Burns International Security Services, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 14, 1986

278 N.L.R.B. 565 (N.L.R.B. 1986)

BURNS SECURITY SERVICES 565
Burns International Security Services, Inc. and
International Union, United Plant Guard Work-
ers of America (UPGWA), Petitioner. Case 39-
RC-306
14 February 1986
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF
ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS
DENNIS AND BABSON
On a petition filed under Section 9(c) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held on
various dates in March, April, May, July, August,
and September 1982 before Hearing Officer Karen
M. Marksteiner. After the hearing and pursuant to
Section 102.67 of the Board's Rules and Regula-
tions, the Regional Director for Region 1 trans-
ferred this case to the Board for decision. The Em-
ployer and the Petitioner filed briefs.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegat-
ed its authority in this proceeding to'- a three-
member panel.
The Petitioner seeks to represent a unit of guards
at the Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Station
in Haddam Neck, Connecticut. The Employer
takes the position that the Petitioner cannot be cer-
tified under Section 9(b)(3) of the Act and that the
petition must be dismissed because: (1) the Petition-
er is affiliated with an organization that admits em-
ployees who are not guards to membership, and (2)
the Petitioner admits nonguards to membership.
Alternatively, the Employer contends, contrary to
the Petitioner, that the unit should be limited to nu-
clear security guards and that sergeants and lieu-
tenants should be excluded as supervisors.
On the entire record, the Board makes the fol-
lowing findings.
1. The Employer, Burns International Security
Services, Inc,, is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. We
find that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act
to assert jurisdiction.
2. International, Union, United Plant Guard
Workers of America (UPGWA) is a labor organi-
zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concern-
ing the representation of certain employees of the
Employer within the meaning of Sections 9(c)(1)
and 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
4. Burns contends that the hearing officer made
the following erroneous rulings:
a. Revocation of subpoenas.
Burns served' subpoenas duces tecum on
UPGWA'S president, two vice presidents, secre-
tary-treasurer , and a regional director requesting
them to produce various records including the fol-
lowing:
(1) UPGWA's constitution and by-laws;
(2) Instruments relating to UPGWA's or its
Local 's affiliation with any other labor organi-
zation;
(3) UPGWA's member roster;
(4) UPGWA's bargaining agreements;
(5) Job descriptions of UPGWA members;
(6) Facilities covered by UPGWA;
(7) Board proceedings in which UPGWA or
its Locals were a party;
(8) Board stipulations or decisions in repre-
sentation cases involving UPGWA or its
Locals;
(9) Private recognition agreements;
(10) Grievances filed by UPGWA or its
Locals;
(11) Arbitration awards;
(12) Unfair labor practice charges regarding
the type of work performed by its members;
(13) Board decisions regarding the above;
(14) Documents relating to receipt of assist-
ance from any other labor organization or the
grant of assistance by UPGWA or its Locals
to any other labor organization;
(15) Attorneys retained by UPGWA or its
Locals;
(16) Department of Labor reports filed by
UPGWA or its Locals;
(17) Records of trusteeships of its Locals;
(18) Records of disaffiliation by its Locals;
and
(19) Correspondence between UPGWA or
its Locals with any organization that admits
non-guards to membership.
Burns served an additional subpoena duces tecum
on UPGWA Local 502's custodian of records re-
questing the following:
(1) Membership roster;
(2) Bargaining agreements;
(3) Job descriptions of members; and
(4) Facilities covered by Local 502 bargain-
ing agreements.
Burns also served subpoenas ad testificandum on a
UPGWA business representative and a UPGWA
regional director . The UPGWA filed motions to
quash. The hearing officer deferred ruling on the
matter until the end of the hearing when she
quashed the subpoenas . We agree with the hearing
officer's ruling.
Burns primarily contends that the subpoenaed
documents and testimony are relevant and neces-
'1-!0 ATT U1@ XT.1 7(1
566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
sary to show that UPGWA is affiliated, directly or
indirectly, with a nonguard labor organization.
Burns asserts no facts and introduced no evidence
that would directly or inferentially support its as-
sertion that UPGWA is affiliated with a nonguard
union. Burns' broad requests for the production of
records and testimony are a mere "fishing expedi-
tion" not entitled to a subpoena from the Board.
Morrison Turning Co., 83 NLRB 687, 689 (1949);
Modern Upholstered Chair Co., 84 NLRB 95, 97
(1949). Burns also contends the information is rele-
vant to show that UPGWA admits nonguards to
membership and is therefore not certifiable. Burns
has introduced no evidence that shows even infer-
entially that UPGWA represents nonguard units of
general employees. In' this respect, the subpoenas
are a mere "fishing expedition." Burns has intro-
duced lengthy testimony purporting to show that
UPGWA has included nonguards in guard units it
represents. Any additional similar evidence that the
subpoenas might reveal would be cumulative. In
addition, for the reasons set out below, such evi-
dence is not sufficiently probative to show that
UPGWA is not certifiable.
b. Collective-bargaining history.
Burns sought to introduce certain evidence re-
garding the supervisory status of lieutenants and
sergeants when Interstate Security Services, Inc.
was the contractor providing security services at
Connecticut Yankee. Burns contends that, as the
duties of lieutenants and sergeants remained the
same when Burns became the security contractor,
Interstate's bargaining agreement and the underly-
ing decision and direction of election' are relevant
and material. Since resolution of the issues turns on
how Burns runs its operation and because the
record contains substantial evidence relating to the
issues, the hearing officer's exclusion of the prof-
fered evidence is neither erroneous nor prejudicial.
c. Industry practice.
Burns called an expert witness to testify about
the regulation of the nuclear power industry by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Burns attempted
to elicit testimony about the typical staffing of the
security force at a nuclear power plant and about
how employers meet NRC security contingency re-
quirements. Burns asserts that the expert would
have testified that NRC regulations require a con-
tingency plan to provide continuous security in the
event of a strike by security personnel and that
such contingency plans often require _ a high
number of supervisors. Even 'accepting Burns'
characterization of the proffered testimony, we
' The Regional Director's decision in Interstate Security Services, Case
39-kC-7, of which we take official notice, states , "The unit is in accord
with the agreement of the parties."
agree with the hearing officer's ruling. Whether
particular employees are or are not supervisors is
governed by the Act.
d. Additional evidence.
Burns introduced considerable evidence purport-
ing to show that UPGWA admitted nonguards into
membership and was therefore not certifiable.
Briefly, the evidence involved contract guard units
represented by the UPGWA at several Ford Motor
Company plants in Michigan, the Tiger stadium
and the Silverdome stadium in Michigan, and the
Beaver Valley Power Station in Pennsylvania.
Burns contends the evidence shows that certain
employees included in the units were not in fact
guards. During the course of the hearing , Burns at-
tempted to introduce additional evidence of a simi-
lar nature-that UPGWA included certain non
guards in contract security units at the Kennedy
Space Center and at plants in Michigan, and Indi-
ana.
The hearing officer ruled that sufficient evidence
was already in the record and refused to permit the
introduction of additional evidence. Burns made an
offer of proof on the record and later filed exten-
sive written offers of proof. We agree with the
hearing officer, and find that additional evidence
would be cumulative. Also, as we find below, the
evidence is not sufficiently probative to show that
UPGWA is not certifiable under Section 9(b)(3).
5. On 13 June 1983 Burns filed a motion to
reopen the record to admit newly discovered evi-
dence, which Burns contends further shows that
UPGWA is not certifiable, because it admits non-
guards to membership. The evidence is an obituary
in the UPGWA's newsletter. It states that prior to
his retirement in October 1982, Pat Rengers was a
final checker at the Louisville, Kentucky Ford
Motor Company plant. Burns contends that the job
is a nonguard job. The motion is denied.
6. The parties stipulated that UPGWA is a labor
organization, Burns contends, however, that
UPGWA is not certifiable because it is affiliated
with organizations that admit nonguards to mem-
bership and because it admits nonguards to mem-
bership. Burns has furnished no evidence on the
first contention and, as found above, the hearing
officer properly quashed Burns' subpoenas seeking
such information. For the following reasons, we
find that Burns has submitted no competent evi-
dence supporting the second contention.
Burns presented witnesses and, documentary evi-
dence regarding employees who worked in guard
units, who were members of UPGWA, and who,
according to Burns, were not statutory guards.
Burns provides the security services and personnel
at the Beaver Vally Power Station at Shipping-
BURNS SECURITY SERVICES 567
sport, Pennsylvania . Of the approximately 200
Burns employees in the Beaver Valley unit, 14 are
central alarm station/secondary alarm station oper-
ators , all of whom are UPGWA members. Burns
contends they are not guards ; UPGWA contends
they are.
In the Detroit, Michigan area , Burns provides se-
curity services at several ]Ford Motor Company
plants , the Silverdome stadium, and the Tiger stadi-
um. It has a collective -bargaining agreement with
UPGWA covering these employees ; the agreement
requires employees to join UPGWA after 30 days.
Burns contends that at the Ford plants 39 guard-
unit employees are not statutory guards including
location leaders, console operators , receptionists,
mail couriers , mailroom attendants, a carpool at-
tendant, a print room attendant , and a finished
product checker . Burns introduced testimony by
management officials that it asserts shows the vari-
ous categories of employees are not guards;
UPGWA introduced testimony by union officials
that it asserts shows the various categories are
guards. Burns contends the dispatchers at the Tiger
stadium and the Silverdome stadium are not statu-
tory guards . Burns also contends that the
clerk/timekeeper at the Tiger stadium is not a
guard.
A review of the evidence presented shows that,
at most, Burns has raised close factual questions re-
garding the guard status of these employees. If, as
asserted by Burns, the employees are not statutory
guards, they at least perform some guard-like
duties. The evidence presented by Burns raises bor-
derline cases.
The central alarm station secondary alarm sta-
tion operators at Beaver Valley principally monitor
closed-circuit television screens covering various
sensitive areas of the site including fence lines,
doors, and gates. They also monitor intrusion
alarms. , The operators do not patrol the site and do
not interchange with watchmen, access controllers,
or response teams . The alarm stations are central to
the power station 's security; they are required
under Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations.
In a very real sense the alarm station operators
serve as , the eyes and the ears of the security force.
Burns introduced evidence that at the Ford
plants the location leaders , either site or shift lead-
ers, are responsible for acting as liaisons between
Burns and Ford . UPGWA introduced evidence
supporting its contention that they all perform unit
work.
Bums introduced evidence that there are several
console operators at various Ford plants, that they
monitor alarm equipment , and that in some cases
they dispatch 'guards to answer alarms. The con-
sole operators' duties vary somewhat from plant to
plant depending on the type and location of moni-
toring equipment. UPGWA introduced evidence
that at least some operators also perform patrol
duties. The console operators work on site.
Burns introduced evidence that there are several
receptionists/telephone operators at various Ford
plants. Apparently, at one plant the two or three
receptionists are also console operators. Although
their duties vary somewhat from plant to plant, the
receptionists, according to Burns, are responsible
for answering phones and transferring calls, hand-
ing out passes to visitors, and asking visitors to sign
a logbook. UPGWA introduced evidence that the
receptionists control access to the offices, inspect
packages, and report rule violations.
Burns introduced evidence that there -are three
mail couriers at two Ford plants and three mail-
room attendants at three other Ford plants. Ac-
cording to Burns, these employees are responsible
solely for various mail-related' functions such as
sorting and delivering mail and transporting mail to
and from Ford plants. UPGWA introduced evi-
dence that the couriers and attendants were uni-
formed and were responsible for handling and de-
livering computer tapes and printouts and mail in-
cluding some marked "addressee only." UPGWA
also introduced testimony that the mailroom at-
tendants substitute for receptionists.
Burns introduced testimony that one Ford plant
has a printroom attendant who is responsible for
making copies of Ford papers and for helping the
mailroom attendant. UPGWA introduced evidence
that the printroom attendant is uniformed, controls
access to the printroom, and is responsible for han-
dling sensitive and confidential materials. The at-
tendant is also responsible for following scrap and
trash trucks to see that the materials reach their
proper destinations.
Burns introduced evidence that a carpool atten-
dent works at a Ford plant, where he maintains
and cleans cars, sees to the repairs of cars, and
takes care of incidental paperwork. There is a con-
flict over whether the attendant is uniformed.
UPGWA introduced evidence that the attendant
enforces Ford's rules over the use of pool cars,
controls the release and return of the cars, and
keeps the car keys in a locked area.
Burns introduced evidence that at one Ford
plant there is one finished product checker who is
responsible for comparing invoice serial numbers
with the serial numbers on tractors and for making
sure that proper accessories have been installed.
UPGWA introduced evidence that there are two
finished product checkers at the plant-one for
railroad shipping and one for truck shipping. The
568 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
checkers are also responsible for inspecting the
tractors to make sure that there are no concealed
extra parts and for general security surveillance of
the shipping area.
Burns introduced evidence that at both the Sil-
verdome and Tiger stadiums it employs dispatchers
who are responsible for monitoring telephone and
radio communications and for dispatching guards
to various locations. UPGWA introduced testimo-
ny that the dispatchers are uniformed and work on
site . UPGWA contends the positions must be
manned for Burns to fulfill its mission . In addition,
UPGWA contends that, until recently, the Silver-
dome dispatchers also worked as special events
guards.
Burns introduced evidence that at the Tiger sta-
dium it employs a clerk/timekeeper who answers
telephone calls, completes payroll sheets, and issues
badges to Burns employees. UPGWA introduced
testimony that the timekeeper receives calls for as-
sistance and is subject to assignment to other loca-
tions as a guard.'In addition, the record shows that
by the close of the hearing the position was no
longer held by a bargaining unit employee.
Burns contends that the employees referred to
above are not guards, that UPGWA admits them
to membership, and therefore that UPGWA is not
certifiable under 9(b)(3). We do not agree.
In enacting Section 9(b)(3) Congress intended to
give guards as employees the full protection of the
Act. Section 9(b) states:
(b) The Board shall decide in each case wheth-
er, in order to assure to employees the fullest
freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by
this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining . . . Provided, that the
Board shall not . . . (3) decide that any unit is
appropriate for such purposes if it includes, to-
gether with other employees, any individual
employed as a guard to enforce against em-
ployees and other persons rules to protect
property of the employer or to protect the
safety of persons on the employer's premises;
but no labor organization shall be certified as
the representative of employees in a bargaining
unit of guards if such organization admits to
membership, or is affiliated directly or indi-
rectly with an organization which admits to
membership, employees other than guards.
The House of Representatives initially decided to
exclude guards , as well as supervisors , as agents of
employers. Instead, Section 9(b)(3) was ultimately
enacted. Senator Taft stated in debate:2
2 2 Leg Hist 1572 (LMRA 1947),
By the provision of the House bill plant
guards were completely excluded from the
Wagner Act. We compromised with the
House by providing they should have the pro-
tection of the Wagner Act, but in a separate
unit from the workers in the plants. This is
certainly a change-although a minor one,
nevertheless a reasonable one-and certainly it
is a compromise with the extreme position
taken by the House.
Thus, within the constraints of the guard proviso
to Section 9(b), guards are fully entitled to repre-
sentatives of their own choosing and to join and
form local and national labor organizations. Con-
comitantly, a guard union is fully entitled to seek
certification as the representative of guard employ-
ees and to include all guards in any appropriate
units. Although the proviso restricts guards in their
choice of bargaining representative, Section 9(b)
requires that within these restrictions we are to
assure employees the fullest freedom in exercising
their rights. Accordingly, we find that the proviso
to Section 9(b), when read in context, requires that
the noncertifiability of a guard union must be
shown by definitive evidence. Otherwise the rights
of guards to be represented by a union and of
guard unions to represent guards would be serious-
ly undermined. We also find, for the reasons
below, that Burns has failed to make such a defini-
tive showing.
First, UPGWA seeks to represent only guards.
Its constitution and bylaws state in article VI, sec-
tion 2:
All employees employed as guards, Security
Officers and Security Police Officers as de-
fined in the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947 (as amended), to enforce against employ-
ees and other persons rules to protect the
property of the private or public employer or
to protect the safety of persons on said em-
ployers' premises shall be eligible for member-
ship in this International union.
UPGWA's contract covering Burns' employees in
the Michigan area states that the employer recog-
nizes the UPGWA as the representative of employ-
ees "performing plant protection duties." In addi-
tion, there is no showing that UPGWA represents
any general or production and maintenance em-
ployees or that it admits such employees to mem-
bership. Further, there is no showing that
UPGWA has continued to represent or admit to
membership any employee determined not to be a
guard by agreement with an employer or through
an appropriate Board proceeding.
BURNS SECURITY SERVICES 569
Second, the employees that Burns contends are
not guards all perform guard-related duties. Wheth-
er they are or are not guards presents close factual
questions that can be answered only by carefully
examining their duties. Whether, for example, mail-
room attendants and couriers are guards will
depend largely on the extent to which they protect
Ford property. The distinction between guards and
nonguards often presents close issues. In Chance
Vought Aircraft, 110 NLRB 1342 (1954), for exam-
ple, the Board found that dispatchers were guards,
and in Caterpillar Tractor, 109 NLRB 871 (1954),
the Board found that dispatchers were not guards.
In Republic Aviation, 106 NLRB 91 (1953), the
Board found that receptionists who screened visi-
tors, issued passes, and checked deliveries were
guards. Similarly, in Thunderbird Hotel, 144 NLRB
84 (1963), the Board found that timekeepers who
prevented unauthorized entrance and made sure
property was not improperly brought in or out
were guards. Compare Ford Motor Co., 116 NLRB
1995 (1956), where the Board found a receptionist
was not a guard.
Third, to attempt to litigate borderline issues of
whether Pennsylvania and Michigan employees are
guards in a representation proceeding held in Con-
necticut and involving Connecticut employees is
difficult and impracticable, if not impossible. Ob-
taining reliable evidence in these circumstances is
sufficiently difficult to raise questions about the
trustworthiness of any evidence presented.
Fourth, UPGWA represents over 25,000 em-
ployees-in over 1000 bargaining units serviced by
over 160 locals. In an organization this size there
will be some close issues of guard status, and it is
to be expected that some of the employees that
UPGWA believes to be guards are in fact not. In
view of the often close factual issues involved, it is
likely that UPGWA may represent someone some-
where who we would find in an appropriate pro-
ceeding is not a guard. Whether employees are
guards may not have been litigated because of in-
advertence or the stipulation of the parties. Fur-
ther, duties change over time and because of new
technologies. Thus, to apply Section 9(b)(3) in a
strictly literal sense would require us to find that a
national guard union such as UPGWA is not certi-
fiable because it admits "close-call" nonguards to
membership. This is contrary to the clear intent of
Congress. It would either effectively prohibit large
national unions for guards or would require guard
unions to so strictly police their membership to ex-
clude employees whose, status presents close factual
issues that numerous statutory guards would be
precluded from exercising the right to representa-
tion'under the Act.
Fifth, the issues raised by Burns do not present
the type of conflict of interests that is the para-
mount concern of Section 9(b)(3). Section 9(b)(3)
was enacted by Congress' largely in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947), which re-
versed the Sixth Circuit's decision. - Congress was
impressed with the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit's
decision.3 The court stated in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 154 F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir.
1946):
In the case of industrial unrest and strikes on
the part of the production employees, the obli-
gations of the plant guards to the municipality
and state would be incompatible with their ob-
ligations to the Union which,.,since it repre-
sents production employees, authorizes and di-
rects the strike.
In debate Senator Taft stated, "[A]s to plant guards
we provided that they could have the protection of
the Wagner Act only if they had a union separate
and apart from the union of general employees."4
In the ' instant case, Burns has introduced evidence
only on borderline cases. All the purported non-
guards perform guard-related duties; none are gen-
eral employees that would involve UPGWA in a
conflict of interests in the event of a strike.
For the foregoing reasons we find that UPGWA
is a guard union that is certifiable under Section
9(b)(3). The evidence submitted by Burns ,does not
show and is not sufficiently probative to show that
UPGWA is not certifiable.
7. The UPGWA has petitioned for a unit of all
Burns' statutory guards employed at the Connecti-
cut Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The power sta-
tion, which is located on a 500-acre site in Haddam
Neck, Connecticut, is owned by the Connecticut
Yankee Atomic Power Company. In early Novem-
ber 1981 Burns was notified that it was the success-
ful bidder for security services at ' 'Connecticut
Yankee. When it took over from Interstate Securi-
ty Services, it offered positions to all Interstate ser-
geants and higher officers; they all accepted. Since
the beginning of 1982, Burns has provided a securi-
ty force of approximately 100 persons at the Con-
necticut Yankee station.
Connecticut Yankee, like other nuclear power
plants, is required to comply with the regulations
issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in-
cluding extensive regulations on .plant security. For
example, the regulations specify the location of
$ See Senator Taft's extended remarks 2 Leg Hist. 1541 (LMRA
1947)
4 2 Leg Hist 1544 (LMRA 1947).
570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
vital security equipment, that access must be strict-
ly controlled, and that the plant have a safeguard
contingency plan to ensure continuous security in
the event of an emergency or strike. Beginning in
1976, Connecticut Yankee designed and installed a
sophisticated physical security system, including a
perimeter protection system with multiple fences
and microwave and energy field detection equip-
ment; a primary and a secondary access point with
metal detection devices, explosive detection de-
vices, radiation detection devices, electronic pas-
sage systems , and bullet-resistant components; and
a sophisticated monitoring system and communica-
tions system housed in the central alarm station and
the secondary alarm station . Burns provides securi-
ty in accord with the site security plan approved
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
has a small staff to oversee the plant's security pro-
visions and to make sure Burns is complying with
the terms of the purchase order. Connecticut
Yankee has a security manager, a security coordi-
nator, and five security shift supervisors. One secu-
rity supervisor is assigned to each shift to oversee
day-to-day security. The security supervisors have
no direct contact with Burns' security guards.
The highest Burns official at the plant is the
chief of security. The next highest is the captain.
Both normally work during the day, Monday
through Friday . Burns has three lieutenants, one
for each shift Monday through Friday, and 20 to
23 sergeants. Burns also employs approximately 60
security officers, i.e., guards , at the site. These em-
ployees are, as stated by Burns in its brief, "indis-
putably guards." In addition' to the security force,
Burns employs a training instructor, a secretary,
and a payroll clerk. The parties stipulated that
these employees should be excluded from the unit.
On occasion Burns has added a guard to patrol the
parking lot, which is outside the secured area.
Burns contends that the unit should be limited to
nuclear security guards. Although at the time of
the hearing the only guards Burns employed at
Connecticut Yankee were nuclear guards , Burns on
occasion had had nonnuclear guards on the prem-
ises. In any event, we do not distinguish for unit
purposes between nuclear guards and other guards.
Wackenhut Corp., 224 NLRB 1142 (1976). Accord-
ingly, we find that the appropriate unit consists of
all guards employed by Burns at the Connecticut
Yankee power station.
Burns and UPGWA agree that the security chief
and the captain are supervisors; they disagree about
the supervisory status of sergeants and lieutenants.
For the reasons set forth below we find that ser-
geants and lieutenants are supervisors.
Burns has three lieutenants at the site-one per
shift Monday through Friday. They spend the bulk
of their time in the lieutenants' office handling pa-
perwork. Although they do not have the authority
to hire or fire employees, they do have the author-
ity, and have exercised the authority, to suspend
guards. The suspension of an employee is not nec-
essarily or always subject to review. In its brief the
UPGWA concedes that "the UPGWA finds the
supervisory responsibilities of lieutenants to be mar-
ginal, at best." Based on their authority independ-
ently to suspend guards, we find that lieutenants
are supervisors.
Sergeants, like lieutenants, receive greater pay
than security guards, wear uniforms distinguishable
from those of guards, attend monthly management
meetings, participate on the board for promotion of
guards, prepare written evaluations of guards, and
make recommendations for commendations for
guards' outstanding work. Burns employs from 20
to 23 sergeants at the Connecticut Yankee plant,
with 5 to 7 assigned per shift, 7 days a week. Ser-
geants rotate their days off. The sergeants' basic
duties are to ensure that all procedures and assign-
ments are carried out. During a shift, sergeants
rotate positions, which include central alarm sta-
tion, secondary alarm station, primary access point,
and field posts. The responsibilities at each position
vary. On weekends and other times when lieuten-
ants are absent, sergeants act as shift supervisors on
a rotational basis.
The central alarm station and secondary alarm
station at Connecticut Yankee are staffed exclusive-
ly by sergeants. The principal duty at both stations
is to monitor televisions and other alarms. The sec-
ondary station serves as a backup and a check on
the central station. The sergeant at the central sta-
tion, in the case of an alarm, will dispatch a guard
to assess the problem. Depending on the guard's
report, the sergeant will tell the guard to return to
his post or remain in position or will order a re
sponse team to the alarm location. The primary
access point guard is responsible for seeing that the
duties of guards at that point and the alternate
access point,are properly carried out. The guards'
duties include escorting visitors, processing passes
to the site, conducting pat downs, and inspecting
vehicles. The sergeant filling the post of field su-
pervisor issues weapons and radios to security per-
sonnel, makes post checks to ensure that guards are
properly covering their stations, and leads response
teams. A sergeant acting as a shift lieutenant per-
forms a lieutenant's duties 'and often is the highest
officer present. Although a shift lieutenant may
suspend a guard, his action, unlike a regular lieu-
BURNS SECURITY SERVICES
tenant's, is always subject to independent investiga-
tion.
In addition to the specialized duties above, all
sergeants train, retrain , and evaluate probationary
guards . Sergeants also do routine retraining as re-
quired by Burns ' contract with Connecticut Yankee
and by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One
sergeant per shift , on a rotational basis , makes post
assignments for guards on the shift . Although ser-
geants do not have the authority to suspend em-
ployees, they do have , and do exercise , the author-
ity to give oral and written reprimands . If a guard
is improperly performing his duties , a sergeant can
remove the guard from his -post and require the
guard to submit to retraining . A sergeant does not
need the approval of a lieutenant or higher man-
agement to order retraining . Often the sergeant
conducts the retraining before any higher officer is
aware of the incident . If a guard refused retraining,
the guard would not be allowed to work the post
and ultimately would be suspended . Although a
guard can , protest a retraining order , such orders
are not routinely reviewed . A retraining reprimand
is written 'up by the sergeant and is made part of
the guard 's personnel file.
Sergeants also are involved in rating probation-
ary guards . Significantly , because Burns had re-
cently taken over the provision of security services
at Connecticut Yankee , all guards were probation-
ary. Two sergeants on the shift with the guard
meet with the lieutenant on the shift to reach a
571
consensus on the guards being evaluated . In one in-
stance, the sergeants persuaded the lieutenant that a
guard was salvageable , and the guard was put on
another shift. Moreover, Burns has decided that
sergeants will similarly participate in the periodic
evaluation of all guards.
Based on the foregoing , we find that sergeants
are supervisors . Although their authority is limited,
they do play significant roles in - evaluating and dis-
ciplining guards . Their evaluations help determine
whether a guard ,should be retained ; their discipline
can' lead to a guard 's discharge . Although the ap-
proximately 2-to-1 ratio of guards to supervisors
seems , as argued by UPGWA, disproportionate,
the ratio is explained in part by the strict security
requirements at a nuclear power, plant. Connecticut
Yankee's site security plan includes sergeants as
part of the contingency security forced under Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission regulations unit em-
ployees may not be part of that force. I
In accord with our decision herein we find the
following unit to be appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9(b) of the Act:
All guards employed by the Employer at the
Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Station in
Haddam Neck, Connecticut, excluding all
other employees, sergeants, lieutenants, and all
other supervisors as defined in the Act.
[Direction of, Election omitted from publication.]