Arsham Hatambeiki et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 20, 202014618365 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 20, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/618,365 02/10/2015 Arsham Hatambeiki 81230.171US1 4554 34018 7590 05/20/2020 Greenberg Traurig, LLP 77 W. Wacker Drive Suite 3100 CHICAGO, IL 60601-1732 EXAMINER DUONG, THAO DUC ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2446 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/20/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): chiipmail@gtlaw.com clairt@gtlaw.com jarosikg@gtlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ARSHAM HATAMBEIKI and PAUL D. ARLING Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 Technology Center 2400 Before ELENI MANTIS MERCADER, JENNIFER L. MCKEOWN, and CARL L. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20, which constitute all pending claims. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We Affirm. 1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Universal Electronics Inc. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The invention relates to managing a plurality of appliances. Abstract; Spec. 1:15–23, 2:22–5:14, Figs. 1–4. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter (emphases added): 1. A method for controlling a state of a system comprised of a plurality of appliances, the method comprising: using a device discovery process to establish a listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the system; using the listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the system, with reference to a command and/or protoctol [sic] database, to configure a software agent to exchange communications, via a one or more communication channels, with each of the plurality of appliances; associating an action triggering state of at least one of the plurality of appliances in the system with an action to be performed by the software agent; receiving by the software agent, via the one or more communication channels, a message from the at least one of the plurality of appliances in the system, the message having data indicative of a current state of the at least one of the plurality of appliances; and causing the software agent to perform the action when it is determined by the software agent that the current state of the at least one of the plurality of appliances corresponds to the action triggering state; wherein the action comprises the software agent transmitting one or more commands, via the one or more communication channels, to a target one or more of the plurality of appliances in the system to thereby cause a change in state of the target one or more of the plurality of appliances. Appeal Br. 10 (Claim Appendix). Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 3 REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Brown et al. US 2004/0015242 Al Jan. 22, 2004 Weber et al. US 6,480,901 B1 Nov. 12, 2002 Raji et al. US 2005/0216302 Al Sep. 29, 2005 Kotlicki US 2014/0176310 Al Jun. 26, 2014 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 2, 4–7, 10, 11, 13–16, 19, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown in view of Weber. Final Act. 6–11. Claims 3 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Weber, and Raji. Id. at 11–12. Claims 8, 9, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Weber, and Kotlicki. Id. at 12–13. ANALYSIS Appellant argues, inter alia, that Brown and Weber do not teach the claim 1 limitation “wherein the action comprises the software agent transmitting one or more commands, via the one or more communication channels, to a target one or more of the plurality of appliances in the system to thereby cause a change in state of the target one or more of the plurality of appliances” (also referred to as “disputed limitation”). Appeal Br. 5–7; Reply Br. 3–5. In the Final Action, the Examiner finds Brown teaches the limitations of claim 1, and independent claim 10, except Brown does not fully disclose the limitations below: Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 4 using a device discovery process to establish a listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the system; and using the listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the system, with reference to a command and/or protoctol [sic] database, to configure a software agent to exchange communications, via a one or more communication channels, with each of the plurality of appliances. Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner finds that Weber teaches these limitations and it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Brown in view of Weber in order to establish a listing of devices in the system and configure a software management application to the devices, and one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated because it would provide the ability to configure management software to particular devices. Id. at 6–8. Appellant argues that “the claimed invention is directed to a software agent that transmits one or more commands, via the one or more communication channels, to a target one or more of the plurality of appliances in the system to thereby cause a change in state of the target one or more of the plurality of appliance” and “[a]s will be appreciated and in keeping with the ordinary meaning of the word "command," the claimed "command" is an instruction -- in the form or a transmitted code or a signal - that tells a target appliance to do something.” Appeal. Br. 5. According to Appellant, Brown describes a system in which devices communicate information within one another via use of the Consumer Electronics Bus (CEBus) protocol through communication channels, and use of the CEBus protocol allows for the application software to reside at each Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 5 device. Id. (citing Brown ¶¶ 6, 33, 39). Appellant argues Brown teaches the application software that resides at each device may include one or more "workflow managers" wherein a "workflow manager" controls the implementation of routines called "workflows" and a "workflow" causes a scenario to be invoked on one device, e.g., a light being turned on, in response to a trigger condition of another device being met, e.g., a home alarm system being activated. Id. (citing Brown ¶ 38). Appellant refers to Figure 4 of Brown and argues As yet further described within Brown and illustrated in Fig. 4 thereof, to provide a trigger condition to a "workflow" resident on a first device 32, a second device 31, via use of the CEBus protocol, transmits condition information on a communication channel, e.g., a transmission bus 33, to a central control section. The central control section comprises a memory for storing the condition information and one or more routers that merely function to "direct the various types of information from the different devices." ¶ 0035; emphasis added). The central control section then transmits the condition information to the first device 32 via use of the same transmission bus 33. The first device 32 receives the condition information as transmitted via the transmission bus 33 whereupon application code 41 resident on the first device 32, i.e., the "workflow manager" resident on the first device, causes the first device 32 to adjust its own state in keeping with the condition information received from the second device. (¶ 0039). Thus, in Brown, it cannot be said that the "workflow manager may reside external from the device such as with state man[a]ger manager/central controller" (OA, pg. 4; emphasis added) when Brown expressly describes that the central controller only functions to route condition information to further devices. In view of the above, it is further submitted that when the second device 31 is a temperature sensor and the first device 32 is a thermostat in keeping with the example raised in the rejection of the claims (OA, pg. 7), the temperature sensor will Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 6 inform the central control section that the temperature has changed, for example, has changed to 68 degrees. The central control section will then provide a "temperature change notification" to the thermostat to inform the thermostat that the temperature has changed, e.g., that the temperature is now 68 degrees. As will be appreciated, the condition information, e.g., the information that the temperature has changed to 68 degrees, is not a command, i.e., does not tell the thermostat to do anything. Rather, the workflow manager resident on the thermostat uses the information received from the temperature sensor to determine an action to be performed. ¶¶ 0040 and 0042). From the foregoing, it will be appreciated that, while a first appliance in Brown will receive, via the one or more communication channels (e.g., power-line wiring, telephone wiring, coaxial cable wiring, and radio frequency), an informational message from a second appliance in the system, in Brown the first appliance, i.e., the appliance receiving the information message from the second appliance, will be caused to perform an internal action when it is determined that the informational message indicates that a current state of the second appliance corresponds to an action triggering state. The first appliance and/or the central control in Brown does not, however, transmit one or more commands, via the one or more communication channels (e.g., power-line wiring, telephone wiring, coaxial cable wiring, and radio frequency), to another, target one or more of the plurality of appliances in the system to thereby cause a change in state of the target one or more of the plurality of appliances as claimed. Id. at 6–7. Appellant further argues the Examiner errs in relying on Weber for the claim 1 limitations “using a device discovery process to establish a listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the system”; and “using the listing of each of the plurality of appliances in the system, with reference to a command and/or protoctol [sic] database, to configure a software agent to Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 7 exchange communications. . .” Id. at 7–9. According to Appellant, the Examiner’s suggested combination would change the way the Brown central control section is intended to operate, and Brown already has the capabilities that are asserted by the Examiner as a reason for modifying Brown. Id. (citing Brown ¶ 35; Final Act. 3, 8). In the Answer, the Examiner refers to Brown’s workflow manager that receives and stores information from various devices and coordinates communication between various devices. Ans. 3–4 (citing Brown ¶¶ 35, 37, 38). The Examiner finds Brown gives two examples of the workflow manager. In the first example, a user wants to limit the amount of time the cooling unit continuously operates. The work flow manager is in a constant monitoring state and when a status change is detected, a workflow manager will determine which workflow routine to activate based on the particular status change and the existing condition. The work flow manager can get the temperature status from the storage location for the temperature sensor or the thermostat device. When it is determined that the temperature has increased or decreased, the workflow manager will process the workflow routine and turn on or off the cooling system [0040-0044]. Therefore, workflow manager (software agent) is receiving a status and determining an action based on the status, and applying a command to the system. (Emphasis added). In the second example[,] [a]ll devices connected to the power outlet will submit to the state manager specific device attributes. And when a workflow manager detects a change in the number of devices operating from the outlet, it will determine if the number of devices connected has increase or decrease by retrieving the number of devices that are currently operating from the stored outlet status information. If the number has increased, the workflow manager will activate the workflow routine. Based on the workflow routine, when a device is connected and begins to operate, the workflow Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 8 manager will determine if the amount of available power is greater than the amount of powered required by all non- operating devices. If the amount available is not greater than the amount required by the connected devices, than the workflow manager will disable the devices that have power requirements that exceed the available power at the outlet device [0046- 0049]. Therefore, the workflow manager (software agent) receives a status of a newly connected device and transmits a command to enable or disable another connected device based on a trigger state. (Emphasis added). Additionally, applicant is making an assumption that each device may include one or more workflow manager[s]. However, applicant cited paragraph [0038, there is no clear indication that one or more workflow manager[s] are residing on the device itself. Furthermore, the claim recites “. . . configure a software agent to exchange communication, via one or more communication channels, with each of the plurality of appliances ... “, “. . . transmitting one or more commands, via the one or more communication channels, to a target one or more of the plurality of appliances in the system to thereby cause a change in state of the target one or more of the plurality of appliances”. Based on the broadest reasonable interpretation. A communication channel can be any form of channel that transmits data from one device/component to another, whether it be internally or externally. Based on the claimed limitation cited above, there is no[] requirement that the software agent must be external to a device. But rather, a communication between two devices, or communication between two components within a device is a form of communication channel. Ans. 4–5. Regarding the combination of Brown and Weber, the Examiner additionally finds that Brown (rather than relying on Weber as in Final Act. 7–8) teaches “a list maintaining status information of all devices, and a Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 9 workflow manager that manages a set of scenarios, the scenarios [are] user define[d] action when triggered.” Id. at 7 (citing Brown ¶¶ 37, 38). The Examiner then relies on Weber to teach a “‘discovery process’ to establish the listing of each of the plurality of devices and using the listing with reference to a database, configure a software agent with the devices.” Id. at 7 (citing Weber 7:25–48, 14:50–57). According to the Examiner, “it would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify Brown in view of Weber in order to have a discovery process to establish a listing of devices in the system and configure a software management application to the devices based off a database of connected devices” and “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated because it would provide the ability to configure management software and the associated devices.” Id. (citing Weber, 7:36–46). In the Reply Brief, Appellant reiterates arguments and argues Brown does not teach a centralized device/software agent that performs an action, where the action comprises the centralized device/software agent transmitting one or more commands to a target appliance to thereby cause a change of state of the target appliance (emphasis added). Reply Br. 2–3. Appellant argues the word “command” never appears within Brown, and that “Brown never expressly describes a centralized workflow manager that determines an action based on a status and that ‘appl[ies] a command to the system’ (Ex. Ans., pg. 4) or a centralized workflow man[a]ger that receives a status of a newly connected device and ‘transmits a command to enable or disable another connected device based on a trigger state.’” Id. (citing Ans., pg. 4). Appellant further argues the Examiner has not met the burden that Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 10 the claimed elements are inherently disclosed by showing the claimed elements necessarily flow from the teachings of Brown. Appellant argues the Examiner’s asserted claim interpretation set forth in the Answer is incorrect. In particular, Appellant argues the claims should not be read such that an "appliance" can be an internal component of a device and that a command communication can be between "two components within a device." Id. at 4 (citing Ans., pg. 5). According to Appellant, the Examiner’s interpretation is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “appliance,” the claims, the Specification, and Brown. Id. In particular, “to one of ordinary skill in the art, an ‘appliance’ would not be considered to be a ‘component’ within a device but would instead be considered to be a household or office device (such as a stove, fan, or refrigerator) operated by gas or electric current (See, e.g., Merriam Webster dictionary, Brown in paragraph 0003, and the subject application at Pg. 2, line 22–Pg. 3, line 5).” Id. at 5. Appellant argues the asserted combination of Weber with Brown is without adequate basis because it would change the information transfer of the Brown principle of operation and the Examiner has not identified a problem of Brown that would be cured by using the teaching of Weber. Id. at 5–6. On the record before us, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and agree, instead, with the findings and conclusion of the Examiner. As stated by the Supreme Court, the Examiner’s obviousness rejection must be based on: [S]ome articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness. . . . [H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed to the Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 11 specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the Specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). While we interpret claims broadly, but reasonably in light of the Specification, we nonetheless must not import limitations from the Specification into the claims. See In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). We do not agree with Appellant’s claim interpretation as it is unreasonably narrow. Regarding the term “command,” the term is used in the Specification “to receive operational command,” “to exit energy-saving mode,” and “to turn on one or more lights,” and the term “command” is not explicitly defined in the Specification. See Spec., 3:5–9, 8:3–7. However, the recited claim term is simply “command,” not an “operational command,” or a “direct command,” and the command is transmitted to one of a plurality of appliances. Similarly, the claim does not recite a “centralized device/software agent transmitting” as argued by Appellant, the claim simply recites “a software agent.” See Reply Br. 2–3. Moreover, the claim does not recite that the software agent is external to the “one or more . . . appliances.” Additionally, the Specification states “it will be understood that the physical platform upon which the disclosed software agent functionality is resident may comprise any of the above forms, or any other Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 12 convenient configuration, as appropriate for a particular embodiment. Spec., 5:11–14. Although a term “communication interface” is utilized at least once in the Specification, the claim term “communication channel” is not defined or utilized in the Specification. See Spec. 4:4–19. Additionally, both the Specification and Brown use the terms “appliances” and “devices” interchangeably. See, e.g., Spec., 2:22–3:5; Brown ¶ 9. Brown teaches a system in which devices communicate information with one another via use of the Consumer Electronics Bus (CEBus) protocol. Brown ¶ 33). A “workflow manager” controls the implementation of routines called “workflows.” Id. at ¶ 38. A “workflow” causes a scenario to be invoked on one device, e.g., a light being turned on, in response to a trigger condition of another device being met, e.g., a home alarm system being activated. Id. at ¶ 38. Figure 4 of Brown teaches condition information is communicated on a communication channel to a central control section which stores the information and directs the information to the devices. Id. at ¶ 39. Use of the CEBus protocol allows for application software to reside at each device. Id. at ¶ 39. The devices perform an internal action using the information to determine an action to be performed. Brown ¶¶ 40, 42–44; Figs. 5, 6a, 6b. Here, applying a broad and reasonable claim interpretation, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Brown teaches the “software agent transmitting one . . . commands” (disputed limitation). In particular, in one example, Brown’s workflow manager activates the workflow which makes a determination of the temperature, and turns on the cooling unit. Brown ¶¶ 41, 42; Figs. 5, 6a, element 61. This action constitutes the claimed “command” as broadly and reasonably interpreted. Additionally, although Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 13 Brown notes that the use of Consumer Electronics Bus (CEBus) protocol allows for application software to reside on each device, this is not described as required, and the claim does not exclude the use of CEBus protocol. Brown ¶ 39. Moreover, even if the application software is on each Brown device, the “communication channel” would constitute the channel within the device, and the Brown channel includes the channel to the central control unit. Brown ¶¶ 33–35, Figs. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6a. Regarding the combination of Brown and Weber, we agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusion, particularly as set forth in the Answer in which the Examiner additionally relies on Brown and provides factual evidence and articulated reasoning to support the conclusion of obviousness. Ans. 7. Appellant does not persuasively argue these findings and conclusion. We note [t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, independent claim 10, and dependent claims 2, 4–7, 11, 13–16, 19, and 20 as these claims are not argued separately. We also sustain the rejection of dependent claims 3, 8, 9, 17, and 18 which are rejected over the combination of Brown, Weber and the additional cited references as these claims are not argued separately. Appeal 2018-008345 Application 14/618,365 14 CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–7, 10, 11, 13–16, 19, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown and Weber is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3 and 12 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Brown, Weber, and Raji is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 8, 9, 17, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Brown, Weber, and Kotlicki is affirmed. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 2, 4–7, 10, 11, 13– 16, 19, 20 103(a) Brown, Weber 1, 2, 4–7, 10, 11, 13– 16, 19, 20 3,12 103(a) Brown, Weber, Raji 3, 12 8, 9, 17, 18 103(a) Brown, Weber, Kotlicki 8, 9, 17, 18 Overall Outcome: 1–20 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation