Bradley, BruceDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardNov 4, 201914469407 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Nov. 4, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/469,407 08/26/2014 Bruce Bradley 1301-045U 8786 112025 7590 11/04/2019 Shutts & Bowen LLP Steven M. Greenberg, Esq. 525 Okeechobee Blvd # 1100 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 EXAMINER KARMIS, ALISSA D ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3683 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/04/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@crgolaw.com patents@shutts.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte BRUCE BRADLEY ____________ Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 Technology Center 3600 ____________ Before DAVID M. KOHUT, IRVIN E. BRANCH, and JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, Administrative Patent Judges. BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21.2 Claims 2, 9, and 16 are canceled. Appeal Br. 23, 25, and 27 (Claims Appendix). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 We reference, herein, the Final Action mailed November 3, 2017 (“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief filed April 16, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed August 10, 2018 (“Ans.”); the Reply Brief filed October 10, 2018 (“Reply Br.”); and the Specification filed August 26, 2014 (“Spec.”). 2 We use the word “Appellant” to reference the “applicant” as defined by 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies SugarCRM Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 2 We AFFIRM. STATEMENT OF THE CASE THE INVENTION Appellant’s invention “relates to CRM [(customer relationship management)] event processing and more particularly to [a] meeting follow up in a CRM application.” Spec. ¶ 2. The invention addresses the following problem: Elemental to any CRM system is a calendaring and scheduling (C&S) component in which meetings and tasks can be scheduled[.] [I]n a CRM system[,] the C&S component integrates other CRM objects including particular business opportunities, particular contacts, and particular end users of the CRM system. As such, scheduling a meeting in the C&S component of a CRM system often requires the [S]pecification [of an] opportunity, [an] individual associated [there]with[], and [an] end user of the CRM system. The passage of time between the meeting and the act of following up, though, can result in the end user neglecting to record important changes to the relevant objects of the CRM system, or [neglecting] the follow up process in its entirety. Id. ¶¶ 4–6.3 In view of the above problem, “the present invention . . . provide[s] . . . for NLP [(natural language processing)] follow up to a meeting in a C&S component of a CRM system.” Id. ¶ 7. Appellant’s Figure 3 illustrates the only disclosed process flow for the “follow up.” Id. ¶ 14. The process retrieves a scheduled meeting’s “follow up” document (steps 310–20), calls 3 The Specification numbers the paragraphs of its first page (Spec. 1) by the improper sequence of 1, 2, 3, 1, and 4. We accordingly reference the foregoing emphasized paragraphs 3 and (then) 1 as a single paragraph 3. Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 3 the system’s pertinent end user if the document has not been “processed” (e.g., completed with follow up information) a threshold duration after the meeting (steps 340–60, 440), and then either (i) allows the user, if connecting (i.e., answered call), to process the document via NLP such as speech recognition (steps 370, 400–20) or (ii) messages the user, if not connecting, with a reminder to complete the document (steps 370–90, 420). See also id. ¶¶ 21–24. ILLUSTRATIVE CLAIM Claim 1 is reproduced, below, with emphasis on “additional elements” (explained infra). 1. A method for natural language processing (NLP) follow up to a meeting in a calendaring and scheduling (C&S) component of a customer relationship management (CRM) system, the method comprising: storing different objects in the CRM system executing in memory of host computing system including different CRM objects comprising business opportunity objects, contact objects and end user records, the business opportunity objects including data pertaining to potential customers, the contact records including data pertaining to individuals affiliated with the potential customers, and the end user objects pertaining to end users of the CRM application; scheduling a meeting from an end user in a C&S component of the CRM system; associating the scheduled meeting with at least one of the CRM objects; loading a document of the end user and extracting a context for the document; matching the context to the scheduled meeting and performing NLP on at least a portion of the document to produce data Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 4 pertaining to at least one of the CRM objects in the CRM system associated with the scheduled meeting; updating the CRM object to which the produced data pertains with the produced data; determining that a threshold period of time has elapsed since a scheduled time for the meeting; and, prompting the end user to produce the document if the end user had not yet updated at least one CRM object in the CRM system associated with the scheduled meeting. Appeal Br. 22–23 (Claims Appendix). REJECTIONS4 Claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Ans. 3; Final Act. 3–8. Claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Kim (US 2011/0076994 A1; pub. March 31, 2011), Rollag (US 9,454,543 B1; iss. Sept. 27, 2016), and Anderson 4 These rejections are those summarized by the Answer (Ans. 3) and differ from the rejections delineated by the Final Action as follows: claims 1–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Final Act. 3–8); claims 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Kim and Rollag (id. at 9–12); and claims 2, 5–7, 9, 12–14, 16, and 19–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Kim, Rollag, and Anderson (id. at 12–16). The Answer’s summary of the rejections reflects Appellant’s Amendment filed January 3, 2018 (after the Final Action) and entered by the Examiner on February 7, 2018. The Amendment ‘rolls’ (i.e., cuts and pastes) canceled dependent claims into respective independent claims as follows: claim 2 into claim 1; claim 9 into claim 8; and claim 16 into claim 15. These changes result in all claims being rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over Kim, Rollag, and Anderson, such that the findings for now-canceled claims 2, 9, and 16 are respectively added to the rejections for independent claims 1, 8, and 15. Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 5 (US 2004/0267585 A1; pub. Dec. 30, 2004). Ans. 3; see also Final Act. Act. 8–16 (see supra n. 4). ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Briefs, and are not persuaded of error for the reasons below. Any other arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101 Principles of Law In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S 208, 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent-ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 6 and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent-eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n. 7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176, and 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, []and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”), 191 (citing Benson and Flook), If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 7 claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. PTO Guidance The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017, Jan. 2018)). See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52, 54–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, we conclude the claim is directed to a judicial exception (id. at 54) and then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations beyond the judicial exception that are not “well-understood, Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 8 routine, conventional” activity in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56. Step 1:5 Does the Claim Recite a Statutory Category? Claim 1 is representative for this rejection. Appeal Br. 6–16; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (representative claims). There is no dispute that claim 1 falls within a category of patentable subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“[P]rocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”). We accordingly turn to the “Step 2” issues raised by the Guidance and Appellant’s arguments.6 5 The Guidance’s “Step 1” is a “determin[ation of] whether a claim satisfies . . . the criteria discussed in MPEP 2106, i.e., whether the claim is to a statutory category.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 53. The Guidance does not address this step in detail. 6 The Guidance separates the above-enumerated issues (1) to (4) (see supra 8–9) into Steps 2A(1), 2A(2), and 2B, as follows: [T]he revised procedure . . . focuses on two aspects [of whether a claim is “directed to” a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2A)]: (1) [w]hether the claim recites a judicial exception; and (2) whether a recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application. [W]hen a claim recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the exception into a practical application,[] further analysis pursuant to the second step of the Alice/Mayo test (USPTO Step 2B) . . . is needed . . . in accordance with existing USPTO guidance as modified in April 2018.[footnote omitted] Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 9 Step 2A, Prong One: Does the Claim Recite Any Judicial Exceptions? Turning to the first issue set forth by the Guidance (see supra 7, bullet ”(1)”), we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites judicial exceptions. Specifically, we agree claim 1 recites the following activities of judicial exceptions: “receiving a document, recognizing context of the document, matching context with a meeting,[] extracting information from the document associated with the meeting[,] and then performing an update based on the information.” Final Act. 3, 4 (Citing the claimed “associating a scheduled meeting with at least one of the objects; loading a document of the end user and extracting a context for the document; matching the context to the scheduled meeting[;] performing [processing] on at least a portion of the document to produce data [; and] updating the [CRM] object.”). We add that each of the un-emphasized features of reproduced claim 1 (supra 3–4) falls within at least one of the Guidance’s following categories of judicial exceptions:7 “(b) Certain methods of organizing human 84 Fed. Reg. 51 (referencing, via the omitted footnote, “USPTO Memorandum of April 19, 2018, ‘Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)’ (Apr. 19, 2018), available at https:// www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/memo-berkheimer- 20180419.PDF [‘USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum’].”). 7 The Examiner alleges a judicial exception not recognized by the Guidance. Namely, the Examiner alleges an exception of: “collecting, analyzing and recognizing certain information including data recognition and providing information based on the analysis.” Final Act. 4. Pursuant to USPTO policy, we do not uphold this determination. See Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 51 (“All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.”). Nor do we, however, find this identification of a judicial exception erred as a matter of law. See Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 10 activity—[] commercial . . . interactions (including . . . sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior . . . (including . . . following rules or instructions);[] and (c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind[].” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52. We find so in view of the claim itself, Appellant’s above-quoted descriptions of the invention (supra 2), and Appellant’s Figure 3 (supra 3) that provides the invention’s only process flow. We further add that the un-emphasized features of reproduced claim 1 encompass longstanding business practices (e.g., performed via telephone and pen-and-paper) for a meeting “follow up.” For example, the claimed “follow up to a meeting in a calendaring and scheduling (C&S) component of a customer relationship management (CRM) system” (preamble) reads on a sales planner (e.g., salesperson’s assistant or manager) using telephone calls with salespeople and “pen-and-paper” activities to record results of sales meetings and accordingly update CRM information (e.g., to record a client’s interests and preferences). The claimed “CRM objects comprising business opportunity objects, contact objects and end user records,” as well as their descriptions (e.g., “the business opportunity objects including”), read on the sales planner categorizing (i.e., binning) the above results by salesperson, client, and/or products of interest. The claimed “scheduling a meeting from an end user in a C&S component of the CRM system” and “associating the scheduled meeting with at least one of the CRM objects” read on the sales planner associating a scheduled sales meeting with id. (“Rejections will continue to be based upon the substantive law[.]”). Instead, and because the Guidance was issued after submission of the appeal papers, we apply the Guidance to facilitate prosecution. Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 11 one of the above categories (e.g., with the salesperson). The claimed “extracting a context for [a] document [of the end user,] matching the context to the scheduled meeting . . . to produce data pertaining to . . . one of the [associated] CRM objects[, and] updating the CRM object . . . with the produced data” reads on the salesperson updating the records for the prospective client of the sales meeting. The claimed “determining that a threshold period of time has elapsed since a scheduled time for the meeting [and] prompting the end user to produce the document if the end user had not yet updated [the] CRM object” reads on the sales planner reminding the salesperson to update the above records after a sales meeting (if the salesperson has not already). For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 recites judicial exceptions. Step 2A, Prong Two: Are the Recited Judicial Exceptions Integrated Into a Practical Application? Turning to the second issue set forth by the Guidance (see supra 8, bullet “(2)”), we agree with the Examiner that the recited judicial exceptions are not integrated into a practical application. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 53 (Describing a “practical application” as a “meaningful limit on the [recited judicial exceptions], such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [exceptions].”). Specifically, we agree the claimed additional elements—i.e., un-emphasized features of reproduced claim 1 (supra 3–4)—are “computer elements (e.g., C&S component, CRM system, host computer system) . . . recited at a high level of generality and generally link[ing the claimed invention] to a particular technological environment[,] which is not a meaningful limitation.” Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 12 Final Act. 6. We also agree the additional elements lack description inasmuch: [The claimed] natural language processing (NLP) on a portion of a document to produce data is recited at a high level with no specifics for performing NLP a special way or with new technology[,] but rather conveys that the well-known conventional use of NLP . . . is being relied upon. This demonstrates the notion of claiming the idea of a solution or outcome (i.e., perform NLP and identify data) rather than claiming a specific way. . . . Further, the updating step after the NLP step does not indicate what about or how the object is being updated[.] [Also,] generality of updating using a module does not demonstrate the “particular way” [of] an improvement to computer related technology[.] Ans. 4–5. We add that the additional elements are not analogous to the Guidance’s “exemplary considerations . . . indicative that an additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into a practical application.” Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55. For example, despite an alleged “NLP” follow up for CRM (Spec., title of invention), the additional elements do not include a technological solution to a NLP problem or even a particular NLP process. Id. (“exemplary considerations” include “improvement to . . . technology” and “transformation . . . of a particular article”). Thus, the additional elements “generally link[] the use of the judicial exception[s] to a particular technological environment” (id.)—namely to a nondescript computer network (for merely downloading a document from an object-oriented database) and nondescript NLP (for merely producing data). For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 is directed to the recited judicial exceptions—not to a practical application thereof. Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 13 Step 2B: Does the Claim Recite Anything That Is Beyond the Recited Judicial Exceptions and Not a Well-Understood, Routine, Conventional Activity? Turning to the third and fourth issues set forth by the Guidance (see supra 7–8, bullets “(3)” and ”(4)”), we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not recite a feature beyond either a judicial exception or “well-understood, routine, conventional” (hereinafter “conventional”) activity. 84 Fed. Reg. 56. Specifically, we agree the claimed “customer relationship management system executing in memory of host computing system and performing natural language processing (NLP) on a document are considered well-known, routine and conventional functions.” Final Act. 5. We also agree the “published [S]pecification ([0032]) indicates that the claim limitations require no more than a generic computer.” Id. at 6; see also Spec. ¶¶ 25–32. We add that the claimed additional elements—i.e., the emphasized feature of reproduced claim 1 (supra 3–4)—constitute only object-oriented database management (“different objects in the CRM system executing in memory of host computing system”), downloading (“loading a document”), and NLP (“method for natural language processing (NLP) follow up” by “performing NLP on . . . the document”). These features are judicially-recognized as generic technology inasmuch (at least): “the recitation of a database structure slightly more detailed than a generic database [(e.g., an object-oriented database)] does not save . . . claims at step one” (BSG Tech LLC v. Buyseasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018)); using a network to receive and send information (e.g., to download) “is not even arguably inventive” (BuySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); “limit[ing an] abstract idea of Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 14 recognizing . . . information from . . . documents . . . to a particular technological environment” (e.g., NLP) is not patent-eligible (Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, National Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). See also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] conventional business practice [is] screening of . . . electronic communications.”). We further add that the additional elements comprise only the above generic technology that performs the claimed operations with no particularity. Thus, the claimed combination of additional elements and judicial exceptions constitutes generic technology (a nondescript database, download, and NLP) that merely applies the judicial exceptions. See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55 (“[A]pply it” bullet corresponding to the Guidance’s footnote 30.). That is, the claimed combination constitutes “mere instructions to apply a judicial exception.” Id. at n. 30; see also MPEP § 2106.05(f) (cited by the Guidance’s footnote 30 as instructive for this issue). For the foregoing reasons, claim 1 merely appends generic computer technology to judicial exceptions. Appellant’s Arguments Appellant contends “claim 1 require[s] specific performance of [a] combination of steps in a process” (Appeal Br. 10), “describe[s] a particular solution to a problem or a particular way to achieve a desired outcome defined by the claimed invention” (id. at 11), “expressly provides how the concept of ‘NLP follow up to . . . a C&S component of a CRM system’ is achieved” (id. at 14), and thereby compels a determination of Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 15 patent-eligibility under McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Circ. 2016) (Appeal Br. 12). We are unpersuaded. As explained in McRO, a claim reciting a judicial exception is nonetheless patent-eligible if reciting a specific mechanism that prevents preemption of the exception. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. McRO particularly explains: The preemption concern arises when the claims are not directed to a specific invention and instead improperly monopolize the basic tools of scientific and technological work. . . . A patent is not good for an effect, or the result of a certain process because such patents would prohibit all other persons from making the same thing by any means whatsoever. A patent may issue for the means or method of producing a certain result, or effect, and not for the result or effect produced. We therefore look to whether the claims in these patents focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. Id. (citations omitted). Rather than implementing such a “specific” technical solution, we find Appellant’s claimed invention merely invokes the above-discussed generic technology. We also find it does not, for example, prevent a monopoly on the following claimed activities falling within judicial exceptions: processing CRM documents that identify business opportunities, contacts, and users; scheduling a meeting; associating a meeting with a document; extracting context from the document; matching the context to a meeting; accordingly updating the document; and, if a threshold duration elapses since the meeting, prompting a user to update the document. Appellant also contends claim 1 compels a finding of patent-eligibility under Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016) Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 16 and Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal Br. 12–13. Like McRO, these decisions emphasize the need for a claimed mechanism that prevents preemption of recited judicial exceptions. See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339 (The claims “recited . . . a specific type of data structure . . . confirm[ing] . . . the § 101 analysis has not been deceived by the ‘draftsman’s art.’”) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 226); Bascom, 827 F.3d at 1352 (The claims ”do not preempt . . . filtering content,” but rather “carve out a specific location for the filtering system (a remote ISP server).”). As discussed, we find Appellant’s claim 1 does not prevent preemption of the recited judicial exceptions. Referencing the Berkheimer Memorandum (see supra n. 6), Appellant also contends the Examiner must present particular evidence (i.e., specified by the Memorandum) that the claimed additional elements constitute “well- understood, routine, conventional” technology. Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br.3–5. We are unpersuaded for each of two reasons. First, the Examiner addresses the Berkheimer Memorandum’s requirements by citing Alice, Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Appellant’s Specification, and the USPTO July 2015 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (July 30, 2015), as support for finding the claimed additional elements constitute conventional technology.8 Final Act. 6. Appellant does not dispute these citations. 8 The July 2015 Update is available at https://www.uspto.gov/ sites/default/files/documents/iegjuly-2015-update.pdf. The Update presents a list of computer functions that are judicially-recognized as conventional. See also MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (presenting a substantially similar list of Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 17 Second, the Berkheimer Memorandum specifies minimal evidence for finding a claim feature constitutes a “well-understood, routine, conventional” activity. See USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum 3 (“[A]n additional element (or combination of elements) is not well-understood, routine or conventional unless the examiner finds, and expressly supports a rejection in writing with, one or more of the following.”). Because claim 1 recites “mere instructions to apply a judicial exception” (supra 15), the rejection does not rest on whether the claimed technology was “well-understood, routine, [and/or] conventional.” See USPTO Berkheimer Memorandum, 1–2 (“Berkheimer informs the inquiry into . . . well-understood, routine, conventional activity.”); see also Guidance 84 Fed. Reg. 55 n. 30 (“[See] MPEP 2106.05(f) for . . . mere instructions to apply a judicial exception.”); MPEP 2106.05(f) (“[T]he well-understood, routine, conventional consideration (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) . . . may assist . . . a determination of . . . mere instructions to apply an exception.”) (emphasis added). Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103 Claim 1 is representative for this rejection. Appeal Br. 16–21; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (representative claims). Appellant contends computer functions that are judicially-recognized as conventional; cited by the Berkheimer Memorandum at, § III.A.2, as sufficient support for a Step 2B finding). Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 18 the applied prior art does not teach or suggest the following claim limitations: determining that a threshold period of time has elapsed since a scheduled time for the meeting; and, prompting the end user to produce the document if the end user had not yet updated at least one CRM object in the CRM system associated with the scheduled meeting. Appeal Br. 17–18, and 23 (Claims Appendix). The dispositive issue is, therefore, whether the combination of Kim, Rollag, and Anderson teaches or suggests these disputed limitations. Id. at 20. Appellant contends the disputed limitations distinguish over Anderson because: [A]lthough Anderson refers to sending a communication to the requesting party to ask for missing critical information, this is not what is claimed by Appellants. In comparison, Appellants have claimed “prompting the end user to produce the document if the end user had not yet updated at least one CRM object in the CRM system associated with the scheduled meeting.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Appellant further contends the disputed limitations distinguish over the combination of Kim and Anderson because: The combination of Kim and Anderson arguably may provide support for the immediate prompting of an end user to input missing critical meeting information in response to a user inputting a new meeting into a user’s schedule that fails to include critical meeting information requirements. . . . Appellants’ claim elements are not merely in response to the input of a new meeting, but rather require a proactive determination by the application as to whether an end user updated a specific set of CRM objects within a threshold period of time after a meeting. Thus, the CRM objects associated with the scheduled meeting must be monitored for changes in order Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 19 to perform the proactive determination. Although Kim mentions that an end user can update a CRM object, Kim and Anderson fail to consider any monitoring of changes to CRM objects associated with a meeting or a proactive determination by the application as to whether an end user updated a CRM object from the specific set of CRM objects within a threshold period of time after a meeting. Additionally, the combination of Kim and Anderson does not disclose the producing of the document. Kim merely refers to extracting scheduling information from a user’s messages. However, Kim does not refer to the producing of the document used to automatically update CRM objects matched to the context of the scheduled meeting. Reply Br.9–10 (emphasis added). We are unpersuaded. The disputed limitations were ‘rolled’ from claim 2 into claim 1. See supra n. 4. Having considered the Final Action’s rejections for claim 1 and now-canceled claim 2, we agree with the Examiner that the disputed limitations would have been obvious over the combination of Kim, Rollag, and Anderson explained below. Final Act. 9– 10 (claim 1), 12–13 (claim 2). The Examiner reads the claimed “CRM object” on Kim’s calendar object for a meeting between an end user and contact (e.g., client). Id. at 9– 10 (citing Kim ¶¶ 64–71). The Examiner reads the claimed “document” on Kim’s smartphone message from the end user to the contact; the message stating the end user cannot attend the meeting and generating an update to the calendar object (e.g., reschedules the meeting). Id.; see also Kim ¶ 66 (extracting of information from messages). The Examiner determines it would have been obvious to prompt (e.g., remind) the end user to send a rescheduling message soon after a missed meeting because: Rollag teaches to quickly update clients (contacts) of events; and Anderson teaches to Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 20 quickly update scheduling information. Final Act. 10–11 (citing Rollag col. 1, ll. 15–55; col. 4, ll. 22–25), and 12–13 (citing Anderson ¶¶ 41, 53). We find the above combination shows it would have been obvious to remind Kim’s end user, soon after a missed meeting, to send a rescheduling message that updates the contact and calendar object. Appellant dos not address the above combination. Appellant rather contends that neither Kim nor Anderson teaches a monitoring of CRM objects to determine whether one has been updated within a threshold duration after a meeting. Even if correct, this contention does not address the Examiner’s above reliance on Kim, Rollag, and Anderson in combination. For the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. CONCLUSION In summary: Claim(s) Rejected Statutory Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3–8, 10–15, 17– 21 § 101 1, 3–8, 10– 15, 17–21 1, 3–8, 10–15, 17– 21 § 103 Kim, Rollag, Anderson 1, 3–8, 10– 15, 17–21 Overall Outcome 1, 3–8, 10– 15, 17–21 Appeal 2019-000324 Application 14/469,407 21 DECISION We affirm the rejections of claims 1, 3–8, 10–15, and 17–21. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation