American Medical Response Mid-Atlantic, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jul 18, 2019

05-CA-221233 (N.L.R.B. Jul. 18, 2019)

JD–58–19
Washington, D.C.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE
MID-ATLANTIC, INC.
and Case 05-CA-221233
MOSIAH O. GRAYTON, an Individual
Christy E. Bergstresser, Esq., for the General Counsel.
John M. Barr, Esq., (Richmond, Virginia) for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Arthur J. Amchan, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Washington, D.C.
on May 22-23, 2019. Mosiah O. Grayton, filed the initial charge on May 24, 2018. She filed
amended charges on June 4, 2018 and January 9, 2019. The General Counsel issued the
complaint on February 4, 2019.
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent, American Medical Response (AMR),
violated the Act by suspending and issuing Mosiah Grayton a last chance agreement in
December 2017 and then by discharging her in May 2018 because she violated the terms of the
last chance agreement. The General Counsel does not allege that the May 2018 conduct for
which Ms. Grayton was discharged was protected. However, the discharge was predicated upon
the last chance agreement, which he alleges was issued for conduct that is protected by Section 7
of the Act.
On the entire record,1 including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and
after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Respondent, I make the following

1 At Tr. 235, line 13, I either said or meant to say hearsay with regard to matters asserted by Ms.
Johnson, rather than Mr. Rohde.
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2
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
5
Respondent AMR is a corporation which operates ambulances in Washington, D.C. and
elsewhere in the United States.2 AMR admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), District Council 20, which
represented Mosiah Grayton when she was employed by AMR, is a labor organization within the 10
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Mosiah Grayton worked for Respondent as an emergency medical technician (EMT) for 15
3 ½ years. Her employment with AMR was not continuous. Grayton’s last period of
employment was from March 2016 to May 24, 2018, when she was terminated. As an EMT,
Grayton transported low priority patients, for example taking them by ambulance from a nursing
home to a doctor’s appointment. Respondent’s EMTs work in pairs. Throughout her last period
of employment, Grayton’s partner most of the time was Briana Hampleton.320
The events of November 2017
Generally when EMTs return to their base of operations on V Street N.E., a supervisor is
present to meet them. One of things the supervisors check is the level of fuel in the ambulances’ 25
tank. The supervisor who meets them is not the same person every time.
At the end of a shift on November 8, 2017, Grayton, who was driving, and Hampleton,
who was in the passenger seat of the ambulance, returned to the base. They were met by
Supervisor Stephen Pawlak. Pawlak told them they must completely fill the gas tank before 30
clocking out. This is consistent with Respondent’s Standard Operating Procedures. However,
other supervisors required the tank to be no more than 3/4 full.4 Additionally, a white board on
which supervisors left messages, directed the EMT’s to ensure that the fuel tanks were ¾ full.
Grayton argued with Pawlak and refused to fill the tank to the top.5
35

2 Respondent operated in Washington, D.C. throughout 2018.
3 Grayton’s disciplinary record prior to November 2017 is not relevant to this case. However,
prior to November 2017, Respondent disciplined Grayton on 3 occasions for being tardy. In
October 2017, it suspended her for 2 days for tardiness. In June 2017, Respondent issued
Grayton discipline for speeding.
4 The testimony of Grayton and Hampleton on this point is uncontradicted. Pawlak, who is still a
supervisor for AMR, did not testify. Although Respondent represented that Pawlak was on military leave
at the time of this hearing, it made no representation regarding efforts to have him testify. There is no
evidence that he could not have done so.
5 In September 2017, Grayton complained to Paige Johnson that Pawlak was displaying favoritism on
the basis of race and asked that Johnson investigate. Prior to Grayton’s complaint, another employee
complained to Johnson about Pawlak displaying favoritism in carrying out his duties.
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3
The events of December 6, 2017
In December Respondent suspended both Grayton and Hampleton for 2 days, December
4 and 5, 2017, for misconduct on November 8. On December 6, Grayton and Hampleton went to 5
the office of Paige Johnson, then Respondent’s Regional Administrative Supervisor.6 Johnson’s
account of the meeting and Grayton’s account are fairly similar and credited. Briana
Hampleton’s account is somewhat different. I do not credit Hampleton’s account to the extent it
differs from that of Johnson and Grayton because it is apparent to me that Hampleton’s
overriding concern since December 6, has been to ensure that she did not get into any more 10
disciplinary trouble with Respondent.7 What occurred is as follows, G.C. Exh. – 5 [December 6,
2017 notes of Paige Johnson and email of those notes to Sonsaraye Byers, then AMR’s HR
generalist].
Brianna Hampleton approached me about decision to suspend her for refusal to refuel a 15
truck. She indicated that Stephen statement provided to management was incorrect
because she was never driving the unit and did not park unit. She also expressed concern
that she was issued a suspension when she has never received any previous write up. I
explained to her that progressive disciplinary action are in place for Attendance &
Punctuality violations but not for any other company violations. While speaking to Ms. 20
Hampleton Mosiah Grayton burst into the conversation with high pitched tone stating
“How come its acceptable for some supervisor’s for units to be brought at ¾ but not
others” she indicated Mr. Siegel had just asked about their fuel level coming off shift and
he deemed ¾ adequate. I tried to inform her that she should raise that concern to
management and she began to yell and say “for what yall don’t look into our concerns 25
and yall don’t care, the same way I submitted a write up on Stephen Pawlak being bias to
crews and nobody looked into this” I tried to speak again and she continued to cut me off
so I told her to back away from my office.
Ms. Hampleton remained in my doorway and Ms. Grayton started to walk away I made 30
statement “that I would not tolerate disrespect to which Ms. Grayton turned around and
yelled some more about how HR does nothing and other things.” Again I verbalized “I
would not tolerate any disrespect and she could have a nice day.” After Ms. Grayton left
out I printed and provided Ms. Hampleton with the Grievance policy and told her she
should follow policy if she truly disagreed with companies decision and she said Ms. 35
Paige I don’t have nothing to do with what just happened with Ms. Grayton and thank
you and left out of my office.

6 Johnson no longer worked for AMR at the time of this hearing. I regard her account of the
December 6, 2018 meeting, G.C. Exh. 5, to be an admission of a party under Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d) and therefore not hearsay and therefore credible.
7 Respondent had already suspended Hampleton for conduct which, according to Hampleton, was
solely Grayton’s. In her incident report form, G.C. Exh. 8, Hampleton reticence is shown by her
unwillingness to mention the subject of the question she had for Paige Johnson. I infer that Hampleton
was afraid that she would be disciplined for Grayton’s outburst on December 6.
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4
This is not the first time Ms. Grayton has displayed this type of behavior at all.
I would like to make sure these accounts are documented and provided to you in timely
fashion to be addressed as this is not the first time a provider has yelled or been 5
combative or argumentative with me with no recourse!
G.C. Exh. 5.
I also credit Grayton’s testimony at Tr. 91-92 which adds details not contained in 10
Johnson’s emails. Grayton complained to Johnson that Hampleton’s suspension was unfair
because Hampleton never refused to fill the tank as directed by Pawlak. She asked that
Respondent rescind it. Grayton also complained that supervisors were inconsistent with regard
to whether the fuel tank was to be full or ¾ full. When Johnson asked her to document this
inconsistency, Grayton started yelling that human resources did not take her complaints, such as 15
her bias complaint about Pawlak seriously and never did anything about them. Johnson also
raised her voiced or yelled, Tr. 91-95.
Respondent puts Mosiah Grayton on unpaid administrative leave, suspends her and then has her
sign a last chance agreement20
After receiving Johnson’s email of her notes on the afternoon of December 6, Human
Resources Generalist Sonsaraye Byers placed Grayton on unpaid administrative leave on
December 7. She then investigated Paige Johnson’s complaint about Grayton. She interviewed
Johnson and Grayton and obtained a statement from Hampleton, who denied remembering very 25
much about the incident.
AFSCME District Council 20 was certified in March 2017 to represent Respondent’s
EMTs. In December 2017 Respondent and the Union were engaged in collective bargaining
negotiations for a first contract.8 During negotiations Sonny Garibay, staff representative for the 30
Union, asked Byers to step outside the negotiating room to give him an update on what level of
discipline Respondent was considering for Grayton.
Byers suggested at hearing that the initiative for a last chance agreement came from
Garibay. However, it is absolutely clear that Respondent, by Byers, gave Grayton and the Union 35
a choice between agreeing to a last chance agreement or termination, Tr. 98-100, 138-39, 164-
166, 289-90, G.C. Exh. 16. Grayton and Gariby agreed to a last chance agreement because they
understood that Grayton would not be allowed to return to work without signing such an
agreement. Grayton and Gariby signed a last chance agreement on December 15, 2017, G.C.
Exh. 9. The agreement provided that:40

8 Respondent and the Union did not reach agreement on a collective bargaining agreement until
August 2018.
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5
Should Ms. Grayton have another issue related to her behavior during this Last Chance
Period [6 months], Ms. Grayton’s employment shall be terminated without recourse to
any grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in any then applicable collective
bargaining agreement…5
The Union and Ms. Grayton agree that upon execution of this Agreement by all Parties,
all matters set forth herein shall be considered and deemed to be fully and finally
resolved, and that neither the suspension nor Last Chance Period, nor this Agreement
shall be subject to the Company’s grievance process as defined in the employee 10
handbook.
As a result of this agreement, Respondent changed Grayton’s unpaid administrative leave
into an unpaid suspension, G.C. Exh. 9. In December 2017, the Union and Respondent did not
have an interim agreement regarding discipline. Respondent had its own internal grievance 15
procedure. The last chance agreement, however, as stated above, provided that it would not be
subject to that process.
Between December 2017 and May 2018, there were several unsubstantiated allegations
of misconduct by Grayton for which she was not disciplined.9 However, on May 7, a social 20
worker complained to Respondent about his or her interaction with Grayton and Hampleton
relative to their transport of a psychiatric patient to the United Medical Center in Southeast
Washington, D.C. Respondent also learned that Grayton and Hampleton had ordered food for
themselves and the patient while at the hospital, G.C. Exh.10.
25
As a result of this incident, Respondent terminated Grayton for violating the terms of her
last chance agreement. Grayton unsuccessfully invoked Respondent’s grievance procedure at
steps 1 and 2. AMR issued Hampleton a final written warning.
ANALYSIS30
Mosiah Grayton engaged in protected concerted activity on December 6, 2017.
Section 7 provides that, "employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 35
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection ... (Emphasis added)."
In Myers Industries (Myers 1), 268 NLRB 493 (1984), and in Myers Industries (Myers
11) 281 NLRB 882 (1986), the Board held that "concerted activities" protected by Section 7 are 40
those "engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of

9 An employee named Joshua Moody made several harassment complaints against Grayton. Grayton
testified she was placed on unpaid administrative leave as the result of one or two of these complaints.
The record indicates that she was not disciplined and paid for one such leave period. While the record is
unclear, I infer that she was ultimately paid for the second leave (assuming there was a second) as there is
no indication in the record that Respondent ever disciplined Grayton as the result of Moody’s complaints,
Tr. 139-140, 260-62.
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6
the employee himself." However, the activities of a single employee in enlisting the support of
fellow employees in mutual aid and protection is as much concerted activity as is ordinary group
activity.
Additionally, the Board held in Amelio's, 301 NLRB 182 (1991) that in order to present a 5
prima facie case that an employer has discharged an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(1), the
General Counsel must establish that the employer knew of the concerted nature of the activity.10
Grayton’s conduct was protected and concerted in that she was making common cause
with Hampleton in protesting Hampleton’s suspension. Assisting other employees affected by 10
the employer’s action, i.e., Hampleton’s suspension, falls within the Act’s “mutual aid and
protection” clause of Section 7, even if the assisting employee is not personally affected, Butler
Medical Transport, LLC, 365 NLRB No. 112 (2017); Richboro Community Mental Health
Council, 242 NLRB 1267, 1267-68 (1979); Delta Health Center, 310 NLRB 26, 43 (1993).
Moreover, Grayton’s outburst concerned Respondent’s application of its fuel gage policy, which 15
was an obvious mutual concern of Grayton and Hampleton, who had both been disciplined for
violating that policy.11
In addition, Grayton’s complaint about supervisor Pawlak was concerted and not simply
a matter of personal concern. Respondent knew that Grayton’s complaints about Pawlak were a 20
group concern because it had received at least one other complaint about him, prior to September
2017, G.C. Exh. 4.
Mosiah Grayton’s conduct on December 6, 2017 did not forfeit the protections of the Act.
25
An employer’s imposition of discipline violates the Act if it relies on prior discipline that
violated the Act and fails to show it would have issued the same discipline even without reliance

10 Also see, Lou’s Transport, Inc., 361 NLRB 1446, 1447 (2014); Correctional Medical Services, 356
NLRB 277 (2010).
11 Respondent ascribes a great deal of significance to the fact that Grayton was standing in the
doorway of Johnson’s office rather being inside the room when Hampleton started her conversation with
Johnson. This is completely irrelevant. Johnson’s statement establishes that she was aware that Grayton
was complaining about the application of Respondent’s fuel policy to herself and Hampleton.
Respondent also ascribes a great deal of significance to Hampleton’s statement to Johnson that she
did not have anything to do with what just happened and her apparent initial refusal to give Respondent a
statement [Nope, that has nothing to do with me., G.C. Exh. 6]. It is crystal clear that Hampleton was
referring to Grayton’s tone in her outburst as opposed to the subject matter of Grayton’s outburst. At that
time and even at the instant hearing, Hampleton was very worried about receiving additional discipline as
the result of Grayton’s conduct. Johnson’s statement establishes that Hampleton already believed that she
was being disciplined for alleged misconduct on the part of Grayton, i.e., refusing to refuel the ambulance
on November 8.
Also irrelevant to the resolution of this case are statements by Grayton and union representative
Gariby that some form of discipline was appropriate for Grayton’s December 6 outburst. Either her
conduct in Johnson’s office was protected or it wasn’t. If it was protected, no form of discipline would
have been legal.
Respondent also suggests that Grayton outburst was made in bad faith because Respondent had
investigated her complaints about supervisor Pawlack. There is no evidence that Respondent made
Grayton aware of any investigation or follow-up on her complaints.
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7
on the prior unlawful discipline, Southern Bakeries, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 78 (2018); Dynamics
Corp., 296 NLRB 1252, 252-1255 (1989) enfd. 928 F. 2d 609 (2d Cir. 1991); The Celotex
Corporation, 259 NLRB 1186, 1186 fn. 2, 1190-1193 (1982).12 The Board has long held that
employers should not be “permitted to take advantage of their unlawful actions, even if
employees may have engaged in conduct that in other circumstances-might justify discipline,” 5
Postal Service, 367 NLRB No. 142 (June 4, 2019).
In the instant case, Respondent concedes that it would not have terminated Mosiah
Grayton had she not violated the December 2017 last chance agreement. Thus, the question is
whether the last chance agreement was unlawful.10
One issue in this case is whether Grayton’s conduct in her December 6 meeting with
Paige Johnson was of such a nature that she forfeited the protection of the Act. The criteria for
evaluating whether an employee’s conduct while engaging in protected activity forfeits the
protection of the Act depends in part on when and where the allegedly protected conduct 15
occurred. In the case of direct communications between an employee and manager or
supervisor, the criteria is set forth in Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814 (1979). In making this
determination the Board balances four factors: 1) the place of discussion; 2) the subject matter of
the discussion; 3) the nature of the employee’s outburst and 4) whether the outburst was
provoked by an employer’s unfair labor practice; Also see Overnite Transportation Co., 343 20
NLRB 1431, 1437 (2004).
Grayton’s outburst occurred at Respondent’s facility in Paige Johnson’s office. It did not
disrupt Respondent’s operations. The subject under discussion was Respondent’s suspension of
Hampleton and Grayton’s perception that Respondent was not responding to her complaints, 25
including complaints about favoritism and inconsistent application of its rules regarding the gas
tanks. Grayton did not curse and did not threaten Johnson. Moreover, although her outburst was
not provoked by an unfair labor practice, it was provoked by what she perceived to be
Respondent’s inaction regarding her prior concerted complaints.13
30
In St. Margaret Mercy Health Care Centers, 350 NLRB 203, 204-05 (2007), the Board
citing Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. NLRB, 544 F. 2d 320 (7th Cir. 1976) stated the test as follows:
Otherwise protected activity remain[s] protected unless found to be ‘so violent or
of such serious character as to render the employee unfit for further service.’ 35
Raising one’s voice and an insolent manner, are insufficient to forfeit the protections of
the Act, Firch Baking Co., 232 NLRB 772 (1977); Postal Service, 251 NLRB 252, 259 (1980)
enfd. 652 F. 2d 409 (5th Cir. 1981). Other factors that weigh in favor of protection are that this
was a single incident, not a sustained course of action, that Grayton did not threaten Johnson and 40
that Johnson herself yelled or raised her voice, Cadillac of Naperville, Inc., 368 NLRB No. 3

12 In Celotex, as in the instant case, there had not been a prior determination that the initial discipline
was unlawful until the Board adjudicated the subsequent discipline (a suspension) and the discipline upon
which it was predicated (a warning).
13 Erik Rohde’s testimony that Paige Johnson told him that she was afraid of a physical altercation is
not credible. Johnson, in her December 8 interview with Byers, stated that Grayton was not being
combative; merely that she was yelling. Johnson stated that she did not feel threatened, G.C. Exh. 18.
JD–58–19
8
(June 12, 2019). In sum, I find that the totality of Board precedent leads me to conclude that
Grayton did not forfeit the protection of the Act. Thus, Respondent violated the Act in
suspending her and giving her a last chance agreement in December 2017. Due its reliance on
the December 2017 last chance agreement in May 2018, Respondent violated the Act in
terminating her employment.5
The issue of whether Grayton’s December 2017 suspension and last chance agreement are
barred by Section 10(b) of the Act is not properly before me.14
Section 10(b) of the Act prohibits the General Counsel from issuing a complaint based on 10
an unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the
Board. However, an employer must raise this statute of limitations defense either in its answer
or at trial, Newspapers and Mail Delivers (New York Post), 337 NLRB 608, 609 (2002). If
raised for the first time in its post-trial brief, the Section 10(b) argument cannot be considered,
Paul Mueller Co., 337 NLRB 764 (2002). Although at trial Respondent alluded to the fact that 15
Grayton did not specifically mention the last chance agreement in her initial charge and first
amended charge, it never argued that consideration of the last chance agreement was time-
barred. Thus, this argument is not properly before me.
However, assuming that I could consider a Section 10(b) argument, I would reject it. On 20
May 24, 2018, Mosiah Grayton filed an unfair labor practice alleging that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) in discharging her. The Board served this charge on Respondent on June
1, 2018. On June 4, 2018, she filed an amended charge alleging that Respondent disparately
disciplined and subjected her to increased scrutiny to discourage employees from engaging in
union or other protected activity. She also alleged Respondent violated the Act in terminating 25
her for her union activities. The first amended charge was served on June 5.
Both the initial charge and the first amended charge were filed and served upon
Respondent within 6 months of Respondent issuing Grayton a last chance agreement. However,
it was not until January 9, 2019 that Grayton specifically alleged in her second amended charge 30
that Respondent violated the Act in issuing her the last chance agreement on December 15, 2017.
The United States Supreme Court in Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1959) held
that a charge merely sets in motion the NLRB’s inquiry; it need not be as specific as a judicial
pleading. The General Counsel’s complaint can therefore deal with any unfair labor practice 35
related to those alleged in the charge and which grow out of the allegations in the charge while
the proceeding is pending before the Board.
In Redd-I, Inc., 290 NLRB 1115 (1988) and Nickles Bakery of Indiana, 296 NLRB 927
(1989) the Board held that a complaint allegation satisfies the Fant Milling criteria if it involves 40
the same legal theory as that contained in a pending timely charge, arises from the same factual

14 The General Counsel’s brief addresses the issue as to whether the General Counsel is somehow
barred from litigating the last chance agreement by virtue of the fact that Grayton agreed to it. However,
Respondent did not plead this as a defense or assert this as a defense in its brief. This issue is also not
properly before me.
JD–58–19
9
circumstances or sequence of events as a timely charge and if a respondent would raise similar
defenses to those in the charge.
I find that the complaint in alleging that the last chance agreement violated the Act is
sufficiently related to the timely filed initial and first amend charge to pass muster under Section 5
10(b). The last chance agreement was part of the sequence of events leading to Grayton’s
discharge, which she specifically mentioned in the timely filed charges.
REMEDY
10
The Respondent, having illegally suspended and later discharged Mosiah Grayton, must
offer her reinstatement and make her whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits. Backpay
shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest
at the rate prescribed in New Horizons, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987), compounded daily as prescribed
in Kentucky River Medical Center, 356 NLRB No. 8 (2010). Respondent shall compensate her 15
for her search-for-work and interim employment expenses regardless of whether those expenses
exceed her interim earnings, computed as described above.
Respondent shall file a report with the Regional Director for Region 5 allocating backpay
to the appropriate calendar quarters. Respondent shall also compensate Mosiah Grayton for the 20
adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving one or more lump-sum backpay awards covering
periods longer than 1 year, AdvoServ of New Jersey, 363 NLRB No. 143 (2016).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended1525
ORDER
The Respondent, American Medical Response, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall30
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Discharging, suspending or otherwise discriminating against any employee for
engaging in protected concerted activity.35
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
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10
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer Mosiah Grayton full
reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent 5
position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously
enjoyed.
(b)Make Mosiah Grayton whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
as a result of the discrimination against her (including her unpaid suspension in December 10
2017 and her termination), in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Compensate Mosiah Grayton for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of
receiving a lump-sum backpay award, and file with the Regional Director for Region 5,
within 21 days of the date the amount of backpay is fixed, either by agreement or Board 15
order, a report allocating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar years.
(d)Compensate Mosiah Grayton for her search-for-work and interim employment
expenses regardless of whether those expenses exceed their interim earnings.
20
(e) Within 14 days from the date of the Board's Order, remove from its files any
reference to the suspension, unlawful last chance agreement and discharge and within 3 days
thereafter notify Mosiah Grayton in writing that this has been done and that the suspension,
last chance agreement and discharge will not be used against her in any way.
25
(f) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the Regional
Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the
Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel
records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if
stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of 30
this Order.
(g) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Washington, D.C. V street
N.E. facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix".16 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by the 35
Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of paper notices, the
notices shall be distributed electronically, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an
internet site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates 40
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to

16 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice
reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board."
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11
ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at
its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since December 15, 2017.5
(h) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
10
Dated, Washington, D.C. July 18, 2019
15
Arthur J. Amchan
Administrative Law Judge
JD–58–19
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT discharge, suspend or otherwise discriminate against any of you for engaging
in protected concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT give you a last chance agreement in retaliation for your protected concerted
activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Mosiah Grayton full reinstatement
to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without
prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Mosiah Grayton whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting
from her discharge, December 2017 suspension and last chance agreement, less any net interim
earnings, plus interest compounded daily.
WE WILL compensate Mosiah Grayton for the adverse tax consequences, if any, of receiving a
lump-sum backpay award, and WE WILL file a report with the Regional Director for Region 5
allocating the backpay award to the appropriate calendar quarters.
WE WILL compensate Mosiah Grayton for her search-for-work and interim employment
expenses regardless of whether those expenses exceed her interim earnings.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from our files any reference to
the unlawful suspension, last chance agreement and discharge of Mosiah Grayton.
JD–58–19
WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been done and that the
suspension, last chance agreement and discharge will not be used against her in any way.
AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE
MID-ATLANTIC, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor
Relations Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it
investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under
the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s
Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
Bank of America Center, Tower II, 100 S. Charles Street, Ste 600, Baltimore, MD 21201-2700
(410) 962-2822, Hours: 8:15 a.m. to 4:45 p.m.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at www.nlrb.gov/case/05-CA-221233 or by using the
QR code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the decision from the Executive Secretary, National
Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by calling (202) 273-1940.
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