Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Areas), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionNov 25, 1998
01981666 (E.E.O.C. Nov. 25, 1998)

01981666

11-25-1998

Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Areas), Agency.


Linda M. Threatt v. United States Postal Service

01981666

November 25, 1998

Linda M. Threatt,

Appellant,

v.

William J. Henderson,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Areas),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01981666

Agency No. 1D-221-1118-95

1D-221-1151-95

Hearing No. 100-96-7182X

100-96-7515X

100-97-7200X

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission or EEOC) from a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her allegations that she was discriminated against, in

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The Commission hereby accepts the appeal in

accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001. For the reasons set forth below

the FAD is AFFIRMED.

The issues on appeal are as follows:

Complaint No. 1/Hearing No. 100-96-7182X - whether appellant

was discriminated against on the bases of sex (female), race

(African-American), color (brown), and reprisal (prior EEO activity),

when from March 25, 1995 through May 9, 1995: (1) she was denied an

opportunity to work at a higher level as an acting supervisor; and (2)

she was denied career developmental details.

Complaint No. 2/Hearing No. 100-96-7515X - whether appellant was

discriminated against on the basis of reprisal when on June 1, 1995, and

ongoing: (1) she was denied an opportunity to work at a higher level as an

acting supervisor; and (2) she was denied career developmental details.

Complaint No. 3/Hearing No. 100-97-7200X - whether appellant

was discriminated against on the bases of sex (female), race

(African-American), color (brown), and reprisal (prior EEO activity)

when: (1) in June 1994 she was removed from the Supervisor's schedule;

and (2) from May 1994 through March 24, 1995, she was kept off the Acting

Supervisor's schedule.

At the time of the alleged discriminatory events, appellant was

employed as a Distribution Clerk at the agency's Merrifield Processing

and Distribution Center in Merrifield, Virginia. The investigative

record reveals that beginning in May 1994, the Manager of Distribution

Operations (MDO1) removed appellant's name from the schedule list of

acting supervisors. Consequently, a second MDO (MDO2) did not use

appellant as an acting supervisor. From March 25 and thereafter,

appellant was not chosen to participate in any of a number of duties

that she perceived as career developmental opportunities, including:

Dispatch Coordinator, relief for the Manager Distribution Operations

and relief for the Administrative Support Office. Several similarly

situated comparators were treated more favorably. The agency presented

credible testimony that appellant was removed from the acting supervisor

list because she was found to be lacking in integrity and because of

poor performance. Specifically, MDO1 and MDO2 concluded that appellant

had lied about another employee's whereabouts and behavior in a witness

statement she made for a Union Grievance appeal. The agency officials

further testified that permitting appellant to work in a supervisory

capacity would affect the morale of the duty station as it would

give the impression that they were rewarding lackluster performance.

Further, individuals who participated in the aforementioned developmental

opportunities were selected based on their dependability and work ethic.

Appellant had not displayed the desired attributes and work quality.

Believing that she was the victim of discrimination, appellant sought

EEO counseling and, thereafter, filed formal EEO complaints on August

24, 1995 (Complaint No. 1) and October 10, 1995 (Complaint No. 2).

The agency accepted the complaints for investigation and complied with all

of our procedural and regulatory prerequisites. Thereafter, the agency

dismissed part of Complaint No. 1 and continued processing the rest of

the complaint. Subsequently, appellant requested a hearing before an

EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ) concerning that portion of Complaint No. 1

that was not dismissed and Complaint No. 2. and appealed the dismissal to

the Commission. In Threatt v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal

No. 01960443 (October 8, 1996) the Commission remanded several of the

issues that had been dismissed. During the period that the remanded

issues were being investigated, and because a hearing date had been

set for Complaint Numbers 1 and 2, the agency moved for a continuance

in order that the AJ might review the remanded issues at the same time.

The motion was granted and the complaints were consolidated for review

by the AJ. The remanded issues were assigned a separate EEOC hearing

number, 100-97-7200X and referred to by the AJ as Complaint No. 3.

Prior to the hearing, the AJ responded to the agency's motion for a

decision on the record. After consideration of the respective positions

of the parties, the AJ concluded that there were no issues of material

fact and granted the motion.

Upon review of the record, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision (RD)

finding no discrimination. In her RD, the AJ concluded that appellant

had established a prima facie case of discrimination based on race, color

and sex, but failed to show that the agency's actions were pretextual.

The AJ further concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima

facie case of reprisal discrimination because there was no showing that

any of the responsible agency officials were aware of appellant's prior

EEO activity. Thereafter, the agency adopted the RD and issued a FAD,

dated November 19, 1997, finding no discrimination. It is from this

agency decision that appellant now appeals. On appeal, appellant

reiterates previously submitted contentions.

After careful review of the entire record, including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission finds

that the AJ's RD sets forth the relevant facts, and properly analyzes

the appropriate regulations, policies and laws. The Commission discerns

no basis to disturb the AJ's finding. Accordingly, the FAD is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or

to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON

WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT

PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may

result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"

means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or

department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the

administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Nov 25, 1998

______________ ____________________________________

Date Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations