Caesars Entertainment Corporation d/lb/a Rio All-Suites Hotel and Casino

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2015

362 NLRB No. 190 (N.L.R.B. 2015)

362 NLRB No. 190
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
Caesars Entertainment d/b/a Rio All-Suites Hotel and
Casino and International Union of Painters and
Allied Trades, District Council 15, Local 159,
AFL–CIO. Case 28–CA–060841
August 27, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER REMANDING IN PART
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS JOHNSON
AND MCFERRAN
On March 20, 2012, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam L. Schmidt issued the attached decision. The Gen-
eral Counsel and the Charging Party Union each filed
exceptions and supporting briefs, the Respondent filed
answering briefs, and the General Counsel filed a reply
brief.1
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions only
to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order
Remanding in Part, and to adopt the judge’s recommend-
ed Order as modified and set forth in full below.2
Facts
The Respondent, a Las Vegas casino and hotel, is
owned and operated by Caesar’s Entertainment, Inc. The
Respondent maintains an 84-page employee handbook
(“The Rio Employee Handbook”) which it distributes to
its workforce of approximately 3000 employees, about
1700 of whom are union-represented. All employees
must sign a form acknowledging receipt of the handbook
and their responsibility to comply with its provisions.
The handbook advises employees that noncompliance
with its provisions may result in discipline, including
discharge. At issue here are nine handbook rules, the
maintenance of which is alleged to violate Section
8(a)(1) of the Act. 3

1 Pursuant to Reliant Energy, 339 NLRB 66 (2003), the Union filed
four post-brief letters.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order to conform to our
findings and to the Board’s standard remedial language. We shall
substitute a new notice to conform to the Order as modified, and in
accordance with our decision in Durham School Services, 360 NLRB
No. 85 (2014).
3 No exceptions were filed to the judge’s finding that the Respond-
ent’s maintenance of a 10th rule, conduct standard No. 28, handbook, p.
2.20, violates Sec. 8(a)(1).
The panel unanimously finds the off-duty employee attire rule law-
ful. Chairman Pearce and Member McFerran form the majority with
Legal Framework
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act if it
maintains workplace rules that would reasonably tend to
chill employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
See Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998),
enfd. 203 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The analytical
framework for assessing whether maintenance of rules
violates the Act is set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-
Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004). Under Lutheran Herit-
age, a work rule is unlawful if “the rule explicitly re-
stricts activities protected by Section 7.” Id. at 646 (em-
phasis in original). If the work rule does not explicitly
restrict protected activities, it nonetheless will violate
Section 8(a)(1) if “(1) employees would reasonably con-
strue the language to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the
rule was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3)
the rule has been applied to restrict the exercise of Sec-
tion 7 rights.” Id. at 647.
The rules at issue here are not alleged to explicitly re-
strict protected activities or to have been promulgated in
response to or applied to restrict Section 7 activities.
Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether employees would
reasonably construe the challenged rules to prohibit Sec-
tion 7 activity, under the first prong of the Lutheran Her-
itage test. In construing rules, Lutheran Heritage teaches
that they are to be given a reasonable reading, and are not
to be considered in isolation. Id. at 646. Further, any
ambiguity in the rule must be construed against the draft-
er—here, the Respondent. Lafayette Park, supra at 825.
Discussion
We find, in agreement with the judge, that mainte-
nance of four of the challenged handbook rules does not
violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.4 For the reasons dis-

respect to the confidentiality rule (handbook, p. 2.21); the rules banning
the use of cameras, camera phones, audio-visual and other recording
equipment; and the rules banning some computer usage. Members
Johnson and McFerran form the majority with respect to the recreation-
al use rules (conduct standard No. 9 and the “Use of Facility” provi-
sion) and the “confidential company information” rule (conduct stand-
ard No. 10).
4 For the following reasons, we agree with the judge that the Re-
spondent did not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) by maintaining a handbook rule
titled “Visiting Property When Not in Uniform” (handbook, p. 2.7).
The contested provision (“clothing which displays profanity, vulgarity
of any kind, . . . or offensive words or pictures”) follows language in
the same paragraph requiring employees to wear “neat and presentable”
clothing, to wear “shirts, shoes or strapped sandals and name tag/badge
if on property for work-related reasons or back of house services (e.g.
HR, Payroll),” and not to wear such items as “bathing suits, short
shorts, thong-type sandals, tube tops, halter tops, tank tops, thin straps,
strapless clothing, midriff tops.” Further, the record shows that em-
ployees frequently wear clothing at the facility that bears a union mes-
sage. Viewing the rule in its context, employees would not reasonably
conclude that Sec. 7 activity, including wearing messages or images
about terms and conditions of employment, is encompassed by the rule.
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
cussed below, however, we reverse the judge and find
that three other challenged rules are unlawful. Finally,
we remand two rules for further consideration.
1. Rules prohibiting the disclosure of confidential
information
In disagreement with the judge and our dissenting col-
league, we find that the confidentiality rule on p. 2.21 of
the handbook is unlawful. That rule provides:
Confidentiality: All employees are prohibited from
disclosing to anyone outside the Company, indirectly
or directly, any information about the Company which
has not been shared by the Company with the general
public. This type of disclosure includes participation in
internet chat rooms or message boards. Exceptions to
the rule include disclosures which are authorized by the
Company or required or authorized by the law. This
information includes, but is not limited to:
 Company financial data
 Plans and strategies (development, marketing,
business)

In finding the “Visiting Property When Not in Uniform” rule to be
lawful, Chairman Pearce does not rely on extrinsic evidence that em-
ployees wear clothing bearing a union message at the facility.
We also agree with the judge that the Respondent’s conduct standard
No. 9 (handbook, p. 2.19) and “Use of Facility” provision (handbook,
p. 2.34) do not violate Sec. 8(a)(1) under either Lutheran Heritage or
Tri-County Medical Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976). As the judge
found, these rules clearly speak to off-duty employees’ recreational use
of the Respondent’s facilities as guests, extolling them to visit during
“non-peak business hours,” to gamble responsibly, and to consume
alcohol “responsibly while having a meal.” Thus, we find that employ-
ees would not reasonably read these rules to restrict their access to the
Respondent’s facilities to exercise their Sec. 7 rights.
Contrary to the judge and his colleagues, Chairman Pearce would
find that the Respondent’s conduct standard No. 9 and “Use of Facility”
provision are unlawful. Both rules require off-duty employees to se-
cure supervisory or managerial approval before they visit the Respond-
ent’s “property,” “public areas,” “public facilities” or “facilities,” thus
giving the Respondent broad, unfettered discretion to interpret the rule
to deny access to those engaged in protected activities. By this re-
quirement, these rules do not comport with the third prong of Tri-
County Medical Center, supra, requiring access rules to be uniformly
applied. See Saint John’s Health Center, 357 NLRB No. 170, slip op.
at 5 (2011) (“In effect, the Respondent is telling its employees, you
may not enter the premises after your shift except when we say you
can. Such a rule is not consistent with Tri-County.”). See also San
Pablo Lytton Casino, 361 NLRB No. 148, slip op. at 4 (2014). Moreo-
ver, the prior-approval requirement also runs afoul of Lutheran-
Heritage, supra, as “employees would reasonably construe the broad
managerial-approval exception as requiring them to disclose their intent
to engage in protected activity when seeking such approval, a com-
pelled disclosure that would certainly tend to chill the exercise of Sec. 7
rights.” San Pablo Lytton Casino, supra, slip op. at 4 fn. 6.
Finally, for the reasons discussed later in this Decision, we find con-
duct standard No. 10 (handbook, p. 2.19) does not violate Sec. 8(a)(1).
As also discussed later in this Decision, Chairman Pearce does not
agree with this finding.
 Organizational charts, salary structures, policy
and procedures manuals
 Research or analyses
 Customer or supplier lists or related infor-
mation.
The property or Corporate Law department should be
consulted whenever there is a question about whether
the information is considered confidential. Any failure
to uphold this policy should be communicated to the
Law department and may result in immediate Separa-
tion of Employment. All managerial, supervisory, and
selected positions are required to comply with the “Use
and Disclosure of Confidential Information” policy.
The challenged Confidentiality rule is extraordinarily
broad in scope, prohibiting employees from sharing “any
information about the Company which has not been
shared by the Company with the general public.” With-
out more, this sweeping provision clearly implicates
terms and conditions of employment that the Board has
found to be protected by Section 7. See, e.g., Flamingo
Hilton-Laughlin, 330 NLRB 287, 291–292 (1999). The
rule then goes on to list illustrations of prohibited disclo-
sures that go to the very core of protected concerted ac-
tivity, leaving employees to reasonably conclude that this
rule prohibits their Section 7 activity. For example, the
rule lists “salary structures” among the confidential in-
formation that cannot be disclosed without the Respond-
ent’s consent. The Board has held, however, that bans
on employees disclosing wages clearly violate Section
8(a)(1). See MCPc, Inc., 360 NLRB No. 39, slip op. at 1
(2014) (finding unlawful a rule prohibiting “dissemina-
tion of confidential information within [the company],
such as personal or financial information, etc.”); Double
Eagle Hotel & Casino, 341 NLRB 112, 115 (2004) (find-
ing unlawful rules banning discussion of terms and con-
ditions of employment, including “disciplinary infor-
mation, grievance/complaint information, performance
evaluations, salary information, salary grade, types of
pay increases, and termination date of employees” and
discussion of “confidential or sensitive information con-
cerning the [c]ompany or any or its employees”), enfd. as
modified 414 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied
546 U.S. 1170 (2006). Likewise, the Board has found
that rules prohibiting employee disclosure of the em-
ployer’s manuals, including the employee handbook, are
overbroad, as employees would reasonably understand
them to encompass disclosure of employees’ terms and
conditions of employment, thereby infringing on em-
ployees’ exercise of their Section 7 rights. Quicken
Loans, 361 NLRB No. 94 (2014), reaffirming as modi-
fied and incorporating 359 NLRB No. 141 (2013) (rule
RIO ALL-SUITES HOTEL & CASINO 3
unlawfully overbroad that defined nondisclosable “non-
public information” to include “all personnel lists, ros-
ters,” and “handbooks”). Yet, the rule expressly covers
“policy and procedures manuals.”
Contrary to the judge and our dissenting colleague, we
do not find that Mediaone of Greater Florida, 340 NLRB
277 (2003), warrants a contrary result. The Mediaone
rule found lawful prohibited disclosure of “customer and
employee information, including organizational charts
and databases,” but did so only in the context of a
lengthy litany of particularized information under the
heading of “Proprietary Information.” That particular-
ized information included business plans, technological
research and development, product documentation, mar-
keting plans and pricing information, copyrighted works,
trade secrets, financial information, patents, copyrights,
trademarks, service marks, trade names and goodwill, as
well as organizational charts. Id. at 278. As the
Mediaone majority explained, the contested phrase ap-
peared within a “larger provision prohibiting disclosure
of ‘proprietary information, including information assets
and intellectual property’ and [was] listed as an example
of ‘intellectual property’”; thus, employees would not
likely understand that employee terms and conditions of
employment were covered by the ban on disclosing pro-
prietary information. Id. at 279 (original emphasis).
Here, the rule’s relationship to the Respondent’s legiti-
mate business concerns, is far less clear and, as discussed
above, references to salary structures and policy manuals
encompass information that employees have a protected
right to disclose. See, e.g., Flex Frac Logistics, LLC v.
NLRB, 746 F.3d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing
Mediaone in enforcing Board order and finding that
“personnel information and documents” is within “larger
category of ‘confidential information’” rather than a
“sub-set of ‘intellectual property’”); Fresh & Easy
Neighborhood Market, 361 NLRB No. 8, slip op. at 2-3
(2014) (distinguishing Mediaone in finding unlawful rule
requiring employees to “Keep customer and employee
information secure. Information must be used fairly,
lawfully and only for the purpose for which it was ob-
tained.”).5
Accordingly, we reverse the judge and find that lan-
guage contained in the confidentiality rule, p. 2.21, vio-
lates Section 8(a)(1).6

5 In Member McFerran’s view, the Board’s decision in Mediaone is
in tension with the mainstream of Board precedent in this area and
properly should be limited to the particular facts presented in that case.
6 The General Counsel also contends that the Respondent’s conduct
standard No. 10 (handbook, p. 2.19) is unlawful. That rule provides,
“Employees will not reveal confidential company information to unau-
thorized persons.” We disagree and find this rule analogous to the rule
found lawful in Lafayette Park, supra, 326 NLRB at 826 (prohibiting
2. Rules banning use of cameras, camera phones, audio-
visual and other recording equipment
Relying on Flagstaff Medical Center, 357 NLRB No.
65 (2011), review granted in part and enfd. in part 715
F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2013), the judge found that the
handbook’s restrictions on employee recordings in con-
duct standards nos. 24 and 35 were lawful, and dismissed
the related 8(a)(1) allegations. Those rules require as
follows:
Conduct standard No. 24, p. 2.20, (emphasis added):
Personal pagers, beepers and cell phones worn by em-
ployees must not be visible or audible to guests and
should not impact job performance. The use of person-
al cellular/digital phones is prohibited while on duty,
but is allowed during break time in designated break
areas. Camera phones may not be used to take photos
on property without permission from a Director or
above.
Conduct standard No. 35, p. 2.21 (emphasis added):

“[d]ivulging Hotel-private information to employees or other individu-
als or entities that are not authorized to receive that information”)
Further, to the extent that the confidentiality rule found unlawful above
influenced employees’ interpretation of conduct standard No. 10, our
standard remedies for the unlawful confidentiality rule, which include
ordering its rescission, will eliminate that concern.
Chairman Pearce would find the broadly worded conduct standard
No. 10 unlawful. See, e.g. Lily Transportation Corp., 362 NLRB No.
54, slip op. at 1 fn. 3 (2015) (and cited cases). He disagrees with the
judge and his colleagues that this rule is akin to one found lawful in
Lafayette Park, supra at 826. Unlike Lafayette Park, where the rule
was limited to one specific type of information which employees would
reasonably understand to relate to their employer’s legitimate interest in
the security of its proprietary information, conduct standard No. 10’s
generalized reference to undefined confidential information carries no
similar restriction or connotation. As an ambiguous term, it must be
construed against the Respondent as drafter. See Hyundai America
Shipping Agency, 357 NLRB No. 80, slip op. at 12 (2011); Lafayette
Park, supra at 828 (citing Norris/O’Bannon, 307 NLRB 1236, 1245
(1992)). Thus, whether it is read individually or in conjunction with the
confidentiality rule on page 2.21 of the handbook, conduct standard No.
10 is overbroad.
Unlike his colleagues, Member Johnson believes that the confidenti-
ality rule on page 2.21 of the handbook is lawful. In Mediaone, the
Board concluded “that employees, reading the rule as a whole, would
reasonably understand that it was designed to protect the confidentiality
of the [r]espondent’s proprietary business information rather than to
prohibit discussion of employee wages.” Id. at 279. The Respondent’s
rule here includes examples of undisputedly confidential company
information that are the same or nearly the same as the “particularized”
examples in Mediaone, a case which he views as correctly decided and
that is still good law. Both sets of examples provide sufficient context
for employees to understand that prohibited disclosures are limited to
proprietary information and would not reasonably be understood as
extending to discussion of employee wages or other terms and condi-
tions of employment. Member Johnson finds the other cases relied on
by the majority to be meaningfully distinguishable in terms of context
from the rule in this case. See Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Market,
361 NLRB No. 8, slip op. at 4–6 (Member Johnson, dissenting).
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Cameras, any type of audio visual recording equipment
and/or recording devices may not be used unless spe-
cifically authorized for business purposes (e.g. events).
Contrary to the judge and our dissenting colleague, we
find these provisions are unlawfully overbroad.7 Em-
ployee photographing and videotaping is protected by
Section 7 when employees are acting in concert for their
mutual aid and protection and no overriding employer
interest is present. Such protected conduct may include,
for example, employees recording images of employee
picketing, documenting unsafe workplace equipment or
hazardous working conditions,8 documenting and publi-
cizing discussions about terms and conditions of em-
ployment, or documenting inconsistent application of
employer rules. See Hyundai America Shipping Agency,
supra, 357 NLRB No. 80, slip op. at 1, 12 (finding un-
lawful maintaining rule prohibiting employees from dis-
closing “information or messages” from the employer’s
email, instant messaging, phone and other computer sys-
tems except to “authorized persons,” which would rea-
sonably be understood to include discussions about terms
and conditions of employment); White Oak Manor, 353
NLRB 795, 795 fn. 2, 798–799 (2009) (finding that pho-
tography was part of the res gestae of employee’s pro-
tected concerted activity in documenting inconsistent
enforcement of employer dress code), reaffirmed and
incorporated by reference at 355 NLRB No. 211 (2010),
enfd. 452 Fed.Appx. 374 (4th Cir. 2011); Sullivan, Long
& Hagerty, 303 NLRB 1007, 1013 (1991) (finding em-
ployee’s use of tape recorder in workplace to aid federal
government investigation to be protected), enfd. mem.
976 F.2d 743 (11th Cir. 1992).
Further, the Respondent tied neither prohibition at is-
sue here to any particularized interest, such as the priva-
cy of its patrons. As our dissenting colleague observes,
the Respondent does have a guest privacy provision as
part of its confidentiality rules.9 That provision admon-

7 As the General Counsel notes, the judge’s statement that employ-
ees would not read the “ban as being designed to chill their Section 7
activities” is an imprecise statement of the Lafayette Park standard
because whether the Respondent drafted the language with the intent to
chill employees’ protected activities is immaterial; the analysis focuses
on whether employees would reasonably read the rule as written as a
limit on such activities.
8 It is settled that “expression of concerns about safety and [well-
being] of . . . employees” in the work place constitutes protected activi-
ty. Martin Marietta Corp., 293 NLRB 719, 725 (1989) (citing NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962)). And employees are
protected in publicizing their workplace concerns and discussing them
with other employees and with union representatives. See Kinder-Care
Learning Centers, 299 NLRB 1171, 1171–1172 (1990).
9 That provision states (handbook, p. 2.21):
Guest Privacy: Employees are prohibited from violating
guest/employee privacy by disclosing privileged information. This
ishes employees not to share “privileged information”
about guests’ gaming habits and to respect celebrities’
privacy. The Respondent, however, failed to link this or
any other interest to the prohibitions at issue here. As a
result, employees would not reasonably interpret these
rules as related to the protection of patron privacy.
Without such a limiting principle, the Respondent’s em-
ployees are left to draw the reasonable conclusion that
these two prohibitions would prohibit their use of audio-
visual devices in furtherance of their protected concerted
activities.10
Contrary to the judge and our dissenting colleague, we
find Flagstaff distinguishable. In Flagstaff, the Board
majority found lawful a medical center’s rule prohibiting
employee use of electronic equipment during work time
and the “[t]he use of cameras for recording images of
patients and/or hospital equipment, property, or facili-
ties.” 357 NLRB No. 65, slip op. at 4–5. Emphasizing
the “weighty” privacy interest of hospital patients and of
hospitals in preventing the wrongful disclosure of indi-
vidually identifiable health information, the Board ma-
jority concluded that “[e]mployees would reasonably
interpret [the employer’s] rule as a legitimate means of
protecting the privacy of patients and their hospital sur-
roundings, not as a prohibition of protected activity.”
Id., slip op. at 5. Unlike the rule in Flagstaff, which ex-
pressly referenced “recording images of patients,” the
rules presented here include no indication that they are
designed to protect privacy or other legitimate interests.11

privileged information includes but is not limited to a guest’s level of
play, frequency of visitation, buy-in amounts, win/loss results or any
other record of their play or personal information. This information
must not be shared with anyone other than the guest or a co-worker
who clearly has a business reason for needing to know. This prohibits
disclosing information to the guest’s family members, friends, or
business associates—anyone other than the guest.
As our Company expands both nationally and internationally and
sponsor[s] events such as the WSOP and celebrity golf outings, a
chance encounter with an employee’s favorite actors, sports idols, or
other public figures is possible and can leave quite an impression.
While it is exciting to see celebrities visiting our properties, we must
be sure to maintain the highest level of professionalism and discretion.
It is essential that employees respect a celebrity’s right to privacy and
discretion.
10 Of course, the fact that these prohibitions are subject to discretion-
ary exemptions by the Respondent does not make them any less unlaw-
ful. See, e.g., American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 234 NLRB 1126, 1131
(1978) (finding unlawful rule requiring employees to obtain permission
before distributing union information in nonwork areas on nonworking
time), enfd. 600 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1979).
Because the Respondent does not invoke security concerns as justi-
fication for these rules, we see no need to address our dissenting col-
league’s speculation about how the Board might decide future cases
involving such concerns.
11 Chairman Pearce adheres to his dissent in Flagstaff, but finds that
case distinguishable here because the Flagstaff medical-care-provider
RIO ALL-SUITES HOTEL & CASINO 5
Based on the foregoing, we find that the Respondent’s
employees would reasonably interpret these rules to in-
fringe on their protected concerted activity. Thus, these
rules violate Section 8(a)(1).12
3. Rules banning some computer usage
Finally, we will remand allegations involving rules
banning computer usage for further consideration. The
judge found that the Respondent’s work rules entitled
“Use of Company Systems, Equipment, and Resources”
are lawful under the Board’s decision in Register Guard,
351 NLRB 1110 (2007), enfd. in relevant part and re-
manded sub nom. Guard Publishing v. NLRB, 571 F.3d
53 (D.C. Cir. 2009).13 Subsequent to the judge’s deci-

employer had a strong interest in protecting patient privacy, an interest
not present here. Casinos and hotels may have an interest in protecting
customer privacy, but that privacy interest does not trump the employ-
ees’ Sec. 7 rights. Accordingly, in this non-patient care setting, an
employer must tailor its workplace rules to not interfere with Sec. 7
rights.
12 Given our finding above, we need not engage in a debate about the
relative weight of privacy interests for hotel or gaming patrons.
Unlike his colleagues, Member Johnson finds both rules lawful. He
observes that there is no Sec. 7 right to possession of a camera or other
recording device by employees on an employer’s property, nor is there
an inherent right to use a camera or other recording device in the course
of Sec. 7 activity. Thus, the question is whether employees would
reasonably view the rule in dispute as implicitly including and interfer-
ing with Sec. 7 activities. Answering that question, the Board majority
in Flagstaff properly found that the hospital’s rule was not unlawfully
overbroad. 357 NLRB No. 65, slip op. at 4–5. As in that case, the
Respondent’s employees would certainly understand its weighty inter-
ests in protecting guest privacy and in protecting both the Respondent
and guests from illegal or unfair gambling activities. And as in Flag-
staff, these interests are expressly and contextually tied to the rules at
issue here. The guest privacy rule (handbook, p. 2.21) quoted by my
colleagues and the abundance of security cameras and other precautions
undoubtedly impress upon employees the importance of these interests.
Contrary to his colleagues, Member Johnson would not require an
express tie-in of the camera-related rules to the privacy rule and Re-
spondent’s security interests, as he finds the connection obvious from
the factual context. Knowing the obvious reasons for these rules, the
Respondent’s employees would similarly and reasonably interpret them
as legitimate means of safeguarding guest privacy and the integrity of
the Respondent’s gaming operations, not as prohibitions of protected
activity.
13 The computer confidentiality rule, p. 2.14, states in relevant part
(emphasis added):
Do not disclose or distribute outside of [Rio’s] any information that is
marked or considered confidential or proprietary unless you have re-
ceived a signed non-disclosure agreement through the Law Depart-
ment. In some cases, such as with Trade Secrets, distribution within
the Company should be limited and controlled (e.g., numbered copies
and a record of who has received the information). You are responsi-
ble for contacting your department manager or the Law Department
for instructions.
The general restrictions section on computer usage, p. 2.14, provides
(emphasis added):
Computer resources may not be used to:
 Commit, aid or abet in the commission of a crime
sion, the Board overruled Register Guard in relevant part
in Purple Communications, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 126
(2014), and articulated a new analytic framework for
determining the lawfulness of employer rules restricting
employee use of a company’s email system. The Board
held in Purple Communications:
we will presume that employees who have rightful ac-
cess to their employer’s email system in the course of
their work have a right to use the email system to en-
gage in Section 7-protected communications on non-
working time. An employer may rebut the presump-
tion by demonstrating that special circumstances neces-
sary to maintain production or discipline justify restrict-
ing its employees’ rights.
Id., slip op. at 14. The Board applied its holding retroactive-
ly, and remanded the case to allow for the introduction of
evidence under the new test. Id., slip op. at 16–17. Accord-
ingly, we will sever and remand the allegation concerning
the Respondent’s rules entitled “Use of Company Systems,
Equipment, and Resources” to the administrative law judge
for further proceedings consistent with Purple Communica-
tions, including allowing the parties to introduce evidence
relevant to a determination of the lawfulness of those
rules.14

 Violate local, state or federal laws
 Violate copyright and trade secret laws
 Share confidential information with the general public, in-
cluding discussing the company, its financial results or
prospects, or the performance or value of company stock
by using an internet message board to post any message,
in whole or in part, or by engaging in an internet or
online chatroom
 Convey or display anything fraudulent, pornographic, abu-
sive, profane, offensive, libelous or slanderous
 Send chain letters or other forms of non-business infor-
mation
 Seek employment opportunities outside of the Company
 Invade the privacy of or harass other people
 Solicit for personal gain or advancement of personal views
 Violate rules or policies of the Company
Do not visit inappropriate (non-business) websites, including but not
limited to online auctions, day trading, retail/wholesale, chat rooms,
message boards and journals. Limit the use of personal email, includ-
ing using streaming media (e.g., video and audio clips) and down-
loading photos.
14 Although Chairman Pearce agrees with the General Counsel that,
even under the prior Register Guard decision, the Respondent’s rules
restricting computer usage were unlawfully overbroad to the extent that
they prohibited the disclosure of “any information that is marked or
considered confidential” and banned employee solicitation for “ad-
vancement of personal views,” he agrees that the rules should be re-
manded to the judge in the first instance to consider under Purple
Communications.
For the reasons set forth in his dissent in Purple Communications,
Member Johnson disagrees with remanding the allegations concerning
the computer usage rules to the judge for further proceedings and anal-
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of
the Act.
2. By the following acts and conduct the Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
(a) Maintaining the provision in its Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Confidentiality,” p. 2.21, that con-
tains the following language: “All employees are prohib-
ited from disclosing to anyone outside of the Company,
indirectly or directly, any information about the Compa-
ny which has not been shared by the Company with the
general public [including] . . . . Organizational charts,
salary structures, policy and procedure manuals.”
(b) Maintaining the provision in its Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 24,” p. 2.20,
that contains the following language: “Camera phones
may not be used to take photos on property without per-
mission from a Director or above.”
(c) Maintaining the provision in its Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 35,” p. 2.21,
that contains the following language: “Cameras, any type
of audio visual recording equipment and/or recording
devices may not be used unless specifically authorized
for business purposes (e.g. events).”
(d) Maintaining the provision in its Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 28,” p. 2.20,
that contains the following language: “Employees who
walk off the job during shift will be considered to have
abandoned their job and voluntarily separated their em-
ployment.”
3. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, the Respondent is ordered to
cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action
designed to effectuate the Act. Having found that the
Respondent maintains unlawful handbook rules, includ-
ing confidentiality rules, camera and audio-visual
equipment use rules, and a restriction about walking off
the job, the Respondent is required to revise or rescind
the unlawful rules. This is the standard remedy to assure
that employees may engage in protected activity without
fear of being subjected to an unlawful rule. See
Guardsmark, LLC, 344 NLRB 809, 812 (2005), enfd. in
relevant part 475 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2007). As stated

ysis consistent with the majority opinion in that case. He further agrees
with the judge’s dismissal of the computer usage allegations because
the evidence does not establish that employees would reasonably con-
strue the computer usage rules as prohibiting Sec. 7 activity in any case.
there, the Respondent may comply with our order of re-
scission by reprinting the Rio Employee Handbook with-
out the unlawful language or, in order to save the ex-
pense of reprinting the whole handbook, it may supply its
employees with handbook inserts stating that the unlaw-
ful rules have been rescinded or with lawfully worded
rules on adhesive backing that will correct or cover the
unlawfully broad rules, until it republishes the handbook
without the unlawful provisions. Any copies of the
handbook that include the unlawful rules must include
the inserts before being distributed to employees. Id. at
812 fn. 8. See also Hills & Dales General Hospital, 360
NLRB No. 70, slip op. at 3 (2014).15
ORDER
The Respondent, Caesars Entertainment d/b/a Rio All-
Suites Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining the provision in its Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Confidentiality,” p. 2.21, that con-
tains the following language: “All employees are prohib-
ited from disclosing to anyone outside of the Company,
indirectly or directly, any information about the Compa-
ny which has not been shared by the Company with the
general public [including] . . . . Organizational charts,
salary structures, policy and procedure manuals.”
(b) Maintaining the provision in its Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 24,” p. 2.20,
that contains the following language: “Camera phones
may not be used to take photos on property without per-
mission from a Director or above.”
(c) Maintaining the provision in its Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 35,” p. 2.21,
that contains the following language: “Cameras, any type
of audio visual recording equipment and/or recording
devices may not be used unless specifically authorized
for business purposes (e.g. events).”
(d) Maintaining the provision in its Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 28,” p. 2.20,
that contains the following language: “Employees who
walk off the job during shift will be considered to have
abandoned their job and voluntarily separated their em-
ployment.”
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-

15 The allegations concern the handbook in use at the Rio location.
Although the record indicates that the handbook is similar to that in use
at other locations of Caesar’s Entertainment, formerly known as Har-
rah’s Operating Company, Inc., the record does not make clear whether
the unlawful provisions at issue are contained in the handbooks in use
at the other sites. Therefore, a nationwide order is not appropriate. Cf.
Guardsmark, LLC v. NLRB, supra at 381 (nationwide order issued
where same provisions in effect at other locations).
RIO ALL-SUITES HOTEL & CASINO 7
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Rescind the provision in the Rio Employee Hand-
book headed “Confidentiality,” p. 2.21, that contains the
following language: “All employees are prohibited from
disclosing to anyone outside of the Company, indirectly
or directly, any information about the Company which
has not been shared by the Company with the general
public [including] . . . . Organizational charts, salary
structures, policy and procedure manuals.”
(b) Rescind the provision in the Rio Employee Hand-
book headed “Conduct Standard No. 24,” p. 2.20, that
contains the following language: “Camera phones may
not be used to take photos on property without permis-
sion from a Director or above.”
(c) Rescind the provision in the Rio Employee Hand-
book headed “Conduct Standard No. 35,” p. 2.21, that
contains the following language: “Cameras, any type of
audio visual recording equipment and/or recording de-
vices may not be used unless specifically authorized for
business purposes (e.g. events).”
(d) Rescind the provision in the Rio Employee Hand-
book headed “Conduct Standard No. 28,” p. 2.20, that
contains the following language: “Employees who walk
off the job during shift will be considered to have aban-
doned their job and voluntarily separated their employ-
ment.”
(e) Furnish all current employees at its Las Vegas fa-
cility with inserts for its Rio Employee Handbook that
(1) advise that the unlawful provisions have been re-
scinded or (2) provide lawfully worded provisions on
adhesive backing that will cover the unlawful provisions;
or publish and distribute to employees at its Las Vegas
facility revised copies of its Rio Employee Handbook
that (1) do not contain the unlawful provisions, or (2)
provide lawfully worded provisions.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Caesars Entertainment d/b/a Rio All-Suites Hotel and
Casino facility in Las Vegas, Nevada copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”16 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 28, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
“National Labor Relations Board.”
are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
papers notices, notices shall be distributed electronically,
such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent
customarily communicates with its employees by such
means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond-
ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. If the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any such time since January 5, 2011.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director for Region 28 a sworn certifi-
cation of a responsible officer on a form provided by the
Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has
taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed
insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically
found.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegation that the Re-
spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining the
rules entitled “Use of Company Systems, Equipment,
and Resources” is hereby severed and remanded to the
Chief Administrative Law Judge for assignment to a
judge for further appropriate action as set forth above
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judge to whom the
case is assigned shall afford the parties an opportunity to
present evidence on the remanded issue and shall prepare
a supplemental decision setting forth credibility resolu-
tions, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recom-
mended Order. Copies of the supplemental decision
shall be served on all parties, after which the provisions
of Section 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations
shall be applicable.
Dated, Washington, D.C. August 27, 2015
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
Harry I. Johnson, III, Member
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT maintain the provision in our Rio Em-
ployee Handbook headed “Confidentiality,” p. 2.21, that
contains the following language: “All employees are
prohibited from disclosing to anyone outside of the
Company, indirectly or directly, any information about
the Company which has not been shared by the Company
with the general public [including] . . . . Organizational
charts, salary structures, policy and procedure manuals.”
WE WILL NOT maintain the provision in our Rio Em-
ployee Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 24,” p.
2.20, that contains the following language: “Camera
phones may not be used to take photos on property with-
out permission from a Director or above.”
WE WILL NOT maintain the provision in our Rio Em-
ployee Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 35,” p.
2.21, that contains the following language: “Cameras,
any type of audio visual recording equipment and/or re-
cording devices may not be used unless specifically au-
thorized for business purposes (e.g. events).”
WE WILL NOT maintain the provision in our Rio Em-
ployee Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 28,” p.
2.20, that contains the following language: “Employees
who walk off the job during shift will be considered to
have abandoned their job and voluntarily separated their
employment.”
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights
listed above.
WE WILL rescind the provision in the Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Confidentiality,” p. 2.21, that con-
tains the following language: “All employees are prohib-
ited from disclosing to anyone outside of the Company,
indirectly or directly, any information about the Compa-
ny which has not been shared by the Company with the
general public [including] . . . . Organizational charts,
salary structures, policy and procedure manuals.”
WE WILL rescind the provision in the Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 24,” p. 2.20,
that contains the following language: “Camera phones
may not be used to take photos on property without per-
mission from a Director or above.”
WE WILL rescind the provision in the Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 35,” p. 2.21,
that contains the following language: “Cameras, any type
of audio visual recording equipment and/or recording
devices may not be used unless specifically authorized
for business purposes (e.g. events).”
WE WILL rescind the provision in the Rio Employee
Handbook headed “Conduct Standard No. 28,” p. 2.20,
that contains the following language: “Employees who
walk off the job during shift will be considered to have
abandoned their job and voluntarily separated their em-
ployment.”
WE WILL furnish you with inserts for our Rio Employ-
ee Handbook that (1) advise that the unlawful provisions
have been rescinded or (2) provide lawfully worded pro-
visions on adhesive backing that will cover the unlawful
provisions; or WE WILL publish and distribute to you re-
vised copies of our Rio Employee Handbook that (1) do
not contain the unlawful provisions, or (2) provide law-
fully worded provisions.
CAESAR’S ENTERTAINMENT D/B/A RIO ALL-SUITES
HOTEL AND CASINO
The Board’s decision can be found at
www.nlrb.gov/case/28-CA-060841 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the
decision from the Executive Secretary, National Labor
Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, SE, Washington, D.C.
20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
Pablo Godoy and Larry A. Smith, for the Acting General Coun-
sel.
John D. McLachlan and David B. Dornak, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM L. SCHMIDT, Administrative Law Judge. I heard
this case at Las Vegas, Nevada, on January 10, 2012. The In-
RIO ALL-SUITES HOTEL & CASINO 9
ternational Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Coun-
cil 15, Local 159, AFL–CIO (Charging Party or Local 59) filed
the charge on July 5, 2011.1 On September 30, 2011, the Re-
gional Director for Region 28 of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board) issued a complaint on behalf of the
Acting General Counsel alleging that Caesars Entertainment
d/b/a Rio All-Suites Hotel and Casino (Respondent or Compa-
ny) violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA or Act) by maintaining certain employee work
rules alleged to be overly-broad and discriminatory.2 Respond-
ent filed a timely answer denying that it engaged in the unfair
labor practices alleged.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after carefully considering the
briefs filed by the Acting General Counsel and Respondent,3 I
make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, a corporation engaged in the operation of a
hotel and casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, derived gross revenues
in excess of $500,000 during 12-month period ending July 5,
2011. During same period, Respondent, in conducting its busi-
ness operations described above, purchased and received at the
its Las Vegas facility goods valued in excess of $50,000 direct-
ly from points outside the State of Nevada. Respondent admits,
and I find, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the
Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
The Company is one of 10 properties in Las Vegas, Nevada,
owned and operated by Caesar’s Entertainment, Inc. (Caesar’s).
This property employs more than 3000 employees. About 1700
of those employees are covered by the three collective-
bargaining agreements between the Company and four separate
labor organizations. Neither Local 159 nor any of its affiliated
organizations represent any of the Company’s workers nor is
there any evidence that it currently seeks to represent any
workers at this property.
The Acting General Counsel alleges in paragraph 4 of the
complaint that Respondent has maintained 10 overly broad
work rules that tend to chill employee Section 7 activities. The
challenged rules are set forth in the “The Rio Employee Hand-
book” (the handbook) under the section titled “What the Rio

1 The name of the International Union has been corrected to reflect
its official name.
2 Sec. 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
“interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7.” The part of Sec. 7 pertinent here guar-
antees employees “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
. . . to refrain from any or all such activities.”
3 Local 159 joined in the brief filed by the Acting General Counsel.
Expects From You.” (Jt. Exh. 1, p. 3, et seq.) The Company
provides the handbook to each newly hired employee and redis-
tributes it to all employees when revised. The handbook, which
appears to be adapted from that in use at Caesar’s properties
nationwide, was last revised in 2007. None of the unions that
currently represent employees have filed a grievance challeng-
ing the rules at issue here.
B. General Legal Principles That Govern Workplace Rules
Under the NLRA
An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining work-
place rules that tend to chill Section 7 activities by its employ-
ees. Lafayette Park Hotel, 326 NLRB 824, 825 (1998). In
Lutheran Heritage Village—Livonia, 343 NLRB 646 (2004),
the Board established an analytical framework for fact finders
faced with deciding NLRA cases that challenge the legality of
workplace rules. It provides that rules explicitly restricting
Section 7 activities violate Section 8(a)(1). But where a rule
does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity, the General Coun-
sel must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)
employees would reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Sec-
tion 7 activity; (2) the employer adopted the rule in response to
union activity; or (3) the employer applied a rule to restrict
employee Section 7 activity. Id. at 647. If a rule explicitly
infringes the Section 7 rights of employees, the mere mainte-
nance of the rule violates the Act without regard for whether
the employer ever applied the rule for that purpose. Guards-
mark v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 369, 375–376 (D.C. Cir. 2007) In all
cases, the Board requires the trial judge to give the rule a rea-
sonable reading, refrain from reading particular phrases in iso-
lation, and avoid improper presumptions about interference
with employee rights. 343 NLRB at 646.
The specific rules at issue are described below, with the chal-
lenged aspects generally shown in italics. No evidence shows
that either the handbook or any specific rule contained in it was
adopted in response to a union organizing campaign. Addition-
ally, there is no evidence that the rules have ever been applied
to inhibit employee Section 7 activities. Consequently, the
analysis provided below centers on whether a challenged rule
expressly restricts employee conduct protected by Section 7,
and, if not, whether employees would reasonably construe the
rule to prohibit Section 7 activity.
C. Relevant Facts and Conclusions
1. The off-duty employee attire rule
Complaint paragraph 4(1) alleges that the handbook rule
prohibiting off-duty employees from wearing “clothing which
displays profanity, vulgarity of any kind, obscene or offensive
words or phrases (sic).” This prohibition applies essentially to
off-duty employees who visit Respondent property for a variety
of purposes. The rule in its entirety reads:
Visiting Property When Not In Uniform: When on proper-
ty while off duty for training, New Hire Orientation, meet-
ings, or coming in to change for work, the following Appear-
ances Guidelines apply: All clothing must be neat and pre-
sentable. Clothing may not be torn, damaged or defaced in
any way. The following items should be worn: shirts, shoes
or strapped sandals and name tag/badge if on property for
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
work-related reasons or back of house services (e.g., HR, Pay-
roll). The following may not be worn: bathing suits, short
shorts, thong-type sandals, tube tops, halter tops, tank tops,
thin straps, strapless clothing, midriff tops, clothing which
displays profanity, vulgarity of any kind, obscene or offensive
words or pictures.
The Acting General Counsel implicitly concedes that this
rule does not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity. Rather, he
claims the words “clothing which displays profanity, vulgarity
of any kind, obscene or offensive words or pictures” could
reasonably lead an employee to “construe the rule to prohibit
them from wearing clothing intended to protest working terms
or conditions for fear that Respondent may deem it to be vul-
gar, profane, or offensive.” (AGC Br., p. 7.) Respondent ar-
gues that this rule is but one aspect of a six page section of the
handbook addressing the image employees present to the hotel
guests rather than a prohibition against wearing clothing with a
“union message.”
I do not agree with the claim that Respondent violated the
Act by the mere maintenance of this rule because I am unper-
suaded that employees would reasonably construe the rule to
prohibit Section 7 activity. This is particularly true where, as
here, the evidence shows that employees frequently wear cloth-
ing at the facility that bears a union message. The Acting Gen-
eral Counsel’s argument, in my judgment, ignores the Board’s
admonition against reading phrases in isolation and making
improper presumptions about interference with employee
rights. Fairly read, in the context where it appears, the adjec-
tive “offensive” addresses matters of taste a reasonable person
would regard as outside the norms of decency common in the
community from which Respondent draws its customers rather
any of the various forms of activity protected by Section 7.
Adtranz ABB Daimler-Benz Transportation, N.A. Inc. v. NLRB,
253 F.3d 19, 26 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The two cases cited by the Acting General Counsel predate
Lutheran Heritage Village. (AGC Br., p. 8.) One of the cited
cases, University Medical Center, 335 NLRB 1318 (2001), was
denied enforcement in pertinent part by the D.C. Court of Ap-
peals. 335 F.3d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Given the favorable
discussion in the Board’s Lutheran Heritage Village decision of
that circuit’s rationale in Adtranz, supra, a case similar to Uni-
versity Medical Center, I find the continued vitality of the two
Board cases cited by the Acting General Counsel very ques-
tionable. For these reasons, I recommend dismissal of this
allegation.
2. The rules governing the use of facilities by
off-duty employees
The allegations in complaint paragraphs 4(2) and 4(3) chal-
lenge work rules applicable to the use of Respondent’s facilities
by off-duty employees. The former is explicitly stated as con-
duct standard No. 9 and is 1 of 35 enumerated in the employee
handbook, under the “Conduct Standards” section. The rule,
along with the section’s preamble, read:
Conduct Standards: Out of respect for our guests and each
other, you are expected to maintain certain behavior and per-
formance standards. The following list provides examples of
behavior that can result in disciplinary action; it is not intend-
ed to be an exhaustive list. You are expected to use good
judgment at all times in behaving appropriately at work.
* * *
9. With your manager’s authorization you may use the Rio
public facilities while off duty. When doing so, employees
must act professionally and adhere to Conduct Standards
(note the above Conduct Standard regarding gambling). In
addition, if alcohol is consumed, it should be done responsibly
while having a meal. Employees participating in company-
sponsored events where alcohol is served (e.g. award ban-
quets) must act responsibly and professionally.
The other rule in this category challenged by the Acting
General Counsel appears several pages ahead of rule 9. It reads
as follows:
Use of Facility: Our guests have priority in using our facili-
ties. Employees, however, are welcome to visit the property
as a guest during off duty, non-peak business hours. Visits
are permitted with your supervisor’s or manager’s approval
so long as you are not in uniform. With that approval, you
may visit public lounges, restaurants, casino and other public
areas while off duty. When using any of the facilities as a
guest you are restricted to public areas. Even though off duty,
you are expected to conduct yourself in a manner consistent
with the Conduct of Standards. Please ensure you review
Conduct Standards #7 (gambling) and #9 (consuming alco-
hol) prior to visiting the property.
The Acting General Counsel argues that these two rules are
“facially invalid” because they require employees to obtain
permission anytime they wish to visit Respondent’s facility
when off duty. In addition, the Acting General Counsel argues
the rules are unlawful because a reasonable employee could
construe them to inhibit Section 7 activities. In support of his
contentions, the Acting General Counsel cites Teletech Hold-
ings, Inc., 333 NLRB 402 (2001) (rule barring the distribution
of literature without “proper authorization” unlawful because it
was not limited to working time nor working areas and because
it required prior managerial authorization) and Tri-County Med-
ical Center, 222 NLRB 1089 (1976) (rule barring off-duty em-
ployees access to parking lots, gates, and other outside non-
working areas unlawful in the absence a business justification).
Respondent, noting that neither of these access rules mention or
implicate any type of Section 7 activity, argues that both rules
are analogous to a rule found lawful by the Board in Lafayette
Park Hotel, supra at 827.
I concur with Respondent’s contention that these rules are
essentially indistinguishable from hotel rule 6 found lawful in
the Lafayette Park Hotel case. There the Board, citing Bruns-
wick Corp., 282 NLRB 794, 795 (1987), found hotel rule 6
could not be read by reasonable employees as requiring prior
managerial permission in order to engage in protected activities
on their free time in nonwork areas. Plainly, Respondents rules
address only the use of “public” areas inside the hotel facility.
As such the rules are inapplicable to parking lots and exterior
nonwork areas such as those addressed in the Tri-County case,
or even nonwork interior areas. And as the rules make no ref-
RIO ALL-SUITES HOTEL & CASINO 11
erence to the distribution of literature, the Acting General
Counsel’s reliance on the Teletech Holdings case is misplaced.
Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of complaint paragraphs
4(2) and 4(3).
3. The confidentiality rules
Complaint paragraphs 4(4) and 4(5) allege that Respondent
maintains confidentiality rules that violate Section 8(a)(1).
Complaint paragraph 4(4) alleges Respondent’s broad elabora-
tion of its confidentiality policy (Rule 2.21) is unlawful. That
provision provides:
Confidentiality: All employees are prohibited from disclos-
ing to anyone outside the Company, indirectly or directly, any
information about the Company which has not been shared by
the Company with the general public. This type of disclosure
includes participation in internet chat room or message
boards. Exceptions to the rule include disclosure which are
authorized by the Company or required or authorized by the
law. This information includes, but is not limited to:
• Company financial data
• Plans and strategies (development, marketing, business)
• Organization charts, salary structures, policy and proce-
dures manuals
• Research or analyses
• Customer or supplier lists or related information.
The property or Corporate Law department should be con-
sulted whenever there is a question about whether the infor-
mation is considered confidential. Any failure to uphold this
policy should be communicated to the Law department and
may result in immediate Separation of Employment. All man-
agerial, supervisory, and selected positions are required to
comply with the “Use and Disclosure of Confidential Infor-
mation” policy.
Complaint paragraph 4(5) challenges conduct standard No.
10, which states: “Employees will not reveal confidential in-
formation to unauthorized persons.”
Although the allegation at complaint paragraph 4(4) suggests
that the Acting General Counsel regards the confidentiality rule
(Jt. Exh. 1, p. 2.21) as unlawful in its entirety, the argument
contained in his brief dispels any such notion. Thus, his brief
states:
Included within Respondent’s broad definition of what consti-
tutes confidential information, is the prohibition against the
disclosure of “organizational charts, salary structures, policy
and procedure manuals.” The rule further defines confidential
information as “any information about the company which
has not been shared by the Company with the general public.”
(AGC Br. pp. 12–13.) Citing Double Eagle Hotel & Casino,
341 NLRB 112 (2004) and Automatic Screw Products, 306
NLRB 1072 (1992), the Acting General Counsel argues that the
rule is “unlawful on its face” because it would inhibit union and
protected concerted activity by precluding employees from
discussing wages and working terms and conditions as well as
freely contacting and conferring union representative, Board
agents, or other third parties on “internet chat rooms or message
boards” concerning these particular subjects.
Respondent’s argument, which draws a distinction between
“salary structures” and an individual employee’s wage rate,
argues that nothing in these two rules implicate matters protect-
ed by Section 7. In addition, Respondent argues that this rule is
analogous to the confidentiality rules the Board found lawful in
Lafayette Park Hotel, supra, Super K-Mart, 330 NLRB 263
(1999), and Mediaone of Greater Florida, Inc., 340 NLRB 277
(2003). I agree.
At first blush, Respondent’s prohibition against the disclo-
sure of information contained in organizational charts, salary
structures, and policy and procedures manuals is arguably an
explicit restriction on Section 7 activity and thus unlawful on
its face as argued by the Acting General Counsel. Thus, in the
context of union organizing activity, an organizational chart
typically contains information of particular significance in de-
termining the scope of an appropriate unit, the unit placement
of particular individuals, and other critical details of signifi-
cance to the employee organizational effort. Arguably, rules
permitting employers to muzzle their employees with respect to
this type of information, whether gained from a first-hand ob-
servation of an organizational chart, or have come to know by
way of their employment experience, would be clearly destruc-
tive of matters at the core of the Section 7 right to participate in
the planning of a union organizing strategy with professional
organizers. Similarly, policy and procedures manuals often
contain significant information about the terms and conditions
of employment for employees. For example, it is not unusual
for these types of documents in the hotel industry to contain
production standards and rules applicable to particular groups
of employees such as room cleaners, or even minutiae address-
ing the expected conduct of particular groups having contact
with the public. And finally, after employees select a repre-
sentative, sharing information they have gained concerning the
employer’s salary structures with their professional bargaining
representative to fashion bargaining demands would be of par-
ticular importance.
But having said that, the Board’s decision in Mediaone, su-
pra, has already held that an employer’s rule that barred the
disclosure of “organizational charts and databases” (the latter
would almost certainly contain an employer’s salary structures)
among numerous other matters do not explicitly restrict Section
7 activity. And as to whether employees would reasonably
construe such rules as inhibiting Section 7 activity, the Board
majority, by the following language, gives the overall context
in which the doubtful portions appear considerable signifi-
cance:
[W]e do not believe that employees would reasonably read
this rule as prohibiting discussion of wages and working con-
ditions among employees or with a union. Although the
phrase “customer and employee information, including organ-
izational charts and databases” is not specifically defined in
the rule, it appears within the larger provision prohibiting dis-
closure of “proprietary information, including information as-
sets and intellectual property” and is listed as an example of
“intellectual property.” Other examples include “business
plans,” “marketing plans,” “trade secrets,” “financial infor-
mation,” “patents,” and “copyrights.” Thus, we find, contrary
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
to our dissenting colleague, that employees, reading the rule
as a whole, would reasonably understand that it was designed
to protect the confidentiality of the Respondent’s proprietary
business information rather than to prohibit discussion of em-
ployee wages.6 “Clearly, businesses have a substantial and le-
gitimate interest in maintaining the confidentiality of proprie-
tary information.” Lafayette Park, supra, 326 NLRB at 826
(employer rule prohibiting “divulging Hotel private infor-
mation to employees or other individuals or entities that are
not authorized to receive that information” found lawful); Su-
per K-Mart, supra, 330 NLRB at 263, 264 (employer rule
stating that “Company business and documents are confiden-
tial” and “disclosure of such information is prohibited” found
lawful). [Footnotes omitted]
340 NLRB 279. Although Respondent’s rule contains no mag-
ic words such as “intellectual property” or “proprietary assets,”
the examples set forth in Respondent’s rules plainly establish
that these are the interests Respondent seeks to protect. For this
reason, I find it doubtful that employees reading Respondent’s
confidentiality rules would miss that notion or misinterpret
them as a restriction on their Section 7 right to disclosure in-
formation they have gained that would advance their interests
concerning their wages, hours and other terms and conditions
of employment. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of these
allegations.
4. The computer usage rules
The complaint paragraphs 4(6) and 4(7) allege that Respond-
ent’s computer usage policy (Jt. Exh. 1, p. 2.13-2.16) violates
the Act. The rule at issue appears in the handbook’s “Comput-
er Usage” section:
Computer Usage: Computer resources are Company proper-
ty and are provided to authorized users for business purposes.
The company has the right to review or seize computer re-
sources, including hardware, software, documents and elec-
tronic correspondence.
* * *
Confidentiality:
Do not disclose or distribute outside of Rio’s any information
that is marked or considered confidential or proprietary unless
you have received a signed non-disclosure agreement through
the Law Department. In some cases, such as with Trade Se-
crets, distribution within the Company should be limited and
controlled (e.g., numbered copies and a record of who has re-
ceived the information). You are responsible for contacting
your department manager or the Law Department for instruc-
tions.
* * *
General Restrictions:
Computer resources may not be used to:
• Commit, aid or abet in the commission of a crime
• Violate local, state or federal laws
• Share confidential information with the general public,
including discussing the company, its financial results or
prospects, or the performance or value of company stock
by using an Internet message board to post any message,
in whole or in part, or by engaging in an internet or
online chat room
• Convey or display anything fraudulent, pornographic,
abusive, profane, offensive, libelous or slanderous
• Send chain letters or other forms of non-business infor-
mation
• Seek employment opportunities outside of the Company
• Invade the privacy of or harass other people
• Solicit for personal gain or advancement of personal
views
• Violate rules or policies of the Company
Do not visit inappropriate (non-business) websites, including
but not limited to online auctions, day trading, re-
tail/wholesale, chat rooms, message boards and journals.
Limit the use of personal email, including using streaming
media (e.g., video and audio clips) and downloading photos.
The Acting General Counsel urges that the Board overrule
Register Guard, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), and reinstate the prin-
ciples in existence prior to that decision. Those principles, the
Acting General Counsel argues, required an employer, with
limited exceptions, to permit its employees to engage Section 7
communications using company equipment if the employer
permitted other nonwork related communications using em-
ployer property. I decline to address the wisdom, or lack there-
of, of the Register Guard decision as that is a matter for the
Board to consider and decide.
In addition, the Acting General Counsel, noting that employ-
ees may use the Company’s computers to access their personal
email and to use of “streaming media” on a limited basis, ar-
gues that the restrictions contained in the Company’s computer
usage policy “inhibit employee’s Section 7 rights, as they do
not allow employees to express concerns which may later be-
come logical outgrowths of group concerns or discuss wages or
working conditions.” The restrictions the Acting General
Counsel refers to are those bullet points set out above. In fram-
ing this argument, the Acting General Counsel assumes that the
word “confidential” as used in the computer usage policy paral-
lels that found in the confidentiality rules. Respondent disputes
the Acting General Counsel’s implicit assertion that the words
“confidential information” as used here could reasonably be
read to limit discussions of matters covered by Section 7. I
agree.
Contrary to the Acting General Counsel’s assertion, the
computer usage rule does not explicitly import the definition of
“confidential” from the handbook’s confidentiality rules or
refer to the subsequently appearing confidentiality rule at all.
Nor would one expect it to where, as here, I have concluded in
agreement with Respondent that the scope of the confidentiality
rule gains its meaning from its from its specific context.
Hence, as with the conclusions reached above concerning the
confidentiality rule, I find the computer usage rule contains no
explicit restriction on Section 7 rights. That being so, the Act-
ing General Counsel had the burden of establishing by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that employees would reasonably
construe the computer usage rule so as to prohibit Section 7
activity. I find the Acting General Counsel failed to meet that
burden. Accordingly, I recommend dismissal of complaint
paragraph 4(6).
RIO ALL-SUITES HOTEL & CASINO 13
5. Rules governing the use of camera and audio visual
devices at work
The General Counsel alleges that two of Respondent’s rules
prohibiting the use of camera phones or other audio visual de-
vices at work unlawfully interfere with employee Section 7
activities. See complaint paragraphs 4(8) and 4(10). These
rules are enumerated as conduct standards 24 and 35, respec-
tively, in the employee handbook. They provide:
24. Personal pagers, beepers and cell phones worn by em-
ployees must not be visible or audible to guests and should
not impact job performance. The use of personal cellu-
lar/digital phones is prohibited while on duty, but is (??not) al-
lowed during break time in designated break areas. Camera
phones may not be used to take photos on property without
permission from a Director or above.
36. Cameras, any type of audio visual recording equipment
and/or recording devices may not be used unless specifically
authorized for business purposes (e.g. events).
The Acting General Counsel argues that as these rules are
unlawful because employees could be reasonably interpret them
to restrict the photographing or filming of fellow employees
engaged in concerted activities such as picketing, or from pho-
tographing or filming unsafe working conditions. Respondent
argues that the Board’s decision in Flagstaff Medical Center,
357 NLRB No. 65 (2011), requires the dismissal of this allega-
tion.
These two rules do not explicitly restrict Section 7 activity,
nor, as previously stated, is there any evidence that Respondent
adopted these rules in response to union activity or applied
them to inhibit such activity. Hence, the question then becomes
whether the Acting General Counsel met his burden of showing
that employees would reasonably interpret the rules as a re-
striction on their protected activities.
As a general rule, an employer may restrict photographing
and filming particularly within its interior work areas in order
to prevent the disruptions to its operations and to protect
against security breaches.4 See e.g., Bill’s Electric, 350 NLRB
292, 295 (2007) (salts who voluntarily participated with a union
agent’s videotaping of their employment application process
after the employer’s request that the filming cease amounts to
misconduct outside the protection of the Act). It is not un-
common for business organizations to regularly provide its
employees with training emphasizing the well-recognized prac-
tice restricting onsite filming and photographing. Given the
widespread recognition of this practice, I am highly dubious of
the Acting General Counsel’s core argument that employees
would reasonably interpret these rules as a restriction against
the type of protected activity cited in his brief, i.e., picketing
(likely to occur outside) and abnormally dangerous working
conditions.
The Acting General Counsel’s argument fails to gain the
least bit of momentum from his efforts to distinguish the Flag-
staff Medical Center case. The Acting General Counsel asserts,

4 Indeed, the Federal courts famously do likewise. See Hol-
lingsworth v Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010).
in effect, that the key component of the Board’s decision in that
case rests in the requirements under the Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA). Because there
is no comparable legal duty to protect the privacy of hotel
guests, the Acting General Counsel argues, the Flagstaff Medi-
cal Center case is inapplicable here.
I find the Acting General Counsel’s arguments concerning
the import of the Flagstaff Medical Center decision fail for two
principal reasons. First and foremost, the Acting General
Counsel’s argument mirrors the dissent’s position in Flagstaff
Medical Center that employees would reasonably read the pho-
tography ban to bar taking a picture of a smoking electrical
outlet to support their efforts to improve safe working condi-
tions. Obviously the Board majority did not share the dissent-
ing member’s outlook and it is the majority’s view of the law
that I am obliged to apply.
And secondly, I disagree with the Acting General Counsel’s
otherwise limited view that the outcome in Flagstaff Medical
Center concerning the photography ban is largely predicated on
HIPPA privacy requirements. In effect, the Acting General
Counsel presupposes that employers should be restricted in
establishing similar workplace rules to those instances where
the law imposes a specific duty. In my judgment, this conten-
tion is flawed. In the same sense that an employer may dis-
charge an employee for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason
at all so long as it is not a reason prohibited by law, the law
recognizes the right of an employer to establish workplace rules
within a similar framework. As Respondent argues, a hotel and
a casino operation has a strong interest in protecting and guard-
ing the privacy of its guests even though the guests’ privacy
interests do not always enjoy some form of legal protection
similar to that of hospital patients. In the overwhelming ma-
jority of instances, hotel employees understand and respect the
privacy of the hotel guests. This common recognition on the
part of hotel employees augurs against a conclusion that they
would reasonably read a photography and filming ban as being
designed to chill their Section 7 activities. Hence, absent some
compelling evidence to the contrary not present here, I find it
likely that the typical hotel employee would perceive that the
rule at issue here has nothing at all to do with their right to
engage in union or concerted activities. For these reasons, I
have concluded that the Acting General Counsel failed to estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent violat-
ed the Act by merely maintaining a rule banning the taking of
photos and filming at its workplace. Accordingly, I recom-
mend dismissal of this allegation.
6. Rule against walking off the job
Complaint paragraph 4(9) sets forth the last rule at issue.
That rule, conduct standard 28, provides:
28. Employees who walk off the job during shift will be con-
sidered to have abandoned their job and voluntarily separat-
ed their employment.”
This rule requires little discussion. It is devoid of ambiguity.
It is an explicit restriction on Section 7 rights. The Act protects
the right of employees to engage in concerted activities, includ-
ing the right to strike without prior notice. NLRB v. Erie Resis-
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); Montefiore Hospital, 621 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1980). The Board has long held that an employer
violates Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a blanket prohibitions
against work stoppages, i.e., those that fail to distinguish be-
tween protected and unprotected work stoppages. Catalox
Corp., 252 NLRB 1336, 1339 (1980). Respondent’s work-
stoppage rule amounts to the type of overly broad ban prohibit-
ed by the Board. For this reason, I find this Respondent’s
walkout rule violates 8(a)(1).
CONCLUSION OF LAW
By maintaining a workplace rule that prohibits employees
from engaging in a walkout, Respondent has engaged in an
unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom
and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
My recommended order requires Respondent to expunge its
rule prohibiting employees from engaging in a walkout protect-
ed by Section 7 of the Act and to post the attached notice to
employees.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, Caesars Entertainment d/b/a Rio All-Suites
Hotel and Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada, its officers, agents, suc-
cessors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining a workplace rule prohibiting employee
walkouts protected by Section 7 of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Expunge from its workplace rules any prohibition against
employees engaging in a walkout protected by Section 7 of the
Act.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Rio
All-Suites facility in Las Vegas, Nevada, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix.”6 Copies of the notice, on forms

5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
provided by the Regional Director for Region 28, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive
days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical post-
ing of paper notices, the notices shall be distributed electroni-
cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customar-
ily communicates with its employees by such means.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the
facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to
all current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since January 5, 2011.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso-
far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated, Washington, D.C., March 20, 2012.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT maintain a workplace rule that prohibits em-
ployees from engaging in a walkout protected by Section 7 of
the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL remove from our rules any prohibition against
employees engaging in a walkout protected by Section 7 of the
Act.
CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT D/B/A RIO ALL-SUITES
HOTEL AND CASINO