Buffalo Linen Supply Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jul 26, 1954

109 N.L.R.B. 447 (N.L.R.B. 1954)

BUFFALO LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY 447
BUFFALO LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY; FAMOUS LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY,
INC.; BUFFALO GENERAL LAUNDRIES CORP.; MODERN LINEN SUPPLY
COMPANY; MORGAN LINEN SUPPLY, INC. ; THE OFFICE TOWEL
SUPPLY COMPANY, INCORPORATED ; WALKERS LAUNDRY AND LINEN
SUPPLY ; and LINEN AND CREDIT EXCHANGE (UNINCORPORATED) and
TRUCK DRIVERS LOCAL UNION No. 449, INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF
AMERICA, AFL. Case No. 3-CA-694. July 06,19 54
Decision and Order
On November 10, 1953, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondents had engaged in certain unfair labor practices and
recommending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report
attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondents filed exceptions to the
Intermediate Report together with a supporting brief. The Respond-
ents also requested oral argument. The request is hereby denied, be-
cause the record and the exceptions and briefs adequately present the
issues and positions of the parties.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the Respondents' exceptions and brief, and the entire
record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of
the Trial Examiner only to the extent that they are consistent with
this Decision and Order.
The Respondent-Employers, together with Frontier Linen Supply,
Inc., are members of the Respondent-Association, Linen and Credit
Exchange (hereafter called the Association). Pursuant to collective
bargaining on a multiemployer basis for approximately 13 years, the
Respondents and the Union have been parties to successive collective-
bargaining agreements' covering the truckdriver employees of the
respective Employers. Prior to the expiration of the contract, con-
taining an automatic renewal clause which was to expire on April
30, 1953, the Union notified the Respondents of its desire to open
negotiations to change the agreement. Thereafter, the parties nego-
tiated unsuccessfully for a new contract, and, on May 26, 1953, the
1 Negotiations on these contracts were conducted between representatives of the Asso-
ciation, acting on behalf of all its employer-members, and representatives of the Union.
After agreement by the respective representatives on a proposed bargaining contract, the
proposal was submitted for approval to the members of the Association and the Union.
Upon approval of the proposed agreement by the individual members of the Association
and the Union , the agreement was signed by each employer-member of the Association and
by officials of the Union
109 NLRB No. 69.
448 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
truckdrivers employed by one member of the Association, Frontier,
went on strike and picketed Frontier's plant. On May 27, the remain-
ing association members laid off their truckdrivers after advising the
Union that the layoff action was the result of the strike of Frontier's
plant and that the employees would be recalled if the Union withdrew
its picket line and ended the strike at Frontier. In the meanwhile,
the parties continued their bargaining negotiations, and, on June 3,
the Union and the Association executed a new contract, respectively
terminated the strike and the lockout, and the truckdrivers of the
various Employers returned to work.
As pointed out by the Trial Examiner, the foregoing facts, mainly
stipulated, present the case "largely in a vacuum." From these facts,
and in the absence of specific evidence showing that the strike was like-
ly to spread to the nonstruck Employers, the Trial Examiner, by re-
liance upon certain prior Board decisions, inferred that the Employers
who were not struck engaged in unlawful retaliatory conduct. How-
ever, in these circumstances, we think the more reasonable inference is
that, although not specifically announced by the Union, the strike
against the one employer necessarily carried with it an implicit threat
of future strike action against any or all of the other members of the
Association. For, the Union's action represents a similar technique of
exerting economic pressure to atomize the employer solidarity which
is the fundamental aim of the multiemployer bargaining relationship.
The calculated purpose of maintaining a strike against one employer
and threatening to strike others in the employer group at future times
is to cause successive and individual employer capitulations. There-
fore, and in the absence of any independent evidence of antiunion
motivation, we find that the Respondent's action in shutting their
plants until termination of the strike at Frontier was defensive and
privileged in nature, rather than retaliatory and unlawful?
Contrary to the assertion of our dissenting colleague, our decision
herein does not establish that the employer lockout is the corollary of
the employees' statutory right to strike. Upon the facts of this case,
we find it unnecessary to pass upon that issue. We have done no more
in this case than affirm the legal concept enunciated by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in the Davis Furniture case, which provides
that a strike by employees against one employer-member of a multi-
employer bargaining unit constitutes a threat of strike action against
the other employers, which threat, per se, constitutes the type of eco-
nomic or operative problem at the plants of the nonstruck employers
a
2 See : Leonard, et al ., d/b/a Davis Furniture Company, et al. v. N. L. R. B., 205 F. 2d
355 (C. A. 9 ), wherein the Court stated , ". . . the right of the employers to lock out tem-
porarily all the employees is no more than equal to the right of the union of all the em-
ployees to call out the employees of one after another of the [employers ] in the whipsaw-
ing manner above described."
BUFFALO LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY 449
which legally justifies their resort to a temporary lockout of em-
ployees.3
Accordingly, we find that the General Counsel has failed to show
that the Respondents' temporary cessation of operations constituted
an unfair labor practice and we shall, therefore, dismiss the complaint
in its entirety.
[The Board dismissed the complaint.]
MEMBER MURDOCK, dissenting :
In this case for the first time in the history of the National Labor
Relations Act and its amendments a majority of this Board is holding
that the mere threat of a strike justifies discrimination against em-
ployees to discourage them from engaging in concerted activities for
their mutual aid and protection.' Not only is this legal conclusion
unprecedented, but the stipulated facts reveal no basis for the infer-
ence that it was the threat of a possible strike at the plant of the Re-
spondent-Employers which caused them as a defensive measure to lock
out their employees. Indeed, that stipulation states the purpose of the
lockout in the clearest language. According to the stipulation, the
Union was informed by the Respondents "that the employees of the
Respondents were locked out because of the strike at Frontier Linen
Supply, Inc., and that if Local 449 would withdraw its picket line and
cease the strike at Frontier Linen Supply, Inc., they would permit the
employees of the Respondents to return to work." On these facts the
conclusion is inescapable to me that the Respondent-Employers, mem-
bers of a multiemployer association, locked out their employees for the
purpose of breaking a strike at the single plant of an employer asso-
ciated with them in collective bargaining.
I think this is a most obvious example of conduct violative of Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act. Contrary to the majority's state-
ment, the Respondents' unlawful retaliatory conduct was not "in-
ferred" by the Trial Examiner. He accepted the facts as stipulated
and, finding no facts in the record to warrant the conclusion that the
lockout was economically justified, held on the basis of all precedents
that the lockout was discrimination within the meaning of these sec-
a Ibid , wherein the court also stated , ". . . the whipsawing threatened the loss of cus-
tomers and a cessation of the [employers '] market."
4 Section 7 of the Act , as amended , provides that : Employees shall have the right to
self-organization , to form, join , or assist labor organizations . . . and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion. . . . ' Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain , or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section 7." Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an em-
ployer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or con-
dition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organi-
zation... .
450 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
tions of the Act. The majority suggests, that it was incumbent on the
General Counsel to produce additional evidence, independent of the
stipulated purpose of the lockout set forth above, to prove antiunion
motivation. In other words, having produced evidence revealing a
prima facie case of discrimination to discourage union activity, the
General Counsel, according to the majority, should have produced
more evidence to show that the Respondents really intended to do what
they did. Typically, evidence of antiunion motivation is necessary
in those cases where the allegation of unlawful discrimination is coun-
tered by the defense that the discrimination was for cause rather than
union activity. Where, as here, the admitted facts reveal that the dis-
crimination resulted solely from concerted activity protected under
Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, evidence of the Respondents' general bias
against the Union is wholly unnecessary. Indeed, the Supreme Court
of the United States has held that where encouragement or discourage-
ment of union activity can reasonably be inferred from the nature of
the discrimination specific proof of intent is unnecessary.5 This rule
of evidence is, as the Court found, "but an application of the common
law rule that a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of
his conduct."
It is true the Board and the courts have held that certain lockouts
are permissible where the record is clear that it was not economically
feasible for the Respondent to keep its doors open under the threat of
an immediate strike. Thus, in Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., et al.,s a group
of automobile dealers were fearful that if they accepted automobile
repair jobs they could not, under the threat of strike, assure their
customers that the work would be done expeditiously. The Board
affirmed the Trial Examiner's finding that the lockout in anticipation
of the strike was justified. Similarly, a lockout to prevent spoilage
of materials,' or one induced by the operative difficulties of running
a plant where the union struck one of three integrated departments 8
has been held lawful. The issue was litigated at length, if incon-
clusively, in the Morand Bros. Beverage' and Davis Furniture io
cases. In those cases the Board fully explicated its view that the
lockout, unlike the strike, which is a specific guaranteed right under
Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, is not a lawful exercise of the employer's
economic power unless, as in the Betts Cadillac and other cases, there
are special business reasons making it impractical or impossible for
the employer to continue operations. In the Morand case the court
5 Gaynor News Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B , 347 U. S 17.
6 96 NLRB 268.
7 Duluth Bottling Association , et al., 48 NLRB 1335.
8International Shoe Company , 93 NLRB 907.
8 91 NLRB 409, on remand 99 NLRB 1448; enfd. in part and remanded 190 F. 2d 576
(C A. 7) ; enfd 204 F. 2d 5529 (C. A. 7).
10 94 NLRB 279, on remand 100 NLRB 10,16 ; remanded 197 F. 2d 435 (C. A. 9) ; set
aside 205 F. 2d 355 (C. A. 9).
BUFFALO LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY 451
affirmed the Board's finding of a violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and
(1). It added dicta, however, to the effect that a lockout of a tem-
porary nature in anticipation of a threatened strike after an impasse
in bargaining had been reached was in the category of defensive
action on the part of an employer. In the Davis Furniture case the
court refused to enforce the Board's decision that the temporary
lockout was violative of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1), reversing, in ef-
fect, the Board's finding that the lockout was not necessitated by
business reasons. The court held that the lockout was the result of the
union's announced whipsawing process, that the employers could not
accept or give orders for furniture under the threat of a strike against
all of the dealers in the multiemployer association. I deemed this
question of such importance that I urged my colleagues on the Board
to request the Supreme Court of the United States to take certiorari
in this case, hoping that this high tribunal would settle the broad and
important issue of whether the lockout, despite the express language
of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act, was nothing more than the
corollary of the Union's right to strike. A majority of the Board,
however, declined to request certiorari.
In the Morand and Davis Furniture cases both courts referred to
previous decisions of the Board, cited above, and indicated that their
views were in conformance with the business necessity rule of the
Board cases. It seems to me that if the language of Section 8 (a) (3)
and (1) of the Act, forbidding discrimination against or interference
with union activities, has any meaning no lockout can be justified
unless the employer produces at least some evidence that it was for
cause. In the absence of such evidence, as in the instant case I can
reach no other conclusion under the express language of the Act than
that the Respondents have violated Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of
the Act. Certainly, the defensive nature of the lockout is not sup-
ported, as the majority asserts in this case, by the absence of inde-
pendent evidence of antiunion motivation. Nor does it help to pile
inference on inference, as the majority does here, to infer that the
Respondents were faced with an actual threat of a strike simply
because the Union struck one member of the Association and, on the
basis of this inference, to make the further inference that the lockout
resulted from the implied threat. In my opinion, such inferences are
no substitute for actual evidence that the lockout was for' cause.
Moreover, as indicated above, any such inference is contrary to the
stipulation of the parties, which reveals that the purpose of the lock-
out in this case was entirely offensive rather than defensive in nature.
I believe the Board was right in the Morand and Davis Furniture
cases, which the majority is apparently reversing here. But even
those ameliorating economic circumstances which might be said to
334811-55-vol 109-30
452 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
justify a lockout in those cases are, as the Trial Examiner correctly
found, absent here. There was no impasse in good-faith collective
bargaining here; there was no general strike authorization; there was
no announcement by the Union that its strike against Frontier Linen
Supply Co. was the first of planned successive strikes against each
employer in the Association. To hold, as the majority does in the
instant case, that a group of employers can lawfully lock out their
employees solely because of a strike at the plant of another employer
associated with them in collective-bargaining increases to that extent
the sore area of industrial conflict and impediments to interstate com-
merce which it is the express policy of this Act to minimize and de-
crease. Under the majority's decision, it now appears to be within
the power of an employer to virtually nullify Sections 7 and 13 of the
Act by the simple expedient of joining a multiemployer association.
But Congress has charged this Board with the duty of preserving
the right of employees to engage in concerted activities for their mu-
tual aid and protection. I would not lightly defeat that right. Cer-
tainly, I would not create out of cumulative inferences a defense to an
invasion of rights specifically guaranteed in this Act. I would not
find that this lockout was "defensive and privileged" when there is not
the slightest evidence in the record before me that the Respondents
were concerned about economic or operative problems in their own
plants. If, indeed, an employer should have the right to use a lock-
out as the Respondents have in this case on the theory that it is the
corollary to the employees' right to strike, it seems to me that is some-
thing for Congress and not this Board to decide. The Act, as I read
it, now forbids such discrimination, and I would enforce it as it is
written.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding, brought under Section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended (61 Stat. 136), was heard in Buffalo, New York, on September 8,
1953, pursuant to due notice. The complaint, issued on July 2, 1953, by the Gen-
eral Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board' and based on charges duly
filed and served, alleged in substance that Respondents had engaged in unfair labor
practices proscribed by Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act, by laying off the
employees whose names are listed in Appendix A hereto from on or about May 27
to June 3, 1953, because of their union membership or their participation in union
or other concerted activities. Respondents, answering through Linen and Credit
Exchange, denied the commission of unfair labor practices as alleged.
All parties were represented at the hearing by counsel or by representatives and
were afforded full opportunity to participate in the hearing and to file briefs and
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. No evidence was offered by
any party; the facts summarized below are established either by admissions in
Respondents' answer or by stipulation of the parties at the hearing. Respondents
have filed a brief.
1 The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing are referred to herein as the
General Counsel and the National Labor Relations Board as the Board. The above-named
Respondents are referred to herein as Respondents and the Charging Union as the Union.
The summary of the pleadings made herein includes amendments made at the hearing.
BUFFALO LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY 453
Upon the entire record in the case , the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENTS
The seven linen supply companies named in the caption hereto are New York
corporations, which, together with Frontier Linen Supply, Inc., of Buffalo, New
York, comprise the membership of the Respondent Linen and Credit Exchange,
which is, in turn, a voluntary unincorporated association of employers who are
engaged in furnishing, supplying, and servicing industrial and commercial enter-
prises with cotton and linen towels, uniforms, and related items. Each of the
corporate Respondents is engaged in the linen supply business as described, and
each operates one or more plants either in Buffalo, Dunkirk, or Niagara Falls,
New York. Jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, admitted by the answer,
establish that each corporate Respondent is engaged in commerce within the Board's
current jurisdictional standards through the volume of their extrastate purchases
of materials and supplies and their services rendered to industrial and commercial
concerns which annually ship goods and merchandise valued in excess of $25,000
outside the State of New York. In the aggregate, members of the Exchange pur-
chased, in 1952, materials and supplies valued in excess of $2,000,000, of which
more than 80 percent were from extrastate sources, and in the same year they
rendered services in excess of $4,000,000, of which more than 20 percent were to
industrial and commercial concerns as aforesaid.
The corporate Respondents have been members of the Exchange for some 13
years. One of the purposes of the Exchange is to obtain uniformity and stability
in labor relations between its members and the various labor organizations repre-
senting employees of its members; and its activities include the conducting of labor
negotiations and the execution of labor contracts on behalf of all its members with
unions representing employees of members.
Respondents are engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act.
It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL, is a labor organization
which admits to membership employees of Respondents other than the Exchange.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Summary of stipulated facts
Respondents admitted that they laid off the employees on May 27, 1953, as
charged in the complaint, and did not reinstate them until June 3, 1953. Respond-
ents denied that the layoff was because of the union membership or union or other
concerted activities of the employees, but stipulated that the employees were laid off
because the Union, as their bargaining representative, had engaged in a strike on
May 26, 1953, at the Frontier Linen Supply, Inc., a member of the Exchange, which
was the bargaining representative of all its members. Frontier had not engaged
independently in bargaining negotiations with the Union.
During the 13 years for which Frontier and the seven corporate Respondents
have been members of the Exchange, said Respondents and Frontier have recog-
nized the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of all their employees
employed as truckdrivers and have had successive collective-bargaining agreements
with Local No. 449, covering the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment of the truckdrivers, which agreements have been arrived at through
negotiations conducted between representatives of the Exchange, acting on behalf
of all its members. and representatives of the Union, acting for the truckdrivers.
Whenever a proposed collective-bargaining agreement was agreed upon, it was
submitted for majority approval to the membership of the Exchange and the Union.
After a majority of the membership of the Exchange and the Union approved such
an agreement, it was signed by each member of the Exchange and by the secretary-
treasurer and business agent for the Union, and conformed copies were given all
signers.
At the expiration of the contract between the Union and the members of the
Exchange in 1949, the Union had caused a strike to be called at all members of
the Exchange, which strike lasted I day, but on completion of the contract in 1949,
all of the employees returned to work.
454 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On April 30, 1952, the Exchange and the Union, on behalf of their respective
members, executed a collective-bargaining agreement covering the wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment of the truckdrivers employed by
the members of the Exchange. This agreement by its terms provided that it should
continue in full force and effect to midnight of April 30, 1953, and should continue
from year to year thereafter unless a 60-day written notice of a desire to change
should be given either by the employer or the Union before the first or any subse-
quent expiration date. Sixty days prior to the first expiration date, the Union served
the required notice of a desire to change the agreement.
Negotiations for a new agreement began sometime in March of 1953 between
the Exchange, acting on behalf of its members, and the Union, acting on behalf
of its member truckdrivers Those negotiations continued off and on until May
26, at which time the Union called on strike its members who were employed as
truckdrivers for Frontier, and established a picket line on that day at Frontier only
On the night of May 26 the Exchange and the Union had a meeting, and during that
meeting and I or 2 subsequent meetings, the Respondents informed the union repre-
sentatives that the employees of the Respondents were locked out because of the
strike at Frontier, and that if the Union would withdraw its picket line and cease
the strike at Frontier they would permit the employees of Respondents to return
to work.
On June 3 the Exchange and the Union reached an agreement for a new con-
tract. The Union thereupon withdrew its pickets from Frontier and terminated the
strike, whereupon the employees of the Respondents went back to work.
B. Concluding findings
The stipulated facts which the parties have chosen to submit present, largely in a
vacuum, a case which resembles skeletally the muchly litigated Morand and Davis
cases,' i. e., multiemployer bargaining with the union through an employer associa-
tion; a strike by the union against one member of the association; a lockout and a
layoff of employees by the other members. Yet, because of the absence of detail
and the silence of the stipulation as to facts which were accorded great, if not cru-
cial, significance at various stages of the Davis-Morand litigation, the present deter-
mination must turn largely on the negative rather than on the positive aspects of
the stipulation.
Certainly, it can be said that under the rationale of the Board's decisions in the
Morand and Davis cases 3 (followed in the later case of Continental Baking Co., 104
NLRB 99), Respondent's conduct was unquestionably unlawful, since it constituted
reprisal against the employees because the Union, as their bargaining representa-
tive, had engaged in a lawful strike against Frontier. Thus, in the absence of evidence
that strikes against other members were threatened or anticipated, that Respondents
were unable to operate without assurances against being struck, that Respondents
had sought and had failed to obtain such assurances, or, alternatively, assurances of
adequate notice for the arrangement of their operations, it cannot be found that the
lockout was defensive in nature. Stated differently, there was no showing that there
were any economic considerations which justified the lockout, and none that the
Respondents' motive was in fact the protection of their economic interests. Cf.
Betts-Cadillac-Olds, Inc., 96 NLRB 268; International Shoe Company, 93 NLRB
907; Duluth Bottling Association, 48 NLRB 1335.
Attention is turned, then, to the question whether the courts' decisions would
dictate a different result.4 But here, again, the stipulated facts differ so widely that
it is unnecessary to speculate on the ultimate impact which those decisions may have
on the Board's views as formerly expressed. Thus, present in either or both of those
2Morand Brothers Beverage Co, 91 NLRB 409; 190 F. 2d 576 (C. A. 7) ; 99 NLRB 1448
(on remand) ; 204 F. 2d 529 (C. A. 7). Leonard et at., d/b/a Davis Furniture Co., 94
NLRB 279; 197 F. 2d 435 (C. A. 9) ; 100 NLRB 1016 ( on remand ) ; 205 F. 2d 355 (C. A. 9).
3 The Board's views were fully explicated in those decisions, which have received wide-
spread comment and analysis in numerous law review articles. See, e. g., Legality of the
Lockout, Koretz, Robert F., Syracuse Law Review, Spring 1953, pp. 251-273. The con-
clusions reached herein render unnecessary either further analysis of the Board's views or
exploration of the realm of the court' s disagreement therewith.
4In Morand, the court ultimately sustained the Board's finding that the employers had
unlawfully discharged their employees, though it expressed sharp disagreement with the
Board's alternative finding that, viewed as effectuating only a layoff, the lockout was also
unlawful (204 F. 2d 529).
BUFFALO LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY 455
cases, but absent here so far as the record shows, were the following facts which were
emphasized by the courts as impelling their conclusions:
An impasse had been reached; negotiations had collapsed; the employers had ex-
hausted the possibilities of good-faith bargaining. The object of the strike in each
case was to force capitulation of the struck employer to the union's demands as made
during the bargaining negotiations with the association.
In Morand, the union had approved a general strike authorization, news of which
quickly reached the employers. After the strike was called against one, the other
employers notified the union they could not operate under the threat of a strike.
In Davis, employees of all the employers had joined in voting to call the strike,
the union had authorized its strike manager to strike successively against each em-
ployer, and the first strike was announced as the beginning of a "whipsawing" process
against one after another of the remaining employers. The effects of the "whipsaw-
ing" process (e. g., loss of customers and good will) were held to justify the lockout
and layoff in protection of the employers' economic interests.
Since the courts' disagreement with the Board stemmed from facts not here shown
to be present, the Board's decisions-which here stand as a fortiori authority-remain
as conclusive precedents.
It is, therefore, concluded and found that by laying off the employees whose names
are listed in Appendix A hereof, from May 27 to June 3, 1953, inclusive, Respondents
discriminated against them to discourage participation in union or other concerted
activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion, and thereby committed an unfair labor practice proscribed by Section 8 (a)
(3) and (1).
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the
case, the undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents' activities set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection
with Respondents' operations described in section I, above, have a close, intimate,
and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of commerce.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
3. By laying off the respective employees whose names are listed in Appendix A,
hereof, from May 27 to June 3, 1953, inclusive, Respondents, respectively, discrimi-
nated in regard to their hire and tenure of employment to discourage membership
in the Union, and thereby engaged in an unfair labor practice proscribed by Section
8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act, and affecting commerce within the meaning of Section
2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in an unfair labor practice, it will be
recommended that they cease and desist therefrom and take affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication.]
Appendix A
Listed below under the names of the respective Respondents are the names of the
employees who were laid off by said Respondents on May 27 and reinstated on June
3, 1953.
Buffalo Linen Supply Company and Linen and Credit Exchange
7oseph Homer Joseph Gdrace
Famous Linen Supply Company, Inc., and Linen and Credit Exchange
Philip Trifiro Hank Legatzke
Carl Maiorana Norm Axford
Sam Scibetta Don Herberger
Al Scibetta John Feraci
456 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Buffalo General Laundries Corp. (Merchants Linen Supply Division) and Linen
and Credit Exchange
James Chambers James J. Finnerty
Robert Thompson Ken Beiter
John H. Monaco Charles Redanz
Ray Butler Edward Johnson
William Mullane
Modern Linen Supply Company and Linen and Credit Exchange
Charles Scibetta Francis Gigante
Robert Pabeljack
Morgan Linen Supply, Inc. and Linen and Credit Exchange
Matty Cornell
Joe Zarcone
Ed Kinney
George Meisenburg
John Calabro
Charles Sanfilippo
Tony Muecio
John Balcerzak
Sam Greco
Emil Guglielmo
Louis Butkowski
The Office Towel Supply
Earl Wagner
J. Dix
Leonard Slawiak
Harry Thorpe
Gordon Ford
Bill Bailey
John MacGregor
Howard Walmuth
Dominic Guericio
Ed Wojciak
Carmen Mambrino
Angelo Abrams
Mide De Angelo
Leonard Pinkowski
Leonard Kuzora
James Maggio
Richard Kalfas
Donald Dugan
Joe Verone
Charles Seward
Company, Incorporated, and Linen and Credit Exchange
John Christiano
Angelo Gerace
Pascal Ipolito
Wilfred Monette
James Irwin
Sylvester Eich
Eugene Monette
James Shufelt
Henry Kujawa
Walkers Laundry and Linen Supply and Linen and Credit Exchange
Felice Ruggiero Paul Pascuzzi
Ted Colaty Harry Pitcher
Appendix B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Re-
lations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations
Act, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America, AFL, or in any other organization of our employees, by laying
them off, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to their hire or ten-
ure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL, respectively, make whole the employees, whose names are listed be-
low, for any loss of pay they may have suffered as a result of our discrimination
against them:
Buffalo Linen Supply Company and Linen and Credit Exchange
Joseph Homer Joseph Gerace
Famous Linen Supply Company, Inc. and Linen and Credit Exchange
Philip Trifiro Hank Legatzke
Carl Maiorana Norm Axford
Sam Scibetta Don Herberger
Al Scibetta John Feraci
BUFFALO LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY 457
Buffalo General Laundries Corp. and Linen and Credit Exchange
James Chambers James J. Finnerty
Robert Thompson Ken Better
John H. Monaco Charles Redanz
Ray Butler Edward Johnson
William Mullane
Modern Linen Supply Company and Linen and Credit Exchange
Charles Scibetta Francis Gigante
Robert Pabeljack
Morgan Linen Supply, Inc. and Linen and Credit Exchange
Matty Cornell
Joe Zarcone
Ed Kinney
George Meisenburg
John Calabro
Charles Sanfilippo
Tony Muecio
John Balcerzak
Sam Greco
Emil Guglielmo
Louis Butkowski
Dominic Guericio
Ed Wojciak
Carmen Mambrino
Angelo Abrams
Mide De Angelo
Leonard Pinkowski
Leonard Kuzora
James Maggio
Richard Kalfas
Donald Dugan
Joe Verone
Charles Seward
The Office Towel Supply Company, Incorporated and Linen and Credit Exchange
Earl Wagner
J. Dix
Leonard Slawiak
Harry Thorpe
Gordon Ford
Bill Bailey
John MacGregor
Howard Walmuth
John Christiano
Angelo Gerace
Pascal Ipolito
Wilfred Monette
James Irwin
Sylvester Eich
Eugene Monette
James Shufelt
Henry Kujawa
Walkers Laundry and Linen Supply and Linen and Credit Exchange
Felice Ruggiero Paul Pascuzzi
Ted Colaty Harry Pitcher
All of our employees are free to become or refrain from becoming members of
the above-named Union or any other labor organization.
BUFFALO LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY
By----------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
FAMOUS LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY, INC.
By----------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
BUFFALO GENERAL LAUNDRIES CORP.
By----------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
MODERN LINEN SUPPLY COMPANY
By----------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
MORGAN LINEN SUPPLY, INC.
By----------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
THE OFFICE TOWEL SUPPLY COMPANY,
INCORPORATED
By----------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
WALKERS LAUNDRY AND LINEN SUPPLY
By----------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
LINEN AND CREDIT EXCHANGE
Dated---------------- By----------
---
--------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.