______________________________ Elizabeth B. Tinnin, Appellant,v.Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 2, 1999
01975420 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 2, 1999)

01975420

02-02-1999

______________________________ Elizabeth B. Tinnin, Appellant, v. Richard J. Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Elizabeth B. Tinnin v. Department of the Navy

01975420

February 2, 1999

______________________________

Elizabeth B. Tinnin, )

Appellant, )

)

v. )

) Appeal No. 01975420

Richard J. Danzig, ) Agency No. DON-95-00151-037

Secretary, ) Hearing No. 170-96-8267X

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

Appellant filed a timely appeal with this Commission on June 27, 1997,

from a final agency decision ("FAD") dated May 27, 1997, concerning her

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. In her

complaint, appellant alleged that her supervisor discriminated against her

on the bases of race (Black), and sex (female), when she was not selected

for the position of Personnel Staffing Specialist, GS-212-12. This appeal

is accepted in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

Appellant had worked for the agency at the Philadelphia Navy Shipyard

("Shipyard") for 35 years prior to her retirement in 1986. At the

time of her retirement, she served as a Supervisory Personnel Staffing

Specialist. In April of 1993, while visiting the Shipyard, appellant

had a conversation with the Assistant Personnel Officer ("APO") where she

inquired about the possibility of her returning to duty to assist in the

closing of the Shipyard. At the end of April 1993, appellant prepared an

updated SF-171 with a cover letter, and sent the information to the APO

through a former co-worker. The APO stated that he never received the

SF-171. However, the Assistant Head of Personnel Operations stated that

she received the SF-171 and referred it to her supervisor, the Director

of Human Resources Office ("Director"). Appellant stated that, after

submitting her SF-171, she had frequent conversations with supervisory

officials in the personnel office concerning her possible reinstatement.

In August or September of 1993, the agency placed an announcement

through the Federal Executive Board seeking a re-employable retired

federal employee for a temporary appointment to assist in the closing

of the Shipyard. The Director stated that he received approximately

ten applications in response to the announcement. After reviewing the

applications, the Director recommended one applicant to the APO, who

served as the Selecting Official. The APO interviewed and subsequently

hired the recommended individual ("Selectee").

Believing that she was the victim of discrimination, appellant sought EEO

counseling and, thereafter, filed a formal EEO complaint on February 25,

1995. The agency accepted the complaint for investigation and complied

with all of our procedural and regulatory prerequisites. Subsequently,

appellant requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge

("AJ"). Following a hearing, the AJ issued a Recommended Decision

("RD"), on March 5, 1997, finding no discrimination. In her RD, the

AJ concluded that appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination based on race or sex, in that she failed to show that

she applied for the position at issue or that her application, which

preceded the announcement, warranted consideration once the vacancy

arose. The AJ found that the fact that both the APO and Director had

knowledge of appellant's interest in re-employment, without more, was

insufficient to demonstrate that she applied and was considered for the

disputed position. The AJ further found that appellant had not shown that

consideration was given to any pre-announcement application in this case.

The agency's FAD adopted the AJ's RD. On appeal, appellant contends that

the AJ erred in finding that she had not established a prima facie case.

Appellant also contends the AJ erred by refusing to permit testimony

regarding EEO complaints involving other employees.<1> The agency asserts

that the AJ's findings were correct and requests that we affirm its FAD.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, including the

statements submitted on appeal, the Commission finds that the AJ's RD

sets forth the relevant facts and properly analyzes the appropriate

regulations, policies and laws. We note that nothing proffered by

appellant on appeal differs significantly from the arguments presented

at the hearing and given full consideration by the AJ. Therefore, the

Commission discerns no basis upon which to overturn the AJ's finding of

no discrimination in this matter. In this regard, the AJ made specific

credibility findings which are entitled to deference due to the AJ's

first-hand knowledge, through personal observation, of the demeanor and

conduct of the witnesses. See Esquer v. United States Postal Service,

EEOC Request No. 05960096 (September 6, 1996); Willis v. Department of

the Treasury, EEOC Request No. 05900589 (July 26, 1990). Accordingly,

it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to

AFFIRM the agency's final decision which adopted the AJ's finding of no

sex or reprisal discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or

to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON

WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT

PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may

result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"

means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or

department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the

administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

February 2, 1999 _______________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 The AJ ruled that the testimony was irrelevant.