Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 19, 1951

93 N.L.R.B. 336 (N.L.R.B. 1951)

336 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH
AMERICA, AFL ; LOCAL UNION No. 303 OF THE AMALGAMATED MEAT
CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL and
WESTERN, INC. Case No. 16-CC-14. February 19, 1951
Decision and Order
On August 23, 1950, Trial Examiner George A. Downing issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondents had-engaged and were engaging in certain unfair
labor practices affecting commerce and recommending that they cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in
the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the
Respondents filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a sup-
porting brief.'
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner with the following modifications :
1. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the International
and the Local violated both Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Act.
Unlike the Trial Examiner, however, we rely solely on their activities,
outside of union meetings, in inducing and encouraging employees of
-Western's customers to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of
their employment to handle Western meat, with an object of forc-
ing their employers to cease doing business with Western, and with a
further object of forcing Western to recognize and bargain with the
uncertified Local. This inducement and encouragement consisted of
telephone calls made at the direction of their agent, Riddle, to Mer-
chant, Pratt, Barker, Boyd, and other members at the retail meat
markets where they were employed in Carthage, Joplin, Miami,
Monett, and Coffeyville ; 2 and the truck picketing at customers' prem-
ises ,3 including the accompanying oral appeal to employee Simone 4
i The Respondents also requested oral argument As the record and briefs in our
opinion adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties, this request is denied
2 See The Graumaa Company, 87 NLRB 755, at p 759, where the Board held in part
that a union violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) by going to a member's place of work and
inducing him to cease work by telling hum the job was "unfair " See also Kimsey Dlfg Co,
89 NLRB 723
3 These facts are distinguishable from those in Schultz Refrigerated Service , Inc, 87
NLRB 502,' where the trucks picketed were themselves the situs of the labor dispute
Here the delivery trucks were not themselves the situs of any labor dispute, and western's
premises , which were the situs of the primary dispute, could readily be picketed
, The Unions ai gue that the pickets' oral appeal to Simone was unauthorized we
find no meat in this argument , as the picketing itself , clearly constituted, inter alia, an
appeal to employees , and the oral appeal to Simone was thus within the authorized
spheie of action See Sunset Line if Twine Co , 79 NLRB 1487
93 NLRB No. 40.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 337
Because of their nature and their purpose, these actions violated both
subsection (A) and subsection (B) of Section 8 (by (4).
We consider the Unions' internal operations in connection with
their generalized listing of Western as "unfair," including their min-
utes and resolutions passed at union meetings, to be primary and
therefore lawful. 5 Accordingly, we do not adopt the Trial Exami-
ner's findings that such activities violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) or
(B). There is valid support in practical human experience, although
perhaps not in abstract logic, for prohibiting a union, as we have done,
from telling a specific employee at his place of work about an unfair
list, and yet holding the promulgation of that unfair list at a union
meeting to be lawful. In effectuating the evident purpose of Congress
to permit primary action while prohibiting secondary inducement, we
'cannot escape drawing a line somewhere so as to preserve a proper area
in which both congressional objectives can best be fulfilled. As we
indicated in the Grauman case, it is traditional primary action for a
union, within its own councils, to classify a primary employer as un-
fair, whereas conveying the same information to a secondary employ-
er's employee at his place of work assumes the aspect of unlawful
secondary inducement tantamount to a specific direction to cease work.
2. We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's finding, unsupported
as it is by sufficient evidence, that the persons who restrained and
coerced Western employee Beauchamp were union agents. Their
activity was not expressly authorized by the Unions, nor did the Unions
establish any pattern of unlawfully coercive picketing which could
constitute implied- authorization of the particular restraint and
coercion far from the picket line. We shall therefore dismiss the
8 (b) (1) (A) allegations of the complaint on agency grounds.
3. We cannot agree with the Trial Examiner's finding that Riddle
violated the Act. The complaint, although naming him in the caption
as an agent of the Unions, clearly alleges that the term "Respondents"
refers only to the International and the Local; and the complaint was
issued only against them. Moreover, Riddle was not served as a
party respondent. Accordingly, we have stricken his name from the
caption.
Order
Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
See the Grauman case , supra, at pp . 756-7, where the Board held in part that it was
lawful primary action for a union to post an "unfair " listing of a primary employer on
its bulletin board and distribute it to affiliated unions, on the ground that such activities
were like "direct picketing at a primary employer ' s premises " or a "general union policy"
against working under nonunion conditions See also The Pure Otl Co , 84 NLRB 315 ;
Ryan Construction. Coip , 85 NLRB 417; Schultz Refrigerated Service, In, supra,
Comeau's Express, 87 NLRB 972 ; Santa Ana Lumber Co, 87 NLRB 937 ; Kimsey Mfg.
Co , supra, Intcrborough News Co , 90 NLRB 2135; Moore Dry Dock Co , 92 NLRB 547.
943732-51-23
338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Relations Board hereby orders that Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL, its Local Union No. 303,
and their agents, including Herb J. Riddle, shall :
1. Cease and desist from inducing or encouraging the employees of
any employer other than Western, Inc., to engage in a strike or a con-
certed refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport; or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities, or to perform any services, where an object
thereof is (1) forcing or requiring any employer or person other than
Western, Inc., to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other-
wise dealing in the products of Western, Inc., or to cease doing business
with Western, Inc.; or (2) forcing or requiring Western, Inc., to
recognize or bargain with Local Union No. 303 as the representative
of its employees unless and until such labor organization shall have'
been certified as the representative of such employees under the provi-
sions of Section 9 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Post at the business offices of the International in Chicago,
Illinois, and of Local No. 303 in Joplin, Missouri, copies of the notice
attached hereto as an appendix." Copies of said notice, to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, shall, after
being signed by officers of the International and the Local, be posted
by them immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained for a period
of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in-
cluding all places where notices to members are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondents to insure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region in writ-
ing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the
Respondents have taken to comply herewith.
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint , insofar as it alleges
that the Respondents violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, be,
and it hereby is, dismissed.
Appendix
NOTICE
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our members that :
6 In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted before the words "A Decision and Order" the words " Decree of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing."
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 339
WE WILL NOT induce or encourage the employees of any em-
ployer other than WESTERN, INC., to engage in a strike or a con-
certed refusal in the course of their employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any
services, where an object thereof is (1) forcing or requiring any
employer or person other than Western, Inc., to cease using, sell-
ing, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products
of Western, Inc., or to cease doing business with Western, Inc. ;
or (2) forcing or requiring Western, Inc., to recognize or bargain
with Local Union No. 303 as the representative of its employees
unless and until such labor organization shall have been certified
as the representative of such employees under the provisions of
Section 9 of the Act.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN
OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL,
By ----------------------------------------------------
(Title of Officer)
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN
OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL, LOCAL UNION No. 303,
By ----------------------------------------------------
(Title of Officer)
Dated--------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
Mr. Evert P. Rhea, for the General Counsel.
Mr. Daniel J. Leary, Joplin, Mo., and Mr. A. L. Commons, Miami, Okla., for the
Respondents.
Mr. John R. Wallace, of Miami, Okla., for Western, Inc.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a first amended charge filed May 15 , 1950, by Western , Inc., herein called
Western, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,' by the
Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region (Fort Worth, Texas ), issued a com-
plaint dated June 1, 1950, against Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen, AFL; Local Union No. 303 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America , AFL ; and Herb J. Riddle, their agent,
herein called the Respondents ,2 alleging that the Respondents had engaged in
and were engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (4) (A) and ( B) and Section 2 (6) and
(7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended ( 61 Stat. 136), herein called
1 The General Counsel and his representatives are herein referred to as the General
Counsel, and the National Labor Relations Board as the Board.
2 The Unions are also herein referred to, respectively , as the International and the Local.
340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Act. Copies of the complaint, of said charge, and of the notice of hearing
were duly served on the Respondents and on Western.
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint alleged in substance
that since on or about November 25, 1949:
(1) Respondents, by orders, instructions, directions, threats, intimidation,
coercion, and picketing of Western trucks while making deliveries to its cus-
tomers, have induced and encouraged employees of such customers and of other
employers doing business with Western to engage in a strike or concerted refusal
in the course of their employment to use, process, transport, or otherwise handle
or work on commodities, livestock, meats, and meat products of Western or to
perform services with respect thereto, an object thereof being to force or require
said employers to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise deal-
ing, in the products of Western and to cease doing business with Western, and
another object thereof being to force or require Western to recognize or bargain
with Respondent, Local 303, as the representative of its employees, without said
Local having been certified as a representative of said employees under the pro-
visions of Section 9 of the Act (in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B))
and
(2) By three alleged acts or incidents occurring on January 27, February 15,
and May 2, 1950, respectively, Respondents had engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
Respondents filed a joint answer in which they made a general denial of all
allegations of the complaint.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on various dates from June 20 through
26, 1950, at Miami, Oklahoma, Joplin, Missouri, and Coffeyville, Kansas, before
George A. Downing, the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly designated by the Chief
Trial Examiner. As the hearing opened the Respondents renewed their motions
for a continuance which had previously been directed, respectively, to the Re-
gional Director and to the Trial Examiner and which had been denied by them.
The motions were again denied. Respondents then also moved to consolidate
with this case an alleged pending case No. 16-CA-279, involving Western, on
charges apparently filed by the Unions 8 The motion was denied.
On motions of the General Counsel the complaint was amended in two minor
respects. As the hearing progressed the Trial Examiner reserved ruling on
Respondents' motions to strike portions of the testimony of various witnesses.
Those motions are now hereby denied.
At the conclusion of the hearing Respondents moved for a dismissal of the
complaint and also moved to strike all testimony which was not connected with
the Respondents in any way. Said motions are now hereby denied, except that
the motion to dismiss is hereby granted as to paragraph 6 of the complaint. See
footnote 7.
The parties were afforded an opportunity to make oral argument and to file
briefs, proposed findings of fact, and conclusions of law. Oral argument was
waived. Briefs have been received from the General Counsel and the Respond-
ents and have been considered.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the,following :
3 Though representing that such a case was "pending before the Board," Respondents'
counsel was unable to state that a complaint had in fact issued. Later reterence to the
matter as the hearing processed indicated that the matter was one pending before the
Regional Director on which no complaint had been issued.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 341
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
Western, Inc., is an Oklahoma corporation with a plant at Miami, Oklahoma,
where it is engaged in the purchase and slaughter of livestock and in the process-
ing and sale of meat and meat products. Prior to July 1949 it had operated
under the name of Banfield Packing Company. During the year 1949 it pur-
chased livestock of a total value of approximately one and three-quarter million
dollars, of which approximately one and one-half millions were received from
points outside the State of Oklahoma. During the same year it made sales of
meats and meat products totaling approximately two and one-quarter million
dollars, of which approximately one and three-quarter millions went to points
outside the State of Oklahoma.
On these facts it is found that Western is engaged in interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL,
and Local Union No. 303 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Work-
men of North America, AFL, are labor organizations within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The evidence
1. Background and summary of main events
During periods pertinent to the issues, Western (formerly Banfield Packing
Company) operated a meat processing and packing plant at Miami, Oklahoma
(in what is known as the "tri-state area"). It normally employed from 70 to
75 employees. A substantial portion of its products were sold and distributed
to retail stores, cafes, and markets (and to some wholesalers) in Miami and
neighboring towns and in Joplin and Carthage, Missouri, and Coffeyville, Kansas.
Practically all of its deliveries to customers in those areas were made by its own
trucks, driven by its own employees.
There is no evidence of a prior history of collective bargaining. On November
24, 1948, Local 303 had lost a Board-conducted election, held on its petition
seeking representation of the employees in the following unit : `
Included :
All employees of the employer employed in and about employer's meat
packing and producing plant, including leadmen.
Excluded :
Executives, superintendents, salesmen, office help and clerical employees,
livestock buyers, firemen, and truck drivers, and all other employees and
supervisory employees as defined in Section 2 (11) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended.
*The General Counsel represented that he had intended to offer the Regional Office's
original record on the representation proceeding but that the file had been misplaced and
could not be located. The Examiner has, however, taken official notice of the representa-
tion proceedings (J S Abercombic Co , 83 NLRB 524) in the Board's official records,
specifically the petition, the tally of ballots, and the certification of results of the election.
The findings here made are based on such proceedings, with which are in accord the
memoranda and correspondence of the Unions, admitted in evidence, the testimony of
Riddle and of J. S. Gammon, Western's president and general manager, and the repre-
sentations of counsel during the hearing.
342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
By certificate of the results of election issued December 3, 1948, the Board
certified that said union had not received a majority of the ballots and that it
was not the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit. The Local
has not since received a certification as such bargaining representative.
Near the end of the ensuing 12-month period,' the Local decided to renew and
did renew its efforts to organize the plant and to obtain recognition as representa-
tive in the same unit .' Riddle contacted Gammon on or about November 22 and
asked for recognition of the Local. Gammon refused to recognize the Union with-
out an election. Riddle in turn refused to agree to an election because of his
feeling that the Local had not received fair treatment from the Board's Regional
Office in the previous election (credited testimony of Gammon).
Thereafter the Local continued its campaign to sign up more members in its
efforts to persuade Western to extend recognition. Western continued to sug-
gest an election and Riddle continued to refuse.
In the meantime the Local's membership had decided to place Western on the
"unfair" or "we do not patronize" list if recognition were not accorded by mid-
night, November 23; and Riddle informed Gammon of such action and told him
Western could not sell in a union market after November 23.
In addition, Respondents implemented the unfair list by union minutes and
resolutions, statements by Riddle to union members in and out of union meetings,
telephone calls and letters from the Local's headquarters to the effect that union
members should not handle Western meats after November 23, or after imposi-
tion of the unfair list. In some instances Riddle actually threatened the im-
position of fines of $100 for violation of such admonitions.
On January 22, 1950, the Local's membership voted to strike the plant. The
strike began in the early morning hours of January 25 with approximately 29
employees participating. A picket line was set up in the immediate vicinity of
the plant and thereafter maintained throughout the period of the commission
of the alleged unfair labor practices.
On or about January 27 and May 2, respectively, there occurred two incidents
of alleged threats and violence at or near the picket line which the General
Counsel relies on as constituting violations of Section 8 (b) (1) W.'
Western's delivery trucks were, on a number of occasions, followed as they
came through the picket line and peacefully picketed as the drivers made
deliveries to customers in Miami and surrounding towns Contemporaneously
with such picketing other persons who had accompanied the pickets entered
the stores and spoke with the owners, managers, or employees, informing them
5 Section 9 (c) (3) provides:
No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within
which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held.
Implicit in the testimony of Riddle and Gammon and in the correspondence and memo-
randa of the Unions is the fact that the Local was seeking representation in the same
unit in which it had lost the previous election. Furthermore, in the 1948 election, the
unit had consisted of 38 employees and in November 1949 it was represented by the Unions
to consist of 39 or 40 employees of a total of from 70 to 75.
7 The General Counsel offered no evidence in support of a third incident, alleged in the
complaint to have occurred on or about February 15, 1950, in which one Gerald R. Hinds
was allegedly threatened while making a delivery at the plant The General Counsel
made no attempt to procure a subpena requiring Hinds' presence as a witness until the
second day of the hearing Hinds, who lived or worked in East St. Louis, Illinois, did not
appear in response to that subpena , which was made returnable at Miami on June 26
(the last day of the hearing), and on which service was attempted by the General Counsel
by registered mail. The General Counsel was unable to state whether legal service had
in fact been effected The General Counsel moved at the conclusion of the hearing for
permission to take Hinds ' deposition at some indefinite time after the closing of the
hearing. The motion was denied.
'AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 343
of the strike at Western and requesting their "cooperation" by not buying or
handling Western meats.
2. Preliminary issue; agency and union responsibility
Since an understanding of the significance of much of the evidence will be
facilitated by a prior deterrmnation of the question of agency and union re-
sponsibility, that issue will be resolved prior to a detailed summary of the
evidence.
The facts are undisputed, being established mainly by Respondents' own
memoranda, letters, and correspondence and by Riddle's testimony Briefly
stated, they establish that Riddle acted as general representative, business agent,
and assistant secretary-treasurer of the Local. In fact, it is entirely clear from
the evidence that Riddle was not only an agent of the Local, but that he was
actually the directing head of its activities in relation to the negotiations with
Western, the labor dispute that resulted, and the various activities which the
Local and its other agents thereafter resorted to as hereinafter summarized.
Riddle's representation of the International is also well established. For it,
he acted as a special International organizer and as an International repre-
sentative, his superiors being the General Executive Board and his orders coming
directly from the International president, the International vice president, and
the International secretary-treasurer Riddle made frequent reports to the
International and kept it intormed of the "program" he had "arranged" for
Western, and the International voiced its approval.
Indeed, the International not only approved and supported the strike action,
but financed the strikers through the regular payment of strike benefits. Fur-
thermore, Vice-President Marvin Hook assumed actual direction of the strike
and assigned International Representatives or Organizers Walter Gieseke and
Nick Hall to assist Riddle in the immediate direction of the strike and of the
picket line. Riddle himself directed and planned the activities of all persons
engaged in picket-line activity and in the activities which emanated therefrom.
See footnote 15 .
3. The promulgation of the unfair list; statements and actions relating thereto
The earliest activities relating to prospective union action against Western
occurred in the Local's meetings in September 1949. The minutes contained the
following statements :
September 20, 1949
Mid-Western Meat Co.' of Miami (Formerly Banfields), Midnight Nov.
23, 1949, no one shall handle any meat after this time.
September 25, 1949
Bro. Riddle spoke about the Banfield Pkg. Co. where we lost the election.
It is now known as the Mid-Western Pkg. Co. and after Nov. 23, Midnight,
1949, this Co. will be put on the unfair list with Local 303.
September 27, 1949
No meat will be bought from the Miami Packing Co. or be sold over union
meat counters until contract has been signed.
8 This misnomer sometimes also appears in some of the Union 's memoranda and corre-
spondence which is in evidence, as well as occasionally in the testimony. In its entirety
the evidence establishes that the references to Mid-Western were intended and were un-
derstood to refer to Western
344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The testimony s is not definitely related to meetings earlier than November,
but it is clear that in one or more November 1° meetings discussions continued
of the Western matter to the same tenor and effect as the foregoing statements.
in the minutes. There were references by Riddle to the impending placement
of Western on the unfair list, and there were further discussions among the
members and by Riddle of the meaning or significance of such action and of the
obligation. of union members in respect thereto. It was understood and agreed
that such obligation involved not buying or handling Western's products. Riddle
affirmed or approved the understanding and in some instances specifically in-
formed individual members that after the deadline (midnight, November 23)
they could not or should not handle any more of Western's meat (credited testi-
mony of Turner and Page)
There was also testimony by John Pratt (employed by Safeway in Miami and'
a member of the Local's executive board) that he attended a meeting of the
executive board in Joplin shortly after December 6 and that Riddle made the
statement in his presence that any member of the Union who continued to buy
meat from Western could be fined $100. Though Riddle denied making such
a statement there is testimony of two other witnesses to similar threats by
Riddle outside of union meetings later to be adverted to. Pratt's testimony is
therefore credited. There is no evidence that any fine was actually imposed.
Telephone Calls from Local's Headquarters
Apparently to insure that all members were apprised of the action agreed on
in the union meetings , Riddle, (luring the month of November , directed his sec-
ietary, Betty Bassman, to call, from the Local's offices in Joplin, the meat market
,managers or the head meat cutters in the area." Bassman testified that she
had a list of the markets and of the members, that Riddle instructed her to talk
only with members, and that she should inform them that on November 24,
Western would be on the unfair list. She testified, however, that in addition
to making that statement , she sometimes added "on my own" that "they just
weren't to buy any more meats from [Western]."
On cross-examination by Western's counsel, Bassman admitted that she had
testified in the injunction suit in the federal court that what Riddle had asked
her to inform the members was "as of midnight, November the 24th, 1949,
Western, Inc, of Miami would be on the unfair list, that they were not to buy
meats from them." Bassman explained , however, that when she testified in the
federal court she had been very nervous and that Riddle had not in fact told
her to inform the meat cutters that they were not to buy meat from Western,
but only that Western was on the unfair list. No reason appears why Riddle
would have so limited his instructions to her, since as herein found' he was
himself engaged contemporaneously in making even broader statements to union
members both in and out of union meetings.
9 The findings here made represent a composite of the evidence , summarized from the
testimony of J. W. Turner , Gordon Moore, Jay Page , Sidney Jennings, Lawrence West,
Earl Merchant , John Pratt , and Riddle To the extent that the testimony of particular
witnesses is, on certain details , in conflict , it has not been credited
"All union meetings which are referred to herein were held in Joplin unless otherwise
specified.
11 In most instances the retail meat markets or counters employed not over two or three
meat cutter 's, one of whom acted as meat buyer , as head meat cutter , and sometimes acted
as a working foreman. It is only in isolated instances that the evidence suggests that such
person rose to the level of a supervisor within the meaning of the Act. All such persons
were members of Local 303. Indeed , the Local's bylaws permitted a qualified or limited
type of membership to supervisors and to proprietors or lessees of meat counters where
they did not employ help.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 345
It is therefore concluded and found that Riddle's instructions at Bassman were
as she admitted testifying in the Federal com t, and that in a number of instances
she specifically informed the recipient of the call that he was not to buy any
more meats from Western.
Bassman testified that so far as she knew she called the union members in
Carthage, Joplin, Miami, and Monett. She denied that she had called anyone
in Coffeyville. However, Earl Merchant, president of the Coffeyville unit of the
Local, and a member of the executive board, testified credibly to having received
such a call.
On some of such calls, Bassman also requested the recipient to convey the
information to members at other stores in the locality called. Thus, Merchant
testified that he was requested to call all members in Coffeyville and that he
did so, and Pratt, at Safeway, in Miami, testified that he was requested to notify
Coates, with Kroger.
W. L. Williamson was the lessee-proprietor of the meat market or counter
in the Corner Grocery at Coffeyville and was the employer of Harvey Barker.
Barker testified that Merchant called him at the market, informing him that
Western was on the unfair list and that "we wasn't to buy no meat from them."
Williamson testified that when Barker informed him of the call, he spoke to
Merchant further about the matter and that Merchant informed him that the
Western plant had been struck and had been placed on the unfair list and
that lie [Merchant] "had been asked to notify all of us members or owners in
Coffeyville not to purchase meat from the Western, Inc." [Emphasis supplied.]
Williamson and Barker were members of the local at the time.
Merchant testified that in making the Coffeyville calls he stated only that
Western was on the unfair list. However, the foregoing testimony of Barker
and Williamson to the contrary is credited.
Letters From the Local
Williamson also testified that shortly after his foregoing conversation with
Merchant lie received a letter from Riddle stating that Western had been placed
on the unfair list and "asking us to cooperate, and to not buy meat or any of
our employees to handle meat coming from Western, Inc."
Harold L. Grainger testified that while he was employed by the Quality Mar-
ket, in Coffeyville, Stark, the meat buyer, received a letter from Local 303, stat-
ing that Western was on the unfair list "and we weren't to buy meat from
them " Bill Baldauf, employed by Kroger, in Baxter Springs, testified that he
received a letter addressed to him personally from Local 303, which mentioned
Western or handling Western meat. He was unable to specify its contents with
further particularity
None of the original letters was available for introduction in evidence, and
Riddle testified that no copies were in existence. Riddle admitted that the
Local had sent out two or three such letters. but testified that they had gone only
to Coffeyville and that they stated only that "this is to instruct you that the West-
ern has been placed on the unfair list by Local 303 " At another point in his
testimony, however, Riddle• admitted that the letters contained the additional
statement that "members of [the] Local should not handle meat products from
that [Western] plant" The testimony of Williamson and Grainger is therefore
credited that the letters contained the additional statements they testified to.
As a result of the foregoing activities, a number of union members in various
retail stores informed their employers or the meat market managers, after the
deadline had passed, that since `western was on the unfair list they (the em-
ployees) would not be permitted and would not handle Western meats and that
346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
it would be "advisable" or "best" for the market not to buy further from
Western. In some instances the employer acquiesced promptly, particularly
where lie obtained his chief supply from other sources and was buying from
Western only "fill-in" orders. The conversations on the foregoing occasions
are of no particular significance to the issues and will not be further adverted
to except in connection with the following incident which involved employees
of both a Safeway and a Kroger store at Miami.
John Pratt was employed by Safeway as a journeyman meat cutter ; he was
a member of Local 303 and of the executive board. Pratt testified that he had
received one of the telephone calls from the Local's headquarters that Western
was on the unfair list and that he was requested to relay the information to
Coates, head meat cutter at Krogers also a member of the Local. Pratt testified
that he did so about a week later, and that he also told Joe Hill (the head meat
cutter and meat buyer at Safeway) of the call and that Hill stopped buying
from Western on December 6.
Pratt testified further that at Riddle's request he attended an executive board
meeting in Joplin shortly after the store stopped handling Western meats and
at that meeting that Riddle stated in his presence that a union member who
continued to handle or buy Western meats could be fined $100.'2 Pratt also
reported that conversation to Joe Hill. Pratt testified also that Riddle stopped in
the store "lots of times" and that on some of his visits inquired of Pratt if "we
sold any Western meat."
George Robert Hill, manager of the Safeway store, testified that Joe Hill
reported to him that Western was on the unfair list and that a fine of $100 would
be imposed not only against union members Pratt and Joe Hill, but also against
the market if further meat purchases were made from Western. He testified
further that Joe Hill stated his intention to make no further meat purchases
from Western and that he (George) approved.
Clem Coates (meat buyer at Kroger) testified that the first information he
received that he should not buy meat from Western was at a Local meeting in
Miami, conducted by Riddle on December 16, at which the question "was left
up to the conscience of the butchers," and that he made no further purchases
after that meeting. Coates' testimony related mainly to his efforts to convince
Riddle that he had not, as reported to the Unions, made the statement, in con-
nection with an earlier order he had placed with Western, "To hell with the`
Union,' I got to have meat." As the evidence wholly fails to establish that
Riddle's investigation of the charge against Coates constituted a violation of
the Act, it is unnecessary to summarize the undisputed facts concerning it.
Two incidents which occurred at the establishments of Western's two chief
wholesaler customers are also of significance.
The Joplin Meat Company Incident
John Boyd, a member of the Local, was employed by R. Q. McNabb, who
conducted, under the name of Joplin Meat Company, a wholesale meat business
in Joplin. Boyd testified that on the date of the last delivery from Western
(December 5), he received a call from Riddle, who said "I guess we knew we
had a fine on us out there." Boyd's testimony continued :
I asked him, I said "What's it for?" He said, "Did you get a shipment
from Western today?" and I said, "I don't know. I just came to work." . . .
12 Riddle denied making any statement relating to imposing a flue on union members for
continuing to buy or handle Western meats. However, in view of the testimony of John
Boyd and R. C. McNabb to similar statements by Riddle (see caption Joplin Meat Co.,
infra ), Riddle's denials are not credited.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 347
So I asked some of the boys, and they said they had; and I told him
that we got one that day. I told him he better talk to Mr. McNabb be-
cause I didn't know anything about that, about the orders.
Boyd told the other employees what Riddle had said and also reported the
all to McNabb.
McNabb testified that upon getting the message from Boyd he called Riddle
and that thereupon the following conversation ensued:
... He asked me if I didn't know that . . . [Western] was on the unfair
list. I told him, yes, I'd heard about it. I didn't think it was'legal, and I
didn't think I was supposed to quit. I didn't think he could make us quit,
and Herb said that [Western was] on the unfair list and . . . that my em-
ployees wasn't supposed to handle [Western meat], and he made the remark
that they could be fined for handling it, and I told him I didn't think that
was legal, that I didn't think he could fine my employees and get away with
it for handling their meat. One word kind of led into another, and then we
finally agreed.
I told him if it was all on the up and up, that I wouldn't handle any more
of the meat, that I'd discontinue handling it, and I didn't want to cause any
of the boys any trouble, in the Union, their Local.
a
McNabb testified that he stopped handling meat at that time, having gotten
Riddle's permission to process the order which had just been received.13
The Jobe Stephens Incident
J. W. Turner, a member of the Local, was employed as a meat cutter and as
working foreman over approximately 10 to 12 meat cutters by Jobe Stephens &
Son, wholesale meat dealers of Joplin. Turner testified that during a Local meet-
ing in November some of the members asked Riddle about Western and that
Riddle stated, "we couldn't handle any [more Western meat], that the strike
was on down there." Turner reported that statement the next morning to
Ruben Shade, the meat buyer, and told Shade "we wasn't allowed to handle any
more [Western] meat."
Shade testified similarly that Turner informed him that "we would have to
quit buying meat from Western Packing Company," that "they were supposed
to have a strike" ; and that in a second conversation shortly afterwards, Turner
informed him that the Union was supposed to have "put a picket" on Western.
Shade mentioned the matter to Jobe Stephens and stopped buying from Western,
the last order being received on November 25.
Stephens in turn affirmed Shade's report to him. He testified also that prior
to that time he had telephoned Riddle as a result of rumors of a strike to be
called at Western and discussed with Riddle the question whether the Local could
legally call a strike before an election. Riddle's position was that the Local
would be within its rights. Stephens' concern was whether he would be able
to continue purchasing from Western because of a clause in his contract with
the Local which dealt with whether his employees could be required to go
through a picket line. He testified, however, that he did not discuss that clause
with Riddle, but did later seek the advice of his attorney, who affirmed the
Union's right to conduct a peaceful picketing.
Stephens testified that he accordingly accepted the November 25 delivery
because his understanding then was that though a strike had been called, no
13 Riddle's denials that he threatened the imposition of fines are not credited. See
footnote 12.
348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
picket line had been established, but that in accordance with his understanding
of his contract, he immediately stopped buying meat from Western when he
heard, shortly thereafter, that a picket line had been put on at the Western
plant "
It is concluded and found from the foregoing evidence that the announced
refusal by Stephens' employees to handle Western meats was not to compel
Stephens to remedy any supposed violation of the Local's contract with him
(cf. Conways Express, 87 NLRB 972), and that such refusal was not related
in any manner to such contract. Such refusal therefore bore no relation to any
primary dispute with Stephens, but had the sole objective of furthering the
secondary dispute with Western (cf. ibid) by exerting pressure on Stephens to
cease doing business with Western.
4. Truck picketing ; contemporaneous appeals to customers
The following and picketing of trucks and the making of contemporaneous
appeals to customers were activities which were resorted to after the strike and
the organization of the picket line on January 25. They began shortly after
January 25, and occurred mainly dining the month of February. The evidence
establishes that such activities occurred in Miami and in the following towns
and villages in the vicinity : Afton, Fairland, Narcissa, Picher, Quapaw, and
Vinita, Oklahoma, and Baxter Springs and Galena, Kansas. There is no evi-
ddnee that the Respondents engaged in such activities at Coffeyville, Kansas, or
at Carthage or Joplin, Missouri.
The following is a complete list of the persons who (in various combinations)
were shown by the evidence to have engaged in such activities on one or more
occasions : Herb J. Riddle, Mrs. Herb J. Riddle, Cleo Bailey, Jr., Helen Beam,
E. O. Newton, Geraldine Crow, Leona Moore (nee Blackburn), Leroy Moore,
T. J. Anderson, and Sherman Stogsdill.
The evidence, which is not in conflict as to the usual pattern of conduct
followed by those persons, is now summarized, with appropriate references to
occasional instances in which the conduct departed from the usual norm.
As Western's trucks went through the picket lines they were followed on their
delivery runs by cars occupied by two, three, or four of the persons above
mentioned.' The cars displayed no signs , placards, or other means of identifi-
cation. In the earlier stages of the activities a single picket sign was carried
in the car, but was not displayed until the actual picketing began . The signs
all bore the following legend, identical in wording to those used at the picket
line: "Western, Inc., non-union. Do not patronize. Meat Cutters Local 303,
AFL." The trucks usually bore Western' s name.
14 That information was erroneous , as the picket line was not established until January
25. The report apparently emanated from Turner , who admitted that he had informed
Shade that " there was a picket line down there," but who was indefinite as to the time
of the conversation.
15 According to credited testimony of Cleo Bailey , Jr., the plans and arrangements and
the organization of the various committees to engage in this action were made in confer-
ences at the picket line which were participated in by Riddle, who approved the arrange-
ments and the agreed plan of action Riddle admitted the plan was his, testifying that
the object of the picketing and of appealing to the customers was to further publicize the
continued existence of the labor dispute with Western, that the Unions considered this
proper and necessary because news had come to them that Western salesmen had informed
customers the strike was over, and the Unions felt that they should counteract such re-
ports in the manner described in order to let the general public and the customers know
the strike was actually continuing.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 349
The car followed the truck on its delivery route, stopping when it did at each
of Western's customers. Usually the truck parked on the street in front of the
customer's store, and the car stopped nearby or across the street Thereupon one
of the occupants of the car took the picket sign and paraded in the street along
the side of the truck away from the store, being accompanied in some instances.
by one of the other occupants of the car, who walked by his side. There is no
evidence that any of such pickets addressed remarks to anyone, or that their
picketing interfered physically with the unloading of the trucks, or that it was
other than peaceful.
On some occasions the Western trucks pulled into alleys, driveways, or delivery
areas along the side or in the rear of the customer's store or market. In those
instances the car occupied by the union adherents stopped out on the street. On
such occasions the picketing usually occurred on the sidewalk across the entrance
to the driveway. Sometimes, however, the picketing was in the alley or driveway
itself and along the side of the truck opposite to the store building. In the fore-
going instances there is no evidence as to the ownership, whether public or
private, of the driveways or alleys. However, in one such instance, later to be
referred to, the customer ordered the picket off his property.
There is also evidence that in some instances the picketing was in U fashion,
but the evidence is clear that in all cases the picketing was confined to the truck
itself and did not extend to the customer's place of business. There is also no
dispute that the picketing ceased immediately upon departure of the truck.
Contemporaneously with the picketing two other occupants of the car entered
the customers store and asked for the owner or manager.16 The usual conversa-
tion was to inform the customer that Western was on the unfair list and that
the callers or the Union would appreciate their cooperation. In some instances
the request for cooperation was spelled out specifically as meaning not to buy
or handle Western meats.
In some instances and on some trips appeals to customers were made contem-
poraneously with deliveries without resort to picketing of the truck. In other
instances the trucks were merely followed, without other activities, for the pur-
pose of checking on the efficacy of earlier appeals.
The only untoward incident resulting from the picketing occurred at Clanton's
Cafe in Vinita where the Western truck, driven by Gerald Miller, had pulled into
a driveway to unload. Miller had been followed by a car Occupied by Mr. and
Mrs. Riddle and Newton, who had parked across the street from the front of the
cafe. Newton picketed on the sidewalk where it was crossed by the driveway
and about 20 to 30 feet away from the rear end of the truck from which deliveries
were being made. There is no evidence that either of the Riddles went into the
cafe to talk with the owner.
Owner Clanton came out to the truck and called to Newton "not to get on his
property and carry that sign" and "to get off or he'd knock him off" and then
ie If he was not present , they usually did not talk with anyone else. However , Johnnie
L. Simone, an employee of the Ed Hess Grocery at Baxter Springs , testified credibly that
the callers asked only if he did the buying of the meat and when he affirmed that he did
they talked with him. He summarized their requests as follows :
All they wanted was our cooperation and didn 't want us to buy meat from Western,
Inc. Wanted us to help them out on their union troubles there.
In another instance an employee (Wayne Doty ) of a customer ( Everett W . Cox, College
Grocery ) testified that he was present and heard the conversation with his employer, and
that in seeking cooperation with the strike, the callers specifically requested Cox not to
handle Western products . However, it is clear from all the evidence concerning the
incident that the callers had asked for and were talking with the employer , that their
remarks were not addressed to or intended for Doty, and that he was simply standing
nearby and happened to hear the conversation.
350 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
threw a rock at Newton17 The Riddles testified that both Clanton's wife and
Miller also threw rocks at Newton. Miller denied this. The issue is an imma-
terial one, since it was agreed by all that Newton did not himself engage in the
rock throwing.
The picketing immediately ceased . The Riddles and Newton entered their car
and drove away and did not follow or picket the truck further that day.
5. The 8 (b) (1) (A) incidents
a. The Beauchamp incident
On the morning of January 27, 1950, Herbert Beauchamp, an employee of
Western, drove a Western truck from the plant through the picket line on a
regular delivery run. He was accompanied by Gerald Miller, another Western
employee.
Beauchamp's testimony may be summarized as follows :
As he passed through the line, he noticed two cars which had been parked there
pull out and begin to follow him. His route took him to Main Street and north
on Main Street, out U. S. Route 66. As he reached Main Street he recognized T.
J. Anderson, a striking employee, as an occupant of one of the cars, and farther
out the highway he recognized Richard Lofiand and Sherman Stogsdill, other
striking employees as the occupants of the second car. The Anderson car later
passed him and then the second car, which was driven by Lofiand. The second
car began slowing down in front of him, and Beauchamp attempted to pass.
Lofland then speeded up and would not let Beauchamp pass.
After a short time, as Beauchamp was driving along parallel to the second
car, he was met by a truck going in the opposite direction and pulled over to
get into the right hand lane. This caused his truck to "bump fenders" with the
Lofiand car which then slowed down and let him pass. Lofiand then started to
pass the Western truck again and as the car got even with the truck, Stogsdill
reached out of the window and threw an empty bottle at the truck, striking it
just below the driver's door of the cab.
Beauchamp then decided to report the matter to the police, and began a loop
to the left on other streets to get back to the highway. Anderson continued to
follow him and later the Lofiand car also appeared. The two cars made a further
attempt to block the road by stopping across both lanes shortly before Beauchamp
got back to the highway. However, Beauchamp pulled out on the left-hand
shoulder and went around them. As he did so, Lofiand threw some metal object
at him, which struck the right front of the cab.
Beauchamp proceeded immediately to the police station, parked his truck,
and started up the steps. As he did so, he slipped and fell and Lofland "came
down on top of [him] and started beating on [him] in the back of the head and
back."
No words were passed by any of the participants at the time of any of the
foregoing incidents.
On Beauchamp's report to the police, Lofiand and Stogsdill were arrested.
Beauchamp also filed written charges with the county attorney who issued sep-
arate informations against Lofland and Stogsdill.'$
17 Credited testimony of Miller . Other than the quoted statements there is no evidence
that Clanton was the owner of the driveway or that it was not open to the public. Aside
from this the preponderance of the evidence is that Newton 's picketing was at all times
on the sidewalk and did not extend closer than 2 or 3 feet to the front of the cafe.
is Stogsdill was later tried and found guilty Lofiand had not been tried at the time
of the hearing in this case . Stogsdill had filed, but had not perfected , his appeal from
the judgment of the county court.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 351
Neither Stogsdill nor Anderson were called as witnesses . Miller , though called
by the General Counsel, testified only on other matters. Lofland's version of the
incident differs widely from Beauchamp 's. Lofland admitted he left from the
picket line but denied that he was following Beauchamp or that he had even
seen him until Beauchamp pulled the truck into his car and forced him off the
road. Lofland testified that he then stopped the car, that it took him and
Stogsdill 35 minutes to straighten the fenders out and that they immediately
went back to the police station to report the matter ; that Beauchamp drove on out
the highway after the bumping incident and that he did not see him again until
they got to the police station. Lofland denied the maneuvering of the cars as
testified to by Beauchamp , denied that he saw Anderson at any time , and denied
that he or Stogsdill threw any missiles at Beauchamp or at the Western truck.
He testified that at the police station it was Stogsdill who was involved in the
further incident with Beauchamp, that he did not himself see the incident, and
he testified only as to what Stogsdill had told him.
As is seen , the above versions are in direct and sharp conflict. No party offered
the testimony of other witnesses which might have assisted in resolving that
conflict. However, the General Counsel did offer the information against Stogs-
dill and the judgment thereon dated May 20, 1950. ' These court records revealed
that Stogsdill was tried and convicted on the charge of willfully, wrongfully, and
unlawfully throwing a missile at Beauchamp on or about January 27, 1950,
and that he was sentenced to serve 30 days in the county jail and to pay, a fine
of $50 and costs.
It is also significant that though Lofland claimed to have returned to the police
station to report the incident to the police, he admitted the sergeant "just
laughed at [him]"; and he admitted that he filed no case or charge against
Beauchamp for bumping into him on the highway.
The foregoing circumstances point up the inherent improbabilities in Lofland's
own version. They, plus Lofland's attitude and demeanor or the stand, have
persuaded the Examiner that Lofland's testimony is not to be credited. The
Examiner therefore adopts the testimony of Beauchamp and finds that the inci-
dent occurred substantially as he testified."
b. The Schmidt incident
In May 1950, Schooner Schmidt was doing some concrete work at the Western
plant as an employee of his father , who was an independent contractor. On
May 2, he left the plant at noon for lunch , driving a cement truck.
Schmidt's testimony may be summarized as follows : As he approached the
picket line , four or five men walked out in the road, one of whom ( identified at
the hearing as Walter Gieseke ) carried a picket sign . He slowed down his
truck and went to the middle of the road. Gieseke went to the right and the
others to the left, and when Schmidt came even with them, Gieseke swung the
picket sign against the windshield and broke it.
Schmidt thereupon pulled up beside the deputy sheriff's car, which was parked
about 20 yards farther, and asked the deputy if he had seen what happened.
The deputy said he had . Gieseke then walked up and asked Schmidt if his name
was Gaines and what he was doing there. Gieseke also told Schmidt he was not
to come back through the picket line, and offered to bet Schmidt he would not do
so. On Schmidt 's statement that he intended to come through again, Gieseke
said :
19 It is found , however , that Beauchamp incorrectly named Lofland , Instead of Stogsdill,
as the one who fell upon him on the steps of the police station.
352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
No, you're not either . . . I have some men here and we will see that
you don't come through ; you better not come through here by yourself again.
The deputy was present during the conversation and approximately four men
were within 10 yards.
Later that day, a member of the law firm which represented Western, accom-
panied by Gammon, came and took Schmidt off another job where he was working,
saying "come on, we are going up to the County Attorney's office." There Schmidt
signed an affidavit or complaint regarding the incident, which he had previously
reported to his father.
Schmidt testified also that as he went through the line, no one said to stop or
asked him to stop.
Neither the deputy sheriff or any of the other witnesses to the incident was
called by either party.
Gieseke's testimony was as follows : That he had not known Schmidt before
and that he mistook him for a man named Gaines for whom he was on the lookout
and with whom lie wanted to talk about having passed through the picket line ;
that he was carrying a picket sign when Schmidt approached and that he held
up his hand motioning for Schmidt to stop so that he could speak to him. In-
stead of stopping, Schmidt "aimed his car" at Gieseke and "tried to run over" him.
Gieseke testified that he was 66 years old, 5 feet. 6 inches tall, and weighed
230 pounds ; that the road there was gravelled with large gravels, and that in
trying to get out of the path of the truck, he stumbled or slipped on a rock, lost
his balance ; and that his sign did hit the truck but it was not intentional.
Gieseke testified further that when Schmidt stopped at the deputy sheriff's
car approximately 30 to 35 feet farther on, he went down there and that the
following conversation ensued:
I asked him his name, asked him if his name wasn't Gaines ; he said no,
and it was none of my business who he was. I asked him what kind of
work he was doing-doing construction work down there for his Dad; his
name wasn't Gaines. . . . I asked him if he didn't know that firm was unfair
down there and he says, gave me some kind of an answer wasn't very nice.
That's about all the conversation we had there.
Gieseke denied having offered to wager Schmidt that he would not come
through the line again and having warned Schmidt not to cross the line again.
Gieseke also testified that he had known of the deputy's presence before the
incident, that the deputy had nothing to say and did not reprimand him in any
way. Gieseke also testified that he did not know or realize at the time that
Schmidt's windshield had been broken.
Although Gieseke admitted that he had been arrested on the charges filed
by Schmidt with the county attorney, the record does not disclose whether there
has been a trial of those charges or what judgment was entered.
In this instance, there is no evidence which will assist in resolving the conflict
in the foregoing versions. However, the circumstances as to which there is no
dispute or little significant conflict assist in resolving the conflict on.the others.
They compel the adoption of Gieseke's version of the incident. Thus, the only
significant fact in issue as to Schmidt's actual passage through the picket line is
whether Gieseke intentionally swung the picket sign against Schmidt's truck.
The circumstances are thoroughly compatible with Gieseke's testimony that the
act was an accidental one. This is particularly true in view of the deputy
sheriff's presence throughout the entire episode and his failure to act or to com-
ment, though-he saw the incident and though Schmidt complained to him about it.
The deputy also heard thb later conversation between Schmidt and Gieseke ; yet,
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 353
although he was obviously present to insure order on the picket line, he again
made no comment and did not reprimand or caution Gieseke against violations of
the law, as might reasonably have been expected if Schmidt's version of Gieseke's
threats had been accurate.
It is therefore concluded and found that the incident and the subsequent con-
versation occurred substantially as testified to by Gieseke.
B. Issues and concluding Aindtngs
1. Section 8 (b) (1) (A)
The issues under Section 8 (b) (1) (A) are largely factual and to that
extent have already been resolved The legal issues are simply whether the
Respondents, by their actions in the Beauchamp and Schmidt incidents, re-
strained or coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7, specifically in the exercise of the right to refrain from joining in the con-
certed activities which accompanied the Local's organization campaign.
In the Beauchamp incident, though no threats were uttered, the course of
conduct pursued by Lofland, Stogsdill, and Anderson was not merely one of coer-
cion but of violence. Those union agents followed Western's trucks from the
picket line on what was obviously known to them to be a delivery run. After it
reached a point some distance from the plant, they made two attempts to block
the truck on the public highways and twice hurled missiles at the truck and its
driver 20
That conduct was clearly calculated and intended to coerce Beauchamp and
Miller into joining with the union adherents in the strike and the other concerted
activities. Under Section 7, they had a right to refrain from such activities.
Section 8 (b) (1) (A), construed in the light of its legislative history, was in-
tended to eliminate such physical violence and intimidation by unions and their
agents in their organization campaigns. National Maiitime Union, 78 NLRB
971; and see United Furniture Workers, Local 309, CIO, (Smith Cabinet Mfg.
Co.), 81 NLRB 886; International Typographical Union, 86 NLRB 951.
It is therefore concluded and found that in committing the acts above found,
Respondents restrained and coerced said employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7, and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A).
The Schmidt incident occurred at or near the picket line and immediately
outside Western's plant, the situs of the labor dispute. The evidence is that
Gieseke intended and attempted to hold a peaceful conversation with Schmidt
with the aim of persuading him not to recross the picket line. As found above,
there were no threats of violence and no restraint or coercion. Such peaceful
solicitation of employees-whether of secondary employers or others-is not
outlawed by Section 8 (b) (1) (A) ."
2. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B)
Since much of the relevant evidence as well as the chief questions of law are
common to the issues under Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B), those issues will be
'0 The inference is also justified, from the incident on the steps of the police station,
that Lofland and Stogsdill followed the truck back to the city to prevent Beauchamp from
reporting the incident to the police
21 Cf the following cases where such solicitation of employees of other employers at the
primary employer's premises was held not to be violative of Section 8 (b) (4) (A)
Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union (Santa Ana Lumber Case), 87 NLRB 937, United
Electrical, Radio and Machine Woikeis of America (Ryan Construction Corp ), 85 NLRB
417; Oil Workers International Union (The Pure Oil Company), 84 NLRB 315
943732-51-24
354 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
discussed under a single heading. Inasmuch as the issues revolve closely around
the conflicting interpretations which the parties place upon that section, a begin-
ning can properly be made with the language of the statute :
Section 8. (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents-
(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any em-
ployer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, manufacture , process, transport , or otherwise handle
or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . or other person to cease
using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products
of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person ;
(B) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with
a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees
under the provisions of Section 9.
To support findings that unfair labor practices were committed under Sec-
tion 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B), respectively, two factors must combine: (1) The
alleged activities must constitute inducement and encouragement of employees
in the course of their employment within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) ;
and (2) the activities must have as an object (under subsection (A)) the forcing
or requiring of any employer, inter alia to cease using the products of any
manufacturer or to cease doing business with any person, or (under subsection
(B)) the forcing or requiring of any other employer to recognize or bargain with
a labor organization without the required certification. The absence of either
factor will defeat the charges thereunder. Cf. United Brotherhood of Carpen-
ters and Joiners (Wadsworth Co.), 81 NLRB 802; Printing Specialties Union v.
LeBaron, 171 F. 2d 331 (C. A. 9).
Respondents contend that both factors are absent, asserting for various
reasons, first, that they did not induce or encourage employees to engage in any
activities proscribed by the Act, and, second, that they did not force or require
any employer to do any of the things enumerated in subsections (A) and (B).
Those contentions will be discussed in order.
a. Did Respondents "induce or encourage" employees within the meaning
of the Act?
(1) The unfair list; improper use thereof
For reasons which are set forth in the Grauman case (Denver Building and
Construction Trades Council, AFL, 87 NLRB 755), the Board has held that
the mere promulgation of a primary employer's name on a "we do not patronize"
list is not per so a violation of the secondary boycott provisions of the Act, Santa
Ana case, supra; and see Spokane Building and Trades Council (Kimsey Manu-
facturing Company), 89 NLRB 1168. The Board considered such lists as con-
stituting lawful primary action, like direct picketing, and a permissible means
of advising members, as well as the public at large, of the union's dispute
with the named primary employer.
Moreover, the Board held, the "unfair" list does not itself become illegal be-
cause of other evidence showing improper or illegal use of the list by union
officials in inducing and encouraging concerted employee action against secondary
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 355
employers with whom the union is not in dispute (Grawinan and Kimsey cases,
supra). It is therefore not possible in the present case to consider Respond-
ents' action in promulgating the "unfair" list as being so augmented and ag-
gravated by the additional evidence of improper and illegal use as to be itself
converted into an unfair labor practice.
The Examiner therefore finds that the promulgation of Western's name on
the unfair list did not constitute such "inducement" or "encouragement" as is
forbidden by the Act.
Attention is accordingly turned to the question whether Respondents' other
acts in furtherance of the objective of such list fall within the proscribed area.
On that question, the unfair list may, of course, be relied upon as evidence in
assessing the propriety of Respondents' other conduct (Grauman case, supra).
The evidence shows clearly that Respondents were not content with the mere
promulgation of the unfair list, letting it exert its own persuasion on union
members and leaving each free to be guided by his own conscience in determin-
ing whether he wished to handle Western's products. Instead, Respondents
resorted to a variety of media, in implementation of the list and to enforce the
express ban adopted by the Local against the further handling of Western's
meats by union members. These include the union minutes and resolutions,
Riddle's statements in and out of union meeting, his threats to impose fines,
the telephone calls and letters, and Merchant's statements to employees in
Coffeyville, pursuant to direction, the tenor of all of which was that because
of the promulgation of the unfair list union members should not handle or work
on Western meats. To the extent that such statements were directed to em-
ployees of Western's customers, they obviously constituted inducement and
encouragement of such employees to engage in a concerted refusal to handle,
work on, or perform any services relating to Western's products. It is so found.
Respondents point to testimony elicited from some witnesses which suggests
that in their cases such statements may have been ineffective for the reasons (1)
that they reached their decisions from the mere report or knowledge that Re-
spondents had placed Western on the unfair list, and (2) that in any event they
did not actually refuse to handle Western's meats and did not engage in any
actual work stoppage or strike. Evidence previously summarized disposes of
the second point, since it reflects frequent instances where employees notified
their employers of their unwillingness to handle Western-means. The success
of such announced refusals rendered unnecessary resort to more coercive action.
See discussion at p 360, infra.
The first point is likewise wide of the mark. Regardless of whether the Re-
spondents' directions were effective or not, they were proscribed by Section 8 (b)
(4), which prohibits conduct by unions or their agents which induces or en-
courages employees to engage in concerted refusals to work on the products of
the primary employer. Cf. Grauman case, supra. Since Respondents' conduct
qualified as such inducement, it is not material that some of the employees testi-
fied that they wereactuated by the persuasive effect of the unfair list. Certainly,
the orders, directions, and threats which are disclosed by the present record
constituted far more forceful inducement than the statements in the Grauman
case which the Board held to constitute encouragement of employees to stop
working.
Respondents also argue that their solicitation of certain employees not to
"buy" Western meats cannot be construed within the statutory language, which
includes "using," "handling," "working on," etc. That contention ignores the
factual realities here. Thus, in most of the retail meat markets and counters
only one, two, or three meat cutters are employed. The buying of meat for
356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the establishment was one of the duties of the meat cutters themselves, usually
of the head meat cutter, where one was designated as such. The inducement of
the cutters not to "buy" included in one word, therefore, inducement not to use,
handle, or work on Western products. -
(2) Truck picketing and contemporaneous activities
To the extent that Respondents' appeals for cooperation with the strike (made
simultaneously with truck deliveries) were directed to Western's customers and
the supervisors, they did not constitute a violation of Section 8 (b) (4) because
the language of that section is addressed to the inducement or encouragement of
"employees" rather than "employers" Printing Specialties Union (Sealright
Pacific, Ltd.), 82 NLRB 271. It is found, however, that the solicitation of Simone,
an employee of the Hess Grocery, at Baxter Springs, to "cooperate" with the
"Union troubles" by not buying Western meat constituted inducement and en-
couragement within the meaning of the Act.
It is not found that the appeal to Cox, of College Grocery, within the hearing
of Wayne Doty, was violative of the Act, Conway's Express, 87 NLRB 972.
The issue whether the truck picketing itself constituted illegal inducement and
encouragement of employees of Western's customers poses by far the most diffi-
cult and uncertain question in the case. It can be found initially, of course, that
such picketing did constitute inducement and encouragement of the employees.
Wadsworth and Sealright cases, supra; Printing Specialties Union v. LeBaron,
supra; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N. L. R. B., 181 F. 2d
34 (C. A. 2) (25 LRRM 2449). The crucial question is whether such inducement
and encouragement under the circumstances here present was illegal.
That question cannot be settled by simple reference to the terms of the statute
since it is now well settled that Section 8 (b) (4) does not encompass every
situation appearing to fall within its literal language. Indeed, the legislative
history discloses congressional intent to limit the section to secondary union
action and to except from its sweep "the primary means which unions tradition-
ally use to press their demands on employers," Pure Oil case, supra. So long,
therefore, as the picketing is confined to the area of primary conduct, it has been
upheld as within the union's lawful right to persuade all persons, including em-
ployees of third persons, to withhold their business from the primary employer.
The present issue therefore becomes whether the picketing of Western trucks
was within the permissible area of primary action or whether it occurred in
the proscribed secondary field.
There is no decided case which is squarely controlling of the present factual
situation, though there are a number which it closely resembles in varying re-
spects, some in the nature of the business involved and others in the type of
activities resorted'to by Respondents. Specifically, the present problem is one of
deciding whether the theory of the Santa Ana case (which followed the rationale
of the Wadsworth, Sealright, and Pure Oil cases) is controlling, or whether it is
possible to apply the different doctrine which was evolved in the Schultz case
(International Brotherhood of Teamsters Union, 87 NLRB 502), to solve the
"special problem" there presented. The decisional difficulties are somewhat
accentuated by the later Sterling Beverages decision (International Brotherhood
of Teamsters Union, 90 NLRB 590), which by implication suggests that;" the
Schultz doctrine is capable of extension to other and different situations.
The question which is suggested by the two latter cases is whether the type
of truck picketing there approved may be legally resorted to in a case where, as
here, the manufacturer or processor maintains its place of business at a fixed
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 357
geographical location, which constitutes the place of employment of his employees
and the situs of the labor dispute. Does each of Western's delivery trucks con-
stitute a further or additional place of business and thereby give a "roving
situs" to the labor dispute so as to make picketing of the trucks permissible?
Analysis of the Schultz case discloses that the doctrine there evolved was the
result of and was intended to apply to a factual situation far different from the
present one. Schultz was in the business of transporting goods by truck between
several States. The labor dispute in question involved only his operations in
the metropolitan area of New York City For some 12 years Schultz had em-
ployed members of a New York local as pickup and delivery drivers in New York
City where it maintained a terminal. The dispute arose when Schultz removed
its terminal to Slackwood, New Jersey, acid thereafter refused to negotiate with
the New York local for the further employment of its members. Though con-
tinuing its New York operations, Schultz employed as drivers members of a New
Jersey local. The New York local resorted to picketing Schultz' trucks as they
were engaged in making pickups and deliveries at customers'.or consignees' places
of business. The picketing was of the same type as engaged in here.
In distinguishing earlier decisions (Wadsworth and Sealright) and in holding
that those activities constituted permissible primary conduct, the Board em-
phasized these facts:
1. Schultz' operations had no fixed geographical situs. Its only geographical
premises were a terminal in New Jersey and a dispatcher's office in New York
City (held by the Board not to constitute a place of business), removed from all
contact with customers and consignees.
2. Its trucks were the "necessary instruments" of its "roving operations."
"the main instrumentality of Schultz' mobile business activities in [New York
City]"; they comprised the "employer's own business New York City at the
point of direct contact with the patronage of its customers and consignees."
3. The trucks also represented the place of employment of the aggrieved em-
ployees and the actual situs of the labor dispute.22
4. Picketing of the New Jersey terminals would have been pointless ; "in view
of the roving nature of its business, the only-effective means of bringing direct
pressure on Schultz was the type of picketing engaged in by the [union]."
There are affirmative indications that the Board did not consider that the
Schultz doctrine applied to a factual situation like the present one. First, in the
decision itself, the Board distinguished the Wadsworth and Sealright cases
on the ground that those employers conducted their manufacturing operations
at fixed geographical locations, and that in such cases the immediate vicinity of
the struck plant, the situs of the primary employer's business, constituted the
area of lawful primary strike activity. Under those circumstances, the Board
pointed out,
. . . the union by extending its picket line to the premises of other employers
and thus abandoning the scene of its actual dispute with the primary em-
ployer, went beyond the protected area of primary picketing. Its picket
line so extended was no longer local in point of contact to the primary em-
ployer's manufacturing operations, the only business involved in the labor
dispute.
22 ". . . our decision rests squarely on the proposition that Respondent, by picketing
Schultz' business at the situs or the labor dispute, had engaged in primary rather than
secondary activity " [Emphasis supplied ]
Also in the later Stet ling Beverages decision, the Board referred to the Schultz case as
one involving the picketing of trucks on which union members were employed at the situs
of their labor dispute with the employer
358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Second, in the Santa Ana case, which followed Schultz by 1 week and in which
the facts relating to the nature of the employer's business and operations even
more closely resembles the present, the Board not only made no attempt to apply
the Schultz doctrine, but also failed to discuss or even mention the ease .21 Such
circumstance is of great significance to the consideration of the present case in
view of the striking similarity of Western's business and operations. Thus,
both concerns were manufacturing or processing concerns 24 and both made some
deliveries by their own trucks. The immediate vicinity of the struck plant, the
situs of the primary employer's business, therefore, constituted the situs of the
labor dispute and the area of lawful primary strike activity (Cf. Schultz ease,
summarizing holding in the Wadsworth and Sealright cases).
Indeed, the evidence in the present -case emphasizes the fact that Western's
packing plant constituted the situs of the labor dispute. Thus, it was at the
packing plant where were employed the employees in the unit for which the
Local was seeking representation and with respect to whose wages, hours,
and working conditions it was demanding bargaining rights and a contract.
The trucks were not the place of employment of arly such employees, nor was
the operation of the trucks any part of the subject matter of the dispute. These
distinctions accentuate the crucial facts that the truck picketing did not occur
at the situs of the labor dispute and was not identified with the actual func-
tioning of the primary employer's business at such situs.
The resemblance of Western's operations to Santa Ana's having been indi-
cated we turn now to a consideration of the Board's holding in the Santa Ana
case.
Though the activities in Santa Ana analogous to those now under considera-
tion were held not to be violative of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) that result was due
entirely to the limited nature of such activities. Indeed the language of the
decision discloses clearly that the result was reached because of the absence of
the very type of activities which are here present.
Thus, as summarized by the Board, the evidence in the Santa Ana case showed
the following :
The Respondents had some of their unemployed members posted in auto-
mobiles outside the Company's yard. When a Company truck left the yard,
men in one of the automobiles followed it to its destination, ascertained
23 That the Board intends to apply the Schultz doctrine narrowly seems apparent from
the Sterling Beverages decision. Sterling, a Massachusetts distributor of Ruppert's beer,
had no place of business in New York City, from whence it hauled by its own truck its
supply of beer for distribution in Massachusetts. The labor controversy concerned the
employment of men to perform the trucking operations incidental to Sterling's loading
and unloading at Ruppert's premises. In other words Sterling's operations at Ruppert's
brewery constituted the source and the subject matter of the controversy and the sites
of the primary labor dispute
Because in two instances picketing of the entrance to Ruppert's loading platform had
occurred at a time immediately before and after the arrival of Sterling's truck, the Board
distinguished the Schultz holding on the ground that in Sterling the picketing was not
confined to the primary employer's trucks but extended directly to the secondary employ-
er's own premises. The Board concluded, "The line must be drawn somewhere and this
is where we draw it."
Except for the apparent intention to construe the Schultz doctrine narrowly, it would
appear that "the triviality of these instances" (so characterized by Member Houston in
dissent) would have justified a finding that such incidents, standing alone, were too iso-
lated to warrant a finding of unfair labor practices. Compare Santa Ana case, supra, and
cases there cited at footnote 18.
14 Santa Ana's business was buying and processing lumber, millwork, and building ma-
terials Western operated a slaughtering and meat processing plant. These facts af-
ford no rational basis for a distinction between their businesses nor between them and the
"manufacturing operations" conducted by Wadsworth and Sealrsght.
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 359
the name and address of the purchaser, and turned this information over
to Bardwell, secretary of the Orange County Council, whose duty it then
was to contact the purchasers for the purpose of dissuading them from con-
tinuing to purchase the Company's products. This happened between 100
and 200 times. The following cars carried no signs, placards or other
means of identification. When the Company's truck reached its destination,
the person or persons in the following car did not picket either the truck
or the premises of the purchaser. Nor did they otherwise urge the em-
ployees of purchasers to do or refrain from doing anything.
On these facts the Board concluded :
It is difficult to perceive how the trailing here followed can be said to
have "induced or encouraged" employees to refrain from working on the
Company's products. The union members in the following cars carried no
signs and made no appeal for employee action by picketing or other means.
Nor, as conducted in this particular case, do we believe that their mere
act of following the Company's trucks was tantamount to "inducement or
encouragement" of employees other than the Company's' truck drivers,
within the meaning of the Act. As a result, we believe that a necessary
prerequisite for a finding that the trailing practice violated Section 8 (b)
(4) (A) is not present. [Emphasis supplied.]
But Respondents here did not confine themselves to the mere following of
Western trucks for the purpose ascertaining the identity of customers for
later contacts. Instead the Unions' agents (1) picketed the truck during
the unloading and (2) by direct contact within the customers' places of busi-
ness, called attention to that dispute and sought the customers' cooperation in
not dealing with Western.26
In sum, it is obvious that the nature of Western's operations and of the
labor controversy which concerned them do not pose that "special problem"
which induced the admittedly exceptional result in Schultz. To the contrary,
the circumstances here, which are practically indistinguishable (except on an
a fortiori basis) from those in Santa Ana, call, as there, for the application of
the general principles of earlier decisions.2e
It is too late, of course, for the contention that Section 8 (c) immunizes either
this or other acts of the Respondents from the thrust of Section 8 (b) (4). Such
contention has been foreclosed by previous Board and court decisions. Wads-
worth and Sealrnght cases, supra; Printing Specialties Union v. LeBaron, supra;
United Brotherhood of Carpenters ,& Joiners v. Sperry, 170 F. 2d 863 (C. A. 10) ;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N. L. R. B. (C. A. 2), supra;
Denver Building Council (Henry Shore), 90 NLRB 1768, and cases there cited.
Under all the circumstances, it is concluded and found that the picketing of
Western trucks constituted forbidden inducement and encouragement of the
28 However , as found above , Respondents ' agents did not in all instances confine their
solicitations to the proprietors , but in some instances talked with employee meat cutters
and buyers. In other instances employees of the customer heard the conversation and saw
the picketing. Indeed, it is difficult to surmise how the employees could have been un-
aware of the picketing of Western 's trucks, since it occurred in the immediate vicinity of
the truck which was usually stopped in front of the customers' stores.
20 Respondents' reliance on the Wohl case (Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers, Local
802 v. Wohl, 315 U. S 769) is obviously misplaced. First, the court was not there con-
fronted with statutory regulation such as the present. Second, the legislative history
reflects congressional recognition that Section 8 (b) (4) would nullify the Wohl decision.
Thus Senator Pepper, a leading opponent of the legislation, openly charged , in referring
to the Wohl case. The provision of the bill to which I refer would reverse the Supreme
Court of the United States " 93 Gong Rea 4322, April 29, 1947. The correctness of that
view was not at any time disputed by the proponents of the Act.
360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employees of Western's customers (who were secondary employers and strang-
ers to the dispute) to cease handling, processing, or working on Western's
products.
b. Were objects of the concerted activities induced by Respondents either of
those proscribed by subsections (A), and (B)?
The issue under subsection (B), being a simple one, will be first disposed of.
There is scant room for question that an object of the concerted action which
Respondents induced employees of Western's customers to engage in was to
force or require Western to recognize and bargain with the Local as the repre-
sentative of its employees 24 Admittedly the Local had not received a certifica-
tion ; nor is there dispute under the evidence that Respondents were seeking
to require Western to recognize and bargain with the Local without such
certification. Such was an avowed object of all the activities, whether per-
missible or proscribed, which the Unions resorted to as above recounted. It
is therefore concluded and found that an object of the concerted action induced
by the Respondents (as heretofore found) fell clearly within the proscription
of subsection (B).
The question whether another object of such action was within the proscrip-
tion of subsection (A) is, under Respondents' contentions, somewhat more
complicated. Certainly it is clear that the Respondents' objective throughout
the activities the General Counsel complains of was to further the Local's dis-
pute with Western. Such objective was evident in the appeals to customers,
simultaneous with the truck picketing, for cooperation with the strike, with the
understanding, implicit or explicit, that this entailed the cessation of business
with Western. The picketing of Western's trucks reflected the same objective,
attainment of which was sought (at least in part) through the medium of recog-
nized employee reluctance to handle goods which pass a picket line. Nor was
such objective any the more obscured in the cases where employees of the cus-
tomers, as a result of the statements, telephone calls, and letters previously
referred to, notified their employers of their unwillingness to further buy,
handle, or process Western meat.
Respondents argue that no "forcing" or "requiring" of employers occurred
within the meaning of the Act because there is no evidence of any actual refusal
to work nor of work stoppages or strikes. This argument is the equivalent of
the district court's conclusion n that the quoted terms connote the use of coer-
cive activities, and that no coercion is shown where, as here, the employers
testified that they were not forced or required to cease doing business with
Western.
But the statutory language is not susceptible of so restrictive an interpreta-
tion. It is enough that an object of the concerted employee action induced by
Respondents was to exert pressure on the employers to induce them to agree
to cease doing business with Western. Distillery Workers Union, 78 NLRB
504; N. L. R. B. v. Distillery Workers Union, 17S F. 2d 584 (C. A. 2) ; Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical' Workers v. N. L. R. B., supra.
The circumstance that Western's customers, to avoid a possible strike or their
own involvement in a labor dispute, chose to cease dealing with Western does
27 Nor do Respondents clearly advance a contrary contention Indeed their brief urges
upon the Trial Examiner the rationalc of the district court decision in the injunction
action , in which it was expressly found that Respondents had committed a violation of
Section 8 ( b) (4) (B).
2e The district court's decision denying the temporary injunction to restrain the secondary
boycott is of course not binding upon the Board in its determination of the present con-
troversy on the merits . N. L. R. B. v. Carpenters Union, 181 F. 2d 126 (C. A. 6).
AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN 361
not avail Respondents, since an object of the employee action which Respondents
had induced was to exert pressure on the employer to do exactly what he did
The coercion of the employer, (if any were needed) seems obvious under the
circumstances. Here the mere exertion of that pressure was adequate to ac-
complish Respondents' objective, which was nonetheless proscribed by the Act
because success made it unnecessary to resort to the more coercive sanctions
which the Joplin Meat Company and Safeway (Miami) incidents, for example,
showed that the Respondents were prepared to invoke.
The statute does not require the secondary employers to resist to the point of
provoking a strike, thereby extending the labor dispute to their own establish-
ments. The contrary view runs counter to the purpose of the statute, which
was to limit the area of permissible industrial conflict. Printing Specialties
Union, et al. v. LeBaron, 171 F 2d 331 (C. A. 9).
Nor is it material, as some of Respondents' evidence showed, that the con-
certed action which they induced had other legitimate objects, such as the
unionizing of Western's employees and the publicizing of the dispute with West-
ern. Where an object violative of the Act is found, its illegality is not miti-
gated by the fact that Respondents' conduct may have had other legal objectives.
Wadsworth case, saps a, and cases there cited at footnote 12.
It is therefore concluded and found that an object of the concerted activities
induced by the Respondents as heretofore found was to force and require West-
ern's customers to cease using, selling, handling, or otherwise dealing in West-
ern's products and to cease doing business with Western.
For reasons which are fully explicated above, the factors necessary to support
findings that Respondents committed unfair labor practices under Section 8
(b) (4) (A) and (B) have here been found in combine. See p 354, supra. It
is therefore concluded and found that Respondents engaged in unfair labor
practices under said section. See Conclusions of Law, No. 4, infra.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondents set forth in Division III, hereof, occurring
in connection with the operations of Western, Inc, set forth in Division I,
hereof, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and
commerce among the several States and tend to lead and have led to labor dis-
putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and
Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) of the Act it will be recommended that they
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in
the case I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,
AFL, and Local Union No. 303 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America, AFL, are labor organizations within the meaning
of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
2 Herb J. Riddle is an agent of the aforesaid organizations within the mean-
ing of the Act.
362 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
3. Respondents and each of them have engaged in and are engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act, and have
restrained and coerced employees of Western, Inc, in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, by intimidatory conduct designed to prevent
said employees from working for Western, Inc., while the strike was in progress
and to coerce them into joining with the union adherents in the strike and in
other concerted activities.
4. Respondents and each of them have engaged in and are engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and (B) of the
Act, by inducing and encouraging members of Local No. 303 employed by cus-
tomers of Western, Inc., to engage in a concerted refusal in the course of their
employment to use, handle, or work on Western's products or to perform any
services for their respective employers, objects thereof being (a) to force and
require their respective employers to cease using, selling, handling, or otherwise
dealing in Western's products and to cease doing business with Western, Inc.,
and (b) to force and require Western, Inc., to recognize and bargain with Local
No. 303 as the representative of its employees although said Local had not been
certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of Section
9 of the Act.
5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.]
PINE HALL BRICK AND PIPE COMPANY and UNITED STONE AND ALLIED
PRODUCTS WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, PETITIONER. Case No.
34-RC-255. February 19, 1951
Decision and Direction of Election
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, a hearing was held before Miles J. McCormick, hear-
ing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free
from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-mem-
ber panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Styles].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of
the Act.
2. The labor organization involved claims to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9
(c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
4. The Petitioner requests a unit of all production and main-
tenance employees at the Employer's three plants and its central yard,
93 NLRB No. 54.
G