Berger, Richard et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 3, 2020

13228269 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 3, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/228,269 09/08/2011 Richard Berger 113748-060UT1 7141
103865 7590 01/03/2020
Procopio - SPE
525 B Street
Suite 2200
San Diego, CA 92101
EXAMINER
WINTER, JOHN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3685
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/03/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@procopio.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte RICHARD BERGER and JOHN CALKINS
____________________

Appeal 2018-007515
Application 13/228,269
Technology Center 3600
____________________

Before JENNIFER S. BISK, BARBARA A. BENOIT, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

BISK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant2 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–9 and 15–20. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 Throughout this Decision we have considered the Specification filed
September 8, 2011 (“Spec.”), the Final Rejection mailed April 21, 2017
(“Final Act.”), the Appeal Brief filed October 20, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”), and
the Examiner’s Answer mailed February 12, 2018 (“Ans.”). Appellant did
not file a Reply Brief.
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Sony
Corporation and Japan and Sony Pictures Technologies, Inc. Appeal Br. 3.
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We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to
consuming electronic media data in bites. Spec. 1. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method of accessing media data in bites, the method
comprising:
[(1a)] receiving at a media access controller a request
from a client to access a piece of media item within a
media item, and [(1b)] determining an address of the
media item, wherein the address indicates a location
where the media item is stored;
[(2)] determining an identification number of the piece of
media item within the media item requested by the client;
[(3)] updating the address by combining the address with the
identification number of the piece of the media item requested
by the client;
[(4)] valuating the piece of media item requested by the client,
and sending a valuated price to the client;
[(5)] receiving a payment from the client for the valuated price;
[(6)] retrieving the piece of media item using the updated
address; and
[(7)] sending the retrieved piece of media item to the client;
[(8)] wherein the media access controller valuates the
price of the requested piece of media item based on the
purchase activity of the client.
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App.).
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1–9 and 15–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4–5.
Claims 1–9 and 15–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over the combination of US 2009/0112749 A1, published
April 30, 2009 (“Monteverde”), US 2011/0071841 A1, published March 24,
2011 (“Fomenko”), and US 7,099,846 B1, issued Aug. 29, 2006
(“Ishibashi”). Final Act. 5–10.
ANALYSIS
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments
for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments and any evidence
presented. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for
emphasis in our analysis below.
Rejection of Claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that “any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof” is patent eligible. 35 U.S.C. § 101. But the
Supreme Court has long recognized an implicit exception to this section:
“‘Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.’” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)
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(quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S.
576, 589 (2013)). To determine whether a claim falls within one of these
excluded categories, the Court has set out a two-part framework. The
framework requires us first to consider whether the claim is “directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. If so, we then
examine “the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered
combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the
nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S.
at 217 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566
U.S. 66, 78, 79 (2012)). That is, we examine the claims for an “inventive
concept,” “an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration
in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The Patent Office issued guidance regarding this framework. See
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance,
to decide whether a claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we evaluate
whether the claim (1) recites subject matter falling within an abstract idea
grouping listed in the Revised Guidance and (2) fails to integrate the recited
abstract idea into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 51. If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, as noted above, we
then determine whether the claim recites an inventive concept. The Revised
Guidance explains that when making this determination, we should consider
whether the additional claim elements add “a specific limitation or
combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine,
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conventional activity in the field” or “simply append[] well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the Examiner’s § 101
rejection.
The Judicial Exception—Abstract Idea
The Examiner determines the claims are “directed to the abstract idea
of requesting and accessing media segments.” Final Act. 4; Ans. 2. For the
reasons explained below, we agree that the claims recite an abstract idea.
Limitations (4), (5), and (8) recite valuating a piece of media data
based on the purchase activity of a client and sending that price to the client.
This is a business or commercial practice that is not meaningfully different
from business and commercial practices that courts have determined are
abstract ideas. See, e.g., In re Salwan, 681 F. App’x 938, 941 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (billing insurance companies and organizing patient health
information); Audatex N. Am., Inc. v. Mitchell Int’l, Inc., 703 F. App’x 986,
989 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (providing an automobile insurance claim valuation
through the collection and use of vehicle information); Accenture, 728 F.3d
at 1344 (generating tasks to be performed in an insurance organization based
on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event); Bancorp Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (managing a stable value protected life insurance policy by
performing calculations and manipulating the results).
Accordingly, we conclude claim 1 recites a certain method of
organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance (i.e., a
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commercial interaction), and thus, an abstract idea.3 Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 52, 53 (listing “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity
. . . commercial or legal interactions” as one of the “enumerated groupings
of abstract ideas”).
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
If a claim recites a judicial exception, we determine whether the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that
exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements
recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating
those additional elements individually and in combination to determine
whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. If the
recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application, the claim
is not directed to the judicial exception.
According to the Revised Guidance, even if the claims recite
advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors, these claims are still
not “directed to” a judicial exception and, thus, are “patent-eligible” if “the

3 Our reviewing court recognizes that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be
described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does
not, “impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. Further, “[a]n abstract
idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction. . . . The
Board’s slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the
patentability analysis.” Id. Moreover, merely combining several abstract
ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC
v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one
abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim
non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d
1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were
directed to a combination of abstract ideas).
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claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical
application of that [judicial] exception.” Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at
53. “Integration into a practical application” requires an additional element
or a combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use
the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the
judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed
to monopolize the exception. Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53.
For example, limitations that are indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include:
1) Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other
technology or technical field - see MPEP § 2106.05(a);
2) Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine - see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
3) Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing - see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
4) Applying or using the judicial exception in some other meaningful
way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception - see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include:
1) Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer,
or merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea – see MPEP
§ 2106.05(f);
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2) Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial exception
- see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3) Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular
technological environment or field of use – see MPEP § 2106.05(h).
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
In addition to describing a method of valuating a piece of media data
based on the purchase activity of a client and sending that price to the client,
claim 1 recites limitations which focus on receiving a request for a piece of
media item (limitation (1a)), determining information about that item
(limitation (1b) and (2)), updating the retrieved information (limitation (3)),
receiving the piece of media item (limitation (6)), and sending the item to
the client (limitation (7)). We conclude that these limitations do not
integrate the recited judicial exception of commercial interactions into a
practical application. These additional elements are recited without
sufficient detail or specific implementation structure such that it limits the
abstract idea to a specific technical solution, such as a technical
improvement to the recited generic processing device, memory, and/or
network components. Moreover, these limitations simply recite insignificant
extra-solution activity to abstract idea. MPEP § 2106.05(g); Affinity Labs of
Texas, LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Claim 1 also recites the additional elements of “a media access
controller” and “a location where the media item is stored.” Considering
claim 1 as a whole, these additional elements do not apply or use the abstract
idea in a meaningful way such that the claim as a whole is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. The Supreme Court
guides that the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be
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circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment’ or [by] adding ‘insignificant postsolution
activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 191–92 (1981)).
The Specification describes both of these elements as generic
components. For example, the Specification states that a media access
controller includes, “a media access map,” “a processor,” “a combiner,” “a
valuator,” and “an access interface.” Spec. 2:19–3:11, 18:13–21:5. Each of
these components are, in turn, described as generic computer devices. Spec.
21:11–24:16 (stating “controller 410 is a programmable processor,” “the
user interface 450 includes a keyboard, a mouse, audio speakers, and a
display,” “computer system 400 includes additional hardware and software
typical of computer systems”). The Specification also discusses the use of
generic memory for storing media items. Id. at 22:1–9.
Appellant’s arguments have not persuaded us claim 1 is “directed to”
a patent-eligible concept. For example, Appellant argues that claim 1 is
similar to a claim discussed in Example 23 of the July 2015 Update to the
Interim Eligibility Guidance. Appeal Br. 6–9 (citing USPTO’s July 2015
Update Examples: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at https:
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-july-2015-app1.pdf
(“the 2015 Guidance Examples”). Specifically, Appellant argues that
“similar to eligible claim 1 of the Guidance, [claim 1 of this application]
relates to addressing the problem of having to download or transfer entire
media files that are large by providing for consuming media data in bites (or
smaller pieces) in a ‘pay-as-you-go’ scheme.” Id. at 9. According to
Appellant, this is “a particular way to consume media data in bites,” and,
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therefore, “does not recite a basic concept that is similar to any abstract idea
previously identified by the courts.” Id.
Example 23 of the 2015 Guidance describes claims for a “Graphical
User Interface for Relocating Obscured Textual Information.” 2015
Guidance Examples, 7. The analysis of claim 1 explains that claim 1 is not
directed to a judicial exception because it “recites dynamically relocating
textual information within a window displayed in a graphical user interface
based upon a detected overlap condition” and “is necessarily rooted in
computer technology to overcome a problem specifically arising in graphical
user interfaces.” Id. at 9. We are not persuaded that the claims at issue here
are analogous to claim 1 of Example 23 of the 2015 Guidance Examples.
Although Appellant asserts that the claims here “solve the problem of having
to download or transfer entire media files that are large,” Appellant does not
point to anything in the Specification indicating that this, or any other
technical problem, is the problem the invention is intended to solve. Nor do
we see any indication in the Specification that there is a technical problem or
solution described. Instead, the solution of “consuming media data in bites
(or smaller pieces) in a ‘pay-as-you-go’ scheme” appears to be a solution to
a business problem—creating an alternative method for collecting payment
for media data.
Appellant also argues that, like McRO, “the use of the specific steps of
consuming media data in bites improves distribution of media data over the
computer network.” Appeal Br. 10 (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). We do not agree with
Appellant’s analogy to McRO. The claims in McRO “focused on a specific
asserted improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic use of rules
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of a particular type.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1314. The rules were “limited”
and had “specific characteristics,” and the claims incorporated “the specific
features of the rules as claim limitations.” McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313, 1316.
Again, however, Appellant does not point to any indication in the
Specification that the claimed method of accessing media data in bites
makes any improvements in data distribution or any other technology.
Accordingly, even in combination with all the other recited elements,
the additional elements recited by claim 1 do not integrate the abstract idea
into a practical application. For these reasons, we determine that claim 1
does not integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application, and is
therefore, directed to an abstract idea under the Revised Guidance.
Inventive Concept
Because we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is “directed to” an
abstract idea, we consider whether an additional element (or combination of
elements) adds a limitation that is not well-understood, routine, conventional
(“WURC”) activity in the field or whether the additional elements simply
append WURC activities previously known to the industry, specified at a
high level of generality, to the judicial exception. Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 56. The Examiner’s finding that an additional element (or
combination of elements) is WURC activity must be supported with a
factual determination. Id. (citing MPEP § 2106.05(d), as modified by the
Berkheimer Memorandum4).

4 Robert W. Bahr, Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.) (2018) (hereinafter “Berkheimer Memorandum”).
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Whether the additional elements (“a network-based system,” “a user
device,” “a database,” “at least one hardware processor,” and “a graphical
user interface”) are WURC activity is a question of fact. See Berkheimer v.
HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Whether something is well-
understood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan . . . is a factual
determination.”).
On the record before us, Appellant has not shown that the claims on
appeal add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, and conventional” in the field, whether the
limitations are considered individually or as an ordered combination (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)). Appellant does not point to any particular claimed
element, or combination of elements, that does not qualify as WURC. See
Appeal Br. 6–11.
In fact, as explained by the Examiner (Final Act. 7) Appellant’s
Specification demonstrates the WURC nature of the claimed computer
components because it indicates they may be implemented with generic
devices. 21:11–24:16.
For these reasons, we conclude that claim 1, considered as a whole,
does not include an inventive concept and we sustain the Examiner’s § 101
rejection of independent claim 1. For the reasons discussed above, we also
sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of claims 2–9 and 15–20, which
Appellant does not argue separately. See Appeal Br. 6–11.
Rejection of Claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
The Examiner finds that claims 1–9 and 15–20 would have been
obvious over the combination of Monteverde, Fomenko, and Ishibashi.
Final Act. 5–10.
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Appellant argues that the prior art references cited by the Examiner do
not suggest limitations (1), (2), (3), or (8) of claim 1. Appeal Br. 11–15.
We discuss each of these disputed limitations below.
First, Appellant argues that paragraph 42 of Monteverde, relied upon
by the Examiner does not disclose limitation (1)—“receiving . . . a request
. . . to access a piece of media item within a media item, and determining an
address of the media item, wherein the address indicates a location where the
media item is stored.” Appeal Br. 12–13. According to Appellant,
paragraph 42 “is directed to allowing a licensee to view a media segment to
determine whether the licensee would like to insert an advertisement,” and
does not disclose limitation (1). Id. at 13.
In response, the Examiner explains that “Monteverde[’s] discussion of
a ‘media segment’ is a portion of a larger piece of content” and, therefore,
teaches a piece of a media item within a media item. Ans. 4–5. The
Examiner adds that “it is an intrinsic property of webpage pages that the
content is associated with a web address or URL that allows access to
content” and, therefore, teaches determining an address of the media item.
Id. Appellant does not address this explanation or explain why Monteverde
does not at least suggest limitation (1). See Appeal Br. 12–13. Appellant’s
argument, therefore, does not persuade us of reversible error in the rejection.
Second, Appellant argues that paragraph 99 of Fomenko, relied upon
by the Examiner, does not disclose limitations (2)—“determining an
identification number of the piece of media item within the media item
requested by the client”—and (3)—“ updating the address by combining the
address with the identification number of the piece of the media item
requested by the client.” Appeal Br. 13–14. According to Appellant,
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paragraph 99 “is directed to generating a purchase token in the form of an
XML file and uses the private key to sign the token,” but does not disclose
limitations (2) and (3). Id. at 14. In response, the Examiner points to
paragraphs 99 and 100 of Fomenko and explains that these paragraphs’
disclosure of “indicating part of the content item” “necessitate[s]
determining an ID associated with a piece of content, further the token of
Fomenko is a combination of an address and an identifier and thus teaches
the combining step as claimed.” Ans. 5. Appellant does not address this
explanation or explain why Fomenko does not at least suggest limitations (2)
and (3). See Appeal Br. 13–14. Appellant’s argument, therefore, does not
persuade us of reversible error in the rejection.
Third, Appellant argues that the portion of Ishibashi cited to by the
Examiner does not disclose limitation (8)—“wherein the media access
controller valuates the price of the requested piece of media item based on
the purchase activity of the client.” Appeal Br. 14–15. According to
Appellant, the Specification defines the term “purchase activity” to be
discounting remaining pieces of a media item when a user has already
obtained some of the pieces. Id. at 15. Appellant states that Ishibashi
discloses “discounting the price for those who purchase the same electronic
content repeatedly” and, therefore, does not teach or suggest limitation (8).
Id.
We do not agree that the Specification defines the term “purchase
activity” as something other than the plain and ordinary meaning. The
portion of the Specification referred to by Appellant clearly states that the
described discount is an example of purchase activity. Spec. 6:20–7:7. In
fact, directly following the quoted example, the Specification describes two
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other examples in which “if a user buys access to a first media item as a
whole, a piece of another media item may be offered at a discount or for
free” and “pieces of a media item can be offered at a discount or for free to
users participating in a subscription service or loyalty program.” Id. at 7:7–
13. Moreover, Appellant does not point to any other language in the
Specification, nor do we see any, that restricts the term “purchase activity”
to anything other than the plain meaning of the term.
Instead, we agree with the Examiner that “Ishibashi’s teaching of
providing a discount price based on a purchase history is sufficient in terms
of art to teach valuating the price of the requested piece of media item based
on the ‘purchase activity’ of the client.” Ans. 6. Appellant’s argument,
therefore, does not persuade us of reversible error in the rejection.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 as
obvious over the combination of Monteverde, Fomenko, and Ishibashi. We
also sustain the rejection of claims 3–5, 7–9, 15, and 17–20, which are not
argued separately (see Appeal Br. 17), as obvious over the combination of
Monteverde, Fomenko, and Ishibashi.
Appellant separately argues claims 2 and 16, asserting that paragraph
99 of Fomenko does not disclose “appending the identification number to
the end of the address” (the “appending limitation”). Appeal Br. 15. In
response, the Examiner explains that “the token of Fomenko is a
combination of an address and an identifier and thus teaches the appending
limitation.” Ans. 6. Appellant does not address this explanation or explain
why Fomenko does not at least suggest the appending limitation. See
Appeal Br. 15. Appellant’s argument, therefore, does not persuade us of
reversible error in the rejection. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s
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rejection of claims 2 and 16 as obvious over the combination of Monteverde,
Fomenko, and Ishibashi.
Appellant also separately argues claim 6, asserting that the “Office
Action cites to Fomenko, paragraphs [0112]-[0120],” which “do not teach,
suggest, or disclose” the limitations recited by claim 6. Appeal Br. 16–17.
In response, the Examiner explains that Ishibishi teaches claim 6’s
limitations. Ans. 6. Appellant does not address this explanation or explain
why Ishibishi does not at least suggest the limitations recited by claim 6.
See Appeal Br. 16–7. Appellant’s argument, therefore, does not persuade us
of reversible error in the rejection. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 6 as obvious over the combination of Monteverde,
Fomenko, and Ishibashi.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9 and 15–20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C. §
References/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–9, 15–20 101 1–9, 15–20
1–9, 15–20 103 Monteverde,
Fomenko, and
Ishibashi
1–9, 15–20
Overall
Outcome
1–9, 15–20

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED