Opinion
Nos. 05-56756 06-55427.
Argued and Submitted July 10, 2007 Pasadena, California.
July 26, 2007.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-05-01263-JAH.
Before: SILVERMAN, W. FLETCHER, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Michael J. Zwebner appeals the district court's orders striking his lawsuit and awarding attorney's fees and costs to James W. Coughlin. We affirm.
The district court applied the correct statute of limitations. A district court's decision concerning the appropriate choice of law is reviewed de novo. See Albingia Versicherungs A.G. v. Schenker Int'l., Inc., 344 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2003), amended by 350 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2003). In a diversity case, the district court is obliged to apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state. See Patton v. Cox, 276 F.3d 493, 495 (9th Cir. 2002).
The California Supreme Court in 1967 adopted a "governmental interest" test to determine which state's laws should apply in conflicts-of-law settings. See Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 553-56 (1967). Under this test, we must apply the statute of limitations of the forum state where the defendant is from that state and the plaintiff is from elsewhere, and the forum state has the stronger interest in applying its law. See American Bank of Commerce v. Corondoni, 169 Cal. App. 3d 368, 370-73 (Cal.App. 1985); Ashland Chemical Co. v. Provence, 129 Cal. App. 3d 790, 793-94 (Cal.App. 1982). Since the forum state, California, has the stronger interest in this suit, we must apply its statute of limitations.
A district court's award of attorneys' fees under state law is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court did not abuse its discretion in rewarding fees to Coughlin. The anti-SLAPP law requires a court to award attorneys' fees to a defendant who, like Coughlin, prevails on a special motion to strike:
In any action subject to [a motion to strike], a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(c). The anti-SLAPP statute makes no distinction between cases in which the defendant prevails because the plaintiff's case is substantively flawed and those in which the defendant wins due to a procedural bar. The statute only says that prevailing defendants "shall" be entitled to attorneys' fees. Coughlin therefore is entitled to attorneys' fees for prevailing on the merits.
The district court's fee award was also reasonable. "The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong." Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court's fee award was supported by ample evidence. Id.
Finally, Coughlin, as the prevailing party, is entitled to attorney's fees and expenses in connection with this appeal. See Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 785 (Cal.App. 1996) (holding that "an attorney fee award at the trial court level includes appellate attorney fees unless the statute specifically provides otherwise" (internal quotation marks omitted). Coughlin has made a timely request to transfer consideration of this issue to the district court on remand. See 9th Cir. Rule 39-1.8.
We therefore AFFIRM the district court's orders and REMAND for consideration of the attorney's fees and expenses due to Coughlin in connection with this appeal.