01983981
05-03-1999
Brenda L. Baxter, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.
Brenda L. Baxter, )
Appellant, ) Appeal No. 01983981
v. ) Agency No. 4-H-300-1035-95
William J. Henderson, ) Hearing No. 110-97-8093X
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
(S.E./S.W. Region), )
Agency. )
DECISION
Appellant timely initiated an appeal to this Commission from a final
agency decision ("FAD") concerning her complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination in violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq., and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The appeal is
accepted pursuant to the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.
The issue presented is whether appellant was discriminated against based
on her physical disability (bulging disk, bone spurring, inability
to fully raise her arm, and shoulder problems) or retaliated against
because of prior EEO activity when the agency terminated her employment
on October 7, 1994.
Appellant was employed as a Transitional Employee (�TE�) City Letter
Carrier from October 1992 to October 1994. As a TE, appellant served
under 359-day appointments. During her first appointment, from October
1992 to October 1993, appellant was rated on her yearly evaluation,
dated September 17, 1993, as �Satisfactory� (the highest rating
possible for a TE) in all factors and was recommended for reappointment.
Appellant was reappointed for another 359-day period. On November 13,
1993, appellant was involved in a rear end collision while delivering
mail and she sustained injuries to her neck, shoulder and head. As a
result of these injuries, she continued to experience a bulging disk,
bone spurring, inability to fully raise her arm, and shoulder problems,
as well as pain and headaches. Appellant was awarded permanent partial
disability from the Office of Workers' Compensation (�OWCP�).
Appellant believed that agency officials thereafter treated her
in a disparate manner. The day after the accident, she was refused
permission to leave early to see a physician. Instead, an agency official
accompanied her to an agency physician the next day; appellant complained
that the official refused to leave the room while the physician examined
her. Appellant alleged that after the accident, her supervisor began
slapping her on the back and changed his expectations for her performance
from day-to-day.
Appellant was placed on full disability from November 30, 1993, to
January 10, 1994. Appellant contended that when she returned to work
on January 10, 1994, the Branch Manager told her that, if she wanted
to retain her job, she had to sign a contract to work six hours a day,
six days a week, rather than the five-day week she had previously worked.
Appellant was placed in a limited duty Return-to-Writer position, as she
was not physically capable of performing the duties of a Letter Carrier.
Thereafter, agency officials attempted to persuade appellant to work
seven days a week, which appellant's physician refused to permit.
On February 5, 1994, appellant went to a break room to take prescribed
medication for her injuries. In order to take the medication, she had to
eat something; in addition, she had to remove her arm brace. A supervisor
observed her and, believing that she was taking a lunch break outside of
her designated time, yelled at her in front of coworkers and continued
to yell at her after she returned to the workroom floor. This event
prompted appellant to seek EEO counseling and appellant filed a formal
EEO complaint in March 1994. She withdrew that complaint in May 1994.
Appellant received her second evaluation on October 7, 1994. Unlike her
first evaluation, this evaluation was issued by the Branch Manager (rather
than her direct supervisor) and rated appellant as �Unsatisfactory� in
the following factors: attitude toward work, coworkers and supervisors;
ability to understand and follow instructions; willingness to handle all
assignments; and appearance, conduct and habits. Appellant was rated as
�Satisfactory� in the following factors: general progress in learning
the job; productivity and work habits; safety; accuracy and thoroughness;
and attendance, punctuality and reliability. In the comment section
of the evaluation form, the Branch Manager wrote that �[appellant]
is unable to perform the duties for which she was hired.� Appellant's
overall evaluation was �Unsatisfactory� and she was not recommended for
another appointment. Accordingly, when appellant's second TE appointment
expired, she was not offered a third appointment.
Appellant timely sought counseling and filed her instant EEO complaint,
which the agency accepted and processed in accordance with all procedural
prerequisites. The complaint was heard before an EEOC Administrative
Judge ("AJ") who thereafter issued a recommended decision ("RD")
finding that appellant had been subjected to discrimination based on
her disability when the agency terminated her employment by failing to
offer her a third appointment as a TE.
Although the AJ noted that the �[a]gency does not dispute the fact that
[appellant] is an individual with a disability within the meaning of
the Rehabilitation Act,� the AJ reviewed the record and determined that
appellant's impairments to her neck, shoulder and back substantially
limited her ability to work and perform manual tasks and concurred that
she was an individual with a disability as defined by the Commission's
Regulations. In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate
treatment based on her disability, appellant must show that: 1) she
was a qualified individual with a disability; 2) she was subjected to an
adverse action or otherwise treated differently from individuals not in
her protected group; and 3) the circumstances give rise to the inference
that the difference in treatment was based on her disability. See Prewitt
v. United States Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); Jasany
v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); Pushkin
v. Regents of University of Colorado, 658 F. 2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981);
Gant v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request No. 05910096 (July
9, 1991).
The AJ found that appellant established a prima facie case in that
she showed that: she was performing the essential duties of the
Return-to-Writer position; she was adversely treated when the agency
failed to offer her another reappointment while other TE's were offered
reappointments; and that the circumstances gave rise to an inference
that appellant's treatment was based on her disability.
The agency asserted that appellant was not offered a third appointment as
a TE because she performed unsatisfactorily during her second appointment.
The AJ found that these legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons were a
pretext to mask discrimination based on her disability. The AJ found
that �from the time [appellant] became an individual with a disability,
the [a]gency embarked on a mission to terminate her employment� by
forcing her to increase the number of days per week that she worked,
yelling at her in front of others, slapping her on the back and giving
her a poor performance evaluation. The AJ noted that appellant received
�Satisfactory� ratings on all objective portions of her evaluation,
but �Unsatisfactory� ratings on the portions which were subjective in
nature. The AJ noted that various agency officials testified that they
would have counseled a TE employee who was deficient prior to issuing a
poor evaluation, but that appellant had not received such counseling.
In addition, four officials testified that they had not observed any
problems with appellant's performance, while the Branch Manager was unable
to provide any details about the alleged problems he observed with her
performance. Finally, although the AJ agreed that it was possible that
appellant could have performed satisfactorily in all objective areas,
while having a poor attitude and appearance and otherwise being deficient
in the other subjective areas, the AJ was not persuaded that the record
supported such a conclusion in this case.
The agency argued that appellant was unable to perform the position of
TE City Letter Carrier and that it did not terminate her but rather had
merely permitted her second TE appointment to expire. However, the
AJ noted that appellant was not required to submit a new application
to obtain a third appointment as a TE and found that the position in
question included the Return-to-Writer job which appellant had occupied
for the majority of her second appointment as a TE. The AJ found that
the agency's assertions constituted an attempt to hide behind the TE
program in order to circumvent the Rehabilitation Act.
Noting that appellant testified that her neurologist now deemed that her
impairments precluded her from performing any position with the agency,
the AJ recommended as relief that the agency grant her back pay from the
time of her termination until such time that she was no longer able to
perform, with or without reasonable accommodation, or that the agency
reinstate her employment �for at least [one] 359-day term.� The AJ
also recommended that appellant receive all associated benefits, that
any negative information be removed from he personnel file, and that the
agency post a notice. The AJ denied appellant's request for compensatory
damages, finding that she did not present sufficient objective evidence
to warrant such an award and presented only �very cursory testimony
regarding emotional distress.� Because the AJ found that appellant had
been discriminated against based on her disability, she did not address
the question of whether appellant also was subjected to reprisal.
In its FAD, the agency timely rejected the RD's finding of discrimination.
While noting that it �may have failed to articulate its position as
clearly as possible during the hearing,� and that it failed to object
to the AJ's statement on the record that �the [a]gency says they're
not contesting whether or not [appellant] has a disability,� <1> it
contended that it had never conceded that appellant was an individual
with a disability. The agency asserted that the record lacked sufficient
evidence to establish that, at the time the decision not to reappoint
appellant was made, her impairments substantially limited a major
life activity or were permanent in nature. The agency noted that the
Commission has held that individuals are not necessarily regarded as
being individuals with disabilities as defined by the Rehabilitation Act
merely because they have been provided with a limited duty assignment
because of an on-the-job injury or have received an award from the OWCP.
The FAD concluded that appellant failed to meet her burden of establishing
that she was an individual with a disability and maintained that she
was never considered to have anything more than a temporary impairment.
Finding that there was �not one iota of evidence or corroboration� for
the allegations that appellant was slapped on the back, yelled at and
otherwise harassed, the agency did not find her testimony in this regard
to be credible. In this regard, the agency noted that, since appellant
was a TE, it could have terminated her at any time it determined that
her services were no longer needed, but it had retained appellant for
the duration of her appointment in spite of her placement on limited
duty status for some ten months. Because of this, the agency found that
its refusal to reappoint her to a third term was �not probative of [a]
discriminatory animus.�
The agency found that the Branch Manager credibly testified that he
had observed deficiencies in appellant's performance, and the fact that
the other four supervisors did not was �not probative of discriminatory
motive� since it was �not inconceivable that he had a totally different
experience� with appellant than others.
The agency found no indication that Return-to-Writer even was an
authorized position or, if it was, that there was sufficient volume of
work for such a position to justify the appointment of a TE. The agency
noted that it needed letter carriers and queried how many TE appointments
it would be obligated to grant appellant under the AJ's reasoning since
the AJ allegedly did not permit consideration of the needs of the agency
in staffing its supplemental workforce.
Appellant, through her counsel, timely appeals and argues that the agency
waived its right to contest whether appellant was a qualified individual
with a disability, noting that the agency �all but conceded that [she]
was� in its opening statement and failed to object to the AJ's statement
on the record that the agency did not contest her status as an individual
with a disability. See n. 1. The brief points out that the agency failed
to cross examine or otherwise challenge testimony or evidence presented
in support of appellant's claim that she was a qualified individual with
a disability. In addition, the agency did not assert that appellant
was unable to perform as a TE with or without accommodation, or that
it would impose an undue hardship on the agency to appoint a TE who
could not perform the duties of a letter carrier. Rather, the agency
chose to contend that appellant was not reappointed to a third term as
a TE solely because of her poor performance, and the AJ properly found
that its articulated reasons regarding her alleged deficiencies were a
pretext for discrimination. The brief further argues that appellant also
established that the failure to reappoint her constituted reprisal for
her prior EEO complaint. As relief, the brief seeks reinstatement as a
full time career employee in a limited duty job; back pay; and $150,000
for mental anguish, humiliation, pain and suffering; attorney's fees;
and removal of negative information from her personnel file.<2>
In its comments on appeal, the agency maintains that its FAD properly
found no discrimination.
The Commission first addresses the issue of whether there is sufficient
evidence in the record to find that appellant met her initial burden
of establishing that she is a qualified individual with a disability.
Here, the record shows that: appellant was absent from work for some
six weeks due to her impairments; she was awarded permanent partial
disability by OWCP; her impairments include bulging disk, bone spurring,
restrictions on the range of motion of her arm, and recurring headaches;
and she offered testimony to the effect that the impairments were
permanent in nature and substantially limited her from performing manual
tasks and working. However, the agency points to a physician's report
dated November 30, 1993, which stated that appellant's injuries were
not expected to be permanent in nature and a letter dated January 28,
1994, which restricted appellant's duties based on her use of a cervical
collar and splint while working. The agency contends that the record as
a whole is insufficient to establish that appellant is, had a record of,
or was regarded as having, an impairment which substantially limited a
major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.203(a).
However, the Commission finds that any deficiency in the record with
regard to whether appellant is, had a record of, or was regarded as
having, an impairment which substantially limited a major life activity
was caused by the agency's conduct in failing to dispute this issue.
During the investigation and hearing, the agency did not assert that
appellant was not an individual with a disability or that no reasonable
accommodation was available; rather, it asserted that she had not been
subjected to disparate treatment based on her disability. Accordingly,
after a careful review of the record, the Commission finds it adequate
to establish that, at the least, by the time the relevant agency
officials determined not to renew her TE appointment in October 1994,
they regarded appellant as an individual with a record of an impairment
which substantially limited a major life activity. In this regard, the
Commission notes that the material relied on by the agency in asserting
that appellant's impairments were anticipated to be transient in nature
were generated shortly after the accident occurred in November 1993,
whereas the record establishes that the impairments continued to exist
through the expiration of appellant's appointment in October 1994.
Similarly, the Commission is unpersuaded by the agency's contentions
in its FAD that the Return-to-Writer position occupied by appellant may
not have been an authorized position or, if it was, that there may not
have been a sufficient volume of work for such a position to justify the
appointment of a TE; and that in either case, it may have posed an undue
hardship upon the agency to reappoint appellant to a TE position. Again,
the agency chose to refute appellant's complaint by contending that she
had not been subjected to disparate treatment because of a disability as
defined by the Commission's Regulations; the agency made no claim that
appellant required any accommodation, let alone an accommodation which
would have imposed an undue hardship on it. It is the employer's burden
to establish that it is unable to accommodate a qualified individual
with a disability because the required accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of its programs. Because the agency
failed to raise these post-hearing assertions earlier, its assertions
regarding accommodation are unsupported by testimony or evidence and
are speculative in nature; they must, therefore, fail.
In applying the analytical framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), and Prewitt, supra, to appellant's claim that she
was subjected to disparate treatment when the agency failed to reappoint
her to a TE position, we find that AJ properly determined that appellant
established that she was subjected to discrimination based on disability.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission is unpersuaded by the
agency's criticisms of the RD. The Commission notes that the AJ heard
testimony from appellant, the Branch Manager and nine other witnesses,
including four supervisors. The testimony of the other witnesses was
found not to support the Branch Manager's assertion that appellant's
performance was defective. The Commission discerns no reason to
disturb the AJ's finding that appellant established that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons articulated for not reappointing her to a third
term as a TE were unworthy of credence and a pretext for discrimination.
In determining the relief to which appellant is entitled, the Commission
notes that it finds unpersuasive the claims set forth in the appeal brief.
Appellant's complaint challenged the agency's refusal to appoint her
to a third TE position and, at the hearing, she testified that her
neurologist deemed her currently incapable of performing any position
with the agency. The brief fails to establish her entitlement to the
relief now sought, which includes placement not in a TE position, but
in a full time permanent limited duty position. The Commission also
agrees with the AJ that appellant's evidence and testimony regarding
claimed emotional distress was inadequate to establish her entitlement
to compensatory damages.
After a thorough review of the record and the arguments on appeal
(including argument and evidence not specifically addressed herein), it is
the decision of the Commission to REVERSE the FAD insofar as it found that
appellant failed to establish discrimination on the basis of reprisal.
Accordingly, in order to remedy appellant for the discriminatory conduct,
the agency is directed to comply with the following ORDER.
ORDER (D1092)
The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions:
(1) The agency shall determine the appropriate amount of back pay
and other benefits due appellant, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. �1614.501,
no later than sixty (60) calendar days after the date this decision
becomes final. Appellant shall receive back pay through either
the date she became unable to perform any position with the agency,
with or without reasonable accommodation, or through the scheduled
date of expiration of a third casual appointment. Appellant shall
cooperate in the agency's efforts to compute the amount of back pay and
benefits due, and shall provide all relevant information requested by
the agency. If there is a dispute regarding the exact amount of back
pay and/or benefits, the agency shall issue a check to appellant for
the undisputed amount within sixty (60) calendar days of the date the
agency determines the amount it believes to be due. Appellant may
petition for enforcement or clarification of the amount in dispute.
The petition for clarification or enforcement must be filed with the
Compliance Officer, at the address referenced in the statement entitled
"Implementation of the Commission's Decision."
(2) The agency shall remove from appellant's personnel file the
evaluation issued on October 7, 1994, and substitute therefore an
evaluation which reflects that appellant performed all factors in a
satisfactory manner.
(3) The agency shall conduct training for its supervisory personnel
at the Sprayberry, Georgia, Post Office, regarding their obligations
under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29
U.S.C. �791 et seq.
(3) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's
Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying
that the foregoing corrective actions have been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G1092)
The agency is ORDERED to post at the Sprayberry, Georgia, Post Office,
facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after
being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall
be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date
this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60)
consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall take
reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be
submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph
entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within ten (10)
calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)
If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by
29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid
by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees
to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to
the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's
order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of
the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right
to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's
order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.
See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,
the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying
complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File
A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for
enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to
the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the
appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the
complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.
See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS-ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request
containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you
have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you
receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some
jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner
suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your
civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN
THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision
or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the
jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,
you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR
DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your
appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME
AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY
HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME
AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.
Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of
your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
May 3, 1999
________________ ___________________________
DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director
Office of Federal Operations
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
An Agency of the United States Government
This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, dated , which
found that a violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq. has occurred at this facility.
Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any
employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE,
COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE or PHYSICAL OR MENTAL
DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,
or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
The United States Postal Service, Sprayberry Post Office, Sprayberry,
Georgia, (hereinafter, the facility), supports and will comply with
such Federal law and will not take action against individuals because
they have exercised their rights under law.
The facility was found to have violated the Rehabilitation Act when it
failed to renew an appointment for a Transitional Employee. The facility
was ordered to award the individual back pay and associated benefits;
to remove negative information from the individual's personnel file;
to conduct training; and to pay the individual reasonable attorney's
fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.
The facility will not in any manner restrain, interfere, coerce, or
retaliate against any individual who exercises his or her right to
oppose practices made unlawful by, or who participates in proceedings
pursuant to, Federal equal employment opportunity law.
___________________________
Postmaster
Sprayberry, Georgia
Date Posted: _____________________
Posting Expires: _________________
29 C.F.R. Part 1614
1 Hearing Transcript at 26.
2While the brief seeks punitive damages in the amount of $300,000,
we advise counsel that Section 102(a)(3) of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 specifically disallows such damages against a government entity.
Therefore, punitive damages are not available against the agency.