01981342
05-15-2001
Ai-Lun Hou, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Pacific Region), Agency.
Ai-Lun Hou v. United States Postal Services
01981342
May 15, 01
.
Ai-Lun Hou,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
(Pacific Region),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01981342
Agency No. 1F-927-1086-95
Hearing No. 340-96-3736X
DECISION
Ai-Lun Hou (complainant) timely initiated an appeal of a final agency
decision (FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment
discrimination on the bases of her race (Asian), national origin
(Chinese), sex (female), reprisal (prior EEO activity) and physical
disability (lower back injury), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., and the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791, et seq. The appeal is accepted
in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.405. For the following reasons,
the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether complainant was subject to discrimination
on the aforementioned bases when the agency required her to submit
releases from her treating physician and obstetrician, and then sent her
for a fitness for duty examination before ordering her to return to her
full duties on August 27, 1995.
BACKGROUND
The record reveals that at the time complainant filed the instant
complaint, she was employed as a Flats Sorter Machine Operator, PS-05 at
the agency's Santa Ana Processing and Distribution Center. Complainant
sustained an on the job injury on or around June 30, 1992. After an
extended period of leave, during which she received Office of Workers
Compensation Program benefits, on February 6, 1995, complainant reported
to the office of the agency's Injury Compensation Coordinator (ICC),
and expressed a desire to return to work that day. (Affidavit B-4). <1>
The ICC attested that she gave the medical documentation complainant
presented that day to the agency's Associate Area Medical Director
(hereafter Medical Director) for review. After reviewing complainant's
medical certificate, the Medical Director concluded that it was not a
release to return to work. As specified in section 342.3 of the agency's
Personnel Operations Handbook, in order to be sufficient, �all medical
certificates must be detailed medical reports and not simply a statement
of ability to return to work.� (Ex. 3b) The medical certificate which
was submitted by complainant on February 6, 1995, merely stated that
complainant could return back to work. (Ex. 2d) On February 7, 1995,
complainant made a request for light duty, but again, she submitted no
medical information to support such a request. (Affidavit B-4)
It was not until June 12, 1995, that complainant submitted adequate
medical documentation which would allow her to return to work. (Affidavit
C-1). However, this medical certificate indicated that complainant was
unable to resume the full duties of her position until another 90 days
had passed. (Ex. 2i) On July 24, 1995, the agency sent complainant for
a Fitness for Duty Examination (FFDE) to get an independent determination
of the extent of her physical limitations. After evaluating the FFDE,
the Medical Director determined that complainant could return to her full
duties as a Flat Sorter Machine Operator. Consequently, on August 17,
1995, the agency's Manager of Distributions Operations sent complainant
a letter ordering her to return to her full duties on August 28, 1995.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the agency informed complainant
of her right to request a hearing or a final agency decision. On June
10, 1996, Complainant requested a hearing with an Administrative Judge
(AJ) of the EEOC. In a recommended decision dated, September 12,
1997, the AJ held that complainant failed to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination on any of her identified bases. In a FAD dated
November 25, 1997, the agency adopted the AJ's recommended finding of
no discrimination.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Complainant did not raise any arguments or make any new contentions
on appeal. In its transmittal statement, the agency requested that the
Commission affirm its FAD.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate where
a court determines that, given the substantive legal and evidentiary
standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine issue of
material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court does not
sit as a fact finder. Id. The evidence of the non moving party must
be believed at the summary judgment stage and all justifiable inferences
must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor. Id. A disputed issue of
fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder
could find in favor of the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F. 2D 103,
105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to
affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by
weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate.
In the context of an administrative proceeding under Title VII, an AJ
may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that
the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
In the case at hand, we find that the AJ acted properly when she issued a
summary finding without holding a hearing given that the case was fully
investigated and there existed no genuine issue of material fact in
this case. In this regard, we find that other than her bare assertion
of discriminatory treatment and reprisal, complainant does not present
any evidence to show that the agency engaged in impermissible conduct.
In fact, complainant failed to submit an affidavit in support of her
claims to the EEO Investigator. She also did not submit any evidence
at the hearing stage nor did she do so on appeal.
In reaching her finding that complainant failed to establish a prima
facie case in relation to her Title VII bases, the AJ held that a number
of employees outside of complainant's protected group were required to
provide medical information and not allowed to come back to work until
they did so. This finding is supported by the evidence of record and
complainant made no attempt to rebut it. Similarly, the AJ held that
complainant did not establish that she was a qualified person with a
disability or that she was subject to reprisal. Assuming arguendo that
complainant did establish a prima facie case of reprisal and disability
discrimination, we find that she failed to present any evidence to
rebut the reasons articulated by the agency for its actions. Namely,
complainant did not show to be pretext, the agency's assertion that it did
not allow her to return to work on February 6, 1995, because she did not
obtain a proper medical release from her doctors, or that it mandated a
FFDE and required complainant to resume the full scope of her Flat Sorter
responsibilities after an independent medical examination established
that there was no objective evidence which precluded complainant from
resuming her usual and customary work duties.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the AJ's
decision properly summarized the relevant facts and laws in this case.
We discern no reason to disturb the AJ's decision. Accordingly, the
agency's finding of no discrimination is AFFIRMED.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, the agency's finding of no discrimination in the non-selection
of complainant for the Mechanic Leader position is AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole
discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not
extend your time in which to
file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
5/15/01
__________________
Date
1 Citations herein refer to affidavits and
exhibits in the Report of Investigation (ROI).