Bartetzko, Anne et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 26, 202013347883 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/347,883 01/11/2012 Anne Bartetzko MLO4-52926-US 1173 87884 7590 03/26/2020 Mossman, Kumar and Tyler, PC P.O. Box 421239 Houston, TX 77242 EXAMINER PEREZ BERMUDEZ, YARITZA H ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2864 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/26/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket@mktlaw.com tthigpen@mktlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte ANNE BARTETZKO and STEPHAN DANKERS ____________ Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 Technology Center 2800 ____________ Before DONNA M. PRAISS, MICHELLE N. ANKENBRAND, and JEFFREY R. SNAY, Administrative Patent Judges. ANKENBRAND, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision finally rejecting claims 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, and 21–31.1,2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellant identifies Baker Hughes as the real party in interest. Supplemental Appeal Brief, filed August 13, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”) 3. 2 Final Action, mailed August 11, 2017 (“Final Act.”). Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE A. Background The subject matter on appeal relates to “borehole logging methods and apparatuses for estimating formation properties using logging data of an earth formation.” Specification, filed January 11, 2012 (“Spec.”) ¶ 1. According to the Specification, gamma ray logs are frequently used to identify and quantify shale because the logs provide a measure of the content of radioactive minerals in a formation, radioactive elements are usually concentrated in clay minerals, and clay minerals are the most important constituent of shale. Id. ¶ 4. However, gamma ray logs are not a quantitative measurement that can directly relate to formation properties such as shale content. Id. ¶ 5. The Specification states that simple statistics may be used to suggest shale versus sand over short depth intervals, but such an approach may not be effective where there are significant changes in gamma ray response (e.g., due to variations in shale composition, depositional environment, compaction, and drilling equipment) and may be limited for real-time applications. Id. ¶¶ 16–17. To remedy these problems, the Specification discloses “methods and apparatuses for estimating a parameter of interest of an earth formation using statistical analysis of logging data, particularly for locating shale layers and estimating shale index/volume.” Id. ¶ 6. This approach is “based on a frequency analysis that is carried out over overlapping depth intervals of defined and limited length.” Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Of the appealed claims, claims 1, 12, and 21 are independent. Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal, and reproduced below: Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 3 1. A method of estimating at least one parameter of interest of an earth formation, comprising: acquiring logging data comprising a plurality of measurements using at least one sensor in a borehole intersecting the earth formation; defining a plurality of overlapping depth intervals in the borehole; estimating, for at least each of a first depth interval of the plurality of overlapping depth intervals and a second depth interval of the plurality of overlapping depth intervals, at least two overlapping cut-off lines in an overlap between the first depth interval and the second depth interval comprising a shale line and a non-shale line using corresponding measurements by using statistical analysis; and estimating the at least one parameter of interest by using the logging data and the overlapping cut-off lines. Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App’x). B. The Rejection The Examiner maintains the following rejection on appeal: 3 Claims 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, and 21–31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter. OPINION After having considered the evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s contentions, Appellant does not identify reversible error with respect to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, and 3 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claims 21–28 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, for failure to comply with the written description requirement. Examiner’s Answer, dated January 11, 2019 (“Ans.”) 3. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 4 21–31. We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of those claims for the reasons expressed in the Final Action, the Answer, and explained below. A. Section 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, our inquiry focuses on the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts the Court has determined are abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20); mathematical formulas (e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts the Court has determined are patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 5 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 6 implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO Section 101 Guidance In January 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”).4 “All USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” Id. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th ed. 2018)) (“Step 2A, Prong Two”).5 4 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p df). 5 We perform this evaluation by (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 7 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55. C. Analysis We now apply the 2019 Revised Guidance to the claims. Appellant does not argue claims 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, and 21–30 separately from claim 1. Thus, claims 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, and 21–30 stand or fall with claim 1.6 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We then address claim 31, which Appellant separately argues. Claim 1 1. Step 2A, Prong One — The Judicial Exception Under Step 2A, Prong One, of the 2019 Revised Guidance the October 2019 Update, we first look to whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–54. 6 To the extent independent claims 12 and 21 include limitations that differ from those in claim 1, we address those limitations in the appropriate sections below. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 8 The Examiner concludes that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. The Examiner finds, inter alia, that the “estimating” limitations of claim 1 are mental processes that fall within the category of abstract ideas. Ans. 17– 18. Appellant does not dispute that the claims are directed to a judicial exception under the first step of the Alice and Mayo framework but, instead, directs its arguments to the second part of the framework. Appeal Br. 10– 15; see Reply Br. 4–6 (arguing that the claims are not abstract because they are significantly more under part 2 of the Alice and Mayo framework, not under part 1). We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites mental processes. For example, claim 1 includes the following limitations: estimating, for at least each of a first depth interval of the plurality of overlapping depth intervals and a second depth interval of the plurality of overlapping depth intervals, at least two overlapping cut-off lines in an overlap between the first depth interval and the second depth interval comprising a shale line and a non-shale line using corresponding measurements by using statistical analysis; and estimating the at least one parameter of interest by using the logging data and the overlapping cut-off lines. Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App’x). A person is able to perform practically, in his or her mind, estimating at least two overlapping cut-off lines that comprise a shale line and a non- shale line using corresponding measurements and statistical analysis for an overlap between first and second depth intervals of a plurality of overlapping depth intervals, as claim 1 recites. The Specification describes determining a percentile to serve as a shale cut-off value, such as the eightieth percentile of a histogram of gamma ray measurements for a given depth interval. Spec. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 9 ¶¶ 19, 50. Gamma ray values at each depth point may be compared with the shale cut-off value. Id. Depth points having a gamma ray value greater than or equal to the shale cut-off value may be classified and flagged as shale, and depth points having gamma ray values less than the shale cut-off value may be classified and flagged as non-shale. Id. A person is able to perform practically, in his or her mind, selecting a percentile as a shale line and compare a gamma ray value to a shale line to classify a depth point as shale or not shale. The Specification further discloses that a shale index/volume can be calculated by using a sand line and a shale line identical to the shale cut-off value but having a different percentile value (e.g., 90%). Id. ¶¶ 20, 51. The sand line uses a calculation similar to the shale line, but has a lower percentile (e.g., 5%). Id. ¶ 21. Like the comparison to the shale line, a person is able to perform practically, in his or her mind, selecting a percentile as a sand line and compare a gamma ray value to the sand line to classify a depth point as sand or not sand. In view of the foregoing, at least the estimating limitations of claim 1 reasonably involve mental processes, including evaluation and judgment. The 2019 Revised Guidance expressly recognizes mental processes as constituting an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Accordingly, the “estimating” limitations of claim 1 recite a judicial exception to patent- eligible subject matter under Step 2A, Prong One. Independent claims 12 and 21 include similar estimation limitations, see Appeal Br. 17, 18–19 (Claims App’x), and, therefore, recite a judicial exception. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 10 2. Step 2A, Prong Two — Integration into a Practical Application Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we consider whether claim 1 as a whole integrates the judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. The October 2019 Update explains that “[a]n important consideration to evaluate when determining whether the claim as a whole integrates a judicial exception into a practical application is whether the claimed invention improves the functioning of a computer or other technology.” October 2019 Update, 12. Here, Appellant contends the claimed invention amounts to something significantly more than an abstract idea under the Alice and Mayo framework because “an approach based on a frequency analysis that is carried out over overlapping depth intervals provides advantages over the prior art.” Appeal Br. 11. Specifically, Appellant argues the claimed invention is a robust method that “allows for both (i) definition of shale layers (mode 1) and (ii) determination of sand and shale lines for shale index/volume calculation (mode 2),” which results in a more accurate representation of a formation and, therefore, provides a technological improvement. Id. at 11–12, 14; see Reply Br. 2–6. Although directed to the Specification’s disclosure, Appellant’s arguments appear to refer to the limitations “defining a plurality of overlapping depth intervals in the borehole” and at least the first “estimating” limitation, which includes the language “by using statistical analysis.” As the October 2019 Update provides, to determine whether the claimed invention provides a technological improvement, we consider whether Appellant’s Specification “provides sufficient details such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize the claimed invention as Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 11 providing an improvement.” October 2019 Update, 12. If the Specification sets forth an improvement in technology, we then evaluate claim 1 “to ensure that the claim itself reflects the disclosed improvement.” Id. As discussed above with regard to the analysis under Step 2A, Prong One, the Specification discloses the use of overlapping depth intervals and the use of a statistical analysis with a shale line and a sand line to estimate the location of a shale layer and/or a shale percentage as one or more parameters of interest. Spec. ¶¶ 18–22, 50–51. However, to the extent the disclosure provides sufficient detail such that one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize an improvement, claim 1 does not reflect that improvement. Specifically, claim 1 recites estimating “at least one parameter of interest” of an earth formation, but does not further limit this parameter. The Specification discloses that “[t]he at least one parameter of interest may include one or more of: (i) a location of a shale layer and (ii) a shale percentage,” but that description also does not limit the “at least one parameter of interest” to a shale layer or shale formation. Spec. ¶ 48 (emphasis added). Therefore, the method of claim 1 encompasses estimating parameters of interest for an earth formation other than those Appellant argues. In addition to the “defining” and “estimating” limitations, claim 1 recites “acquiring logging data comprising a plurality of measurements using at least one sensor in a borehole intersecting the earth formation.” This limitation does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because it relates to mere data gathering. Insignificant data gathering steps “add nothing of practical significance to [an] underlying abstract idea.” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 12 Cir. 2014). Moreover, claim 1 does not limit the “logging data” that is acquired. The Specification states “logging data may include, but is not limited to, nuclear radiation emissions and spontaneous electrical potentials.” Spec. ¶ 47 (emphasis added). That disclosure, however, does not limit the logging data to any particular type of data, such as the gamma ray values discussed in the Specification for comparing to shale or sand lines at certain depth intervals. To the extent the preamble attempts to impose a meaningful limitation by reciting the abstract idea in the context “of an earth formation,” the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of [the abstract idea] to a particular technological environment.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92). In other words, the preamble language does nothing more than generally link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment. Appellant further contends that the claims are narrowly drawn and do “not preempt any and all generic processing of data in a similar system.” Appeal Br. 12. This argument also is unpersuasive. The mere fact that claim 1 may not preempt all ways of estimating at least one parameter of interest of an earth formation using statistical analysis fails to persuade us that claim 1 integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]he absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.”); see also BSG Tech. LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that a claim does not become eligible Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 13 merely because “it recites limitations that render it narrower than the abstract idea”). Appellant additionally asserts “novel and transformative elements of the present claims” by contrasting claim 1 with a reference, Dumanoir.7 Appeal Br. 13–14. However, “[t]he question . . . of whether a particular invention is novel is ‘wholly apart from whether the invention falls into a category of statutory subject matter.’” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 190 (quoting In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (CCPA 1979) (emphasis omitted)); see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013) (“[G]roundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.”); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90 (A novel and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible.); Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[A] claim for a new abstract idea is still an abstract idea. The search for a § 101 inventive concept is thus distinct from demonstrating § 102 novelty.”). Accordingly, Appellant’s argument is not persuasive of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1. Independent claim 12 recites, among other things, the function of acquiring logging data and a processor configured to perform estimates similar to those recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App’x). Independent claim 21 includes limitations substantially similar to those in claim 1. Id. at 18–19. For the same reasons we explain above in connection with claim 1 under Step 2A, Prong Two, of the 2019 Revised Guidance, the 7 Appellant does not provide any information about the Dumanoir reference. The reference, however, appears to be US 4,495,604, issued Jan. 22, 1985, which the Examiner cited in an earlier Office Action. See Final Office Action, mailed June 2, 2015, 3. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 14 “acquiring” and “estimating” functions and steps recited in claims 12 and 21 are insufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Claim 12 also recites a carrier and at least one sensor disposed on the carrier. The Examiner correctly explains that the limitations of a carrier and at least one sensor disposed on a carrier regard data gathering and do not apply or use the judicial exception in a meaningful way. Final Act. 6–7. As with the preamble language, these limitations merely link the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment (e.g., evaluation of earth formations). Appellant argues that the Examiner did not evaluate claims 21–30 based on the respective claimed features of each claim.8 Appeal Br. 15. However, the Examiner addresses these claims in the rejection and explains how their limitations merely expand upon the abstract idea and recite mere data gathering via conventional equipment. Final Act. 5, 7–9; see Ans. 20– 21. Appellant’s arguments do not identify a reversible error in the Examiner’s rejections of claims 21–30. In sum, we find that claim 1 does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Accordingly, claims 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, and 21–30 are directed to an abstract idea. 8 In the Reply Brief, Appellant argues claims 3 and 4 integrate the judicial exception into a practical application because claim 3 “recites logging data types” and claim 4 “further recites these parameters.” Reply Br. 5. First, because Appellant raises these arguments for the first time in the Reply Brief, we need not consider them absent a showing of good cause, which is lacking here. 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2). Even considering Appellant’s arguments, however, we do not find them persuasive because they amount to no more than summarizing the additional limitations of claims 3 and 4 and a conclusory argument that the limitations integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, without further explanation. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 15 3. Step 2B — Inventive Concept Because claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea, we evaluate the additional elements of the claim, individually and in combination, to determine whether the claim provides an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself). See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. The Examiner concludes, and we agree, that the claims do not contain any additional elements, individual or in combination, that amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Final Act. 4–5. As we explain above, claim 1 contains the additional elements of (1) “acquiring logging data comprising a plurality of measurements using at least one sensor in a borehole intersecting the earth formation,” and (2) “defining a plurality of overlapping depth intervals in the borehole.” The limitation “acquiring logging data” relates to routine data gathering, as discussed above. Routine data-gathering steps, however, are “insufficient . . . to constitute an inventive concept.” Solutran, Inc. v. Elavon, Inc., 931 F.3d 1161, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Further, the claim recites this limitation at a high level of generality, which as the Examiner finds, and, as we discuss above, encompasses numerous types of logging data pertinent to an earth formation. Final Act. 4–5. Claim 1 also recites the limitation “defining a plurality of overlapping depth intervals in the borehole” at a high level of generality. This indicates a lack of inventive concept that would otherwise be sufficient to transform the judicial exception into patent eligible subject matter. Thus, the additional elements of claim 1 do not indicate an inventive concept when evaluated individually. Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 16 The additional elements of claim 1 also do not indicate an inventive concept when viewed as an ordered combination. Appellant asserts the claimed invention is an unconventional technological solution to a technological problem and “the claims’ enhancing limitation necessarily requires that the components operate in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality.” Appeal Br. 12–13. Appellant however, does not explain which components are arranged in an unconventional manner or how components are operating in an unconventional manner, such as to achieve the improvement Appellant asserts.9 Therefore, the additional elements of claim 1, individually and in combination, fail to provide an inventive concept such that the claims recite “significantly more” than an abstract idea. Because independent claim 21 includes additional elements substantially similar to those of claim 1, our analysis above for claim 1 also applies to claim 21 under step 2B. With regard to claim 12, the Examiner finds the limitations of “a carrier configured to be conveyed in the borehole” and “at least sensor [sic] disposed on the carrier and configured to acquire logging data comprising a plurality of measurements” are recited at a high level of generality. Final Act. 6–7. We agree. Further, as discussed above, Appellant does not persuasively explain how the components recited in the claims are arranged in an unconventional manner that would transform the judicial exception into patent eligible subject matter. In addition, the Specification does not indicate that the sensors contemplated for Appellant’s apparatus are anything other than generic sensors performing generic 9 We further note that claim 1 does not recite an “enhancing limitation” as Appellant argues. See Appeal Br. 16 (Claims App.). Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 17 functions. Spec. ¶¶ 43, 45–48. Therefore, on the record before us, we are not persuaded that the additional elements of claim 12 amount to significantly more than the judicial exception, such as by indicating an inventive concept. In summary, we have carefully considered Appellant’s arguments but are not persuaded of reversible error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, and 21–30. Claim 31 Claim 31 depends from claim 1 and recites “further comprising displaying the estimated at least one parameter of interest.” Appellant asserts that estimating a depth of a shale boundary layer “is a measurement of a physical property” and that under the “long-standing doctrine” of In re Abele, 684 F.2d 901 (CCPA 1982), the display of this information is not abstract. Appeal Br. 14–15; see also Reply Br. 7. Thus, Appellant argues that the limitation of claim 31 “integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of that exception.” Reply Br. 7. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive. Claim 31 is merely directed to displaying the at least one parameter of interest that is estimated in claim 1. This represents extra-solution activity because it is a mere nominal or tangential addition to the claim, i.e., a generic presentation of analyzed data. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 890 F.3d at 1021 (“[M]erely presenting the results of abstract processes of collecting and analyzing information, without more (such as identifying a particular tool for presentation), is abstract as an ancillary part of such collection and analysis.”) (citations omitted). Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 18 We are also not persuaded that In re Abele supports the Appellant’s position that the claimed subject matter integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. In In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, the Federal Circuit discussed Abele and explained that “the transformation of that raw data into a particular visual depiction of a physical object on a display was sufficient to render that more narrowly-claimed process patent-eligible.” Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962–963 (emphasis added). Contrary to Appellant’s suggestion, see Appeal Br. 15; Reply Br. 7, whether an estimate of a depth of a shale layer boundary is a measurement of a physical property does not, itself, indicate a practical application for claim 31. As discussed above, claim 31 merely recites displaying the at least one parameter of interest that claim 1 estimates. Appellant, therefore, does not identify any “transformation” that claim 31 implicates, see Bilski, sufficient to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 963. Nor does Appellant persuasively explain how claim 31 provides an inventive concept. Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 31. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, and 21–31 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, 21–31 101 Eligibility 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 15–18, 21–31 Appeal 2019-003125 Application 13/347,883 19 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation