Anindya Ghoshal et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 23, 2019

12337848 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 23, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/337,848 12/18/2008 Anindya Ghoshal SK-05972-US
(LMS0526US)
4430
91017 7590 09/23/2019
Cantor Colburn LLP - Sikorsky Aircraft Corp.
20 Church Street
22nd Floor
Hartford, CT 06103
EXAMINER
PARK, HYUN D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2865
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/23/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usptopatentmail@cantorcolburn.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________
Ex Parte ANINDYA GHOSHAL, ROXANA ZANGOR,
ZAFFIR A. CHAUDHRY, JIMMY LIH-MIN YEH,
JEFFERY R. SCHAFF, and MARK W. DAVIS
____________________

Appeal 2018-000217
Application 12/337,848
Technology Center 2800
____________________

Before JAMES A. WORTH, AVELYN M. ROSS, and
MICHAEL G. McMANUS, Administrative Patent Judges.

ROSS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
Appellant2 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a non-final
rejection of claims 1–4 and 6–24. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 In our Decision we refer to the Specification filed December 18, 2008
(“Spec.”), the Non-Final Office Action appealed from dated October 6, 2016
(“Non-Final”), the Appeal Brief filed March 31, 2017 (“Appeal Br.”), the
Examiner’s Answer dated August 10, 2017 (“Ans.”), and the Reply Brief
filed October 10, 2017 (“Reply”).
2 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined by 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The subject matter on appeal relates to “structural health management,
and more particularly to a method for monitoring [the] health of a structure”
such as an aircraft. Spec. ¶¶ 1–3. Independent claim 1, reproduced below,
is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
l. A method comprising:
performing a first damage prediction with a computational
model using at least data from a multitude of damage sensors
mounted to a structure, the multitude of damage sensors
including a multitude of local damage sensors applied to the
structure and a multitude of global damage sensors applied to the
structure, wherein the multitude of damage sensors provide data
indicative of the configuration of the structure;
performing a second damage prediction with the
computational model using at least data from a multitude of load
sensors associated with the structure;
selectively performing on a Health and Usage Monitoring
System (“HUMS”) one of a plurality of predefined damage
monitoring actions in response to the outcome of the first damage
prediction and the second damage prediction to determine a
structural health;
identifying areas on the structure where damage is likely
to occur under operational conditions;
mounting a first quantity of the multitude of local damage
sensors to the areas where damage is likely to occur; and
mounting a second quantity of the multitude of global
damage sensors to a plurality of locations on the structure, the
second quantity greater than the first quantity.

Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App’x). Claim 19, the remaining independent claim,
is similar to claim 1 but claims a system for monitoring the health of a
structure. Id. at 13.
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REJECTIONS
The Examiner maintains the following rejections:
A. Claims 1–4, 6–8, 19, 21, and 23 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Trego,3 Materer),4
and Monroe.5 Non-Final 3.

B. Claims 9–10, 14, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 over the combination of Trego, Materer, Monroe,
and further in view of Petrisco.6 Id. at 8.

C. Claims 11–13 and 15–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 over the combination of Trego, Materer, Monroe,
and further in view of Swaminathan.7 Id. at 13.

D. Claims 22 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
over the combination of Trego, Materer, Monroe, and
further in view of Malkin.8 Id. at 22.
Appellant seeks our review of Rejections A–D. See generally Appeal
Br. Appellant presents argument for Rejection A, claims 1 and 19
(together), and claim 23, and Rejection D, claims 22 and 24 (together). See
id. Therefore, consistent with the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
(2013), we limit our discussion to Rejections A and D (claims 1, 19, and 22–

3 Trego et al., US 2006/0004499 A1, published January 5, 2006 (“Trego”).
4 Materer et al., US 2009/0058427 A1, published March 5, 2009
(“Materer”).
5 David A. Monroe, US 5,798,458, issued August 25, 1998 (“Monroe”).
6 Petrisko et al., US 3,777,555, issued Dec. 11, 1973 (“Petrisko”).
7 Swaminathan et al., US 5,140,528, issued August 18, 1992
(“Swaminathan”)
8 Malkin et al., US 7,302,866; issued December 4, 2007 (“Malkin”).
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24) and all other remaining claims stand or fall together with the claim from
which they depend.
OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential)
(cited with approval in In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify
the alleged error in the examiner’s rejections . . . .”)). After considering the
evidence presented in this Appeal and each of Appellant’s arguments, we are
not persuaded that Appellant identifies reversible error. Thus, where we
affirm the Examiner’s rejection, we do so for the reasons expressed in the
Final Office Action and the Answer. We add the following.

Rejection A – Obviousness
(claims 1–4, 6–8, 19, 21, and 23)
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 6–8, 19, 21, and 23 over the
combination of Trego, Materer, and Monroe. Non-Final 3.
Claims 1 and 19:
The Examiner finds that Trego teaches nearly all aspects of claims 1
and 19, including “a multitude of local damage sensors applied to the
structure (Paragraph [0029], lines 7-8, corrosion sensors, Fig. 3 222) and a
multitude of global damage sensors applied to the structure (Paragraph
[0029], lines 1-7, acoustic sensors for detecting cracks; Fig. 3 220; strain
sensors detecting impact; Fig. 3, 214, Paragraph [0031]).” Id. at 4. The
Examiner acknowledges that Trego does not disclose “a first quantity of the
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multitude of local damage sensors . . . and a second quantity of the
multitude of global damage sensors [where] the second quantity greater than
the first quantity,” as claimed. Non-Final 5; Appeal Br. 10 (Claims App’x).
But, the Examiner finds that “Materer discloses placing four local damage
sensors (Fig. 6, corrosion sensors 100) at various locations on the aircraft to
monitor corrosion (Paragraph [0041])” and “Monroe discloses placing a
greater quantity of low cost, global damage sensors throughout the aircraft to
monitor structural damages (Fig. 1, acoustic sensors 19a-19m or 14 sensors;
Col. 2, lines 11-15, lines 32-39, lines 57-65; Fig. 2).” Id. at 5. The
Examiner reasons that because Trego describes identifying areas on the
structure where damage is likely to occur—which is necessarily smaller than
the remaining areas of the aircraft—it would have been obvious to mount
local damage sensors to the smaller areas (i.e., damage-prone locations) and
then mount global damage sensors in “a greater quantity throughout the
larger areas . . . of the aircraft,” in order to provide for comprehensive
damage monitoring of the entire aircraft. Id. at 6.
Appellant presents four arguments in opposition to the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1 and 19. Appeal Br. 4–7. First, Appellant argues that
Monroe does not teach damage sensors because the claims require damage
sensors to “perform[] a first damage prediction” where the sensors of
Monroe are acoustic sensors that record sounds and are used to reconstruct
an event. Id. at 5. According to Appellant, “[o]ne skilled in the art would
not consider a sound recording device to be a ‘damage sensor.’” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. As the Examiner
explains, Appellant is narrowly interpreting “damage sensor.” Ans. 3. The
Specification, however, broadly defines “damage sensor” as “any device that
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can either sense a deviation in a structure from its original configuration or
that can produce a signal that can be used to sense the deviation in the
structure from its original configuration.” Spec. ¶ 16 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Examiner finds that Trego “teaches that information
gathered from the passive acoustic sensor and active acoustic sensors are
used to develop information regarding likely, incipient, and actual damage
and degradation of the structure.” Ans. 4 (citing Trego ¶ 29). In particular,
Trego states that data from these sensors can be used by the usage monitor to
“include a probabilistic corrosion model to predict the initiation of corrosion
and assess the subsequent progress thereof.” Trego ¶ 29 (emphasis added).
The Examiner also finds that Monroe “uses acoustic sensors to detect
structural mechanical failures or other acoustical events where sensed
information is sent to the flight crew and ground tracking system for analysis
during flights.” Id.
The recorded signals are invaluable in locating the source of an
onboard acoustic event such as . . . a structural failure . . . or the
like. Additional sensors could also be utilized, the sensors 19a-
19m are shown just to provide an example of placement in order
to illustrate the teachings of the subject invention. . . . The time
and intensity of the detected signal at each of the sensors 19a-
19m will permit reconstruction of the event, pinpointing where
the failure or event occurred. By tying the acoustic signal to a
chronology, barometric pressure and navigational tracking
signals, as will be explained herein, the acoustic data can be used
to reconstruct the precise location, time and intensity of an event.
This will greatly enhance the ability to reconstruct an event and
will also permit corrective action to be taken while in flight,
where possible.
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Monroe, 5:8–32. Therefore, consistent with the Examiner’s findings, both
Trego and Monroe suggest the use of the damage sensors to predict where
damage is likely to occur.
Second, Appellant asserts that “neither Materer nor Monroe teaches
one to provide more global damage sensors than local damage sensors.”
Appeal Br. 5. Appellant contends that when Materer and Monroe teach four
corrosion sensors or sensors 19a–19m, respectively, these are merely
exemplary. Id. Appellants further argue that, relative quantities of local to
global sensors are not suggested, but rather, “the teachings of Materer and
Monroe could still result in an equal quantity of global and local sensors, or
could result in more local sensors that global sensors.” Id. at 6.
On this record, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. As the
Examiner states (Ans. 5), the difference between local and global sensors are
“merely labels” and do not differentiate between the two types of sensors,
which “can actually be the same type of sensors.” Id. at 6; see also Reply
Br. 2 (admitting “that the local and global sensors could be the same type of
sensor”). Because the difference between local and global sensors are
quantitative, we agree with the Examiner that “any sensor arrangement
showing simply the ‘differences in the quantity’ of two types of any damage
sensors mounted onto the given structure, will read on the claims.” Ans. 7.
The Examiner’s findings that Trego and Materer teach placing corrosion
sensors in discrete areas where corrosion is likely to occur (id. at 7) and
Monroe describes placing low cost acoustic sensors throughout the aircraft
(id. at 8) are supported by the record. Therefore, like the Examiner, we
determine that the combination of Trego, Materer, and Monroe suggests
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placement of a greater number of global damage sensors as compared to
local damage sensors.
Furthermore, our reviewing court guides that where “the problem is
known, the possible approaches to solving the problem are known and finite,
and the solution is predictable through use of a known option,” a solution
that is obvious to try may indeed be obvious. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc.,
544 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008), citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007); see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc.,
874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (The fact that a reference “discloses a
multitude of effective combinations does not render any particular
formulation less obvious.”). Here, because there are only a finite set of
options having predictable results—that is, a greater number, an equal
number, or a lesser number of global sensors compared to local sensors—
and the Examiner has identified each of the claimed elements in the cited
references supported by an adequate rationale for combining those
teachings, the claimed proportions, if any modification were required, would
have been “obvious to try” at the time of Appellant’s invention. Moreover,
Appellant has provided no evidence that modifying the teachings in the cited
references would have been “outside the technical grasp” of the ordinary
artisan, nor has Appellant presented evidence that the result would not have
been predictable. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420. As a result, we are not persuaded
the Examiner reversibly erred in concluding that having a greater number of
global damage sensors in comparison to the quantity of local damage sensors
would have been obvious to an artisan possessing an ordinary skill at the
time of invention.
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Third, Appellant contends that the Examiner’s reasoning is flawed,
lacks rational underpinnings, and is supported by improper hindsight
reconstruction. Appeal Br. 6. Appellant asserts that there is no basis for the
Examiner’s position that the areas where corrosion would occur (i.e., the
location of local sensors) would obviously be smaller than the remaining
area of the aircraft. Id.
Appellant argues that “the Examiner has no basis for this statement”
and that “even if there were smaller number of areas where corrosion may
occur, it does not necessarily follow that one would provide a small number
of sensors in those areas—especially considering that Monroe and Materer
do not teach one to provide fewer local sensors than global sensors.” Id.
According to Appellant, the Examiner’s basis for combining the
references—i.e., to provide “comprehensive damage monitoring—lacks any
basis absent reference to Appellant’s disclosure. Id. at 6–7.
On this record, we agree with the Examiner who finds “Trego teaches
that corrosion sensors may be located in limited areas such as doors” and
that Materer “discloses placing four local damage sensors in locations where
corrosion is a concern.” Ans. 7; see also Trego ¶ 29 (identifying “areas
exposed to impact [which] include the following doors and surrounding
structures: passenger doors, service doors, and cargo doors”). The Examiner
further finds that “Monroe, on the other hand, discloses placing a greater
quantity of low cost, global damage sensors throughout the aircraft to
monitor structural damage.” Id. at 8. Thus, Appellant’s argument that the
Examiner’s account of the prior art is inaccurate and that “the notion that
‘corrosion sensors do not need to be placed throughout the aircraft’ comes
entirely from the Examiner,” and not the prior art (Reply Br. 2) is
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unpersuasive. Based on the combined teachings of Trego, Monroe and
Materer, the Examiner reasons that “one of ordinary skill in the art would
have still obviously combined the above references to arrive at the claimed
invention, since the particular combination of ‘differences in quantity’ of
local and damage sensors . . . would have nonetheless, provided a
comprehensive damage monitoring of the entire aircraft.” Ans. 8. We find
no error in the Examiner’s reasoning or evidence of hindsight.
Lastly, Appellant urges that the Examiner’s changing positions over
four separate office actions is evidence “that there truly is no rational
reason” for modifying Trego. Appeal Br. 7. Appellant’s fourth argument
does not identify, much less allege, a basis for reversible error on the part of
the Examiner and is therefore unpersuasive.
Therefore, on this record, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1 and 19.
Claim 23:
Claim 23 depends from claim 1 and further requires “the local damage
sensors are selected from the group consisting of ultrasonic sensors, phase
data sensors, and crack gauges.” Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App’x). The
Examiner finds that “Trego discloses the local damage sensors are selected
from the group consisting of ultrasonic sensors, phase data sensors, and
crack gauges.” Non-Final 8 (citing Trego, Fig. 3, 220 and ¶ 29).
Appellant argues that “when addressing claim 1, the Examiner reads
the claimed global sensors on Trego’s sensors 220 . . . [but] [c]laim 23
relates to local sensors, however.” Appeal Br. 8. Therefore, sensors 220
cannot be the local sensors as claimed. Id.
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in incorrectly identifying the ultrasonic sensors and crack gauges,
corresponding global sensor 220, as local sensors in claim 23. “Appellant
agrees that the local and global sensors could be the same type of sensor.”
Reply Br. 2. The Examiner further explains that “Trego, in general terms,
describes corrosion sensor, it is well known that ultrasonic sensors and crack
monitors are also corrosion sensors, since they are widely accepted non-
destructive testing technique for corrosion detection, including in pipes,
tubes, and other structures.” Ans. 10. Therefore, the fact that the Examiner
identified ultrasonic sensors (acoustic sensors 220), i.e., a type of sensor, in
rejecting claim 23 is irrelevant because the local and global sensors may be
the same type of sensor.
Rejection D – Obviousness
(claims 22 and 24)
The Examiner rejects claims 22 and 24 over the combination of
Trego, Materer, Monroe, and further in view of Malkin. Non-Final 22.
Claims 22 and 24, depending from claim 1 and claim 19 respectively,
additionally requires that “the multitude of global damage sensors are piezo
sensors.” Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App’x). The Examiner finds that the
additional subject matter of claims 22 and 24 are taught by Malkin. Id. at
22. The Examiner explains that “[a]lthough Trego discloses the use of strain
gauges, the strain gauges are not disclosed as piezo,” but “Malkin discloses a
piezo strain sensor for an aerospace vehicle.” Id. The Examiner reasons that
one skilled in the art would have reason to use the piezo strain gauge of
Malkin “so as to allow the complete sensor assembly to be placed in the
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airstream of the vehicle or within confined tight interior spaces in which no
cable need[s] to be permanently attached to the sensing head.” Id. at 22–23.
Appellant contends that claims 22 and 24 are not obvious over the
combination proffered by the Examiner. Appeal Br. 8. Specifically,
Appellant argues that “the Examiner appears to have forgotten the rejection
of claims 1 and 19 modified Trego such that its ‘global sensors’ were
replaced by Monroe’s acoustic sensors 19a-19m. One would certainly not
replace an acoustic sensor with a piezo sensor.” Id.
The Examiner explains that he has designated both the “acoustic
sensors as well as strain sensors as global damage sensors (see Section B1
above). It should be noted that strain sensors can also utilize surface
acoustic waves for detection of strain. In this sense, strain sensors can also
be viewed as an acoustic sensor.” Ans. 9. The Examiner finds that Malkin’s
“piezosensor . . . is based on ultrasound (or acoustic as it is related to
sound).” Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. The Examiner relies
upon Trego to teach nearly all aspects of claims 1 and claim 19—including
global sensors (acoustic sensors 220 and strain sensors 214)—except that
Trego does not suggest “a first quantity of the multitude of local damage
sensors . . . and a second quantity of the multitude of global damage sensors
[where] the second quantity greater than the first quantity,” as claimed.
Non-Final 5; Appeal Br. 10, 13 (Claims App’x). The Examiner relies on the
combined teachings of Trego, Materer, and Monroe to suggest a quantity of
global damage sensors that is greater than the quantity of local damage
sensors. The Examiner does not suggest replacing Trego’s global sensors
with Monroe’s acoustic sensors 19a–19m. Furthermore, Appellant
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acknowledges local damage sensors and global damage sensors could be the
same type. Reply Br. 2. Therefore, Appellant’s argument fails to identify
any reversible error because Appellant does not address the rejection as
presented by the Examiner.
CONCLUSION
Appellant fails to identify a reversible error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–4, 6–6, 19, 21, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the
combination of Trego, Materer, and Monroe.
Appellant fails to identify a reversible error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 9–10, 14, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the
combination of Trego, Materer, Monroe, and further in view of Petrisco.
Appellant fails to identify a reversible error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 11–13 and 15–18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the
combination of Trego, Materer, Monroe, and further in view of
Swaminathan.
Appellant fails to identify a reversible error in the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 22 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of
Trego, Materer, Monroe, and further in view of Malkin.
DECISION
For the above reasons, the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–4 and 6–
24 is affirmed as detailed below.

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Claims
Rejected
Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6–8, 19,
21, 23
§ 103 Trego, Materer,
Monroe
1–4, 6–8, 19,
21, 23

9–10, 14, 20 § 103 Trego, Materer,
Monroe, Petrisco
9–10, 14, 20
11–13, 15–18 § 103 Trego, Materer,
Monroe, Swaminathan
11–13, 15–18
22, 24 § 103 Trego, Materer,
Monroe, Malkin
22, 24
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–24

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED