Barbara A. Reed, Complainant,v.Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 24, 2003
01A21764_r (E.E.O.C. Feb. 24, 2003)

01A21764_r

02-24-2003

Barbara A. Reed, Complainant, v. Ann M. Veneman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.


Barbara A. Reed v. U.S. Department of Agriculture

01A21764

February 24, 2003

.

Barbara A. Reed,

Complainant,

v.

Ann M. Veneman,

Secretary,

Department of Agriculture,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A21764

Agency Nos. 010042 & 010217

Hearing No. 100-A1-7578X

DECISION

Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from the agency's

final order dated March 12, 2002, dismissing her complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

In her complaints, complainant claimed that the agency retaliated

against her because of her prior EEO activity as evidenced by the

following incidents:

On September 29, 2000, the Office of Human Resources required complainant

to submit additional documentation to support her request to participate

in the Leave Donor Program;

The Office of Human Resources gathered false and injurious information

about complainant, as evidenced by a report of a meeting on April 1,

1999; and

The agency maintained records of confidential information, which proved

detrimental to complainant's career.

The agency accepted the complaint for investigation, and subsequently

forwarded it to an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) for a hearing.

In a �Pre-hearing Order� dated December 27, 2001, the AJ determined

that both parties submitted proposals for full relief under Poirrier

v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01933308 (May 5,

1994), and certified that full relief would consist of the following:

80 hours of sick leave; and

Reasonable attorney's fees as determined after submission to the agency of

an appropriate petition under EEOC Regulations at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e).

Furthermore, the AJ declined to award compensatory damages as a

measure of full relief, because despite two opportunities to do so,

complainant failed to submit evidence to establish her entitlement to

compensatory damages. Upon receiving the agency's offer of full relief,

dated January 7, 2001, wherein the agency unconditionally promised

to provide complainant with the above referenced award, the AJ issued

another Order dated January 11, 2002, finding that the complainants were

rendered moot under Poirrier. This Order also instructed the agency to

take final action within 40 days of its receipt of the Order, and set

forth complainant's appeal rights.

On February 5, 2002, after the above referenced 40-day period, complainant

filed the instant appeal, arguing that the agency failed to comply with

the AJ's order by failing to issue a final order within the referenced

time frame. In a subsequent appeal statement, dated February 28, 2002,

complainant also argued that her proposed offer of full relief, which

she presented to the AJ, included a request for compensatory damages for

emotional pain and suffering, apparently suggesting that the AJ erred in

excluding it from the offer of full relief. Complainant also claimed

AJ bias noting that she did not exclude certain agency officials from

the proceedings, gave the agency a second chance to submit a proposal

of full relief, and otherwise engaged in actions which assisted the

agency in its conspiracy to defeat complainant's EEO complaints.

Complainant requests a hearing.

Subsequent to complainant's appeal, the agency issued its final order,

dated March 12, 2002, wherein it implemented the AJ's Order, and dismissed

the captioned complaints as moot.

On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Under these revisions, the Commission eliminated the dismissal

grounds of failure to accept a certified offer of full relief from

the regulations. Therefore, agencies may no longer dismiss complaints

due to a complainant's failure to accept a certified offer of full

relief. Furthermore, in addressing the issue of non-compliance with a

Poirrier offer of full relief, the Commission held that this regulatory

change results in eliminating the elements of an offer of full relief

from "any acceptable analytical framework." See Tripicchio v. Department

of Justice,

EEOC Appeal No. 01993307 (November 28, 2001); (request for reconsideration

denied, EEOC Request No. 05A20432 (May 17, 2002).

We find that the "Offer of Full Relief" brokered by the AJ constitutes

a Poirrier Offer of Full Relief pursuant to Poirrier v. Department of

Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01933308 (May 5, 1994). That is, we

find that the record reflects that the agency's Offer of Full Relief

in this case contained all of the relief specified by the AJ during

the pre-hearing settlement conference. We further note that Poirrier

requires dismissal on the grounds of mootness.

Therefore, because the new regulations have, in effect, eliminated the

"offer of full relief," as a means of resolving EEO complaints, the issue

of compliance with the agency's �Poirrier offer� of full relief becomes

an issue of whether the captioned complaint was properly dismissed

on the grounds of mootness pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(5).

See Miller v. Department of Treasury, EEOC Appeal No. 01993839 (February

14, 2002); Nicholson v. U.S. Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A22195

(July 24, 2002).

The regulation set forth at 29 C.F.R. � 1614.107(a)(5) provides for

the dismissal of a complaint when the issues raised therein are moot.

To determine whether the issues raised in complainant's complaint are

moot, the factfinder must ascertain whether (1) it can be said with

assurance that there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged

violation will recur; and (2) interim relief or events have completely

and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged discrimination.

See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); Kuo

v. Department of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05970343 (July 10, 1998).

Additionally, in assessing whether a complaint has been rendered

moot, the Commission has held that an agency must address the issue of

compensatory damages when a complainant shows objective evidence that she

has incurred compensatory damages, and that the damages are related to

the alleged discrimination. See Jackson v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Appeal No. 01923399 (November 12, 1992), req. for recons. den.,

EEOC Request No. 05930306 (February 1, 1993).

Regarding claim 1, we find that there is no dispute between the parties

that complainant lost 80 hours of sick leave because of her inability to

participate in the Leave Donor Program, and that restoration of this leave

would constitute one measure of full relief for this claim. Moreover,

the instant offer of full relief provides complainant with attorney's

fees, further �eradicating� the harm suffered by complainant regarding

this matter. Furthermore, we find that the AJ properly determined that

complainant is not entitled to compensatory damages as part of full relief

for this claim. Specifically, we find that although complainant provided

a description of her emotional suffering in the second proposal for full

relief she submitted to the AJ, it was unsupported by an affidavit from

complainant, or any pertinent documentary evidence, as twice requested by

the AJ. Additionally, we find no evidence to suggest that this matter is

likely to recur, and we find that the remedies provided by the agency in

the offer of full relief are likely to constitute an adequate deterrent

in this case. Accordingly, we find that the offer of full relief in

this case renders claim 1 moot.

Regarding claim 2, we find that the document that complainant refers to,

memorializes a formal discussion regarding management concerns that a

�few employees� are abusing resources in pursuit of �labor and employee

relations,� to include absences without permission or explanation, and

setting up unauthorized details. Complainant apparently submits this

as evidence that she was �targeted� as one of these employees, and argues

that the information is inaccurate and part of a conspiracy to block her

career success. Notwithstanding complainant's contentions, we find that

the document at issue does not name complainant, and she submits no other

evidence to show that the information in the report is erroneous, or to

otherwise demonstrate that she is the victim of the claimed conspiracy.

Moreover, complainant herself provided this document to the EEO Counselor,

and does not claim that it is maintained as part of her personal personnel

records, nor does she claim a breach of confidentiality regarding the

instant complaint file wherein a copy now resides.

Accordingly, given that the offer of full relief provides complainant

with attorney's fees and is likely to act as a deterrent, and given

our determination above that complainant is not entitled to an award of

compensatory damages, we find that the offer of full relief in this case

constitutes the full measure of relief available regarding this matter,

and renders claim 2 moot.

In claim 3, we find that complainant contends that a certain confidential

report, containing her name, was associated with the EEO investigative

report of another employee, and that the report was �un-sanitized� thereby

further damaging her career potential. We note that the report at issue

is a chronicle of the status of various requests (e.g., FOIA requests,

requests for EEO Counseling, requests for congressional inquiry),

grievances, and EEO complaints filed by named employees, including

complainant. Nonetheless, complainant provides no evidence to show

that the confidentiality of this employee's complaint file was breached,

and /or that this report was used against her interests concerning any

specific non-promotion or any other action adverse to her employment.

Accordingly, as above, given that the offer of full relief provides

complainant with attorney's fees and is likely to act as a deterrent,

and given our determination above that complainant is not entitled to an

award of compensatory damages, we find that the offer of full relief in

this case constitutes the full measure of relief available to complainant

concerning this matter, and renders claim 3 moot.

Finally, after careful review, we find no evidence to support

complainant's claim that the AJ engaged in bias against her interests,

and we find that she incurred no detriment in pursuing this appeal by

the agency's late filing of its final actions in this case.

In conclusion, for the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the agency's

dismissal of the captioned complaints on the grounds of mootness.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

February 24, 2003

__________________

Date