Bruce Abramson

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 31, 2020

2020003993 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 31, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/225,085 09/02/2011 Bruce D. Abramson 404613 1781
23460 7590 12/31/2020
LEYDIG VOIT & MAYER, LTD
TWO PRUDENTIAL PLAZA, SUITE 4900
180 NORTH STETSON AVENUE
CHICAGO, IL 60601-6731
EXAMINER
POLLOCK, GREGORY A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3695
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/31/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Chgpatent@leydig.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte BRUCE D. ABRAMSON
________________

Appeal 2020-003993
Application 13/225,085
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, JOHN A. EVANS, and
JASON J. CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals the Final Rejection
of claims 26–30, 32–34, 36, 38–40, and 42.2 We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.3
INVENTION
The invention relates to facilitating the completion of contracts for
conditional or unconditional forward sales (“CCUFSs”) of retail goods via a
CCUFS exchange, in combination with a distribution network for taking

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. According to Appellant, Bruce D. Abramson is the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Claims 1–25, 31, 35, 37, 41, 43 are cancelled. Appeal Br. 17, 19, 21, 23.
3 Our panel rendered a decision previously on December 25, 2018.
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delivery on completed contracts. Abstract. Claim 26 is illustrative of the
invention and is reproduced below. The emphasized text denotes an abstract
idea as discussed infra in § D.
26. A system for processing contractual transactions
relating to gasoline and providing distribution of the gasoline
pursuant to contractual terms, the system comprising:
a networked computing system including one or more
networked computing devices accessible via a network to a
plurality of user computing devices, the networked computing
system being configured to:
receive, from a first seller, a first offer to sell a first
quantity of gasoline at a price, the first offer to sell having a
plurality of parameters including a gasoline type, a location for
distribution, and a time for distribution, wherein the first offer to
sell is received from the first seller via a first contract-writing
interface which allows sellers to input quantity, type, price,
location and time terms;
group the first offer to sell with one or more other offers
to sell having the same gasoline type, the same location for
distribution, and the same time for distribution to form a pool,
wherein the pool corresponds to a second quantity of gasoline
greater than the first quantity of gasoline and the pool includes
the gasoline type, the location for distribution, and the time for
distribution;
receive, from a first buyer, a first offer to buy a quantity of
gasoline at a price, the first offer to buy having a plurality of
parameters including the gasoline type, the location for
distribution, and the time for distribution, wherein the first offer
to buy is received from the first buyer via a second contract-
writing interface which allows buyers to input quantity, type,
price, location and time terms;
determine that the gasoline type, the location for
distribution, and the time for distribution of the first offer to buy
matches the gasoline type, the location for distribution, and the
time for distribution of the pool, and that the price of the offer to
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buy is greater than or equal to the price of one or more offers to
sell of the pool;
generate, in response to the determination, a record of a
futures contract for the first buyer permitting distribution of
gasoline of the gasoline type at the location for distribution and
the time for distribution; and
store the record of the futures contract in a database
accessible on the networked computing system; and
a plurality of gas station computing devices located at a
plurality of gas stations, each gas station including one or more
gas station computing devices, wherein each of the gas station
computing devices is configured to:
receive a request for distribution of a quantity of gasoline
of the gasoline type at the location for distribution and at the time
for distribution pursuant to the record of the futures contract;
determine whether to distribute the requested quantity of
gasoline in whole or in part pursuant to the record of the futures
contract by accessing the networked computing system;
distribute some or all of the requested quantity of gasoline,
as determined; and
update the record of the futures contract for the first buyer
to deduct the distributed quantity of gasoline by accessing the
networked computing system.
Appeal Br. 17–18 (Claims Appendix) (emphases added).

REJECTION
The Examiner rejects claims 26–30, 32–34, 36, 38–40, and 42 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. Final
Act. 2–12.
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ANALYSIS
Claims 26–30, 32–34, 36, 38–40, and 42 Rejected Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
A. Principles of Law
Inventions for a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter” generally constitute patent-eligible subject matter.
35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–
77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept
the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the
claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e.,
the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
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such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as
nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an
attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court
also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the
abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this
principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the
formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing
Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
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566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance”), updated by USPTO, October 2019
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf) (“Update”); see also
October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct.
18, 2019) (notifying the public of the availability of the Update). “All
USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected
to follow the guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also
October 2019 Guidance Update at 1. The Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent
updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).4
Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites the
following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and

4 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019
(Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated.
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application.5
MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activity” in
the field; or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
MPEP § 2106.05(d).
C. The Examiner’s Rejection and Appellant’s Arguments
The Examiner concludes the present claims recite certain methods of
organizing human activity. Final Act. 9, 13. The Examiner concludes the
present claims are not integrated into a practical application and there are no
limitations recited in the present claims that add significantly more to the
abstract idea. Ans. 4–6; Final Act. 10, 13. The Examiner determines the
present claims do not amount to significantly more than an abstract idea
itself because the abstract idea is implemented using additional elements that
are well-understood, routine, and conventional. Ans. 10 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 2–

5 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by
(a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements
individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole
integrates the exception into a practical application.” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II.
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21, 31–32); Final Act. 15 (citing Spec. ¶ 37).
Appellant argues the present claims recite specific limitations that do
not preempt any abstract idea. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant argues the
Examiner overemphasizes the consideration of whether a generic processor
performs the recited operations. Appeal Br. 14–15 (citing Examples 21, 36,
37).
Appellant argues the present claims are novel and non-obvious and
are, therefore, an inventive concept. Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues the
present claims recite interactions between multiple computing devices and
distributions of gasoline pursuant to those interactions, thereby providing
efficient parameter-based pooling and matching along with actual
distribution with network-based verification, which results in an inventive
concept. Appeal Br. 13–14 (citing BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc.
v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellant argues
the Examiner does not provide the evidence required by Berkheimer to
support a determination that the additional elements are well-understood,
routine, or conventional. Appeal Br. 15–16 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc.,
881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); Reply Br. 4–6. We disagree with
Appellant.
D. Step 2A, Prong 1
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question that we resolve
pursuant to the 2019 Revised Guidance. The emphasized portions of claim
1, reproduced above (see supra at 2)6, recite commercial interactions

6 We determine that the “store” (claim 26), “storing” (claims 32 and 38), and
“transmitting” (claims 32 and 38) limitations amount to insignificant extra-
solution activities (e.g., gathering or sending data).
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(including agreements in the form of contracts or legal obligations) because
they pertain to processing contractual transactions relating to gasoline and
providing distribution of the gasoline pursuant to contractual terms, which
Appellant acknowledges. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d); Appeal Br. 2.
Commercial interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts or
legal obligations) fall into the category of certain methods of organizing
human activity. MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). Certain methods of organizing
human activity are a type of abstract idea. Id.
We must still determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a
practical application, namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the
abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract
idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the abstract idea. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). We therefore
(1) identify whether there are any additional recited elements beyond the
abstract idea, and (2) evaluate those elements both individually and
collectively to determine whether they integrate the exception into a
practical application. See id.
Accordingly, we proceed to Prong 2.
E. Step 2A, Prong 2
Here, the elements in the present claims used to implement the
abstract idea are the “networked computing system,” “networked computing
devices,” “network,”7 “user computing devices,”8 “first contract-writing

7 Claims 32 and 39 do not recite “network,” whereas claim 26 recites
“network.”
8 Claims 32 and 39 do not recite “user computer devices,” whereas claim 26
recites “user computer devices.”
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interface,” “second contract-writing interface,” “database,” “gas station
computing devices,”9 and “gas stations.”10 See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d).
The additional elements of the present claims do not integrate the abstract
idea into a practical application because they do not impose any meaningful
limits on practicing the abstract idea for the following reasons.
The Update addresses how we consider evidence of improvement that
is presented to us. MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d). It states:
[T]he evaluation of Prong Two requires the use of the
considerations (e.g. improving technology, effecting a particular
treatment or prophylaxis, implementing with a particular
machine, etc.) identified by the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit, to ensure that the claim as a whole “integrates [the]
judicial exception into a practical application [that] will apply,
rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial
exception.
Update 11 (emphases added). The Update further states:
During examination, the examiner should analyze the
“improvements” consideration by evaluating the specification
and the claims to ensure that a technical explanation of the
asserted improvement is present in the specification, and that the
claim reflects the asserted improvement. Generally, examiners
are not expected to make a qualitative judgment on the merits of
the asserted improvement. If the examiner concludes the
disclosed invention does not improve technology, the burden
shifts to applicant to provide persuasive arguments supported by
any necessary evidence to demonstrate that one of ordinary skill
in the art would understand that the disclosed invention improves
technology. Any such evidence submitted under 37 C.F.R.

9 Claims 32 and 39 recite “gas station computing device,” whereas claim 26
recites “gas station computing devices.”
10 Claims 32 and 39 recite “gas station,” whereas claim 26 recites “gas
stations.”
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§ 1.132 must establish what the specification would convey to
one of ordinary skill in the art and cannot be used to supplement
the specification. For example, in response to a rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 101, an applicant could submit a declaration under
§ 1.132 providing testimony on how one of ordinary skill in the
art would interpret the disclosed invention as improving
technology and the underlying factual basis for that conclusion.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
We, therefore, focus on any evidence Appellant cites in its briefs, as
discussed in the Update. Appellant does not refer us to any paragraphs of
the Specification. See generally Appeal Br. (Appellant does not refer to any
paragraphs).
At best, the present claims recite an improvement to certain methods
of organizing human activity (i.e., an abstract idea as discussed supra in
§ D). Id.; see, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract
idea.”). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly
discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot
rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for
patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the additional elements in the present claims, namely
“networked computing system,” “networked computing devices,”
“network,” “user computing devices,” “first contract-writing interface,”
“second contract-writing interface,” “database,” “gas station computing
devices,” and “gas stations” do not, either individually or in combination,
integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. In particular,
Appellant’s Specification discloses that these elements encompass generic
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computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 16, 31–33, 38, 39, 43, 56. Merely adding
generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not integrate
those ideas into a practical application. See MPEP §§ 2106.04(a), (d)
(Citing 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (identifying “merely
includ[ing] instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer” as an
example of when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical
application)).
Appellant’s arguments that the present claims do not preempt any
abstract idea (Appeal Br. 11) do not persuade us that the claims are patent
eligible. Although preemption may denote patent ineligibility, its absence
does not demonstrate patent eligibility. See FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric
Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). For claims covering a
patent-ineligible concept, preemption concerns “are fully addressed and
made moot” by an analysis under the Mayo/Alice framework. Ariosa
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
overemphasizes the consideration of whether a generic processor performs
the recited operations. Appeal Br. 14–15 (citing Examples 21, 36, 37). The
present claims pertain to processing contractual transactions relating to
gasoline and providing distribution of the gasoline pursuant to contractual
terms, which Appellant acknowledges (see Appeal Br. 2); whereas the
claims in Example 36 (i.e., Example 36 pertains to tracking inventory) and
Example 37 (i.e., Example 37 pertains to a relocation of icons on a graphical
user interface) are unlike the present claims. Appellant’s citation to
Example 21 is unavailing. Example 21 pertains to a fundamental economic
practice, whereas the present claims recite certain methods of organizing
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human activity as stated supra in § D.
We, therefore, conclude that the additional elements, whether
considered individually or as an ordered combination, do not integrate the
abstract idea into a practical application because the additional elements are
generic computer components that do not impose meaningful limits on
practicing the abstract idea.
Appellant does not make any other arguments pertaining to Step 2A,
Prong 2. Because we determine that the present claims recite an abstract
idea that is not integrated into a practical application, we proceed to Step 2B.
F. Step 2B
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the Examiner does not
provide the evidence required by Berkheimer to support a determination that
the additional elements are well-understood, routine, or conventional.
Appeal Br. 15–16 (citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2018)); Reply Br. 4–6.
The Examiner determines the present claims do not amount to
significantly more than an abstract idea itself because the abstract idea is
implemented using additional elements that are well-understood, routine,
and conventional. Ans. 10 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 2–21, 31–32); Final Act. 15
(citing Spec. ¶ 37).
Notably, Appellant does not rebut paragraph 37 cited in the Final
Office Action. Additionally, the Specification indicates that the additional
elements (i.e., “networked computing system,” “networked computing
devices,” “network,” “user computing devices,” “first contract-writing
interface,” “second contract-writing interface,” “database,” “gas station
computing devices,” and “gas stations”) are nothing more than generic
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computer components. Spec. ¶¶ 16, 31–33, 38, 39, 43, 56. Appellant’s
Specification indicates these additional elements were well-understood,
routine, and conventional components because it describes them at a high
level of generality and in a manner that indicates that they are sufficiently
well-known. Id.
We disagree with Appellant’s argument that the present claims are
novel and non-obvious and are, therefore, an inventive concept. Appeal Br.
12. Appellant improperly conflates the requirements for patent-eligible
subject matter (§ 101) with the independent requirements of novelty (§ 102)
and non-obviousness (§ 103). “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a
process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining
whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of
possibly patentable subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89; see also
Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(stating that, “under the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim directed to a newly
discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) cannot
rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive concept necessary for
patent eligibility”).
We agree with the Examiner that the additional elements, either
individually or in combination, do not amount to an inventive concept. Ans.
5, 8. An inventive concept “cannot be furnished by the unpatentable law of
nature (or natural phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.” Genetic, 818 F.3d at
1376; see also 2019 Revised Guidance; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (explaining
that, after determining a claim is directed to a judicial exception, “we then
ask, ‘[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?”’ (alteration in original)
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78)). Instead, an “inventive concept” is
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furnished by an element or combination of elements that is recited in the
claim in addition to the judicial exception and sufficient to ensure the claim,
as a whole, amounts to significantly more than the judicial exception itself.
Alice, 573 U.S. at 218–19 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73); see BSG Tech
LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining
that the Supreme Court in Alice “only assessed whether the claim limitations
other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was
directed were well-understood, routine and conventional” (emphasis
added)).
Appellant’s citation to BASCOM is unavailing. Appeal Br. 13–14. As
an initial matter, Appellant’s argument appears misplaced because all of the
features recited, with the exception of the additional elements identified
above, are directed to the abstract idea, as discussed supra.
Moreover, in BASCOM, the claims were directed to “a filter
implementation versatile enough that it could be adapted to many different
users’ preferences while also installed remotely in a single location.”
BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1348–51. The inventive concept was “the installation
of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with
customizable filtering features specific to each end user” that “gives the
filtering tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits
of a filter on the [Internet Service Provider] server.” Id. at 1350. Thus,
when considered as an ordered combination, the Federal Circuit concluded
the claims provided “an inventive concept can be found in the non-
conventional and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces.”
Id. Here, the present claims recite an abstract idea using additional elements
that are generic computer components as discussed supra, or at best,
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improving an abstract idea—not an inventive concept. Accordingly,
Appellant’s assertion fails to identify error in the Examiner’s analysis.
For at least the above reasons, we conclude that each of the present
claims, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea
that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an
inventive concept. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of:
(1) independent claims 26, 32, and 38; and (2) dependent claims 27–30, 33,
34, 36, 39, 40, and 42 under § 101.
We have only considered those arguments that Appellant actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellant could have made, but chose not to
make, in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

CONCLUSION

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
26–30, 32–
34, 36, 38–
40, 42
101 Eligibility 26–30, 32–
34, 36, 38–
40, 42