Ali S. Khayrallah

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 19, 2019

14465374 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 19, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/465,374 08/21/2014 Ali S. Khayrallah 12975.0077-00000 4911
22852 7590 07/19/2019
FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER
LLP
901 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-4413
EXAMINER
AUNG, SAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2416
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/19/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
regional-desk@finnegan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ALI S. KHAYRALLAH
____________________

Appeal 2018-005525
Application 14/465,3741
Technology Center 2400
____________________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, LARRY J. HUME, and
MATTHEW J. McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

FRAHM, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s decision finally rejecting claims 1–29. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 According to Appellant, Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (publ) is the real
party in interest (App. Br. 2).
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Disclosed Invention and Exemplary Claim
The disclosed invention relates “to backhaul compression, and more
particularly, to terminal-aided backhaul compression” (Spec. 1:2–3; see also
Title), used in wireless networks that operate “in a simulcast or broadcast on
demand mode” (Spec. 1:6; see also Fig. 1). Appellant discloses
“distribut[ing] some of the receiving node’s function onto wireless
terminals” (Spec. 1:24–25), by providing (i) backhaul compression methods
(claims 1, 12, 24); (ii) a delegate wireless terminal in communication with a
network node (claim 8); and (iii) network nodes of wireless communication
networks that transmit using backhaul compression (claims 18, 27), that can
recall messages without an increase in communication on the backhaul link
(see Spec. 1:25–28).
Claims 1, 8, 12, 18, 24, and 27 are independent, and each recite
similar limitations pertaining to a method, delegate wireless terminal, and
network node that can identify messages previously stored upon receipt from
a message label from a network node that identifies a message stored in
memory (see infra, limitation [A] recited in claim 1, and commensurate
limitations in remaining independent claims 8, 12, 18, 24, and 27). Claim 1,
reproduced below (with key limitations emphasized and bracketed lettering
added), is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method performed at a delegate wireless terminal in
a wireless communication system using terminal aided backhaul
compression, comprising:
receiving, at the delegate wireless terminal, a message
label from a network node, wherein the message label identifies
a message stored in a memory of the delegate wireless terminal,
and wherein the delegate wireless terminal is a delegate for
storing messages to be communicated from a transmitting
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network node to a receiving network node using
backhaul compression;
[A] identifying, at the delegate wireless terminal, based on
the received message label, the message stored in the memory of
the delegate wireless terminal; and
transmitting, at the delegate wireless terminal, the message
to an intended destination.

App. Br. 10 (Claims Appendix).
The Examiner’s Rejections
(1) Claims 1–29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–4; Ans. 3–4.
(2) Claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 8–10 are rejected as being unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Pazhayakath et al. (US
2014/0334491 A1; published Nov. 13, 2014) (hereinafter, “Paz”), Bitar
(US 8,498,296 B2; issued July 30, 2013), and Racz et al. (US 2010/0322151
A1; published Dec. 23, 2010) (hereinafter, “Racz”).2 Final Act. 5–15.
(3) Claim 4 is rejected as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103
over the combination of Paz, Bitar, Racz, and Kobayashi et al.

2 For the obviousness rejections of claims 1–29, Appellant presents specific
arguments on the merits only as to claim 1 (see App. Br. 8–9; Reply Br.
3–5), and relies on the arguments presented as to claim 1 for the
patentability of all remaining claims 2–29 (see App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 5).
Based on Appellant’s arguments and the common subject matter of claims
1–3, 5, 6, and 8–10, we select claim 1 as representative of the group of
claims rejected over the combination of Paz, Bitar, and Racz. The appeal of
the obviousness rejections of 4, 7, and 11–29 will therefore stand/fall with
the outcome of the appeal of the obviousness rejection of claims 1–3, 5, 6,
and 8–10, which in turn stands/falls with the obviousness rejection of
representative claim 1 over the combination of Paz, Bitar, and Racz.
Therefore, our analysis will only address the merits of claim 1.
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(US 2006/0159054 A1; published July 20, 2006) (hereinafter, “Kobayashi”).
Final Act. 15–17.
(4) Claims 12, 17, 18, and 23 are rejected as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Paz, Racz, and Kobayashi. Final
Act. 17–28.
(5) Claims 7 and 11 are rejected as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Paz, Racz, and Fransen et al.
(US 2015/0358804 A1; published Dec. 10, 2015) (hereinafter, “Fransen”).
Final Act. 28–29.
(6) Claims 13–15 and 19–21 are rejected as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Paz, Racz, Kobayashi, and Awad
(US 2012/0220290 A1; published Aug. 30, 2012). Final Act. 29–33.
(7) Claims 16 and 22 are rejected as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Paz, Racz, Kobayashi, and Crosta
et al. (US 2014/0119377 A1; published May 1, 2014) (hereinafter,
“Crosta”). Final Act. 33–38.
(8) Claims 24 and 27 are rejected as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Paz, Crosta, and Racz. Final
Act. 38–44.
(9) Claims 25, 26, 28, and 29 are rejected as being unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Paz, Crosta, Racz, and Kobayashi.
Final Act. 44–47.

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Principal Issues on Appeal
Based on Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 2–5)
and the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 7–9), the following two principal issues are
presented on appeal:
(1) Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–29
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter,
without significantly more?
(2) Has Appellant shown the Examiner erred in rejecting
(a) claims 1–3, 5, 6, and 8–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination
of Paz, Bitar, and Racz; and/or (b) claims 4, 7, and 11–29 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103, over various combinations of prior art references all based on Paz and
Racz, because the base combination of Paz and Racz fails to teach or suggest
using backhaul compression at a network node, including performing
identification as recited in limitation [A] of representative claim 1?

ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and requirements of this title.

There are, however, three judicially-created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: “[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted);
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Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70
(2012).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In
accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim
is “directed to.” See id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are
drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party
to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
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view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter, “Revised Guidance”). Under that
guidance, after determining that a claim falls within one of the statutory
categories under § 101 (hereinafter, “Step 1”), we determine whether the
claim recites:
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(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, mental processes, or
certain methods of organizing human activities such as a
fundamental economic practice or managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people) (hereinafter,
“Step 2A, Prong 1”); and

(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (MPEP) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, Jan. 2018)) (hereinafter, “Step 2A, Prong 2”).

Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 51–52, 54–55.
Only if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then evaluate
whether the claim provides an inventive concept. Revised Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 56; Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18. For example, we look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception (hereinafter, “Step
2B”).

Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.

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Step 1
Under Step 1 of the patent-eligibility inquiry under § 101, we
determine whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories
of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.
In the instant case on appeal, claim 1 and claims 2–7 depending
therefrom recite “[a] method performed at a delegate wireless terminal in a
wireless communication system using terminal aided backhaul compression”
(claim 1). Claim 12 and claims 13–17 depending therefrom recite “[a]
method at a network node of a wireless communications network using
backhaul compression” (claim 12). Claim 24 and claims 25 and 26
depending therefrom recite “[a] method performed at a network node of a
wireless communications network configured for backhaul compression”
(claim 24). A process is a statutory category of invention under § 101.
Therefore, claims 1–7, 12–17, and 24–26, as method claims, recite at least
one of the enumerated categories (e.g., a process) of eligible subject matter
in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claim 8 and claims 9–11 depending therefrom recite “[a] delegate
wireless terminal in communication with a network node” including “a
memory,” “a transceiver,” and “a processor” (claim 8). Claims 18 and 27,
and claims 19–23, 28, and 29 depending respectively therefrom, recite “[a]
network node of a wireless communications network” including “a
memory,” “a transceiver,” and “a processor” (claims 18, 27). A machine or
manufacture are statutory categories of invention under § 101. Therefore,
claims 8–11, 18–23, and 27–29, as apparatus claims, recite at least one of the
enumerated categories (e.g., machine and/or manufacture) of eligible subject
matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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As a result, as to claims 1–29, we continue our analysis under Step 2A(i) of
the Revised Guidance to determine whether the claims (1) recite a judicial
exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the
enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above); and (2) are patent-eligible.
Step 2A, Prong 1
Under Step 2A, Prong 1, we determine whether claims 1, 8, 12, 18,
24, and 27 recite a judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea. The Examiner
concludes claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (see Final Act. 3–4;
Ans. 3–4), specifically, “receiving a message label to identify a message for
communication” and “comparing the received message label and stored
message stored in the memory at the delegate wireless terminal” (Final
Act. 3). The Examiner also determines “using backhaul compression” as
recited in claim 1 does not meaningfully limit the claim or otherwise provide
a technological improvement (see Final Act. 3–4; Ans. 4). Using claim 1 as
an example, the Examiner concludes that claims 1–29 are directed to a
judicial exception, in particular, the abstract idea of ‘“comparing data to
determine a risk level’” (Final Act. 8).
Appellant contends that the claimed features, “such as using a
message label to perform backhaul compression using a delegate wireless
terminal, are necessarily rooted in a wireless communication process” (App.
Br. 8) and in “radio communications” (Reply Br. 2), and “relate specifically
to terminal-aided backhaul compression” (App. Br. 7). We agree.
Appellant describes the invention as relating “to backhaul
compression, and more particularly, to terminal-aided backhaul
compression” (Spec. 1:2–3; see also Title), used in wireless communication
networks (see Fig. 1) that operate “in a simulcast or broadcast on demand
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mode” (Spec. 1:6; see also Fig. 1). Appellant’s invention “distributes some
of the receiving node’s function onto wireless terminals” (Spec. 1:24–25) in
order to achieve the technological advantage that a transmitting node in a
wireless communication network would not have to resend entire messages
and “needlessly transmitting the same information over and over”
(Spec. 1:11), thus “relying on scarce backhaul resources” (Spec. 1:22). As a
result, using Appellant’s invention, “there is no increase in communication
on the backhaul link” (Spec. 1:27–28).
Appellant’s claims recite (i) backhaul compression methods (claims 1,
12, 24); (ii) a delegate wireless terminal in communication with a network
node (claim 8); and (iii) network nodes of wireless communication networks
that transmit using backhaul compression (claims 18, 27), that can recall
messages without an increase in communication on the backhaul link (see
Spec. 1:25–28). Claims 1, 8, 12, 18, 24, and 27 each recite similar
limitations pertaining to a method, delegate wireless terminal, and network
node that can identify previously stored messages in order to conserve
backhaul compression resources. In this light, the methods (claims 1, 12,
24) and apparatuses (claims 8, 18, 27) for improving a wireless terminal or
network node using backhaul compression do not fall into any of the
subcategories of abstract ideas enumerated in the Revised Guidance,
namely:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;

(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity—
fundamental economic principles or practices (including
hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal
interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
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obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including social
activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and

(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human
mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).

Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 (footnotes omitted).
Claims 1, 8, 12, 18, 24, and 27 do not recite mathematical concepts,
because there are no mathematical relationships, formulas, equations, or
calculations analyzed or performed in the claim. Claims 1, 8, 12, 18, 24,
and 27 also do not recite mental processes, because the steps of receiving a
message label from a network node, identifying a message stored in wireless
terminal memory (or determining if a message label coincides with a
message stored at a network node as in claims 8 and 27), and transmitting a
message to an intended destination are not something that can be practically
performed in the human mind—these operations exist exclusively in the
realm of wireless communication in wireless communications networks
having network nodes and wireless terminals. Finally, claims 1, 8, 12, 18,
24, and 27 do not recite any of the methods of organizing human activity
identified in the Revised Guidance. That is, claims 1, 8, 12, 18, 24, and 27
relate to wireless communication methods and apparatuses using backhaul
compression, not fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial
or legal interactions, or managing personal behavior or relationships or
interactions between people. See Revised Guidance. Accordingly, we
determine claims 1, 8, 12, 18, 24, and 27 do not recite an abstract idea
because none of the limitations fall within the enumerated categories of
abstract ideas under the Revised Guidance.
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Because claims 1, 8, 12, 18, 24, and 27 do not recite subject matter
falling into one of the recognized categories of abstract ideas (e.g.,
mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and
mental processes), we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments (App.
Br. 7–8; Reply Br. 2–3) claims 1–29 are not directed to an abstract idea, and
thus the Examiner erred in concluding claims 1–29 are directed to an
abstract idea.
Steps 2A, Prong 2 and 2B
As we determine claims 1–29 are not directed to a judicial exception,
we need not consider whether (i) these claims integrate the alleged judicial
exception into a practical application under Step 2A, Prong 2, or (ii) there is
an inventive concept under Step 2B.

Issue (2): Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections (Final Act. 5–47) in light
of Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (App. Br. 8–9), and Reply
Brief (Reply Br. 3–5) that the Examiner has erred, along with the
Examiner’s response to Appellant’s arguments found at pages 4 through 7 of
the Examiner’s Answer. Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred
in rejecting (i) claim 1 for obviousness over the combination of Paz, Bitar,
and Racz, and (ii) claims 2–29 for obviousness using the same base
combination of Paz and Racz, are unpersuasive. We concur with the
conclusion reached by the Examiner as to the obviousness of representative
claim 1, and we provide the following for emphasis.
In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, it is incumbent
upon the Examiner to establish a factual basis to support the prior art
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rejection — the so-called “prima facie” case. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d
1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (the USPTO has the initial burden of proof
“‘. . . to produce the factual basis for its rejection of an application under
sections 102 and 103.’” (quoting In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (CCPA
1967))). “[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art
or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.”
In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
In the instant case before us on appeal, the Examiner sufficiently
mapped the teachings of Paz (see Final Act. 6–7) and Racz (see Final Act. 8;
Ans. 6) to the limitations of claim 1, and thus set forth a prima facie case of
obviousness. We agree with the Examiner that there is significant similarity
and alignment between Paz’s method for processing packets shown in
Figure 3 and Appellant’s process flow shown in Appellant’s Figure 7A (see
Final Act. 9; Ans. 4–5). We also agree with the Examiner that under the
broadest reasonable interpretation, the identification operation of limitation
[A] recited in claim 1 encompasses Paz’s operations shown in Figure 3 and
described in paragraphs 13, 31, and 32 (see Ans. 4–5).
Paz’s step 314 of extracting and validating fields from a received
packet, and 318 of accessing stored signature function data, “which includes
an action a next hop ID” (see ¶ 32) that act to “define[] a set of packet fields
. . . to form a unique signature for packets with the same relevant fields”
(¶ 31), teaches or suggests receiving (and identifying) a message label as
recited in claim 1. Thus, we agree with the Examiner (Ans. 6) that Paz
teaches identifying a received message label stored in the memory (e.g.,
Paz’s hash table). In other words, Paz’s received second packet (including
parsed, extracted, and validated fields) described in paragraph 32 functions
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similarly to the message label recited in claim 1, and Paz’s fields of the
second packet or fields of the first packet defined by the signature function
similarly to the message recited in claim 1. Furthermore, Paz’s step 320 of
routing a packet based on the signature function data (see ¶ 32), teaches or
suggests transmitting a message to an intended destination as recited in
claim 1. In this light, Appellant’s argument that Paz “does not teach or
suggest ‘a message label’” (Reply Br. 4), is unpersuasive.
We note that each reference cited by the Examiner must be read, not
in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as
a whole. See In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(finding one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references
individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references).
A determination of obviousness does not require the claimed invention to be
expressly suggested by any one or all of the references. See, e.g., In re
Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981).
In this light, Appellant’s argument that Paz’s “signature function is
not used to identify a stored message, but at most process a received
message” (Reply Br. 4), is unpersuasive, because the Examiner relies upon
Bitar, and not Paz, as teaching or suggesting identifying the message (Ans. 6
(citing Bitar Fig. 7, steps 710–720 (identifying LSP labeled data
packet/message within the memory); col. 7, ll. 50–55)).
Similarly, Appellant’s argument (App. Br. 8) that Paz only mentions a
backhaul network, but fails to teach or suggest using backhaul compression
is also unpersuasive. We agree with the Examiner (Final Act. 6–8;
Ans. 4–6) that both Paz (see ¶ 13) and Racz (see Fig. 1; ¶¶ 24, 25) pertain to
backhaul compression in wireless communications networks. The Examiner
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relies on a properly made combination of Paz, Bitar, and Racz to support the
conclusion of obviousness of the subject matter of independent claim 1.
Appellant has not rebutted or otherwise shown the Examiner’s explanation
of the combination of the collective teachings and suggestions of the applied
references (see Final Act. 6–9; Ans. 4–6) made in response to the
Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief (regarding the references
individually or in pairs) to be in error. Appellant’s Reply Brief does not
convince us otherwise.
In view of the foregoing, Appellant has not persuasively shown the
Examiner erred, and we sustain the rejection of representative claim 1, as
well as claims 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8–10 grouped therewith, as being obvious over
the combination of Paz, Bitar, and Racz. For similar reasons, and because
claims 4, 7, and 11–29 each contain commensurate limitations as claim 1;
and (ii) Appellant argues claims 4, 7, and 11–29 for the same reasons as
claim 1 (see App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 5), we also sustain the Examiner’s
obviousness rejections of claims 4, 7, and 11–29.

CONCLUSIONS
(1) Appellant has shown the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–29
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a judicial exception (e.g., an
abstract idea), without significantly more.
(2) Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in rejecting (a) claims
1–3, 5, 6, and 8–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over the combination of Paz,
Bitar, and Racz; and/or (b) claims 4, 7, and 11–29 over various other
references combined with the same base combination of Paz and Racz.

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DECISION
For the above reasons, we (1) reverse the Examiner’s decision to
reject claims 1–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 101; and (2) affirm the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 1–29 as being unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103
over the same base combination of Paz and Racz.
Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–29,
because at least one ground of rejection has been affirmed for each claim.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1) (“The affirmance of the rejection of a claim on
any of the grounds specified constitutes a general affirmance of the decision
of the examiner on that claim, except as to any ground specifically
reversed”).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED