancing

opportunities to its predominately older senior level Region VII

employees (over 40 years of age).<1> In particular, complainant claimed

that the agency failed to afford senior staff with the opportunity to

participate in rotation assignments to other divisions in Region VII,

whereas participation in a rotation assignment program is an integral

part of the training program for the employees hired in 1998.<2>

Furthermore, complainant claimed that the detrimental effect of this

practice is compounded by an unwritten policy that requires a senior

level employee to identify a co-worker or co-workers to take over his/her

work when requesting a rotation assignment. Complainant argued that

because of the nature of the work performed by �specialists,� such

as herself and the co-complainant, this is essentially impossible.

Complainant claimed that this same unwritten policy encourages the

career enhancement of the 52 newer employees, to include a fast track for

promotion; however, the unwritten policy does not take a similar interest

or action on behalf of its older senior employees. Complainant claimed

that as many as 400 Region VII employees are adversely affected by the

agency's practice, consisting of the unwritten rotation assignment policy

and preferential treatment of the 52 newer employees, warranting a class

action complaint.

The agency forwarded the complaint to the EEOC's St. Louis District

Office for a determination regarding class certification. On June 1,

2002, the Administrative Judge (AJ) issued a decision recommending that

the class complaint be dismissed on the grounds that it did not meet the

requirements for class certification. Specifically, the AJ found that

while the complaint satisfied the commonality requirement, it failed

to satisfy the remaining three criteria of numerosity, typicality,

and adequacy of representation as set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204.

First, the AJ determined that �commonality� was satisfied because a

readily identifiable employment practice had been identified, i.e.,

the disparate impact of the �unwritten policy� described by complainant,

which effectively prevented senior staff from participating in rotation

assignments. However, the AJ next determined that complainant did not

satisfy the typicality requirement because she failed to present any

evidence that she had ever requested a rotation assignment that the

agency denied. The AJ indicated that a class agent who suffered no

injury cannot satisfy the typicality requirement.

Regarding numerosity, the AJ defined the class as those Region VII

employees over the age of 40 who are in positions so specialized that

no other employee is available to assume his or her duties while the

specialized employee rotates to a different assignment. The AJ further

found that this number must be further limited to those Region VII

employees over the age of 40 who requested a rotation assignment which

the agency denied. The AJ indicated that as evidence of numerosity,

complainant declared that the agency's �Rotational Opportunity Assignment

Program,� covers an indeterminable number of employees, and that the

class, though still being developed, should consist of significant

numbers, potentially up to 400 employees. However, the AJ found that

despite ample time (since April 2000), complainant submitted no names of

additional class members, exclusive of herself and the co-complainant.

Furthermore, the AJ determined that to the extent that other complainants

existed, joinder would not be difficult. The AJ found that these

individuals could be easily identified from employment records and

that they worked in a defined geographical area. Accordingly, the AJ

concluded that complainant failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement.

Regarding adequacy of representation, the AJ noted that prosecution of a

class action complaint is both complex and expensive. The AJ found that

the record failed to establish that the class agent either appreciated

this complexity or had access to adequate resources to pursue the matter.

Additionally, the AJ questioned whether complainant had the ability to

represent the class as reflected by her cursory response describing her

abilities to do so, and found that the record failed to reflect that

the class would be represented by legal counsel.<3> Accordingly, the

AJ concluded that complainant failed to satisfy this fourth requirement

as well.

Finally, in addition to dismissing the class complaint for failing to

satisfy typicality, numerosity, and adequacy of representation, the

AJ indicated that the agency must notify the class agent regarding the

processing of the individual complaint.

In its final order, the agency implemented the AJ's decision rejecting

the class complaint pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204. Additionally,

the agency determined that based upon the AJ's finding that complainant

had not been �injured,� it dismissed her individual EEO complaint for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(1).

On appeal, complainant argues that the AJ erred in finding that she

did not satisfy the typicality requirement. Complainant argues,

in pertinent part, that the agency previously denied her request

for a rotation assignment in 1997, and that she is part of the class

adversely impacted by the preferential treatment of the younger newly

hired employees. Regarding numerosity, complainant argues that the AJ

erred in limiting the class to those senior staff members who could not

find a replacement to assume their duties, and that further discovery

would have allowed her to gather additional evidence of numerosity.

As to adequacy of representation, complainant avers that the AJ had not

informed her of the need for an attorney, but that she was now in the

process of obtaining legal counsel. Complainant additionally argues

that the AJ inappropriately assumed that she did not have the financial

status to cover the expenses to pursue the complaint. Complainant further

argues that the AJ's findings and conclusions reflect bias in favor of

the agency, and requests that the class complaint be reinstated.

In response, the agency argues with regard to numerosity that

notwithstanding the AJ's definition of the class, complainant could only

identify two potential class members (herself and the co-complainant),

which is insufficient to establish numerosity. Regarding typicality, the

agency avers that complainant submits evidence of a rotation assignment

request denied in 1997, for the first time on appeal. The agency argues

that this information was previously available, and should not now be

considered. Moreover, the agency notes that because the denial occurred

in 1997, it must be deemed untimely because of her April 2000 initial

EEO Counselor contact. Finally, the agency asserts that complainant

failed to present evidence that she has, in fact, retained competent

counsel to represent the class, such that the adequacy of representation

requirement is not satisfied.

Class Complaint

Commonality and Typicality

An individual seeking to maintain a class action is required to meet the

"prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of

representation" set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2). This section,

which is an adoption of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, provides that the agency may reject a class complaint

if any one of these prerequisites is not met. See 29 C.F.R. �

1614.204(d)(2). In addressing a class complaint, it is important to

resolve the requirements of commonality and typicality prior to addressing

numerosity in order to "determine the appropriate parameters and the size

of the membership of the resulting class." See Moten v. Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission, EEOC Request No. 05960233 (April 8, 1997) (citing

Harris v. Pan American World Airways, 74 F.R.D. 25, 45 (N.D. Cal. 1977)).

The purpose of the commonality and typicality requirements is to ensure

that class agents possess the same interests and suffer the same injury

as the members of the proposed class. See General Telephone Company

of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). In application, the

commonality and typicality prerequisites tend to merge and are often

indistinguishable. Id. Commonality requires that there be questions of

fact common to the class. The class agent must, therefore, establish

some evidentiary basis from which one could reasonably infer the operation

of an overriding policy or practice of discrimination. This can be done

through allegations of specific incidents of discrimination, supporting

affidavits containing anecdotal testimony from other employees against

whom an employer allegedly discriminated in the same manner as the class

agents, and evidence of specific adverse actions taken. See Mastren

v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05930253 (October

27, 1993).

As an initial matter, we find that neither the AJ nor the agency properly

framed complainant's claim. Specifically, we find that the practice at

issue, as identified by the AJ, is not limited to the agency's alleged

unwritten policy requiring senior specialists to backfill their positions

while serving in a rotation assignment. Instead, we determine that the

�practice� at issue is the agency's failure to offer its career (and

typically older) Region VII employees the same opportunity to participate

in the six-week rotational assignment program provided as training to

the 52 newly hired, predominately younger, employees, who do not have to

�backfill� their positions while on assignment.<4> Complainant contends,

in essence, that she, and all �career� employees, especially specialists,

in Region VII are adversely impacted by this practice because rotational

assignments, particularly the rotation assignment program offered to

the 52 new employees, is significantly career enhancing, regardless of

position or career tract. Complainant avers that this experience gives

these 52 predominately younger employees a critical unfair advantage

over older employees, especially regarding promotions.

Therefore, in framing the claim in this manner, we find that the requisite

harm arises because of the agency's purported failure to offer the same

rotational assignment opportunity to its predominately older �career�

employees in Region VII, as provided to the 52 newly hired employees.

Contrary to the AJ's determination, we find that complainant need

not additionally show that she requested, and was denied a rotation

assignment, in order to demonstrate an actionable harm in this case,

either for the purpose of establishing typicality as to the class

complaint, or �stating a claim,� as to her individual complaint.

See Diaz v. Department of the Air Force, EEOC Request No. 05931049

(April 21, 1994).

Moreover, in considering the claim as now framed, we find that the AJ

improperly defined the class as those employees over the age of 40 who

are in positions so specialized that no other employee is available

to assume their duties. Instead, we find that the �practice� at issue

concerns the agency's rotation assignment program for the 52 newly hired,

predominately younger employees, which does not have a requirement to

�backfill� positions. Because the agency purportedly did not afford this

same opportunity to its Region VII predominately older senior employees,

we determine that the class should be defined as all Region VII employees

over the age of 40. In this regard, we note that the record reflects

that the 52 new employees were slated to eventually fill a variety of

positions, not only specialists positions, so that the class may not be

properly limited to only Region VII specialists over the age of 40.

Furthermore, we also find that the class should not be limited to those

members who could show that they requested a rotation assignment which

the agency denied. Specifically, we find that because the practice at

issue concerns only the rotation assignment program offered exclusively

to the 52 new employees, and not any and all requests for rotation

assignments made by senior staff. Therefore, we find that the class in

this case should not be limited to only those older career employees who

requested and were denied rotation assignments, and this should not be

a requirement for class membership.

Finally, based on the above re-framing of the claim, and the re-stated

definition of the class, we find that complainant has not only established

commonality with the other older senior employees over the age of 40 in

Region VII, but typicality as well. Specifically, we find that these

certification requirements are established because the entire class,

consisting of all senior employees in Region VII over the age of 40,

are adversely impacted by the same �practice� (thereby establishing

commonality); and, these class members all suffer the same harm, i.e.,

loss of a significant career enhancing opportunity, to the undue advantage

of the 52 younger newly hired employees (thereby establishing typicality).

Accordingly, for the above stated reasons, we find that the AJ and

agency erred in framing the claim, and defining the class, and also

erred in concluding that complainant failed to establish the typicality

requirement. Based on our re-framing of the claim, and identification

of the class, we find that complainant establishes both commonality

and typicality.

Numerosity

Numerosity requires that the putative class be so large as to make

joinder impractical. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2)(i). No set

number is required, and each case is evaluated on its own circumstances.

See General Telephone Company v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980). Considerations include the number of class

members, the location and dispersion of class members, the ease of

identifying class members and any other factors which would indicate a

substantial hardship in the class members participation in the complaint.

See Martin v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05920003 (December

19, 1991). The exact number of class members need not be shown prior to

certification, but some showing must be made of the number of individuals

affected by the alleged discriminatory practices who therefore may assert

a claim. See Moten, supra.

Regarding numerosity, we note that the AJ and agency ultimately find that

complainant fails to establish numerosity because she can identify, by

name, only two potential complainants, herself and her co-complainant.

However, in her decision, the AJ acknowledges that Region VII consists

of 566 employees, and that 425 of these are over the age of 40.

Accordingly, with reference to the above cited legal standard, and

based on the re-framed claim, and re-defined class, as described above,

we find that complainant establishes the element of numerosity.

Adequacy of Representation

Adequacy of representation �is perhaps the most crucial requirement

because the judgment will determine the rights of the absent class

members.� See Bailey, et al. v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC

Request No. 05930156 (July 30, 1993). EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �

1614.204(a)(2)(iv) requires that the agent of the class, or, if

represented, the representative, will fairly and adequately protect the

interests of the class.

In this case, the AJ determined that complainant could not financially

pursue a class action complaint, and that she is otherwise not able to

fairly and adequately represent the class, especially in that she lacks

the necessary legal expertise to do so. However, on appeal, complainant

disputes the AJ's finding that she cannot procure adequate financing,

and avers that she is in the process of obtaining expert legal counsel.

The Commission has held that where the other certification requirements

have been met, the AJ may conditionally certify the class for a reasonable

period of time so that the class agent may secure adequate representation.

See Hines v. Department of the air Force, EEOC Request No. 05940917

(January 29, 1996). Therefore, based on our determination herein that

complainant established the elements of commonality, typicality, and

numerosity, we find that this case should be remanded, with instructions

to the agency to forward the case to the St. Louis District Office,

where the AJ should conditionally certify the class for a reasonable

period of time so that the class agent may secure adequate representation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we find that the AJ improperly dismissed the captioned

class action complaint for failing to satisfy the requisite certification

criteria, and we VACATE the agency's final order implementing that

determination. The class complaint is REMANDED to the agency for further

processing, as set forth in the ORDER below.

Individual Complaint

Because of our determination herein, ordering that the class complaint

be conditionally certified by the AJ, we find that a determination on

complainant's individual complaint must be held in abeyance pending the

outcome of the class complaint. Therefore, we VACATE the agency final

order dismissing the individual complaint, and we REMAND the individual

complaint to the agency, and ORDER the agency to hold the individual

in abeyance pending the outcome of the certification determination on

the class complaint.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following action:

1. Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date that this decision

becomes final, the agency is ORDERED to transfer this case to the

St. Louis District Office, and to request an assignment to an AJ. The AJ

must conditionally certify the class complaint, for a reasonable time,

sufficient to allow the class agent to furnish evidence to establish

that she satisfied the adequacy of representation requirement, as set

forth in 29 C.F.R. � 1614.204(a)(2)(iv).

2. Upon the expiration of the time period established by the AJ, the

AJ must render a decision on the issue of class certification, either

certifying or dismissing the class complaint, for failing to satisfy

the adequacy of representation requirement.

3. The agency shall hold the individual complaint in abeyance pending

the outcome of the class action complaint, and timely send complainant

a written notice regarding this action.

Copies of all pertinent documentation verifying compliance with the

above actions must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0501)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement

of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the

right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g).

Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a civil action on

the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled

"Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408.

A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying

complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c)

(1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the complainant files a civil action, the

administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for

enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0900)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date

that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a

civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date

you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the

Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in

the complaint the person who is the official agency head or department

head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title.

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.

"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the

local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 14, 2004

__________________

Date

1The record variously shows the number of the newly hired group to

consist of either 48 or 52 employees. We find that the exact number is

not significant to our determination herein, and we will use the number

of 52, as claimed by complainant.

2According to the record, the 52 newly hired employees were to perform

a rotation assignment for a six-week duration in each of Region VII's

six divisions to familiarize them fully with the work and personnel of

Region VII.

3In his decision, the AJ indicated that complainant provided only a

�cursory� response to his inquiry asking her how she met the adequacy of

representation requirement, using the following reply from complainant

as an example: �I will fairly and adequately protect the interest of

the class during the processing of the complaint.�

4We note that complainant contends that because the newly hired employees

are not required to backfill their positions while on assignment, this

results in an additional hardship to the career employees who must

perform their duties in their absence.