Antonio Hernandez, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionApr 15, 2004
01A21997_r (E.E.O.C. Apr. 15, 2004)

01A21997_r

04-15-2004

Antonio Hernandez, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Antonio Hernandez v. United States Postal Service

01A21997

April 15, 2004

.

Antonio Hernandez,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A21997

Agency Nos. 4H-320-0195-99

4H-320-0070-00

Hearing Nos. 150-A0-8928X

150-A1-8405X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning two equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.

The record reveals that complainant, a Distribution/Window Clerk at the

agency's Rio Piedras Station in San Juan, Puerto Rico, filed two formal

EEO complaints on September 3, 1999 and March 6, 2000, respectively.

Therein, complainant claimed that he was the victim of unlawful employment

discrimination on the bases of national origin (Hispanic) and disability

(deformed and weak bones of the hand) when:

on March 12, 1999, he was denied a transfer to the Gainesville, Florida

Post (Agency No. 4H-320-0195-99); and

on December 10, 1999, he was denied a transfer to the Lake City, Florida

post office (Agency No. 4H-320-0070-00).

In a final decision issued on October 22, 1999 final decision, the

agency dismissed Agency No. 4H-320-0195-99 on the grounds of untimely

EEO Counselor contact. On appeal, the Commission reversed the agency's

dismissal and remanded the complaint to the agency for further processing.

Hernandez v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A00982

(May 16, 2000).

Thereafter, at the conclusion of the investigation of the two captioned

complaints, complainant received a copy of the investigative report and

requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On March

3, 2001, the agency filed a Motion to Consolidate, requesting that

Agency No. 4H-320-0070-00 be consolidated for hearing with Agency

No. 4H-320-0195-99. Following a hearing, the AJ issued a decision

finding no discrimination with respect to Agency Nos. 4H-320-0195-99

and 4H-320-0070-00.

Regarding discrimination on the basis of national origin, the AJ

found that complainant failed to demonstrate that similarly situated

employees not in complainant's protected class were treated differently

under similar circumstances. Regarding the denial of transfer to the

Gainesville post office (Agency No. 4H-320-0195-99), the AJ noted

that only one out of the six individuals who received transfers to

Gainesville holds the same position as complainant. The AJ further

noted that the individual who was transferred to Gainesville was from

the same commuting area as the Gainesville facility. Furthermore, the

AJ noted that complainant did not dispute a Labor Relations Specialist's

testimony or the Postmaster's affidavit stating that transfers from the

same geographic location are given greater consideration.

Regarding the denial of transfer to the Lake City post office (Agency

No. 4H-320-0070-00), the AJ found that only one individual was given

a transfer after complainant submitted his request for a transfer to

the Lake City facility. The AJ also found that the individual who was

transferred to the Lake City facility was a letter carrier, a position

for which complainant was not qualified.

Regarding discrimination on the basis of disability, the AJ found that

complainant failed to present any evidence reflecting that he is a person

with a disability.

Furthermore, the AJ found that there was nothing in the record that the

denials of a transfer was a result of complainant's national origin

or disability. The AJ concluded that the denials of a transfer were

the result of �a combination of bad timing, a poor evaluation from

[complainant's] supervisor, and too many people within the Lake City

and Gainesville community areas who were also seeking transfers.�

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision.

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings

by an AJ will be upheld if

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence

is defined as "such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations

Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding

whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding.

See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's

conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether

or not a hearing was held.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis

first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that

a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment

action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction

Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to

the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,

450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the

complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder

by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of

a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502

(1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of

the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

The Commission determines that the record supports a finding that

the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

its actions.<1> Specifically, the record reveals that complainant

received a "below average" evaluation based on a prior suspension and

attendance problems. Moreover, the record supports the AJ's finding

that the transfer denials were further predicated upon the �below

average� evaluation combined with other factors such as poor timing and

preference for transfer applicants who were within commuting distance

of the transfer sites. Moreover, we find that complainant did not

sufficiently rebut this explanation with evidence from which a reasonable

fact- finder could conclude that unlawful discriminatory animus motivated

the denial of transfer to either the Gainesville or Lake City post office.

The Commission determines that the AJ's findings of fact are supported by

substantial evidence in the record and that the AJ's decision referenced

the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We discern no basis to

disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination. Therefore, after a careful

review of the record, we AFFIRM the agency's final order implementing

the AJ's finding of no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

April 15, 2004

__________________

Date

1The Commission presumes for purposes of

analysis only, and without so finding, that complainant is a person with

a disability.