Cameron Butler, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 26, 1999
01986984_r (E.E.O.C. Aug. 26, 1999)

01986984_r

08-26-1999

Cameron Butler, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Cameron Butler, )

Appellant, )

)

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01986984

) Agency No. 1F-941-0082-98

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

On September 10, 1998, appellant filed a timely appeal of an August 17,

1998 final agency decision which dismissed his complaint for failure to

state a claim and for failure to contact an EEO Counselor in a timely

manner.

In its final decision, the agency identified the issues of appellant's

June 2, 1998 complaint as whether appellant was discriminated against

on the bases of physical disability (carpal tunnel syndrome, back

injury) and in retaliation for prior EEO activity when: (1) appellant's

[Department of Labor's] Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP)

claim was denied; (2) appellant was given improper sitting assignments;

and (3) management failed to inform appellant that he had carpal tunnel

syndrome. In its final decision, the agency dismissed allegation (1)

on the grounds that the allegation failed to state a claim and on the

alternative ground of untimely EEO contact. In dismissing allegation

(2) for failure to contact an EEO Counselor timely, the agency noted

that appellant did not initiate EEO Counselor contact until April 16,

1998, although allegation (2) occurred in April 1993. Regarding its

dismissal of allegation (3) for untimely EEO contact, the agency stated

that appellant knew he had carpal tunnel syndrome in November 1996,

when he filed a claim for a work injury and that he noted in his claim

that the agency withheld the diagnosis of his condition.

Allegations (1) and (3)

The Commission finds that allegation (1) was properly dismissed

for failure to state a claim. Regarding allegation (3), it is the

determination of the Commission that the allegation is more appropriately

dismissed for failure to state a claim.

The record reveals that appellant allegedly sustained work injuries to his

back and both hands, including both thumbs in 1993, and that appellant

filed claims for the payment of workers' compensation benefits.

A November 1993 OWCP telephone report indicates that appellant

reported bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. In a November 15, 1996

Notice of Occupational Disease and Claim for Compensation (Form CA-2)

submitted to the OWCP, appellant reported carpal/cubital tunnel syndrome.

The record reveals that appellant resigned from the agency in June 1993.

The record also reveals that appellant applied for Social Security

disability benefits in July 1993, and that in April 1996, a Social

Security Administration Administrative Law Judge found appellant to be

disabled from June 4, 1993.

Upon review, the Commission finds that allegations (1) and (3)

constitute a collateral attack on the workers' compensation process

and the administration of appellant's workers' compensation claims

and, therefore, fail to state cognizable claims. The Commission has

previously held that issues concerning an employee's OWCP claim are not

appealable to the Commission except in limited circumstances. Schultz v.

U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950173 (September 26, 1996).

Where a complainant alleges that the agency discriminated in a manner

pertaining to the merits of a workers' compensation claim then the

complaint does not state an EEO claim. Pirozzi v. Department of the Navy,

EEOC Request No. 05970146 (October 23, 1998)(allegedly false statements

made by agency to OWCP during OWCP's processing of a workers' compensation

claim goes to merits of compensation claim); Hogan v. Department of

the Army, EEOC Request No. 05940407 (September 29, 1994) (reviewing

an allegation that agency officials provided misleading statements to

OWCP would require the Commission to essentially determine what workers'

compensation benefits the complainant would likely have received); Reloj

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05960545 (June 15,

1998) (allegation that agency's provision of false information to the

OWCP resulted in denial of benefits is a collateral attack on OWCP's

decision and, thus, fails to state a claim). The Commission also does not

find that allegation (3) constitutes a failure by the agency to provide

information to the OWCP. Foster v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No.

05950693 (May 16, 1996)(failure by agency to submit required paperwork

to OWCP states a claim).

A complainant may not use the EEO process to launch a collateral attack

on the workers' compensation process. The Commission has recognized

very narrow exceptions to the general prohibition on collateral attacks.

See Story v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05960314 (October

18, 1996); Lau v. National Credit Union Administration, EEOC Request

No. 05950037 (March 18, 1996). Allegations (1) and (3) do not fall

within these narrow exceptions. There is no evidence that allegations

(1) and (3) relate to an employment policy or practice, either by

the OWCP or by the agency. See Reloj v. Veterans Administration,

EEOC Request No. 05960545 (June 15, 1998); Agustin v. Department of

Labor, EEOC Request No. 05960127 (December 19, 1996). Rather, the

dismissed allegations relate to the general administration of workers'

compensation benefits and actions and decisions regarding benefits and,

as such, they fail to state a claim.

Allegation (2)

The record reveals that after an alleged work injury in March 1993,

appellant was offered a limited duty position by the agency in April

1993. Appellant declined the position, stating that he had a veterans

service disability and he could not perform the duties of the position.

Allegation (2) was dismissed by the agency on the grounds of untimely

EEO contact.

Generally, an aggrieved person must initiate contact with an EEO Counselor

within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(1). EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.105(a)(2)

permits the time period to be extended under certain circumstances.

Where a complainant alleges a failure to accommodate, the Commission has

held that a failure to accommodate constitutes a recurring violation,

that is, a violation that recurs anew each day that an employer fails

to provide an accommodation. See Mitchell v. Department of Commerce,

EEOC Appeal No. 01934120 (March 4, 1994). In addition, the Commission's

Regulations provide that the time limits in Part 1614 are subject to

waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

For example, the Commission has long held that an agency may not dismiss

a complaint based on an appellant's untimeliness, if that untimeliness is

caused by the agency's action in misleading or misinforming the appellant.

Elijah v. Department of the Army, EEOC Request No. 05950632 (March 28,

1996)(if agency officials misled appellant into waiting to initiate EEO

counseling, agency must extend time limit for contacting EEO Counselor);

Herrera v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05891351 (September

28, 1989). However, although time limitations are subject to waiver,

estoppel and equitable tolling, complainants are required to act with

due diligence in pursuit of their claims or the doctrine of laches may

be applied. Sapp v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05950666

(May 31, 1996); O'Dell v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05901130 (December 27, 1990).

In the present complaint, appellant does not argue that he was not

aware of the applicable time limitations. Appellant asserts on

appeal, however, that his EEO contact was timely because he filed

"EEO complaints" in March, April and October 1993; in February and

June 1996; and in August 1997; and in April and June 1998. Appellant

also asserts that when he filed a complaint in October 1993, no final

decision was ever issued and the agency failed to re-open the matter.

Appellant also asserts that when he attempted to file a complaint,

he was informed that his complaint would be dismissed as untimely.

In light of appellant's assertions, and an unexplained April 2, 1993

Request for Counseling by appellant and an also unexplained February 16,

1996 letter from the agency to appellant referencing a closed counseling

file contained in the present record, it is unclear whether appellant

may have contacted an EEO Counselor prior to the April 16, 1998 contact

reflected in the Counselor's Report in the present complaint and the

nature and outcome of any alleged prior contacts. It is well-settled

that a complainant satisfies the criterion of EEO Counselor contact by

contacting an agency official logically connected with the EEO process

and by exhibiting an intent to begin the EEO process. See Floyd

v. National Guard Bureau, EEOC Request No. 05890086 (June 22, 1989).

In addition, the Commission has consistently held that the agency bears

the burden of obtaining sufficient information to support a reasoned

determination as to timeliness. Williams v. Department of Defense,

EEOC Request No. 05920506 (August 25, 1992). The Commission has also

held that the EEO Counselor must inquire into the reasons for the delay

when a complainant initiates counseling beyond the 45-day time limit

for doing so. Martin v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No.

05960642 (August 8, 1998); Franklin v. Department of Defense, EEOC Request

No. 05910767 (December 9, 1991). Accordingly, because the Commission is

unable to determine the propriety of the agency's dismissal of allegation

(2), we will remand the allegation to the agency for a supplemental

investigation on the issue of the timeliness of Counselor contact.

Appellant is advised that failure to cooperate with the agency's request

for information can result in the dismissal of his complaint pursuant

to the provisions of 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(g).

Consistent with the foregoing discussion, the agency's dismissal

of allegations (1) and (3) is AFFIRMED. The agency's dismissal of

allegation (2) is VACATED and the allegation is REMANDED to the agency

for a supplemental investigation.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to conduct a supplemental investigation and to

take the following actions:

1. The agency shall conduct an inquiry sufficient to enable it to make

a reasoned determination as to the timeliness of EEO Counselor contact

regarding allegation (2). The agency shall notify appellant that he has

fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the agency's notification in

which to provide the agency with clear information regarding any alleged

EEO contacts occurring prior to April 16, 1998, concerning allegation

(2). Appellant shall be requested to provide the dates, names, and

places of the alleged EEO contacts, and the nature of each of those

alleged contacts. Thereafter, the agency shall supplement the record

with affidavits and other relevant evidence from those EEO individuals

purportedly contacted by appellant. Such evidence shall include, but

is not limited to, the dates of the prior contacts, the nature of those

contacts and shall denote whether appellant exhibited an intent to begin

the EEO process and to pursue his allegation when the contacts were made.

If the agency is unable to obtain specific information from EEO officials

who may no longer be available, then the agency should so state and

obtain the required information from EEO officials having custody and

control of the records.

2. After completion of the investigation, the agency shall decide whether

to process or dismiss the remanded allegation. 29 C.F.R. �1614.106 et seq.

The supplemental investigation and issuance of a notice of processing

and/or new final agency decision must be completed within 45 (forty-five)

calendar days of the date this decision becomes final.

A copy of the notice of processing and/or a copy of the new final agency

decision must be sent to the Compliance Officer as referenced below.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action

in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion of

your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion of the

complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative processing.

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file

a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the

date you filed your complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the

Commission, until such time as the agency issues its final decision

on your complaint. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be filed

within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File

A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

August 26, 1999

DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations