ADOBE INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 12, 2021

2019004554 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 12, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/541,785 11/14/2014 Damien Antipa 4436US01/216391 1348
121363 7590 01/12/2021
Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.
(Adobe Inc.)
Intellectual Property Department
2555 Grand Blvd
Kansas City, MO 64108
EXAMINER
HASTY, NICHOLAS
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2178
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/12/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
seaton@shb.com
shbdocketing@shb.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAMIEN ANTIPA and ANTONIO SANSO

Appeal 2019-004554
Application 14/541,785
Technology Center 2100

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, SCOTT B. HOWARD, and
JULIET MITCHELL DIRBA, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claims 1–20 are pending, stand rejected, are appealed by Appellant,
and are the subject of our decision under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a).1 See Final Act.
1; Appeal Br. 3.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a) (2019). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Adobe,
Inc. See Appeal Br. 3.
2 We refer to Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.”), filed Nov. 14, 2014;
Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”), filed Dec. 17, 2018; and Reply Brief (“Reply
Br.”), filed May 22, 2019. We also refer to the Examiner’s Final Office
Action (“Final Act.”), mailed Sept. 7, 2018; and Answer (“Ans.”) mailed
Apr. 5, 2019.
Appeal 2019-004554
Application 14/541,785

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The invention, according to Appellant, generally relates to “protecting
documents from cross-site scripting attacks” (Title), which occur when
“malicious users, or attackers . . . inject code into web pages that are loaded
by other users,” and which “can allow an attacker to access sensitive data,
such as private user data.” Spec. ¶ 1. Appellant’s claims recite computer
storage media, systems, and methods, including a first content handler
within an embedded document that is embedded within a containing
document. The first content handler receives untrusted content sent by a
second content handler that is part of the containing document. The
embedded document (content in the embedded document) is rendered in the
containing document that is in turn displayed in an application. The
untrusted content is forwarded to the embedded document by the second
content handler without the untrusted content being rendered directly in the
containing document. Additionally, a sandbox policy of the application is
enforced on the embedded document so that the rendered untrusted content
is restricted from accessing data associated with the containing document.
See Spec. ¶¶ 4, 5, 23, 24, 43, 44, 49; Abstract. Claim 1 (directed to
computer storage media), 14 (directed to a method), and 17 (directed to a
system) are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. One or more computer storage media storing computer-
useable instructions that, when used by one or more computing
devices, cause the one or more computing devices to perform
operations comprising:
receiving, by a first content handler that is part of an
embedded document embedded in a containing document,
untrusted content sent by a second content handler that is part of
Appeal 2019-004554
Application 14/541,785

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the containing document, wherein content in the embedded
document is rendered in the containing document displayed in an
application and the untrusted content is forwarded to the
embedded document by the second content handler without the
untrusted content being rendered directly in the containing
document;
rendering the received untrusted content in the embedded
document, wherein a sandbox policy of the application is
enforced on the embedded document by the application such that
the rendered untrusted content is restricted from accessing at
least some data associated with the containing document.
Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Boodaei et al.
(“Boodaei”)
US 2008/0222736 A1 Sept. 11, 2008
Aciicmez et al.
(“Aciicmez”)
US 2011/0185427 A1 July 28, 2011
Mike Ter Louw and V.N. Venkatakrishnan, BLUEPRINT: Robust
Prevention of Cross-site Scripting Attacks for Existing Browsers, 30th IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (2009) (“Louw”).
REJECTION3
The Examiner rejects claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Aciicmez, Boodaei, and Louw. See Final Act. 2–10.

3 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011), amended 35 U.S.C. § 103. Because the present application
has an effective filing date after the AIA’s effective date (March 16, 2013),
this decision refers to 35 U.S.C. § 103.
Appeal 2019-004554
Application 14/541,785

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ANALYSIS
The Examiner rejects independent claim 1 (as well as independent
claims 14 and 17, and dependent claims 2–13, 15, 16, and 18–20) as being
obvious over Aciicmez, Boodaei, and Louw. See Final Act. 2–3; Ans. 3–4.
Appellant contends that Aciicmez, Boodaei, and Louw do not teach the
disputed limitations of claim 1. See Appeal Br. 5–12; Reply Br. 2–7.
Specifically, Appellant contends, inter alia, that claim 1 recites “a first
content handler that is part of an embedded document embedded in a
containing document and a second content handler that is part of the
containing document” (Appeal Br. 7 (quotations omitted)), but Louw does
not describe these features. See Appeal Br. 5–9; Reply Br. 2–4. Appellant
further contends the Examiner misconstrues Louw because a browser, cited
by the Examiner as meeting the containing document of Appellant’s claim 1
(see Ans. 3 (citing Louw pp. 334, 335)), cannot reasonably be construed as a
document. See Reply Br. 2–4
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner misconstrues Louw and
that the Examiner-cited portions of Louw (in combination with Aciicmez
and Boodaei) do not teach or suggest “a first content handler that is part of
an embedded document,” which is “embedded in a containing document”
and “a second content handler that is part of the containing document.”
Appeal Br. 14 (Claims App.) (claim 1). See Appeal Br. 5–9; Reply Br. 2–4.
In particular, the Examiner determines that the “containing document” of
claim 1 reads on Louw’s browser—the Examiner concludes that “[i]t would
be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to
implement a browser [(Louw’s browser)] as a containing document
Appeal 2019-004554
Application 14/541,785

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transporting untrusted content to an embedded document.” Ans. 3 (citing
Louw pp. 334, 335).
As pointed out by Appellant “a browser is plainly not a document;”
rather “a browser should be understood to be a software application that can
display documents, such as web pages.” Reply Br. 3. We agree with
Appellant that a document would not have been understood by a person of
ordinary skill in the relevant art to read on a browser. As further pointed out
by Appellant, such an interpretation conflicts with other features of claim 1.
See Reply Br. 3. Claim 1 expressly requires that “the embedded document is
rendered in the containing document displayed in an application.” Appeal
Br. 14 (Claims App.) (claim 1). See Reply Br. 2–4. The Examiner has not
sufficiently explained how Louw’s browser can be a containing document
that is displayed in an application.
Consequently, we are constrained by the record before us to find that
the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Aciicmez, Boodaei,
and Louw renders obvious Appellant’s claim 1. Independent claims 14 and
17 include limitations of commensurate scope. Claims 2–13, 15, 16, and
18–20 depend from and stand with claims 1, 14, and 17, respectively.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of claims
1–20.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–20
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–20.
Appeal 2019-004554
Application 14/541,785

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DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 103 Aciicmez, Boodaei,
Louw
1–20

REVERSED