BANCPASS, INC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 7, 2020

2019002872 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/599,250 05/18/2017 Glenn Deitiker 2731-703USC1 8459
58687 7590 10/07/2020
DUBOIS, BRYANT, & CAMPBELL, LLP
303 Colorado Street
Suite 2300
AUSTIN, TX 78701
EXAMINER
SINGH, RUPANGINI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3628
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/07/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
BWIESE@DBCLLP.COM
CHEUSMANN@DBCLLP.COM
SSTERLING@DBCLLP.COM
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GLENN DEITIKER, J. CHRIS GEORGE, and
SHANNON FUENTES SWANK
Appeal 2019-002872
Application 15/599,250
Technology Center 3600
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, KRISTEN L. DROESCH, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–13 and 15–18. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a) (2017). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Glenn Deitiker, J. Chris George, and Shannon Fuentes Swank. Appeal Br. 2.
We note that the Bib data for the prior application/appeal also discloses
BancPass, Inc. as the owner of the entire rights. (See also Assignment, filed
May 18, 2017, Assignment, filed Feb. 7, 2018, and Terminal Disclaimer,
filed Sept. 10, 2018).
Appeal 2019-002872
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2
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to method and system for electronic toll
payment where an application detects upcoming toll facilities and notifies
the customer. The customer can accept the payment of the toll through the
application whereupon the financial provider makes a payment from the
customer’s designated account to the toll facility. Abstract. Claim 1,
reproduced below (emphasis added), is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method for making payments, comprising:

providing, by one or more processors, an application to a
customer for installation on a personal electronic device;

registering, by the one or more processors, the customer’s
vehicle’s license plate and financial account information with a
financial network, wherein the financial network is
communicatively connected to a vehicle license plate detection
device that is located within a toll facility;

detecting, through the vehicle license plate detection
device, the customer’s vehicle’s license plate at the toll facility;

paying a toll charge for the customer’s use of the toll
facility by debiting the customer’s financial account and paying
the toll facility; and

notifying the customer through the application that the
customer has paid the toll charge.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Yamauchi US 2003/0115095 A1 June 19, 2003
Solomon US 2004/0119609 Al June 24, 2004

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Tuton et al. US 2005/0197976 A1 Sept. 8, 2005
Fraser et al. US 2010/0191584 A1 July 29, 2010
Dasgupta US 2010/0090865 A1 Apr. 15, 2010
Medina, III et al. US 8,019,629 B1 Sept. 13, 2011
Mussman et al. US 8,364,583 B1 Jan. 29, 2013

Regions Mobile Banking, April 26, 2009 Regions Mobile Banking,
dated April 26, 2009
https://web.archive.Org/web/20090426091748/http://www.regions.com:80/p
ersonal_banking/mobile_banking.rf? (PTO-892, mailed Aug. 1, 2017)

REJECTIONS2
Claims 1–13 and 15–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because
the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature,
a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more.
Claims 1–3, 5, and 9–11 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§103(a) as being unpatentable over Tuton in view of Yamauchi and further
in view of Regions.
Claim 4 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Tuton, Yamauchi, and Regions, as applied to claim 1, and
further in view of Fraser.

2 We note that claims 14 and 19 were subject to a restriction
requirement as drawn to the active detecting of the customer at the toll
facility using a personal electronic devices and a geolocation system.
Restriction requirement, mailed June 29, 2017. Appellant elected claims
drawn to passively detecting the customer’s vehicle as the customer passes
through the toll facility. Consequently, claims 14 and 19 are withdrawn
from consideration.

The Examiner withdrew the rejection to a nonstatutory obviousness
type double patenting over prior patent US 9,691,061 B2. Ans. 4.

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Claims 6 and 15–18 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Tuton, Yamauchi, and Regions, as applied to
independent claim 1 (for dependent claims 6, 15–16) and independent claim
10 (for dependent claims 17–18), and even further in view of Dasgupta.
Claims 7 and 13 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Tuton in view of Yamauchi, and further in view of
Regions, as applied to claim 1, and further in view of Solomon.
Claim 8 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Tuton in view of Yamauchi, and further in view of
Regions, as applied to claim 1, and further in view of Mussman.
Claim 12 stands rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Tuton in view of Yamauchi, and further in view of
Regions, as applied to claim 1, and further in view of Medina.
OPINION
35 U.S.C. § 101
Appellant argues claims 1–13 and 15–18 as a group. Appeal Br. 16.
We select claim 1 to represent the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Arguments which Appellant could have made but did not make in the Briefs
are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant has the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error
in the Examiner’s position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985–86 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
Patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is a question of law that is
reviewable de novo. See Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
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a. Legal Principles
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, under Step 2A, we first determine what concept the claim is
“directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before
us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a
third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the
basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
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252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If, under Step 2A, the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, then,
under Step 2B, “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine
whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at
221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must
include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
On January 7, 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) published revised patent subject matter eligibility guidance. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50,
2019 (“Revised Guidance”). Under the Revised Guidance, Step 2A of the
Alice two-step framework is divided in two prongs. For Step 2A, Prong 1,
we look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions falling into
certain groupings of abstract ideas (e.g., mathematical concepts, certain
methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes). For Step 2A, Prong 2, if the claim recites
such a judicial exception, we look to whether the claim recites any additional
elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).
Only if a claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then determine, under Step 2B
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of the Alice two-step framework, whether the claim adds a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood,
routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply
appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known
to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial
exception.
b. Discussion – Claim 1
i. Examiner’s Findings and Conclusions
In the Final Action, the Examiner finds that claim 1 recites one of
certain methods of organizing human activity and collecting and comparing
known information and creating contract relationships. Final Act. 12. The
Examiner additionally finds that the notifying step is insignificant extra-
solution activity. Final Act. 12. The Examiner also maintains that claim 1
does not include an inventive concept and, is therefore, ineligible for
patenting. Final Act. 2–3. Regarding the inventive concept, the Examiner
finds that the additional limitations are not significantly more than the
abstract idea, and finds Appellant’s Specification (namely, in US
2017/0255918 Al ¶¶ 2, 33–35 “the consumer installs an application on their
personal electronic device which becomes the primary means of payment
authorization;” see also Spec. ¶¶ 12–32 defining terms) describes the
invention as using generic and well-known components and, as a result, the
additional elements included in claim 1 do not amount to an inventive
concept. Final Act. 13; Ans. 6. Additionally, the Examiner differentiates
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the claims in McRO from the present claims that recite an abstract idea
carried out on a general purpose computer.3 Ans. 12.

ii. Appellant’s Arguments and Contentions
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant contends that the Examiner has
neglected to recite many of the tangible elements of the claimed invention in
the Examiner’s analysis. Appeal Br. 11. Appellant makes general
comparisons to various cases without drawing any specific similarities to the
claimed invention. Appeal Br. 11–24. Appellant contends that the claims
recite a practical application having real-world use. Appeal Br. 14–16;
Reply Br. 7. Appellant contends that the totality of the limitations of the
“claims of the present application define a very specific mobile toll payment
process” where the “invention as a whole is thus both useful and
accomplishes a practical application . . . a very specific, very concrete, very
practical mobile toll payment system.” Appeal Br. 15–16. Appellant also
contends the claimed subject matter is “trying to solve, namely the improved
method of mobile toll payments.” Appeal Br. 23.
In the Reply Brief, Appellant addresses the Revised Guidance. Reply
Br. 5–8. Appellant generally contends that claim does not recite a certain
method of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
concept or commercial and legal interactions, and the claim is eligible
because it does not recite a judicial exception. Reply Br. 7.
Appellant also generally contends that even if the claims recite an abstract
idea, the claims would be patent eligible because they are integrated into a

3 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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practical application of toll payment processing. Reply Br. 7–8. Appellant
contends that the claim recites the combination of all the elements as
additional elements where the claim as a whole is directed to a particular
improvement in toll payment technology. Reply Br. 8. Specifically,
Appellant contends that the method streamlines the payment of toll charges
by linking a user’s financial account to a license plate detection device
which provides a specific improvement over prior systems, resulting in
improved payment processing. Reply Br. 8. As a result, Appellant contends
that the claim as a whole integrates the mental process into a practical
application and no analysis under step 2B is required. Reply Br. 8.

iii. Analysis
The Examiner and Appellant list many “Sections” and arguments
addressing the patent eligibility rejection which go to many aspects of patent
eligibility analysis prior to the 2019 Revised Guidance. Appellant addresses
the Revised Guidance in the Reply Brief. We address Appellant’s analysis
under the Revised Guidance.
Appellant does not set forth separate arguments for patentability of
claims 1–13 and 15–18. See Appeal Br. 7; Reply Br. 2. Based on
Appellant’s arguments and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv),
we select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and
address Appellant’s arguments thereto. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Dependent claims stand or fall with representative claim 1.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
For Step 2A, Prong 1, of the Revised Guidance, we agree with the
Examiner and find that the emphasized portions of claim 1, reproduced
above, recite elements that fall within the abstract idea grouping of certain
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methods of organizing human activity. See generally Final Act. 12. The
Revised Guidance requires us to evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial
exception (e.g., an abstract idea). According to the Revised Guidance, to
determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea, we must identify
limitations that fall within one or more of the designated subject matter
groupings of abstract ideas. According to the October 2019 Patent
Eligibility Guidance Update produced by the USPTO, “a claim recites a
judicial exception when the judicial exception is ‘set forth’ or ‘described’ in
the claim.” See October 2019 Patent Eligibility Guidance Update Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df (“October Update”). The Revised Guidance lists “[c]ertain methods of
organizing human activity” as one such grouping and characterizes certain
methods of organizing human activity as including, inter alia, “commercial
or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business
relations).” 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We find that the emphasized elements of
claim 1 describe these judicial exceptions.
Specifically, regarding certain methods of organizing human activity,
we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 sets forth the human activity of
“detecting a vehicle’s license plate, and paying a toll through a financial
account registered with the plate,” which, in our view, is a form of
“commercial or legal interactions” of the Revised Guidance. For example,
the emphasized steps of claim 1 include providing an application to a
customer for installation on a personal electronic device; registering the
customer’s vehicle’s license plate and financial account information with a
financial network; detecting the customer’s vehicle’s license plate at the toll
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facility; and paying a toll charge for the customer’s use of the toll facility by
debiting the customer’s financial account and paying the toll facility.
These steps relate to “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity”
as one such grouping and characterizes certain methods of organizing human
activity as including, inter alia, “commercial or legal interactions.” Thus,
we find that claim 1 recites an abstract idea.
Turning to Prong 2 of the Step 2A of the Revised Guidance, we
recognize that claim 1 includes additional elements such as “one or more
processors,” “a personal electronic device,” “an application,” “a financial
network,” “a toll facility,” and “vehicle license plate detection device.”
Furthermore, our review of Appellant’s Specification finds that the terms
“one or more processors,” “a personal electronic device,” “an application,”
“a financial network,” “a toll facility,” and “vehicle license plate detection
device” are nominal. Appellant’s Specification indicates that the “network,”
“interface,” “an electronic trading system,” and “remote computing device”
(see Spec. ¶¶ [3], [4], [12], [13], [14], [24], and [40] “The toll system will
detect the vehicle though electronic or manual methods and match the
vehicle to the financial account using the vehicle license plate, radio
frequency transmitter, or other automatic or manual vehicle identification
system”) (emphases added) of claim 1 do not recite specific types of
additional elements or their specific operations. As a result, these additional
elements are not enough to distinguish the steps of claim 1 from describing
certain methods of organizing human activity. Thus, claim 1 does not
integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical application.
In addition, we determine that claim 1 also recites insignificant post-
solution activity (“notifying the customer through the application that the
customer has paid the toll charge.”). See Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc.,
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842 F.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (addressing insignificant post-
solution activity); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359,
1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (addressing insignificant pre-solution activity).4
The recited insignificant extra-solution activity does not help integrate the
recited methods of organizing human activity into a practical application of
the abstract idea.
Additionally, Appellants proffer that the totality of the claim language
corresponds to the “additional elements.” Reply Br. 8. We disagree with
Appellant and find that only the above identified elements are “additional
elements” to the recited abstract idea and the Specification generically
discloses each of these additional elements at a high level with regards to the
underlying process of license plate detection and toll payment. Appellant
additionally argue that although each of the collecting steps analyzed
individually may arguably be viewed as a mere concept, the claim as a
whole is directed to a particular improvement in toll payment technology
that streamlines the payment of toll charges by linking a user’s financial
account to a license plate detection device. Reply Br. 8. We note that
Appellant’s argument is not commensurate in scope with the express
language of independent claim 1.
Thus, Appellant’s argument fails because the argument is not
commensurate with the scope of claim 1. See In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344,
1348 (CCPA 1982) (“[A]ppellant’s arguments fail from the outset because

4 Alternatively, the “providing . . . an application” step may be viewed as
insignificant pre-solution activity because it is a preliminary step to acquire
or communicate data, but is recited at a high level and the “application” need
not be installed at this step of the method.

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. . . they are not based on limitations appearing in the claims.”); see also In
re Hiniker Co., 150 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[The] proffered facts
. . . are not commensurate with the claim scope and are therefore
unpersuasive.”). See also Ans. 16. The broad language of claim 1 does not
specify that the method streamlines the payment of toll charges by linking a
user’s financial account to a license plate detection device which provides a
specific improvement over prior systems, resulting in improved payment
processing. As a result, we agree with the Examiner that the combination of
additional elements as a whole does not integrate the recited abstract idea
into a practical application.
Therefore, based on our analysis under the Revised Guidance, we
agree with the Examiner and find that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
As a result, we focus our attention on Step 2B of the Alice two-step
framework.
Step 2B of the Alice two-step framework requires us to determine
whether any element, or combination of elements, in the claim is sufficient
to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly more than the judicial
exception. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. As discussed above, claim 1 includes
additional elements such as a terms “one or more processors,” “a personal
electronic device,” “an application,” “a financial network,” “a toll facility,”
and “vehicle license plate detection device.” We agree with the Examiner’s
findings that the additional elements of claim 1, when considered
individually and in an ordered combination, correspond to nothing more than
generic and well-known components used to implement the abstract ideas.
See Ans. 6, 13, 16–17, 19; Final Act. 13–15.
In other words, we find that the additional elements, as claimed, are
well-understood, routine, and conventional and “behave exactly as expected
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according to their ordinary use.” See In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,
823 F.3d 607, 615 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, implementing the abstract idea
with these generic and well-known components “fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221.
Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 does not provide
significantly more than the abstract idea itself.
Therefore, because Claim 1 is directed to the abstract ideas of certain
methods of organizing human activity and does not provide significantly
more than the abstract idea itself, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is
ineligible for patenting and affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.

35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Appellant does not set forth separate arguments for patentability of
claims 1–3, 5, and 9–11. See Appeal Br. 25; Reply Br. 8. Based on
Appellant’s arguments and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv),
we select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and
address Appellant’s arguments thereto. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Dependent claims 2, 3, 5, and 9–11 stand or fall with representative claim 1.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Appellant has the burden on appeal to the Board to demonstrate error
in the Examiner’s position. See In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 985–86 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
With respect to the obviousness rejection of representative
independent claim 1, Appellant contends that “a nearly identical issue was
addressed by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in the parent application.
See, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD, Appeal No. 2015-003987
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. . . Examiner asserted that a website would serve to ‘notify the customer
that a charge had been paid.’” Reply Br. 9; see also Appeal Br. 24–29.
Appellant further contends that the Board, in the prior Decision, was clear
that the cited Mussman reference “does not state that it is the website that
notifies the customer of the paid charge.” Appeal Br. 27; Reply Br. 9.
Appellant also argues that such an invitation does not constitute providing
notice to the consumer through an application and only provides the
customer the ability review a charge once they become aware of it. Appeal
Br. 27–28.
We note that Appellant’s quotation cites to Appellant’s argument
from the prior Appeal Brief at page 11, that was quoted by the Board rather
than the specific finding made by the Board.
Appellant further contends that the newly applied Regions reference is
just like the Mussman reference applied in the parent prosecution and
decided in the prior Board decision at page 4. Reply Br. 9.
We find Appellant’s argument to be unavailing because the Board’s
prior finding and holding was specific with regards to the combination of
both the notifying step and the option to dispute step. The Board explained:
“Examiner states that ‘issuing banks usually invite their cardholders to bring
any inquiries or disputes about transactions . . . via a website,’ this portion
does not state that it is the website (i.e., an application) that notifies the
customer of the paid charge and of the option to dispute the paid charge.
Id.”; Prior Dec. 4–5 (emphasis added); “Examiner fails to support
adequately the finding that Mussman discloses notifying a customer through
an application that the customer has paid a charge and has the option to
dispute the charge.” Prior Dec. 5 (emphases added).
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In the present rejection under review, the Examiner has relied upon
the Regions reference to teach and suggest that the mobile application allows
the user to bank securely, through a mobile application, where the user can
review accounts, view account history, and make payments which would
allow the user to view the charges which would notify the customer through
an application that the customer has paid a charge (without the additional
option to dispute the charge). Final Act. 19.
It is well settled that, during patent examination, claims must be given
their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The
broadest reasonable interpretation standard requires the words of the claims
to be given their “broadest reasonable meaning . . . in their ordinary usage as
they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into
account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may
be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s
specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
However, although we interpret claims broadly but reasonably in light of the
Specification, we nonetheless must not import limitations from the
Specification into the claims. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323 (citations
omitted).
We find the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim limitation
“notifying the customer through the application that the customer has paid
the toll charge” encompasses the teachings and suggestions of the Regions
reference that allows the user to be notified through the mobile application.5

5 We note that the language of independent claim 1 does not specifically
recite “sending a notification,” or “receiving a notification” but merely
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We agree with the Examiner that the Regions reference teaches and suggests
the claimed “notifying the customer” step. We further note that the
Yamaguchi reference also discloses the use of an application on a mobile
device/cell phone to teach and suggests handshaking emails between the
mobile device, the toll system and the cellular phone company and provides
communications to the cellular phones of each of the users when they split
the toll. (Yamaguchi ¶¶ 49, 50, 53, 55; see also Final Act. 18, citing
Yamaguchi ¶ 50.)
Therefore, Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s factual
findings or conclusion of obviousness of representative independent claim 1,
and independent claim 10 not separately argued.

Dependent Claims
With respect to dependent claims 4, 6–8, 12, 13, and 16–18,
Appellant argues that the claims depend from independent claims 1 and 10
and are allowable due to their dependency. Appeal Br. 29–31. Because
Appellant identified no deficiency in the Examiner’s factual findings or
conclusion of obviousness of representative independent claim 1, we find
Appellant’s argument to be unavailing to show error in the Examiner’s
conclusion of obviousness of the dependent claims.
CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner’s patent eligibility and obviousness rejections are
affirmed.

“notifying the customer through the application that the customer has paid
the toll charge.”
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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–13, 15–
18
101 Patent eligibility 1–13, 15–
18

1–3, 5, 9–
11
103(a) Tuton, Yamauchi,
Regions
1–3, 5, 9–
11

4 103(a) Tuton, Yamauchi,
Regions, Fraser
4
6, 15–18 103(a) Tuton, Yamauchi,
Regions, Dasgupta
6, 15–18
7, 13 103(a) Tuton, Yamauchi,
Regions, Solomon
7, 13
8 103(a) Tuton, Yamauchi,
Regions, Mussman
8
12 103(a) Tuton, Yamauchi,
Regions, Medina
12
Overall
Outcome
1–13, 15–
18

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED