Cardinal Financial Corp.

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 15, 2007

No. 75528485 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 15, 2007)

Hearing: Mailed:
October 11, 2006 February 15, 2007

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
________

In re Cardinal Financial Corp.
________

Serial No. 75528485
_______

Ralph M. Tener of McCandlish & Lillard, P.C. for Cardinal
Financial Corp.

Tina D. Brown, Trademark Examining Attorney, Law Office 105
(Thomas G. Howell, Managing Attorney).
_______

Before Seeherman, Quinn and Zervas, Administrative
Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Seeherman, Administrative Trademark Judge:

Cardinal Financial Corporation has appealed from the
final refusal of the Trademark Examining Attorney to
register CARDINAL BANK N.A. and design, as shown below, for
banking services.1 The words BANK N.A. have been
disclaimed.

1 Application Serial No. 75528485, filed July 22, 1998, and
asserting first use and first use in commerce on June 8, 1998.
THIS OPINION IS NOT A PRECEDENT
OF THE TTAB
Ser No. 75528485
2

The drawing is lined for the colors red and blue to
indicate that color is a feature of the mark.
Registration has been refused pursuant to Section 2(d)
of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §1052(d), on the ground
that applicant’s mark so resembles the mark CARDINAL
FINANCIAL COMPANY and design, shown below, with the words
FINANCIAL COMPANY disclaimed, previously registered for
“banking services, namely mortgage bankers,”2 that, as used
in connection with applicant’s services, it is likely to
cause confusion or mistake or to deceive.

2 Registration No. 2216820, issued January 12, 1999; Section 8 &
15 affidavits accepted and acknowledged. While the word
“bankers” in the registration may be a typographical error, it is
plain that the banking services which “mortgage bankers” would
offer are “mortgage banking services.” Applicant appears to have
acknowledged this, as it refers to the registrant’s services as
“mortgage services” or “mortgage banking services.” See
applicant’s brief, p. 12. We have therefore construed
registrant’s identification of services to be “mortgage banking
services.”
Ser No. 75528485
3

The appeal has been fully briefed, and applicant and
the Examining Attorney appeared at an oral hearing before
the Board.
With its appeal brief applicant submitted three
exhibits. Exhibit 1 is simply a page showing both
applicant’s and the cited marks, while Exhibits 2 and 3
consist of Internet evidence. The Examining Attorney has
objected to this evidence as untimely. Trademark Rule
2.142(d) provides that “[t]he record in the application
should be complete prior to the filing of an appeal.” We
do not regard the mere placing of both applicant’s and the
cited marks on a single sheet of paper as new evidence;
both marks are of record. Therefore, Exhibit 1 will be
considered. However, the Examining Attorney’s objection to
Exhibits 2 and 3 is well taken. Applicant states that it
is submitting this evidence pursuant to Section 1208.03 of
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure,
but this section merely discusses the acceptability of
Internet evidence; it does not provide that such evidence
Ser No. 75528485
4
may be submitted with an applicant’s appeal brief, or
otherwise contradict Trademark Rule 2.142(d).
Applicant has also asked, in the alternative, that “if
the Board declines to accept such evidence at this point,
the Applicant requests that the Board suspend the appeal
and remand the application for further examination.”
Brief, p. 3. The Board does not consider such
“alternative” requests for remand. After an appeal has
undergone full briefing and an oral hearing, and the Board
determines that an evidentiary submission is untimely, the
Board will not at that point consider a request for remand
so that the untimely evidence can be made of record. To do
so would be a severe waste of the Board’s and the Examining
Attorney’s time and resources. If applicant had wished to
ensure that the late-filed evidence would be of record, the
proper procedure would have been to file a separately
captioned request for remand, which also requested
suspension of the appeal. Instead, applicant merely filed
its appeal brief with the alternative request for remand
literally buried in the text, in the second sentence of the
second paragraph on page three.
We also point out that applicant’s alternative request
for remand is not supported by a showing of good cause.
See TBMP §1207.02 (2d ed. rev. 2004). Applicant has
Ser No. 75528485
5
provided no reason why it could not have made the Internet
evidence of record prior to the filing of the appeal. In
this connection, we note that the evidence consists of a
page from the website of applicant’s subsidiary, which also
bears the copyright date 2002 (the appeal was filed in
2005), and a page from a Virginia state government website.
Accordingly, Exhibits 2 and 3, submitted with
applicant’s appeal brief, have been given no consideration.
Our determination of the issue of likelihood of
confusion is based on an analysis of all of the probative
facts in evidence that are relevant to the factors set
forth in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357, 177 USPQ 563 (CCPA 1973). See also, In re Majestic
Distilling Co., Inc., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). In any likelihood of confusion analysis, two
key considerations are the similarities between the marks
and the similarities between the goods and/or services.
See Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544
F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24 (CCPA 1976). See also, In re Dixie
Restaurants Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 41 USPQ2d 1531 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
During the course of prosecution applicant advised the
Examining Attorney that it had a previous application,
Serial No. 75514741, for CARDINAL BANK in standard
Ser No. 75528485
6
character form, that this application was refused
registration on the basis of the same registration at issue
herein, and that that refusal was affirmed by the Board.
That decision issued on July 14, 2005. Although applicant
had previously requested that examination of the present
application be suspended pending a decision in the appeal
in Serial No. 75514741 “which is on appeal for a
substantially identical issue,” response filed January 14,
2005, in its brief applicant states the decision in the
earlier appeal has no bearing on the instant appeal because
the present CARDINAL BANKING and design mark is
significantly different from its prior mark. However, we
think that there are some significant similarities in the
facts and issues that were discussed in the prior decision.
Because it appears that many of the arguments made by
applicant and the Examining Attorney in this appeal are
identical to the arguments made previously, and discussed
at some length in the July 14, 2005 decision, we will not
repeat those arguments in detail in this opinion.
Turning first to the du Pont factor of the similarity
of the services, applicant asserts that “banking services
may only be provided by chartered banks, whereas mortgage
services may only be provided by licensed mortgage
bankers.” Brief, p. 11. However, applicant also concedes
Ser No. 75528485
7
that “entities that offer ‘banking services’ also offer
‘mortgage banking services.’” Id. We find it difficult to
reconcile both of these statements. All we can assume is
that applicant is referring, in its first statement, to
either a technical interpretation of banking services, or
restrictions with regard to banking services in a
particular state or states.
In any event, we must determine the question of the
similarity of the services as they are identified in
applicant’s application and the cited registration. In re
Big Pig Inc., 81 USPQ2d 1436, 1438 (TTAB 2006) (the issue
of likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of
the goods [or services] as identified in the involved
application and cited registration, regardless of what the
record may reveal as to the particular nature of the goods
[or services], their actual trade channels or the class of
purchasers to which they are in fact directed and sold).
Applicant has identified its services as “banking
services.” The cited registration is for “banking
services, namely mortgage bankers.” Clearly mortgage
banking services is a subset of banking services, and is
thus encompassed by applicant’s identification of goods.3

3 The registrant, during negotiations for a consent agreement,
discussed infra, also treated applicant’s identified “banking
Ser No. 75528485
8
To this extent, we must consider the services to be legally
identical.
Moreover, we note that applicant’s own brochure, which
it submitted as a specimen, lists, under the heading
“Consumer Loan Products and Services, “residential real
estate loans.” Because applicant also lists “home equity
loans and home improvement loans in the same section, a
consumer would reasonably consider “residential real estate
loans” to be another term for home mortgages, and that
providing mortgages is one of applicant’s banking services.
In addition, the Examining Attorney has made of record
a number of third-party registrations, based on use in
commerce, which show that a single mark has been registered
for, inter alia, banking services and mortgage banking
services. See, for example, Registration No. 2659389 for
MORTGAGE BY MORNING; Registration No. 2655443 for ALPINE
BANK and design; Registration No. 2654093 for “FACES YOU
KNOW…PEOPLE YOU TRUST.”; and Registration No. 2623458 for
HORIZON BANK. Third-party registrations which individually
cover a number of different items and which are based on
use in commerce serve to suggest that the listed goods

services” as encompassing “mortgage banking,” since one of the
registrant’s requirements for the agreement was that applicant
amend its identification to exclude “mortgage banking services.”

Ser No. 75528485
9
and/or services are of a type which may emanate from a
single source. See In re Albert Trostel & Sons Co., 29
USPQ2d 1783 (TTAB 1993).
In view of the identifications of the services in
applicant’s application and the cited registration, and the
evidence that banking services and mortgage banking may be
offered by the same entity under a single mark, we find
that applicant’s services are identical in part and
otherwise closely related to the registrant’s identified
services, and also that they are offered through the same
channels of trade. Thus, the du Pont factors of similarity
of the goods/services and similarity of trade channels
favor a finding of likelihood of confusion.
This brings us to a consideration of the marks.
Applicant’s primary argument regarding the difference
between its present mark and the cited mark goes to the
appearance of the marks themselves.4 Applicant points out
that its mark is lined for the colors red and blue, as
opposed to the cited mark which makes no claim to color,
and that in its mark these “bright contrasting colors make
the mark extremely forceful and distinctive.” Brief, p. 5.

4 As noted previously, the Board found likelihood of confusion
between applicant’s mark CARDINAL BANK, N.A. and the cited mark
in its decision in Serial No. 75514741. The only difference
between that case and the present case is that applicant’s mark
herein is in special form and contains a design element.
Ser No. 75528485
10
Applicant also notes the different type font in which the
words are shown, the differences in the depictions of the
bird design, and the different meanings of the words BANK,
N.A. and FINANCIAL COMPANY in the respective marks.
We must determine whether applicant’s mark and the
registered mark, when compared in terms of appearance,
pronunciation, connotation and commercial impression, are
similar or dissimilar. Palm Bay Imports, Inc. v. Veuve
Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73
USPQ2d 1689 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In analyzing whether the
marks are similar or dissimilar, we are guided by the
following principles. First, it is well-established that,
in articulating reasons for reaching a conclusion on the
issue of likelihood of confusion, there is nothing improper
in stating that, for rational reasons, more or less weight
has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided
the ultimate conclusion rests on a consideration of the
marks in their entireties. In re National Data Corp., 753
F.2d 1056, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Second, the
test is not whether the marks can be distinguished when
subjected to a side-by-side comparison, but rather whether
the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their
overall commercial impression that confusion as to the
source of the goods or services offered under the
Ser No. 75528485
11
respective marks is likely to result. Centraz Industries
Inc. v. Spartan Chemical Co., 77 USPQ2d 1698 (TTAB 2006).
Under actual marketing conditions, consumers do not
necessarily have the luxury of making side-by-side
comparisons between marks, and must rely upon their
imperfect recollections. Dassler KG v. Roller Derby Skate
Corporation, 206 USPQ 255 (TTAB 1980). Third, when marks
would appear on virtually identical goods or services, the
degree of similarity necessary to support a conclusion of
likely confusion declines. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v.
Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700
(Fed. Cir. 1992).
Considering the appearance of the marks, they are
overall very similar. Both contain the identical word
CARDINAL, followed by generic wording for the services
(BANK, N.A. and FINANCIAL COMPANY). Although the generic
wording differs, it does not serve to distinguish the marks
because consumers will look to and refer to CARDINAL as the
source-indicating element of the marks. In saying this, we
have considered applicant’s argument that the presence of
the words BANK, N.A. and FINANCIAL COMPANY in the
respective marks does, in this particular case, serve to
distinguish them because “the longstanding regulatory
separation of the functions of banks and mortgage bankers”
Ser No. 75528485
12
has caused the public to distinguish banking services from
mortgage banking services. Brief, p. 9. In support of
this position, applicant asserts that under Pennsylvania
state law a bank must have the word “bank” or “banking” in
its name, while a mortgage banker which is not a bank is
prohibited from using a name which implies that it is a
bank. Thus, it appears to be applicant’s position that
consumers would regard the different generic terms in the
respective marks as pointing to different sources of the
services because they would understand the different
meanings of these words, and that applicant’s mark
indicates a chartered bank, while the registrant would not
be a chartered bank because the word BANK does not appear
in its mark. We are not persuaded by this argument. It is
not clear what familiarity consumers have with various
state laws as to when the term BANK may be used in a
trademark, or whether they would ascribe any significance
to the presence or absence of this word in a mark, since
the same entities offer banking services and mortgage
banking services. As the Board stated in its July 14, 2005
opinion, “it is still likely that consumers could
reasonably believe, in light of the similarities in sound,
appearance, connotation and overall commercial impression
between the respective marks due to the shared term
Ser No. 75528485
13
‘CARDINAL,’ that the respective services have a common
source or sponsorship if such services are otherwise
commercially related.” Slip op. pp. 7-8.5
The marks are also similar in that they contain a
drawing of a bird. Although there are certain differences
in the way the bird is depicted, in each mark it is
obviously a cardinal and, thus, the design element in each
mark reinforces the meaning of the word CARDINAL. As noted
above, applicant relies heavily on the fact that its mark
is lined for the colors red and blue. However, although
the cited registration does not claim color as a part of
the mark, this does not mean that the mark may only be
depicted in black and white. On the contrary, the cited
mark may, for example, be depicted in the same color red
that is used in applicant’s mark, or it may use red for the
same parts of its mark that are colored red in applicant’s
mark. We have also taken note of applicant’s argument that

5 Applicant also argues, in its reply brief, that in Amalgamated
Bank of New York v. Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank, 842 F.2d
1270, 6 USPQ2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the Court found that the
generic components BANK OF NEW YORK and TRUST & SAVINGS BANK were
deemed by the parties and the Federal Circuit to adequately
distinguish the two marks. As the applicant apparently
recognizes, a key component of that decision was the consent
agreement by the parties, i.e., that the parties themselves
concluded that confusion was not likely. That key component is
not present in the instant case, and we do not read Amalgamated
as in any way standing for the proposition that the inclusion of
different generic terms in an otherwise identical mark is
sufficient to distinguish the marks.
Ser No. 75528485
14
the marks use different type fonts, but again, we do not
consider these differences to be distinguishing. The fonts
in neither mark are so unusual that they would make a
particular impression, or cause consumers to distinguish
the marks on this basis.
We acknowledge that there are specific differences in
the appearance of the marks that can be pointed out when
the marks are compared side-by-side. However, as noted
above, this is not the appropriate method for comparison.
Overall, the marks are very similar in appearance,
consisting of the dominant word CARDINAL followed by the
generic names for the services, a design of a cardinal
bird, and even lining that emphasizes the words (CARDINAL
is underlined in applicant’s mark, and there are lines
above and below the words in the cited mark).6 Consumers,

6 Applicant argues in its brief that the dominant part of the
cited mark is the capital C with a bird perched on it, while as
for its own mark, it states, variously, that the most prominent,
noticeable component is the word CARDINAL (brief, p. 5), the
dominant part of its mark is either the red bird or the word
CARDINAL (brief, p. 8), and CARDINAL is “unquestionably the
dominant component in the Applicant’s mark” (reply brief, p. 2).
At the oral hearing, applicant acknowledged that the word
CARDINAL is the dominant part of both marks. We note that in the
July 14, 2005 decision the Board found CARDINAL to be the
dominant element of the registrant’s mark and of applicant’s word
mark CARDINAL BANK, N.A. Suffice it to say that, because of the
prominent appearance of the word in both marks, the fact that the
services would be referred to by the words, rather than the
design, and the fact that the other wording in both marks is
generic, we have no doubt that CARDINAL is the dominant element
of both marks.

Ser No. 75528485
15
retaining a general impression of the marks, are likely to
misremember the slight differences in the marks, and to
view the marks as the same. Moreover, even if some
consumers would note that applicant’s mark contains the
generic words BANK, N.A., and the registered mark has the
generic words FINANCIAL COMPANY, such consumers are likely
to think the services still emanate from a single source
which is using variations of a single mark to represent
different services that it offers.7
Applicant’s special form drawing does not change the
pronunciation of its previous mark, CARDINAL BANK, N.A. in
standard character form, which was the subject of its
previous application. Again, we find that the marks are
extremely similar in pronunciation, the dominant word
CARDINAL being pronounced identically in both marks. For
the reasons already stated, the difference in pronunciation

7 Applicant makes the argument that because of the concept of
branding, a company creates a single consistent identity for its
family of products or services. Applicant further contends that
consumers are aware of this principle, and would think it unusual
for a company to adopt two different logos, which do not follow a
consistent approach. Applicant has not submitted any evidence in
support of this position and, for the reasons we have given in
finding the marks to be similar, we are not persuaded that
consumers would think the two marks in question are so different
that they do not identify a single source. We also note from the
consent agreement that applicant uses a variety of marks
containing the element CARDINAL, but not all have the words
CARDINAL BANK, N.A, e.g., CARDINAL BANK, CARDINAL ONLINE BANKING,
CARDINAL ONLINE BUSINESS BANKING.

Ser No. 75528485
16
of the generic wording BANK, N.A. and FINANCIAL COMPANY
does not serve to distinguish the marks. Nor, for the same
reasons, do the differences in these words serve to
distinguish the marks in their connotation. Both marks
convey the meaning of the cardinal bird, a meaning that is
emphasized by the inclusion of the design of the bird in
both marks. Overall, the marks are very similar in
appearance, pronunciation and connotation, and they convey
very similar commercial impressions.
The du Pont factor of the similarity of the marks
favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
Applicant asserts that the factor of the conditions of
purchase (the 4th du Pont factor) favors applicant.
Applicant argues that because consumers are entrusting
their money to a bank they will give heightened scrutiny to
banks while, because the acquisition of a home mortgage is
the largest financial commitment most people make, and the
relationship typically lasts for many years, potential
customers exercise heightened scrutiny in selecting their
mortgage companies. Although the decision to open a bank
account or obtain a mortgage is not made on impulse, we do
not agree with applicant that the prospective consumer acts
Ser No. 75528485
17
with more than ordinary care.8 Ordinary consumers, who are
not familiar with the peculiarities of banking laws in
different states, are not likely to accord any significance
to whether a generic term in a bank or mortgage lenders’
mark is BANK or FINANCIAL COMPANY. Accordingly, although
this du Pont factor favors applicant to the extent that we
accept that the purchasing decision will not be made on
impulse, it does not outweigh the similarities in the
marks, or cause us to find that consumers will note the
slight dissimilarities in the marks and therefore not be
confused.
Applicant also argues that, because the banking
industry is replete with business names and marks that use
the same components, such as FIRST, NATIONAL, FEDERAL,
TRUST and SAVINGS, the public is more conditioned to look
carefully at the names of banks and note the differences
between them. We make no comment on the use of such terms
as FIRST, NATIONAL, etc., as there is no evidence of such

8 For example, although one may have a mortgage for decades, the
institution that owns the financial paper may change many times
during this period. Once a homeowner has received the mortgage,
so that the money can be used to purchase the home, the name of
the company that holds the paper is largely irrelevant to him.
As the Court stated in Amalgamated Bank of New York v.
Amalgamated Trust & Savings Bank, supra, 842 F.2d at 1274, 6
USPQ2d at 1308, quoted by applicant in its brief: “Others do not
even know that they will be customers of a bank until they
discover that they are, i.e., when paper they have signed,
payable to someone else, is assigned to a bank.”
Ser No. 75528485
18
use in the record. As for third-party marks which contain
the word CARDINAL, there are two registrations which are of
record, No. 2131555 for CARDINAL CA$H for debit card
services and No. 2436074 for CARDINAL CAPITAL MANAGEMENT,
INC. for investment counseling and portfolio management
services, both of which were cited against the applicant’s
application and later withdrawn as a result of applicant’s
submission of consent agreements. The consent agreements
provide evidence of the use of these marks.9 Thus, there is
evidence of three companies using the term CARDINAL for
services in the financial field. However, the number of
third-party uses is so limited, and the services for which
those third-party marks are used are sufficiently different
from each other and from the cited registrant’s “mortgage
banker services,” that we cannot conclude that the public
is so accustomed to seeing CARDINAL marks for financial
services that they will distinguish applicant’s mark and
the mark in the cited registration on the basis of the very
slight differences between applicant’s and the registrant’s
mark, where the services are legally identical.

9 Another application, Serial No. 74671304 for CARDINAL MERCHANT
SERVICES, was also cited as a potential bar, but this application
was abandoned. Therefore, the application is not evidence that
the mark was ever used.

Ser No. 75528485
19
Applicant also argues that there have been “nearly
eight years of concurrent use” without any instances of
actual confusion. Brief, p. 13. Applicant bases its
statement on the June 8, 1998 first use dates claimed in
its application and the August 1, 1987 first use dates
claimed in the cited registration. (Applicant’s appeal
brief was filed in March, 2006.) We give little probative
weight to this statement, since we have no information
about whether the companies are engaged in business in the
same geographic areas, or the extent of their activities
and advertising should they be in overlapping areas.10 We
also note applicant’s statement that, during negotiations
with the registrant to obtain a consent agreement,
registrant never asserted it was aware of any actual
confusion. However, because there is no evidence of the
amount or extent of applicant’s and the registrant’s use,
we cannot conclude that there has been an opportunity for
confusion to occur, if it were likely to occur. Thus, we
treat the du Pont factor of “concurrent use without

10 We note that applicant asserts that the registrant has been
licensed to engage in mortgage lending in Virginia since June 15,
2000, and that applicant has its headquarters in Virginia.
However, applicant bases its statement about registrant’s
activities on evidence that is not properly of record (Exhibit 3)
and, moreover, having a license to do business is not the same as
evidence that a company is engaging in business on a meaningful
level.
Ser No. 75528485
20
evidence of actual confusion,” as well as the factor of
instances of actual confusion, as neutral.
Finally, applicant points to a consent agreement that
was drafted during negotiations with the registrant. This
agreement was never signed, and we therefore cannot treat
it as a consent by registrant to the registration of
applicant’s mark, or otherwise give it the deference that
is normally accorded to the views of the parties who would
best know the marketplace and be in the best position to
determine whether confusion is likely. See In re du Pont,
supra. Applicant argues that we may look to certain
language in the agreement, specifically the statement in
paragraph 2: “The parties agree that there is no likelihood
of confusion, mistake or deception resulting from the use
and registration of their respective marks, as identified
in Registrant’s U.S. Registration No. 2,216,820
(hereinafter ‘Registrant’s Federal Registration’) and
Applicant’s Amended Applications and as described in this
Agreement.” Applicant asserts that despite the
registrant’s redlining of much of the agreement, this
paragraph, stating that there is no likelihood of
Ser No. 75528485
21
confusion, was retained, and that this reflects the
registrant’s view of the marketplace.11
However, this paragraph is only part of the agreement,
which also provides, in paragraph 1, that applicant will
amend the identification of services in its application to
expressly exclude “mortgage banking services.” We cannot
read paragraph 2 without paragraph 1; registrant’s
agreement that there is no likelihood of confusion is
clearly contingent on the deletion of mortgage banking
services from applicant’s application. Thus, even if the
agreement had been executed, we could not view it as a
consent to register applicant’s mark with its present
identification of services. Accordingly, we give this
unsigned agreement no probative weight.
We also give no persuasive value to applicant’s
statement that the registrant has been aware of applicant’s
use of its mark since 2001 but has never demanded that
applicant cease using its mark. The fact that the
registrant has not yet taken any action against applicant
cannot be regarded as a consent to applicant’s registration
of the mark. See National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v.

11 Applicant has explained that the consent agreement was not
finalized because the registrant wanted applicant to change its
trade name to remove the component FINANCIAL.

Ser No. 75528485
22
American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d 1572, 1581, 19
USPQ2d 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (laches cannot begin to run
until a mark is published for opposition).
Because applicant’s and the registrant’s services, as
identified, are legally identical in part and are otherwise
closely related; because the marks are very similar in
appearance, pronunciation, connotation and commercial
impression, the differences between them being
insignificant in terms of differentiating source; and
because the services are purchased by the public at large,
exercising ordinary care, we find that applicant’s use of
CARDINAL BANK N.A. and design in connection with banking
services is likely to cause confusion with the mark
CARDINAL FINANCIAL COMPANY and design for the identified
“banking services, namely mortgage banker.”
Decision: The refusal of registration is affirmed.