Bradley, Bruce

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Nov 4, 2019

14469407 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/469,407 08/26/2014 Bruce Bradley 1301-045U 8786
112025 7590 11/04/2019
Shutts & Bowen LLP
Steven M. Greenberg, Esq.
525 Okeechobee Blvd
# 1100
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
EXAMINER
KARMIS, ALISSA D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/04/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
patents@shutts.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte BRUCE BRADLEY
____________

Appeal 2019-000324
Application 14/469,407
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before DAVID M. KOHUT, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and
JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges.

BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21.2 Claims 2,
9, and 16 are canceled. Appeal Br. 23, 25, and 27 (Claims Appendix).
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We reference, herein, the Final Action mailed November 3, 2017
(“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief filed April 16, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the
Examiner’s Answer mailed August 10, 2018 (“Ans.”); the Reply Brief filed
October 10, 2018 (“Reply Br.”); and the Specification filed
August 26, 2014 (“Spec.”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to reference the “applicant” as defined by
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies SugarCRM Inc. as the real party in
interest. Appeal Br. 2.
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We AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
THE INVENTION
Appellant’s invention “relates to CRM [(customer relationship
management)] event processing and more particularly to [a] meeting follow
up in a CRM application.” Spec. ¶ 2. The invention addresses the following
problem:
Elemental to any CRM system is a calendaring and scheduling
(C&S) component in which meetings and tasks can be
scheduled[.] [I]n a CRM system[,] the C&S component
integrates other CRM objects including particular business
opportunities, particular contacts, and particular end users of the
CRM system. As such, scheduling a meeting in the C&S
component of a CRM system often requires the [S]pecification
[of an] opportunity, [an] individual associated [there]with[],
and [an] end user of the CRM system.
The passage of time between the meeting and the act of
following up, though, can result in the end user neglecting to
record important changes to the relevant objects of the CRM
system, or [neglecting] the follow up process in its entirety.
Id. ¶¶ 4–6.3
In view of the above problem, “the present invention . . . provide[s]
. . . for NLP [(natural language processing)] follow up to a meeting in a C&S
component of a CRM system.” Id. ¶ 7. Appellant’s Figure 3 illustrates the
only disclosed process flow for the “follow up.” Id. ¶ 14. The process
retrieves a scheduled meeting’s “follow up” document (steps 310–20), calls

3 The Specification numbers the paragraphs of its first page (Spec. 1) by the
improper sequence of 1, 2, 3, 1, and 4. We accordingly reference the
foregoing emphasized paragraphs 3 and (then) 1 as a single paragraph 3.
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the system’s pertinent end user if the document has not been “processed”
(e.g., completed with follow up information) a threshold duration after the
meeting (steps 340–60, 440), and then either (i) allows the user, if
connecting (i.e., answered call), to process the document via NLP such as
speech recognition (steps 370, 400–20) or (ii) messages the user, if not
connecting, with a reminder to complete the document (steps 370–90, 420).
See also id. ¶¶ 21–24.
ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM
Claim 1 is reproduced, below, with emphasis on “additional elements”
(explained infra).
1. A method for natural language processing (NLP) follow
up to a meeting in a calendaring and scheduling (C&S)
component of a customer relationship management (CRM)
system, the method comprising:
storing different objects in the CRM system executing in
memory of host computing system including different CRM
objects comprising business opportunity objects, contact objects
and end user records, the business opportunity objects including
data pertaining to potential customers, the contact records
including data pertaining to individuals affiliated with the
potential customers, and the end user objects pertaining to end
users of the CRM application;
scheduling a meeting from an end user in a C&S component of
the CRM system;
associating the scheduled meeting with at least one of the CRM
objects;
loading a document of the end user and extracting a context for
the document;
matching the context to the scheduled meeting and performing
NLP on at least a portion of the document to produce data
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pertaining to at least one of the CRM objects in the CRM
system associated with the scheduled meeting;
updating the CRM object to which the produced data pertains
with the produced data;
determining that a threshold period of time has elapsed since a
scheduled time for the meeting; and,
prompting the end user to produce the document if the end user
had not yet updated at least one CRM object in the CRM
system associated with the scheduled meeting.
Appeal Br. 22–23 (Claims Appendix).
REJECTIONS4
Claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Ans. 3; Final Act. 3–8.
Claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as obvious over Kim (US 2011/0076994 A1; pub. March 31, 2011), Rollag
(US 9,454,543 B1; iss. Sept. 27, 2016), and Anderson

4 These rejections are those summarized by the Answer (Ans. 3) and differ
from the rejections delineated by the Final Action as follows: claims 1–21
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Final Act. 3–8); claims 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17,
and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Kim and Rollag (id. at 9–12);
and claims 2, 5–7, 9, 12–14, 16, and 19–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
obvious over Kim, Rollag, and Anderson (id. at 12–16). The Answer’s
summary of the rejections reflects Appellant’s Amendment filed January 3,
2018 (after the Final Action) and entered by the Examiner on February 7,
2018. The Amendment ‘rolls’ (i.e., cuts and pastes) canceled dependent
claims into respective independent claims as follows: claim 2 into claim 1;
claim 9 into claim 8; and claim 16 into claim 15. These changes result in all
claims being rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Kim, Rollag,
and Anderson, such that the findings for now-canceled claims 2, 9, and 16
are respectively added to the rejections for independent claims 1, 8, and 15.
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(US 2004/0267585 A1; pub. Dec. 30, 2004). Ans. 3; see also
Final Act. Act. 8–16 (see supra n. 4).
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
arguments. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments
Appellant actually raised in the Briefs, and are not persuaded of error for the
reasons below. Any other arguments Appellant could have made but chose
not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Principles of Law
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S
208, 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice,
573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent-ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978));
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and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
Concepts determined to be patent-eligible include physical and chemical
processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth,
vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n. 7 (quoting Corning v.
Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson,
409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176, and 191 (“We view
respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, []and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure
or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”), 191 (citing Benson
and Flook),
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A
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claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
PTO Guidance
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019)
(“Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether
the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed.,
Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52, 54–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial
exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, we conclude the claim is directed to a judicial exception
(id. at 54) and then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations
beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood,
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routine, conventional” activity in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
Step 1:5 Does the Claim Recite a Statutory Category?
Claim 1 is representative for this rejection. Appeal Br. 6–16; see also
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (representative claims). There is no dispute
that claim 1 falls within a category of patentable subject matter. See
35 U.S.C. § 101 (“[P]rocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.”). We accordingly turn to the “Step 2” issues raised by the Guidance
and Appellant’s arguments.6

5 The Guidance’s “Step 1” is a “determin[ation of] whether a claim satisfies
. . . the criteria discussed in MPEP 2106, i.e., whether the claim is to a
statutory category.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 53. The Guidance does not
address this step in detail.
6 The Guidance separates the above-enumerated issues (1) to (4) (see
supra 8–9) into Steps 2A(1), 2A(2), and 2B, as follows:
[T]he revised procedure . . . focuses on two aspects [of whether
a claim is “directed to” a judicial exception under the first
step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2A)]: (1) [w]hether
the claim recites a judicial exception; and (2) whether a recited
judicial exception is integrated into a practical application.
[W]hen a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate
the exception into a practical application,[] further analysis
pursuant to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO
Step 2B) . . . is needed . . . in accordance with existing USPTO
guidance as modified in April 2018.[footnote omitted]
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Step 2A, Prong One: Does the Claim Recite
Any Judicial Exceptions?
Turning to the first issue set forth by the Guidance (see supra 7,
bullet ”(1)”), we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites judicial
exceptions. Specifically, we agree claim 1 recites the following activities of
judicial exceptions: “receiving a document, recognizing context of the
document, matching context with a meeting,[] extracting information from
the document associated with the meeting[,] and then performing an update
based on the information.” Final Act. 3, 4 (Citing the claimed “associating a
scheduled meeting with at least one of the objects; loading a document of the
end user and extracting a context for the document; matching the context to
the scheduled meeting[;] performing [processing] on at least a portion of the
document to produce data [; and] updating the [CRM] object.”).
We add that each of the un-emphasized features of reproduced claim 1
(supra 3–4) falls within at least one of the Guidance’s following categories
of judicial exceptions:7 “(b) Certain methods of organizing human

84 Fed. Reg. 51 (referencing, via the omitted footnote, “USPTO
Memorandum of April 19, 2018, ‘Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)’ (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF [‘USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum’].”).
7 The Examiner alleges a judicial exception not recognized by the Guidance.
Namely, the Examiner alleges an exception of: “collecting, analyzing and
recognizing certain information including data recognition and providing
information based on the analysis.” Final Act. 4. Pursuant to USPTO
policy, we do not uphold this determination. See Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 51
(“All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management,
expected to follow the guidance.”). Nor do we, however, find this
identification of a judicial exception erred as a matter of law. See
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activity—[] commercial . . . interactions (including . . . sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior . . . (including
. . . following rules or instructions);[] and (c) Mental processes—concepts
performed in the human mind[].” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52. We find so in
view of the claim itself, Appellant’s above-quoted descriptions of the
invention (supra 2), and Appellant’s Figure 3 (supra 3) that provides the
invention’s only process flow.
We further add that the un-emphasized features of reproduced claim 1
encompass longstanding business practices (e.g., performed via telephone
and pen-and-paper) for a meeting “follow up.” For example, the claimed
“follow up to a meeting in a calendaring and scheduling (C&S) component
of a customer relationship management (CRM) system” (preamble) reads on
a sales planner (e.g., salesperson’s assistant or manager) using telephone
calls with salespeople and “pen-and-paper” activities to record results of
sales meetings and accordingly update CRM information (e.g., to record a
client’s interests and preferences). The claimed “CRM objects comprising
business opportunity objects, contact objects and end user records,” as well
as their descriptions (e.g., “the business opportunity objects including”), read
on the sales planner categorizing (i.e., binning) the above results by
salesperson, client, and/or products of interest. The claimed “scheduling a
meeting from an end user in a C&S component of the CRM system”
and “associating the scheduled meeting with at least one of the CRM
objects” read on the sales planner associating a scheduled sales meeting with

id. (“Rejections will continue to be based upon the substantive law[.]”).
Instead, and because the Guidance was issued after submission of the appeal
papers, we apply the Guidance to facilitate prosecution.
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one of the above categories (e.g., with the salesperson). The claimed
“extracting a context for [a] document [of the end user,] matching the
context to the scheduled meeting . . . to produce data pertaining to . . . one of
the [associated] CRM objects[, and] updating the CRM object . . . with the
produced data” reads on the salesperson updating the records for the
prospective client of the sales meeting. The claimed “determining that a
threshold period of time has elapsed since a scheduled time for the meeting
[and] prompting the end user to produce the document if the end user had
not yet updated [the] CRM object” reads on the sales planner reminding the
salesperson to update the above records after a sales meeting (if the
salesperson has not already).
For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 recites judicial exceptions.
Step 2A, Prong Two: Are the Recited Judicial Exceptions
Integrated Into a Practical Application?
Turning to the second issue set forth by the Guidance (see supra 8,
bullet “(2)”), we agree with the Examiner that the recited judicial exceptions
are not integrated into a practical application. See Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 53 (Describing a “practical application” as a “meaningful limit
on the [recited judicial exceptions], such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [exceptions].”). Specifically, we
agree the claimed additional elements—i.e., un-emphasized features of
reproduced claim 1 (supra 3–4)—are “computer elements (e.g., C&S
component, CRM system, host computer system) . . . recited at a high level
of generality and generally link[ing the claimed invention] to a particular
technological environment[,] which is not a meaningful limitation.”
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Final Act. 6. We also agree the additional elements lack description
inasmuch:
[The claimed] natural language processing (NLP) on a portion
of a document to produce data is recited at a high level with no
specifics for performing NLP a special way or with new
technology[,] but rather conveys that the well-known
conventional use of NLP . . . is being relied upon. This
demonstrates the notion of claiming the idea of a solution or
outcome (i.e., perform NLP and identify data) rather than
claiming a specific way. . . . Further, the updating step after the
NLP step does not indicate what about or how the object is
being updated[.] [Also,] generality of updating using a module
does not demonstrate the “particular way” [of] an improvement
to computer related technology[.]
Ans. 4–5.
We add that the additional elements are not analogous to the
Guidance’s “exemplary considerations . . . indicative that an additional
element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into
a practical application.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55. For example, despite
an alleged “NLP” follow up for CRM (Spec., title of invention), the
additional elements do not include a technological solution to a NLP
problem or even a particular NLP process. Id. (“exemplary considerations”
include “improvement to . . . technology” and “transformation . . . of a
particular article”). Thus, the additional elements “generally link[] the use
of the judicial exception[s] to a particular technological environment”
(id.)—namely to a nondescript computer network (for merely downloading a
document from an object-oriented database) and nondescript NLP (for
merely producing data).
For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 is directed to the recited judicial
exceptions—not to a practical application thereof.
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Step 2B: Does the Claim Recite Anything That Is
Beyond the Recited Judicial Exceptions and Not a Well-Understood,
Routine, Conventional Activity?
Turning to the third and fourth issues set forth by the Guidance
(see supra 7–8, bullets “(3)” and ”(4)”), we agree with the Examiner that
claim 1 does not recite a feature beyond either a judicial exception or
“well-understood, routine, conventional” (hereinafter “conventional”)
activity. 84 Fed. Reg. 56. Specifically, we agree the claimed “customer
relationship management system executing in memory of host computing
system and performing natural language processing (NLP) on a document
are considered well-known, routine and conventional functions.”
Final Act. 5. We also agree the “published [S]pecification ([0032]) indicates
that the claim limitations require no more than a generic computer.” Id. at 6;
see also Spec. ¶¶ 25–32.
We add that the claimed additional elements—i.e., the emphasized
feature of reproduced claim 1 (supra 3–4)—constitute only object-oriented
database management (“different objects in the CRM system executing in
memory of host computing system”), downloading (“loading a document”),
and NLP (“method for natural language processing (NLP) follow up” by
“performing NLP on . . . the document”). These features are
judicially-recognized as generic technology inasmuch (at least): “the
recitation of a database structure slightly more detailed than a generic
database [(e.g., an object-oriented database)] does not save . . . claims at step
one” (BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287
(Fed. Cir. 2018)); using a network to receive and send information (e.g., to
download) “is not even arguably inventive” (BuySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc.,
765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); “limit[ing an] abstract idea of
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recognizing . . . information from . . . documents . . . to a particular
technological environment” (e.g., NLP) is not patent-eligible (Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass’n, 776
F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC
v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] conventional
business practice [is] screening of . . . electronic communications.”).
We further add that the additional elements comprise only the above
generic technology that performs the claimed operations with no
particularity. Thus, the claimed combination of additional elements
and judicial exceptions constitutes generic technology (a nondescript
database, download, and NLP) that merely applies the judicial exceptions.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55 (“[A]pply it” bullet corresponding to the
Guidance’s footnote 30.). That is, the claimed combination constitutes
“mere instructions to apply a judicial exception.” Id. at n. 30; see also
MPEP § 2106.05(f) (cited by the Guidance’s footnote 30 as instructive for
this issue).
For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 merely appends generic computer
technology to judicial exceptions.
Appellant’s Arguments
Appellant contends “claim 1 require[s] specific performance of [a]
combination of steps in a process” (Appeal Br. 10), “describe[s] a particular
solution to a problem or a particular way to achieve a desired outcome
defined by the claimed invention” (id. at 11), “expressly provides how the
concept of ‘NLP follow up to . . . a C&S component of a CRM system’ is
achieved” (id. at 14), and thereby compels a determination of
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patent-eligibility under McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Circ. 2016) (Appeal Br. 12).
We are unpersuaded. As explained in McRO, a claim reciting a
judicial exception is nonetheless patent-eligible if reciting a specific
mechanism that prevents preemption of the exception. See McRO,
837 F.3d at 1314. McRO particularly explains:
The preemption concern arises when the claims are not directed
to a specific invention and instead improperly monopolize the
basic tools of scientific and technological work. . . . A patent is
not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process because
such patents would prohibit all other persons from making the
same thing by any means whatsoever. A patent may issue for
the means or method of producing a certain result, or effect,
and not for the result or effect produced. We therefore look to
whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or
method that improves the relevant technology or are instead
directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea
and merely invoke generic processes and machinery.
Id. (citations omitted). Rather than implementing such a “specific” technical
solution, we find Appellant’s claimed invention merely invokes the
above-discussed generic technology. We also find it does not, for example,
prevent a monopoly on the following claimed activities falling within
judicial exceptions: processing CRM documents that identify business
opportunities, contacts, and users; scheduling a meeting; associating a
meeting with a document; extracting context from the document; matching
the context to a meeting; accordingly updating the document; and, if a
threshold duration elapses since the meeting, prompting a user to update the
document.
Appellant also contends claim 1 compels a finding of patent-eligibility
under Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
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and Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal Br. 12–13. Like McRO, these
decisions emphasize the need for a claimed mechanism that prevents
preemption of recited judicial exceptions. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339 (The
claims “recited . . . a specific type of data structure . . . confirm[ing] . . . the
§ 101 analysis has not been deceived by the ‘draftsman’s art.’”) (quoting
Alice, 573 U.S. at 226); Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352 (The claims ”do not
preempt . . . filtering content,” but rather “carve out a specific location for
the filtering system (a remote ISP server).”). As discussed, we find
Appellant’s claim 1 does not prevent preemption of the recited judicial
exceptions.
Referencing the Berkheimer Memorandum (see supra n. 6), Appellant
also contends the Examiner must present particular evidence (i.e., specified
by the Memorandum) that the claimed additional elements constitute “well-
understood, routine, conventional” technology. Appeal Br. 15–16;
Reply Br.3–5. We are unpersuaded for each of two reasons.
First, the Examiner addresses the Berkheimer Memorandum’s
requirements by citing Alice, Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709
(Fed. Cir. 2014), Appellant’s Specification, and the USPTO July 2015
Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (July 30, 2015), as support for finding the
claimed additional elements constitute conventional technology.8
Final Act. 6. Appellant does not dispute these citations.

8 The July 2015 Update is available at https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/iegjuly-2015-update.pdf. The Update presents
a list of computer functions that are judicially-recognized as conventional.
See also MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (presenting a substantially similar list of
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Second, the Berkheimer Memorandum specifies minimal evidence for
finding a claim feature constitutes a “well-understood, routine,
conventional” activity. See USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum 3 (“[A]n
additional element (or combination of elements) is not well-understood,
routine or conventional unless the examiner finds, and expressly supports a
rejection in writing with, one or more of the following.”). Because claim 1
recites “mere instructions to apply a judicial exception” (supra 15), the
rejection does not rest on whether the claimed technology was
“well-understood, routine, [and/or] conventional.” See USPTO Berkheimer
Memorandum, 1–2 (“Berkheimer informs the inquiry into
. . . well-understood, routine, conventional activity.”); see also Guidance
84 Fed. Reg. 55 n. 30 (“[See] MPEP 2106.05(f) for . . . mere instructions to
apply a judicial exception.”); MPEP 2106.05(f) (“[T]he well-understood,
routine, conventional consideration (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) . . . may assist
. . . a determination of . . . mere instructions to apply an exception.”)
(emphasis added).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3–8,
10–15, and 17–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
Claim 1 is representative for this rejection. Appeal Br. 16–21; see
also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (representative claims). Appellant contends

computer functions that are judicially-recognized as conventional; cited by
the Berkheimer Memorandum at, § III.A.2, as sufficient support for a
Step 2B finding).
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the applied prior art does not teach or suggest the following claim
limitations:
determining that a threshold period of time has elapsed since a
scheduled time for the meeting; and,
prompting the end user to produce the document if the end user
had not yet updated at least one CRM object in the CRM
system associated with the scheduled meeting.
Appeal Br. 17–18, and 23 (Claims Appendix). The dispositive issue is,
therefore, whether the combination of Kim, Rollag, and Anderson teaches or
suggests these disputed limitations. Id. at 20.
Appellant contends the disputed limitations distinguish over Anderson
because:
[A]lthough Anderson refers to sending a communication to the
requesting party to ask for missing critical information, this is
not what is claimed by Appellants. In comparison, Appellants
have claimed “prompting the end user to produce the document
if the end user had not yet updated at least one CRM object in
the CRM system associated with the scheduled meeting.”
Id. (emphasis omitted). Appellant further contends the disputed limitations
distinguish over the combination of Kim and Anderson because:
The combination of Kim and Anderson arguably may provide
support for the immediate prompting of an end user to input
missing critical meeting information in response to a user
inputting a new meeting into a user’s schedule that fails to
include critical meeting information requirements. . . .
Appellants’ claim elements are not merely in response to the
input of a new meeting, but rather require a proactive
determination by the application as to whether an end user
updated a specific set of CRM objects within a threshold period
of time after a meeting. Thus, the CRM objects associated with
the scheduled meeting must be monitored for changes in order
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to perform the proactive determination. Although Kim
mentions that an end user can update a CRM object, Kim
and Anderson fail to consider any monitoring of changes to
CRM objects associated with a meeting or a proactive
determination by the application as to whether an end user
updated a CRM object from the specific set of CRM objects
within a threshold period of time after a meeting.
Additionally, the combination of Kim and Anderson does not
disclose the producing of the document. Kim merely refers to
extracting scheduling information from a user’s
messages. However, Kim does not refer to the producing of the
document used to automatically update CRM objects matched
to the context of the scheduled meeting.
Reply Br.9–10 (emphasis added).
We are unpersuaded. The disputed limitations were ‘rolled’ from
claim 2 into claim 1. See supra n. 4. Having considered the Final Action’s
rejections for claim 1 and now-canceled claim 2, we agree with the
Examiner that the disputed limitations would have been obvious over the
combination of Kim, Rollag, and Anderson explained below. Final Act. 9–
10 (claim 1), 12–13 (claim 2).
The Examiner reads the claimed “CRM object” on Kim’s calendar
object for a meeting between an end user and contact (e.g., client). Id. at 9–
10 (citing Kim ¶¶ 64–71). The Examiner reads the claimed “document” on
Kim’s smartphone message from the end user to the contact; the message
stating the end user cannot attend the meeting and generating an update to
the calendar object (e.g., reschedules the meeting). Id.; see also Kim ¶ 66
(extracting of information from messages). The Examiner determines it
would have been obvious to prompt (e.g., remind) the end user to send a
rescheduling message soon after a missed meeting because: Rollag teaches
to quickly update clients (contacts) of events; and Anderson teaches to
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quickly update scheduling information. Final Act. 10–11 (citing Rollag
col. 1, ll. 15–55; col. 4, ll. 22–25), and 12–13 (citing Anderson ¶¶ 41, 53).
We find the above combination shows it would have been obvious to remind
Kim’s end user, soon after a missed meeting, to send a rescheduling message
that updates the contact and calendar object. Appellant dos not address the
above combination. Appellant rather contends that neither Kim nor
Anderson teaches a monitoring of CRM objects to determine whether one
has been updated within a threshold duration after a meeting. Even if
correct, this contention does not address the Examiner’s above reliance on
Kim, Rollag, and Anderson in combination.
For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3–8,
10–15, and 17–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claim(s) Rejected Statutory Basis Affirmed Reversed
1, 3–8, 10–15, 17–
21
§ 101 1, 3–8, 10–
15, 17–21

1, 3–8, 10–15, 17–
21
§ 103 Kim, Rollag,
Anderson
1, 3–8, 10–
15, 17–21

Overall Outcome 1, 3–8, 10–
15, 17–21

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DECISION
We affirm the rejections of claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED