Atlanta Gas Light Companyv.Bennett Regulator Guards, Inc.

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 6, 2015

08491273 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 6, 2015)

Trials@uspto.gov Paper 88
571-272-7822 Entered: January 6, 2015

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

ATLANTA GAS LIGHT COMPANY,
Petitioner,

v.

BENNETT REGULATOR GUARDS, INC.,
Patent Owner.
_______________

Case IPR2013-00453
Patent 5,810,029
_______________

Before JENNIFER S. BISK, JAMES B. ARPIN, and
PATRICK M. BOUCHER, Administrative Patent Judges.

BOUCHER, Administrative Patent Judge.

ORDER
35 U.S.C. § 312(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.8(b)(1)

On January 22, 2014, we instituted an inter partes review of claims 1–8 of
U.S. Patent No. 5,810,029 (“the ’029 patent”), based on a Petition filed by Atlanta
Gas Light Company (“Petitioner”). Because the Petition failed to identify all real
parties in interest as required by 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), we vacate our Decision to
Institute (Paper 31) and terminate the review.
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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a utility company that constructs, operates, and maintains a
natural-gas-system infrastructure in Georgia. Ex. 1037 ¶ 5. On July 18, 2012,
Petitioner was served by Patent Owner with a complaint alleging infringement of
the ’029 patent in Bennett Regulatory Guards, Inc. v. McJunkin Red Man Corp.
and Atlanta Gas Light Company, Civil Action 5:12-cv-1040 (N.D. Ohio) (“the
related litigation”). Paper 4 (“Pet.”), 1. On July 3, 2013, the U.S. District Court
dismissed Petitioner from the related litigation for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
at 1–2. Exactly one year after being served in the related litigation, on July 18,
2013, Petitioner filed its Petition for inter partes review of the ’029 patent.
Paper 3.
Petitioner is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of AGL Resources, Inc.
(“AGLR”). Ex. 2006, 4. AGLR has officers, but no other employees, and is
characterized by Petitioner as a “holding company that . . . conducts substantially
all of its operations through its subsidiaries.” Paper 62 (“Reply”), 17 (citing Ex.
2043, 51:24–25, 59:11; Ex. 1039 ¶ 4).
Another of AGLR’s several subsidiaries is AGL Services Company
(“AGLS”), a sister company of Petitioner. Ex. 2006, 5. AGLS “provides support
services (e.g., legal, supply chain, facilities) to various subsidiaries of AGLR, such
as [Petitioner].” Reply 17–18 (citing Ex. 2043, 38:15–25, 43:18–44, 125:24–
126:2). Petitioner explains that operating entities such as Petitioner “‘dictate what
they want and what they need’ in the form of support services from AGLS.” Reply
18 (citing Ex. 2043, 92:13–22). The cost of work performed by AGLS on behalf
of an entity, such as Petitioner, and the cost of materials related to such work are
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charged to the entity receiving the service or using the materials. Reply 18 (citing
Ex. 2043, 93:5–22, 97:1–4, 119:8–120:3).
Evidence presented established that, although certain functions are assigned
to the different entities, they are referred to casually, both internally and externally,
by the umbrella designations “AGL” or “AGL Resources.” See, e.g., Ex. 2043,
8:23–9:2, 12:20–22. The extent of this corporate blurring is illustrated by
negotiations with McJunkin Red Man Corporation (“MRMC”) related to indemnity
provisions of a “Master Agreement for Inventory Support Services” (“the supply
agreement”).
1
The supply agreement was entered into by AGLR “in its own behalf
and/or on behalf of [AGLR] and one or more subsidiaries of AGLR.” Paper 55
(“PO Resp.), 3 (citing Ex. 2018, 1); see Ex. 2006, 5. After Patent Owner sued
Petitioner for infringement of the ’029 patent, Petitioner and MRMC disputed
“whether any indemnity is owed between them” in connection with the related
litigation as a result of those indemnity provisions. Paper 27, 4 (citing Ex. 1027 ¶
3).
Negotiations with MRMC were undertaken by at least Robert (“Bob”)
Schnorr and Bryony Hodges. PO Resp. 4–5. Mr. Schnorr serves as Vice
President, Supply Chain and Fleet, for Petitioner, as well as for other AGLR
subsidiaries. Reply 18 n.3; Ex. 1027 ¶ 1.
2
During such negotiations, various

1
McJunkin Red Man Corporation was formed in 2007 as the result of a merger
between McJunkin Corporation and Red Man Pipe & Supply Co. Ex. 2010. The
relationships among various entities related to McJunkin Red Man Corporation are
summarized by our diagram on page 8 of our Decision to Institute (Paper 31).
Those details are not relevant to our conclusions herein.

2
Mr. Schnorr’s deposition (see Ex. 2043) involved considerable inquiry by Patent
Owner attempting to establish Mr. Schnorr’s precise position at Petitioner and/or
related entities. Two factors appear to underlie much of the apparent disconnect
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pieces of correspondence were exchanged directly between Mr. Schnorr and Rory
Isaac of MRMC. See Exs. 2021, 2031–2033. Those originated by Mr. Schnorr are
written on “AGL Resources” letterhead (see, e.g., Ex. 2031) or bear the “AGL
Resources” letterhead symbol in the body of an email communication (see, e.g.,
Ex. 2033). Those originated by Mr. Isaac are addressed to Mr. Schnorr at “AGL
Resources Inc.” (Ex. 2030) or “AGL Resources, Inc.” (Ex. 2032).
3
The body of
these pieces of correspondence identify the party with whom MRMC is negotiating
as “AGL.”
4
During his deposition, Mr. Schnorr testified that he had access to
letterhead specific to Petitioner (“AGLC”), but did not “know specifically”
whether he had previously written letters on “AGLC letterhead”: “it would depend

between Patent Owner’s questions and Mr. Schnorr’s responses: (1) different
assumptions whether a vice-president is an “named officer” (compare Paper 87
(“Tr.”), 59:22 with id. at 75:3–10); and (2) Mr. Schnorr’s casual reference to “AGL
Resources” as an umbrella term referring to AGLR and its subsidiaries. We need
not decide whether the lack of clarity in Mr. Schnorr’s testimony resulted from a
desire not to answer, a lack of knowledge, or a simple difference in assumptions
underlying questions by Patent Owner and responses by Mr. Schnorr. The specific
character of that lack of clarity is sufficient as evidence of the pervasive nature of
the corporate blurring by AGLR and its subsidiaries, including Petitioner and
AGLS.

3
Correspondence between attorneys was more precise in identifying parties to the
negotiation. See, e.g., Ex. 2022 (letter from Russell Blythe, counsel for Petitioner,
to Rick L. Rambo, counsel for MRMC, identifying party as “Atlanta Gas Light
Company”).

4
We accept Petitioner’s explanation at oral hearing that “the specific identification
of a particular AGL entity or McJunkin entity was [not] at issue in the discussion.”
Tr. 81:6–8. Nevertheless, the casual identification of “AGL” as a party to the
negotiation and use of the “AGL Resources” logo by Mr. Schnorr contribute to an
overall picture in which AGLR and its subsidiaries externally blur distinctions
between them.
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on the individual circumstance and what company I was representing at the time.”
Ex. 2043, 144:15–145:13 (emphasis added).
In addition, Mr. Schnorr identifies himself as “Vice President, Supply Chain
& Fleet at AGL Resources” on his LinkedIn
®
profile. Ex. 2045. His business card
includes a similar identification and provides his email address as
“bschnorr@aglresources.com.” Ex. 2048. A similar identification also is provided
with his biographical information on the “AGL Resources” web site at
http://www.aglresources.com/about/bios_Schnorr.aspx. Ex. 2047. The “AGL
Resources” web site also identifies Mr. Schnorr as “Vice President, Supply Chain
and Fleet” on a web page bearing the copyright notice “©2014 AGL Resources
Inc.” Ex. 2035. Barbara Christopher, Assistant Corporate Secretary for Petitioner,
provided a declaration in the related litigation that identifies Mr. Schnorr as an
“officer[] of AGL Resources Inc.,” with the title “Vice President, Supply Chain
and Fleet,” and that omits Mr. Schnorr’s name in a list of “officers” of Petitioner.
Ex. 2046 ¶ 11. Mr. Schnorr testified that his “paycheck comes from AGL
Resources Services, Inc. [presumably AGL Services Company].” Ex. 2043, 54:7–
8.
Ms. Hodges’s participation in the negotiations is evidenced by an email
string between her and Aditi Dravid, in-house counsel for an entity related to
MRMC. Ex. 2026. Her email communications identify her as “Chief Counsel,
Field Operations & Litigation,” without specific identification of the entity that
employs her. Id. During those negotiations, Ms. Hodges used the email address
“bhodges@aglresources.com.” Id. Ms. Christopher testified in the related
litigation that Ms. Hodges is “employed by AGL Services Company,” and
affirmatively testified that she is “not employed by Atlanta Gas Light Company
[i.e., Petitioner].” Ex. 2038, 35.
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We consider the facts related more directly to this proceeding in light of this
corporate blurring. For example, in describing actions taken with respect to this
proceeding, Mr. Schnorr signed a letter that stated:
Please note that, even in the absence of an indemnification agreement,
AGL has taken steps to support [MRMC]’s defense. For example,
AGL’s outside counsel has taken the lead on preparing joint
exchanges and filings (including non-infringement contentions,
invalidity contentions, and claim construction positions). In addition,
AGL has also filed a petition for inter partes review of [Patent
Owner]’s U.S. Patent No. 5,810,029 by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office – at AGL’s sole expense.

Ex. 2031 (emphasis added). These statements were prepared with the assistance of
Ms. Hodges. Ex. 2043, 161:20–162:1, 166:16–167:10. Preparation for Mr.
Schnorr’s deposition included assistance by David Slovensky, whom Ms.
Christopher identified as “Vice President and Associate General Counsel
(Distribution Operations)” for “AGL Resources Inc.” Ex. 2043, 11:21–12:15; Ex.
2046. Ms. Christopher did not identify Mr. Slovensky as an officer of Petitioner.

II. ANALYSIS
A petition for inter partes review “may be considered only if— . . . the
petition identifies all real parties in interest.” 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2) (emphases
added).

A. Burden
“In an inter partes review . . . , the petitioner shall have the burden of
proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.” 35
U.S.C. § 316(e).
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The statutory requirement that a petition for inter partes review identify all
real parties in interest defines a “threshold issue.” See ZOLL Lifecor Corp. v.
Philips Elec. N. Am. Corp., Case IPR2013-00606, slip op. at 10 (PTAB Mar. 10,
2014) (Paper 13). The Office Trial Practice Guide (“Practice Guide”) explains that
“[t]he typical common-law expression of the ‘real party-in-interest’ . . . does not fit
directly into the AIA trial context” because that notion reflects standing concepts,
and no such requirement exists in the context of an inter partes review
proceeding.” 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756, 48,759 (Aug. 14, 2012). Rather, a real party in
interest is a party that “desires review” of the patent at issue, and “may be the
petitioner itself, and/or it may be the party or parties at whose behest the petition
has been filed.” Id. The Practice Guide further directs parties to the Office’s prior
application of similar principles in the context of inter partes reexaminations,
specifically noting those set forth in In re Guan, Inter Partes Reexamination
Proceeding, Control No. 95/001,045, Decision Vacating Filing Date (Aug. 25,
2008).
In Guan, the Office explained that, generally, in inter partes reexamination
proceedings, it “will not look beyond the required statement identifying the real
party in interest,” but that exploration is appropriate when “the statement related to
the real party in interest is not facially accurate, or is ambiguous.” Guan at 7.
Similarly, in inter partes review proceedings, the Board generally accepts the
petitioner’s identification of real parties in interest at the time of filing the petition.
Zoll, 7 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,695).
The Board has adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence as applying to inter
partes review proceedings. 37 C.F.R. § 42.62(a). The Office’s practice, explained
in Guan, of initially accepting the identification of real parties in interest in a
petition as accurate acts as a rebuttable presumption that benefits petitioners.
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“[T]he party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing
evidence to rebut the presumption. But this rule does not shift the burden of
persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.” Fed. R. Evid. 301
(emphasis added). Thus, when, as here, a patent owner provides sufficient rebuttal
evidence that reasonably brings into question the accuracy of a petitioner’s
identification of the real parties in interest, the burden remains with the petitioner
to establish that it has complied with the statutory requirement to identify all the
real parties in interest.
5

This allocation of the burden for establishing whether third parties have, or
have not, been identified properly as real parties in interest appropriately accounts
for the fact that a petitioner is far more likely to be in possession of, or to have
access to, evidence relevant to the issue than is a patent owner.

B. Factors
“Whether a party who is not a named participant in a given proceeding
nonetheless constitutes a ‘real party-in-interest’ . . . to that proceeding is a highly
fact-dependent question.” Practice Guide at 48,759. Several factors are relevant.

5
The Board has not adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless,
an analogy with the allocation of burden to show satisfaction of the “minimal
contacts” prong of the International Shoe test for personal jurisdiction by a district
court—also a “threshold issue”—is instructive. Int’l Shoe v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310
(1945). The Federal Circuit has held that this prong allocates the burden to the
plaintiff to show that (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities at
residents of the forum state, and (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s activities with the forum state. Grober v. Mako Products, Inc., 686
F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The burden allocated to the defendant of
showing that personal jurisdiction is otherwise unreasonable relates to the “fair
play and substantial justice” prong of the International Shoe test, and is reached
only after the threshold “minimal contacts” prong has been satisfied by the
plaintiff. Id.
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Id. (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)). In Taylor, the Supreme Court
identified the following factors, but noted that the list “is meant only to provide a
framework . . ., not to establish a definitive taxonomy” (Taylor, 553 U.S. at 893
n.6): (1) whether the third party agrees to be bound by the determination of issues
in the proceeding; (2) whether a pre-existing substantive legal relationship with the
party named in the proceeding justifies binding the third party; (3) “in certain
limited circumstances,” whether the third party is adequately represented by
someone with the same interests; (4) whether the third party exercised or could
have exercised control over the proceeding; (5) whether the third party is bound by
a prior decision and is attempting to rehear the matter through a proxy; and (6)
whether a statutory scheme forecloses successive hearing by third parties.
A common focus of inquiry is the fourth factor, namely whether the third
party exercised or could have exercised control over the proceeding. But “[c]ourts
and commentators agree . . . that there is no bright-line test for determining the
necessary quantity or degree of participation to qualify as a ‘real party-in-interest’
. . . based on the control concept.” Practice Guide at 48,759 (citing Gonzalez v.
Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 759 (1st Cir. 1994)).

C. Application
Both AGLR and AGLS have had a level of involvement in this proceeding.
The issue before us is whether Petitioner has shown that that level of involvement
is insufficient to conclude that they are real parties in interest.
We find that Mr. Schnorr engaged in negotiations with MRMC regarding
whether indemnity was owed, and that he conducted those negotiations at least
partially on behalf of AGLR. Even if Mr. Schnorr also has a position with
Petitioner, both the testimony of Ms. Christopher and extrinsic evidence establish
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that he is an officer of AGLR. In addition, even though he had access to letterhead
specific to Petitioner, Mr. Schnorr repeatedly conducted those negotiations with
letterhead that bears the designation “AGL Resources,” a federally registered
trademark owned by AGLR.
6
See Ex. 3001. Mr. Schnorr testified specifically that
choice of letterhead would depend on the individual circumstances and which
company he was representing at the time. His letter of August 5, 2013, to Mr.
Isaac, in which Mr. Schnorr asserted that “AGL has also filed a petition for inter
partes review . . . at AGL’s sole expense” was made in response to a letter
addressed to him in his capacity at “AGL Resources, Inc.,” i.e., at AGLR. His
August 5, 2013, letter was prepared with the assistance of Ms. Hodges, an
employee of AGLS and not of Petitioner. Furthermore, Mr. Schnorr was prepared
for his deposition in this proceeding, at least in part, by Mr. Slovensky, an officer
of AGLR.
It remains unclear who paid the filing fees and legal expenses associated
with this proceeding. Petitioner intimates that such fees and expenses may have
been paid by AGLS and charged back to Petitioner, but makes no unambiguous
statement to that effect:
Operating entities such as [Petitioner] ‘dictate what they want and
what they need’ in the form of support services from AGLS. Work
done by AGLS on behalf of an entity such as AGLC may get billed to
the entity receiving the service. Likewise, the cost of materials – such
as the accused products in the litigation – is charged to the entity that

6
Petitioner was asked at oral hearing about who owns the trademark, but did not
provide an unambiguous response. Tr. 73:15–74:5. Contrary to the position taken
by Patent Owner, we do not find that every use of “AGL Resources” letterhead
must be imputed to AGLR. Rather, our conclusion that Mr. Schnorr engaged in
negotiations, at least in part, on behalf of AGLR results from considering the
totality of the circumstances.
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uses the materials. As a sister company, there is no indication that
AGLS could control AGLC’s operations.

Reply 17 (emphasis added, citations omitted). Patent Owner correctly observes
that Petitioner has not produced receipts or statements that show Petitioner paid the
filing fee, and has not produced internal records showing a chargeback to
Petitioner for any filing fees or other legal expenses that may have been paid by
AGLS. Tr. 50: 2–51:7. When asked at oral hearing why Petitioner did not
produce such documents, Petitioner’s counsel replied that “it is not clear that there
is any single document that would clear that up,” and reaffirmed that his law firm
represents Petitioner. Id. at 77:16–78:6.
Rather than maintaining well-defined corporate boundaries, AGLR,
Petitioner, and AGLS are so intertwined that it is difficult for both insiders and
outsiders to determine precisely where one ends and another begins. Indeed, use of
the umbrella term “AGL Resources” in referring to AGLR and its subsidiaries—on
letterheads, email addresses, website addresses, etc.—encourages the perception
that AGLR and its subsidiaries function as a single entity. Although parent-
subsidiary relationships are not among those expressly identified by the Supreme
Court in the second Taylor factor, this factor weighs heavily in favor of finding
AGLR to be a real party in interest in this proceeding. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894
(“Qualifying relationships include, but are not limited to, preceding and
succeeding owners of property, bailee and bailor, and assignee and assignor”
(emphasis added)).
We also find that the fourth Taylor factor weighs in favor of finding AGLR
to be a real party in interest in this proceeding, particularly when considered in
light of Petitioner’s overall burden to establish that it correctly identified all real
parties in interest in its Petition. As explained in Gonzalez,
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[T]here is no bright-line test for gauging substantial control. The
inquiry must be case-specific, and fact patterns are almost endlessly
variable. The critical judgment cannot be based on isolated facts.
Consequently an inquiring [tribunal] must consider the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether they justify a reasonable
inference of the nonparty’s potential or actual involvement as a
decisionmaker. . . . The nonparty’s participation may be overt or
covert, and the evidence of it may be direct or circumstantial—so long
as the evidence as a whole shows that the nonparty possessed
effective control over a party’s conduct of the [proceeding] as
measured from a practical, as opposed to a purely theoretical,
standpoint.

Gonzalez, 27 F.3d at 759 (citations omitted).
7
We emphasize that our
determination that AGLR possessed sufficient control over the proceeding to
conclude—in combination with application of other Taylor factors—that it is a real
party in interest does not hinge on any particular, isolated fact. Rather, our
determination results from consideration of the entire circumstance of AGLR’s
involvement in this proceeding, including the demonstrated participation of
officers and employees of AGLR and AGLS and the lack of clarity over who
actually financed filing fees and attorney costs.
In applying the remaining Taylor factors, we note that we give little weight
to the fifth and sixth factors, which are not readily applicable to the facts at issue in

7
This quotation from Gonzalez continues by asserting that “[t]he burden of
persuasion ultimately rests with him who asserts that control (or the right to
exercise it) existed to such a degree as would warrant invoking nonparty
preclusion.” Gonzalez addressed real party in interest in the context of whether
issue preclusion could be asserted against a non-party to a prior litigation. Thus,
its discussion of “burden of persuasion” is not entirely applicable here. However,
we note that this assertion of who must come forward with evidence is consistent
with our determination that Patent Owner must rebut adequately the presumption
that Petitioner accurately identified all real parties in interest.
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this proceeding. Although we conclude that AGLR has the same interests in this
proceeding as Petitioner, and that Petitioner adequately represents those interests,
we also give little weight to Taylor’s third factor because it is not apparent that this
proceeding falls within the “limited circumstances” identified by the Supreme
Court.
The only Taylor factor that weighs against finding AGLR to be a real party
in interest is the first factor. No evidence establishes, or even suggests, that AGLR
has agreed to be bound by the determination of issues in this proceeding. Indeed,
Petitioner’s vigorous opposition suggests the opposite.

D. Correction of Petition
We conclude that at least AGLR is a real party in interest that Petitioner
failed to identify in its Petition. The Petition is, therefore, incomplete and,
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(2), may not be considered.
Petitioner argues that “the remedy is not termination of the IPR.” Reply 20.
Instead, Petitioner contends that “the Board could simply allow [Petitioner] one
month to add other parties under 37 CFR § 42.106(b) and then proceed to a final
decision.” Id. Two considerations caution against doing so.
First, the Board has previously authorized amendment of a petition to correct
the identification of real parties in interest under 37 C.F.R. § 42.106(b). See, e.g.,
Petroleum Geo-Services Inc. v. Westerngeco LLC, Case IPR2014-00678, slip op. at
6–7 (PTAB Aug. 12, 2014) (Paper 23). But Petitioner acknowledges that, to its
knowledge, such authorizations have only been made by the Board before
institution of a trial (Tr. 38:19–39:24), and we are unaware of any instance in
which the Board has granted such an authorization after trial institution. Patent
Owner contends that, because the Petition was, in fact, accorded a filing date, the
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curative provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 42.106(b) are not applicable. Paper 65, 4.
Patent Owner reasons that accepting Petitioner’s position that a petition could be
cured after institution for failure to identify all real parties in interest would
encourage concealment at the time of filing. Id.
We lack sufficient briefing by the parties whether the curing provision of
37 C.F.R. § 42.106(b) should extend to correction of incomplete petitions after trial
institution. Petitioner was aware that Patent Owner challenged its identification of
real parties in interest, including its failure to identify AGLR as a real party in
interest, before we instituted trial. Paper 13, 16; Paper 26, 8–11. Nevertheless,
Petitioner did not request authorization to correct its Petition, even when granted
authorization, over Patent Owner’s opposition, to file a Reply to Patent Owner’s
Preliminary Response and Supplemental Preliminary Response to address issues
raised under 35 U.S.C. § 312(a). See Paper 22, 2–3. At best, and only after
institution of trial, Petitioner has suggested that correction of the Petition is a
potential remedy—without actively and affirmatively seeking authorization to
make such a correction and while simultaneously resisting acknowledging that
AGLR is a real party in interest. Petitioner, thus, has failed to take the necessary
steps to put the merits of its position squarely before us.
Second, Petitioner filed its Petition exactly one year after being served with
a complaint in the related litigation. Pet. 1. Correction of the Petition as proposed
by Petitioner would require assignment of a new filing date. 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.106(b). Because the new filing date necessarily would fall more than a year
after service of the complaint, the Petition would be barred under 35 U.S.C.
§ 315(b) if service of the complaint was effective.
Both parties acknowledge that the complaint was dismissed with respect to
Petitioner for lack of personal jurisdiction. Reply 20. Petitioner contends that the
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complaint was dismissed without prejudice and, therefore, is treated as though it
had never been filed under the reasoning of Macauto U.S.A. v. BOS GmbH & KG,
Case IPR2012-00004, slip op. at 15 (PTAB Jan. 24, 2013) (Paper 18). Patent
Owner contends that “Macauto does not stand for the sweeping proposition that
any dismissal of a complaint without prejudice makes service a nullity,”
distinguishing the voluntary dismissal at issue in Macauto with the involuntary
dismissal in the litigation related to this proceeding. Although Petitioner appears
to have the stronger position, Petitioner’s failure to seek authorization to correct its
Petition again leaves us with insufficient briefing to address fully this issue on its
merits.
In the absence of adequate opportunity by both parties to address fully the
issues of (1) whether 37 C.F.R. § 42.106(b) applies to correction of petitions after
institution of a trial, and (2) whether an involuntary dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction renders service of a complaint a nullity, we decline to decide these
issues.

E. Sanctions
During the course of the trial, Petitioner cross-examined, as routine
discovery, Gregory A. Bennett and Joseph M. Prahl, both of whom provided
declarations filed in this proceeding by Patent Owner. See Exs. 1031, 1032. At the
depositions of both Mr. Bennett and Dr. Prahl, before examination by Petitioner,
Patent Owner objected to the qualifications of the videographer and the court
reporter, asserting that it believes a contractual relationship between them and
Petitioner’s counsel calls their objectivity into question. Ex. 2052, 5; Ex. 2053, 5.
Patent Owner subsequently filed a Motion to Exclude the deposition testimony of
Mr. Bennett and Dr. Prahl, asserting that “[t]he court reporter was not authorized
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by law to take the depositions in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 23, 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(f),
and Rule 30(b)(5), Fed. R. Civ. Pro.” Paper 72, 2. In opposing Patent Owner’s
Motion to Exclude, Petitioner filed a declaration by Linda Oda, General Manager
for the Atlanta office of the reporting firm that employed the court reporter. Paper
78, 1; Ex. 1054. Patent Owner subsequently cross-examined Ms. Oda as routine
discovery. Ex. 2058.
Each party requests that sanctions be imposed on the other party as a result
of this sequence of events. Petitioner contends that Patent Owner lacked a good-
faith basis for its Motion to Exclude, and that Petitioner improperly “was forced to
conduct a factual investigation, obtain a declaration from a third party, and prepare
[an] opposition paper.” Paper 78, 8. Patent Owner contends that Ms. Oda’s
deposition was disrupted by actions of the deponent’s attorney that “were serious
violations of the deposition guidelines laid down in Appendix D of the Trial
Practice Guide as well as 37 C.F.R. [§] 42.1(b) and (c).” Paper 83, 3. Patent
Owner specifically contends that Ms. Oda’s attorney “interpos[ed] numerous
speaking objections,” “argued with [Patent Owner’s] counsel in a hostile manner,
gave speeches, . . . answered questions as if he were a witness,” and “instructed the
witness not to answer questions on a number of occasions that did not involve
preserving a privilege.” Id. at 2–3.
The Board has discretion to impose a sanction against a party for
misconduct, including “[f]ailure to comply with an applicable rule or order in the
proceeding,” “[a]dvancing a misleading or frivolous argument,” and “actions that
harass or cause unnecessary delay or an unnecessary increase in the cost of the
proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.12(a). We decline to impose sanctions on either
party.
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Although Patent Owner’s objections at the time of the depositions appear to
be based on weak evidence, namely a remark made by the videographer (Paper 78,
4 n.3), it was required to make any objection to the qualifications of officers taking
the deposition at the time of the deposition and on the record. 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.53(f)(8). Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude relies instead on sworn
testimony by Tiffany Horton. Ex. 2054. Even if aspects of Ms. Horton’s
testimony would be entitled to little weight, we do not find Patent Owner’s
argument sufficiently frivolous to warrant imposition of sanctions.
We have reviewed the transcript of Ms. Oda’s deposition and find Patent
Owner’s characterization generally accurate. But termination of this proceeding
renders consideration of whether to exclude Ms. Oda’s declaration and deposition
transcript, as requested by Patent Owner (Paper 83, 3), moot. We also decline to
award Patent Owner fees and expenses in connection with Ms. Oda’s deposition.
Petitioner was the proponent of Ms. Oda’s direct testimony, and our Rules already
contemplate that “[e]xcept as the Board may order or the parties may agree in
writing, the proponent of the direct testimony shall bear all costs associated with
the testimony, including the reasonable costs associated with making the witness
available for the cross-examination.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.53(g).
Because we terminate this proceeding and vacate our Decision to Institute,
we do not reach the merits of Patent Owner’s Motion to Exclude.

III. ORDER
In consideration of the foregoing, it is
ORDERED that the proceeding is hereby terminated; and
FURTHER ORDERED that the Decision to Institute (Paper 31) is vacated.

IPR2013-00453
Patent 5,810,029

18

PETITIONER:
Holmes J. Hawkins, III
Russell E. Blythe
KING & SPALDING LLP
hhawkins@kslaw.com
rblythe@kslaw.com

PATENT OWNER:

Wayne Porter, Jr.
LAW OFFICES OF WAYNE D. PORTER, JR.
porter@porterpatentlaw.com