Betty A. Thompson, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 6, 1998
01965932 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 6, 1998)

01965932

10-06-1998

Betty A. Thompson, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Betty A. Thompson v. United States Postal Service

01965932

October 06, 1998

Betty A. Thompson, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01965932

v. ) Agency Nos. 4-P-1112-92,

) 4-P-1134-92, 4-P-1370-93

William J. Henderson, ) Hearing Nos. 280-96-4005X,

Postmaster General, ) 4006X, 4007X

United States Postal Service, )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from the final decision of the agency concerning

her allegation that the agency violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of

1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �791 et seq.; and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �621 et seq. The appeal

is accepted by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of EEOC

Order No. 960.001.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented herein are whether the agency discriminated against

appellant based on physical disability (plantar strain fasciitis), age

(50), sex (female), and reprisal (prior EEO activity) when: (1) on May 16,

1992, she was not selected for the position of Confidential Secretary;

(2) between June and August 1992 she was isolated from other employees;

(3) she was denied work hours in November 1992; and (4) on December 4,

1992, she was issued a Letter of Warning.

BACKGROUND

During the period in question, appellant was employed as a Distribution

Clerk at the Liberty, Missouri, Post Office. Appellant filed three

formal complaints between August 1992 and March 1993 in which she raised

what have been identified as Issues 1 through 4. In addition, appellant

alleged that she was discriminated against when: (5) on May 29, 1992 the

police were called; and (6) on May 30, 1992, she was charged as having

been absent without leave on May 29, 1992.

Following an investigation of these complaints, appellant requested an EEO

administrative hearing and her case was assigned to an administrative

judge (AJ). Because appellant had filed a civil action which was

before a Federal magistrate, the AJ remanded the complaint to the agency

pending the issuance of the magistrate's decision. After the magistrate's

decision was issued, the agency issued a final decision dismissing Issues

1 through 6 under the doctrine of res judicata. Appellant appealed

that decision and we determined that Issues 5 and 6 had been properly

dismissed. Thompson v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01945441

(September 18, 1995). We also found, however, that the dismissal of

Issues 1 through 4 was improper and we remanded them for processing.

These issues were subsequently heard by the AJ in May 1996, and she

issued a recommended decision (RD) dated June 7, 1996.

Regarding Issue 1, the AJ initially found that appellant's supervisor

(the Responsible Official, RO) had committed a per se violation of the

Rehabilitation Act when he filled out appellant's supervisory evaluation

for the Confidential Secretary position (the Position). Specifically,

the RO wrote, "Due to [appellant's] work restrictions placed by Department

of Labor, she cannot be utilized in new assignments and responsibilities."

In finding that this was discriminatory, the AJ noted that the reference

had nothing to do with appellant's ability to perform the duties of

the Position, and that the statement merely constituted "an unnecessary

referral to her medical restrictions without any clear business necessity

or relationship to her performance." As relief, the AJ recommended that

the agency "cease and desist from making such references to the medical

work restrictions of [employees] on such evaluations."

Regarding the actual selection for the Position, the AJ found that,

even absent the RO's discriminatory statement, appellant would not

have been selected. Specifically, the AJ found appellant had not

demonstrated that she was as qualified for the Position as any of the

five individuals who were determined to be the best qualified. In so

finding, the AJ noted that all of these individuals, unlike appellant,

were serving in secretarial positions at the time of the selection. The

AJ also found that the panel members credibly testified that the RO's

discriminatory comment played no part in their deliberations.

With regard to Issue 2, the AJ found that appellant could not establish

a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the primary reason being

that she had not established that she was a "qualified individual with a

disability." The basis for this finding was the AJ's determination that,

because the magistrate had concluded that appellant was not a "qualified

individual with a disability," she was bound by that determination under

the doctrine of res judicata. For reasons that are not apparent, the AJ

did not address the other bases of discrimination raised by appellant.

Issue 3 involves appellant's allegation that she lost two hours of pay

after being misled by the RO regarding what time she should report for

work on November 16, 1992. The AJ found sufficient evidence to conclude

that the RO's actions were retaliatory, but noted that appellant had been

compensated for the two hours in question as a result of a grievance.

For that reason, and upon determining that appellant had presented no

evidence of other losses, the AJ found that appellant was not entitled

to further monetary damages.

Finally, the AJ found appellant had not established that she was

discriminated against with regard to Issue 4. In so finding, the AJ

examined the reasons why appellant was issued the letter of warning (LOW)

on December 4, 1992, i.e., for doing her nails on the clock and failing

to follow instructions, and found that they were credible. Conversely,

the AJ found that appellant's version of what occurred was not credible.

In a final decision (FAD) dated July 11, 1996, the agency adopted the RD

in its entirety. It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Issue 1

As discussed, although both the agency and the AJ found that the

RO had committed a per se violation of the Rehabilitation Act, they

also concluded that, even absent the RO's discriminatory statement,

appellant would not have been selected for the Position. We agree,

and find that the five applicants determined to be the best qualified

for the Position, including the selectee, were all better qualified

than appellant. Appellant does not, at this point, disagree with

that conclusion. She does argue, however, that she is entitled to an

award of compensatory damages. We disagree, and note that the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 (Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991))

provides that a complainant is not entitled to compensatory damages

in situations where, although an unlawful employment practice has been

established, the respondent demonstrates that it would have still taken

the challenged action in the absence of the unlawful practice. 42

U.S.C. �2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii). Because it is clear that appellant

would not have been selected for the Position even absent the RO's

discriminatory comment, we find that she is not entitled to compensatory

damages with regard to this issue.

Issues 2 and 4

In considering Issue 2, the Commission finds that, even assuming appellant

can demonstrate that she is a "qualified individual with a disability,"

the AJ properly concluded that she had not established disability

discrimination. Moreover, although the AJ did not address the other bases

raised by appellant, we find appellant has not established discrimination

under any of these bases. Specifically, although appellant alleged that

management isolated her from other employees by placing her in the middle

of the workroom floor, both the RO and the postmaster testified that, due

to the size of the facility and the number of employees who work there,

it was virtually impossible to isolate an employee from other employees.

Both individuals also testified that they had not intentionally attempted

to isolate appellant from other employees.

Appellant also objects to the AJ's finding of no discrimination

with regard to Issue 4, and directly challenges aspects of the AJ's

credibility findings. Having carefully reviewed the record, however,

we find that the AJ's credibility determinations are well-reasoned and

should not be disturbed. In this regard, we find that there is sufficient

evidence in the record to conclude that the version of events set forth

in support of the LOW are accurate.

Issue 3

Although the AJ found that appellant had established discrimination with

regard to this issue, she also found that, insofar as appellant had been

compensated for the two hours in question, there was no further relief

to which she was entitled. We disagree with this conclusion. First, it

is not apparent that appellant received an award of interest with regard

to the two hours. In this regard, because the alleged discriminatory

act occurred after November 21, 1991, appellant would be entitled to

interest on this award pursuant to Section 114 of the Civil Rights Act

of 1991. See Ramsey v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05940658

(July 27, 1995). Second, although the AJ was correct in finding that

appellant had presented no evidence of other losses related to this

issue, appellant had not requested compensatory damages at the time of

the hearing. Because appellant is now requesting compensatory damages,

and because a finding of discrimination has been made with regard to this

issue, we find that she should be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate

whether she is entitled to such damages. Accordingly, the agency shall

conduct a supplemental investigation which addresses that question.

CONCLUSION

It is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the FAD's finding of

discrimination with regard to Issues 1 and 3 and its finding of no

discrimination with regard to Issues 2 and 4; and to MODIFY the FAD's

award of relief with regard to Issue 3.

The agency is ORDERED to take the following actions:

1. The agency shall award appellant interest on the two hours of back

pay for the work she missed on November 16, 1992.

2. The agency shall conduct a supplemental investigation to determine

whether appellant is entitled to compensatory damages with regard to

the incident that occurred on November 16, 1992. The agency shall

afford appellant an opportunity to present evidence in support of her

compensatory damages claim.<1> Appellant shall cooperate with the agency

in this regard. Thereafter, the agency shall issue a final decision. 29

C.F.R. �1614.110. The supplemental investigation and issuance of the

final decision must be completed within sixty (60) calendar days of the

date this decision becomes final. A copy of the final decision must be

submitted to the Compliance Officer, as referenced below.

3. The agency shall cease and desist making improper references to

employees' medical restrictions on their supervisory evaluations.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at the Liberty, Missouri, Post Office,

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The

agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar

days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall

be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations,

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington,

D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting documentation,

and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the appellant. If

the agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the appellant

may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. �

1614.503(a). The appellant also has the right to file a civil action

to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following

an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408,

1614.409, and 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the appellant has the right to

file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the

paragraph below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. ��

1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action

on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42

U.S.C. � 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1993). If the appellant files a civil action,

the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition

for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.410.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29

C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by

the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of

this decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim

for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

this decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you

receive a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any

argument in opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to

reconsider MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request to

reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments must bear

proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (T0993)

This decision affirms the agency's final decision in part, but it also

requires the agency to continue its administrative processing of a

portion of your complaint. You have the right to file a civil action

in an appropriate United States District Court on both that portion

of your complaint which the Commission has affirmed AND that portion

of the complaint which has been remanded for continued administrative

processing. It is the position of the Commission that you have the right

to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court

WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this

decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions

have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting

that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS

from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY 30

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file

a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the

date you filed your complaint with the agency, or your appeal with the

Commission, until such time as the agency issues its final decision

on your complaint. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case

in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and

not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to

file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e

et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791,

794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion

of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

OCT 06, 1998

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 In order to assess the claim, the agency shall request from appellant

evidence of and testimony establishing any pecuniary and non-pecuniary

injury suffered and its link to the agency's retaliatory actions. See

Feris v. Environmental Protection Agency, EEOC Appeal No. 01934828

(August 10, 1995), request to reopen denied, EEOC Request No. 05950936

(July 19, 1996); Carle v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No.

01922369 (January 5, 1993); Rivera v. Department of the Navy, EEOC

Appeal No. 01934157 (July 22, 1994).