Here, we conclude that the policy unambiguously requires an insured to provide Selective with written notice of a claim or lawsuit brought against an insured and to send Selective copies of any legal papers received in connection with the claim or lawsuit. We further conclude that Selective met its initial burden of establishing that plaintiffs failed to provide notice of the claim or lawsuit as a matter of law inasmuch as Selective's employee averred that Selective did not receive notice of the underlying lawsuit until nearly 17 months after the undisputed latest date when plaintiffs learned of the underlying lawsuit and where plaintiffs offered no excuse for the delay (see Anglero v. George Units, LLC, 61 A.D.3d 564, 565, 877 N.Y.S.2d 296 ; Gershow Recycling Corp. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 22 A.D.3d 460, 461–462, 801 N.Y.S.2d 832 ; Zugnoni v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 A.D.2d 1033, 1033, 579 N.Y.S.2d 296 ). Plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557, 562, 427 N.Y.S.2d 595, 404 N.E.2d 718 ).
Supreme Court properly denied the motion of defendant New York Central Mutual Insurance Company (New York Central) seeking summary judgment declaring that it has no obligation to defend or indemnify plaintiff in the underlying action and granted the cross motion of plaintiff to the extent of declaring that New York Central is obligated to defend her in the underlying action. Contrary to New York Central's contention, plaintiff's delay in giving notice of the incident did not vitiate the insurance policy issued by New York Central to plaintiff ( see Zugnoni v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 A.D.2d 1033, 1033-1034). We have examined New York Central's remaining contention and conclude that it lacks merit ( see Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 293-294; Sullivan v. Breese, 160 A.D.2d 997, 998-999; cf. Grayes v. DiStasio, 166 A.D.2d 261, 262-263).
Defendant contends that the letter did not notify him that a lawsuit would be commenced against him and that, as an absentee landlord, he did not believe that he could be held liable for the accident. Because there is an issue of fact whether defendant had a reasonable belief in nonliability to support his seven-month delay in notifying plaintiff, the court erred in granting defendant's cross motion for summary judgment ( see, Matter of Travelers Ins. Co. [DeLosh], 249 A.D.2d 924, 924-925; Zugnoni v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 A.D.2d 1033, 1033-1034; see also, Home Mut. Ins. Co. of Binghamton v. Preston, 155 A.D.2d 932, 933, lv dismissed 75 N.Y.2d 947). Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment because there is a further issue of fact whether plaintiff disclaimed liability "as soon as is reasonably possible" (Insurance Law § 3420 [d]; see, Osterreicher v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 272 A.D.2d 926 [decided May 10, 2000]).
t was within a reasonable time in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case at hand" (Mighty Midgets v. Centennial Ins. Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 19; see, Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 86 A.D.2d 779, affd 56 N.Y.2d 799). The burden of establishing a reasonable excuse for the delay is upon the insured (see, Can-Am Roofing v. American States Ins. Co., 229 A.D.2d 973, 974). It has been held that a delay of one year, absent a reasonable excuse, is sufficient to vitiate the insurance contract as a matter of law (see, New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Filakouris, 240 A.D.2d 481; see also, Security Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 436). A delay is justified, however, when an insured has a "reasonable belief in nonliability" as measured by whether "a reasonable person could envision liability" (White v. City of New York, supra, at 957-958). Where there is a credible basis to support the reason for the delay, the issue of reasonableness becomes one of fact (see, Zugnoni v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 A.D.2d 1033; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Masternak, 55 A.D.2d 472, 474). Respondent furnished a credible basis for the delay in presenting his claim to petitioner.
The court erred, however, in granting that part of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment declaring that defendant is required to defend and indemnify plaintiff and to reimburse it for the expenses and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the Coburn action. Absent a reasonable excuse, an insured's failure to give notice to the insurer within a reasonable time after the occurrence giving rise to the claim "vitiates the policy" ( Security Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 436, 440; see, Zugnoni v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 A.D.2d 1033). The burden of justifying the delay by establishing a reasonable excuse is upon the insured ( see, Security Mut. Ins. Co. v Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., supra, at 441), and where the insured offers no excuse or an excuse unsupported by credible facts, the issue of reasonableness may be determined by the court as a matter of law ( Deso v. London Lancashire Indem. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 127, 130). A delay is justified where an insured has a "reasonable belief in nonliability", as measured by whether "a reasonable person could envision liability" ( White v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 955, 957-958).
ven Apts., No. 6 v. Allcity Ins. Co., 182 A.D.2d 658, 659; see, e.g., Cottone v. Vanguard Ins. Co., 199 A.D.2d 298). Generally, questions of the insured's good faith and reasonableness in believing that he or she would not be sued and in delaying notification to the insurer are issues to be resolved by the trier of fact ( see, Winstead v. Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 170 A.D.2d 500; AMRO Carting Corp. v. Allcity Ins. Co., 170 A.D.2d 394). In view of the evidence presented on the parties' respective motions for partial summary judgment in this case, we find that a question of fact exists with regard to whether the plaintiff's delay in notifying New York Central Mutual Fire Insurance Company of the occurrence was, under all of the attendant circumstances, reasonable and premised on a good faith belief that a claim would not be made against him ( see, e.g., E.T. Nutrition v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 201 A.D.2d 451; Town of Smithtown v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 191 A.D.2d 426; Zugnoni v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 A.D.2d 1033; Triantafillou v. Colonial Coop. Ins. Co., 178 A.D.2d 925; Cohoes Rod Gun Club v. Firemen's Ins. Co., supra). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Putnam County, so that this question may be resolved.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. Contrary to the defendant insurance carrier's intention, we find that a question of fact exists as to whether or not the plaintiff's delay in notifying its carrier of an alleged occurrence was, under all of the attendant circumstances, reasonable and premised on a good faith belief that a claim would not be made against the plaintiff (see, E.T. Nutrition v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 201 A.D.2d 451; Town of Smithtown v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 191 A.D.2d 426; Zugnoni v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 A.D.2d 1033). Furthermore, questions of fact exist as to whether or not the alleged occurrence falls within the completed operations hazard and/or the products hazard exclusion of the relevant general liability insurance policy (cf., Logan's Silo Sales Serv. v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 185 A.D.2d 651).
e to give timely notice if the belief is reasonable under all the circumstances of the case" (Beach Haven Apts., No. 6 v Allcity Ins. Co., 182 A.D.2d 658, 659; see, e.g., Cottone v Vanguard Ins. Co., 199 A.D.2d 298). Generally, questions of the insured's good faith and reasonableness in believing that he or she would not be sued and in delaying notification to the insurer are issues to be resolved by the trier of fact (see, Winstead v Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 170 A.D.2d 500; AMRO Carting Corp. v. Allcity Ins. Co., 170 A.D.2d 394). In view of the evidence presented on the parties' respective motions for summary judgment in this case, we find that a question of fact exists with regard to whether the plaintiff's delay in notifying Central of the occurrence was, under all of the attendant circumstances, reasonable and premised on a good faith belief that a claim would not be made against the plaintiff (see, e.g., Town of Smithtown v National Union Fire Ins. Co., 191 A.D.2d 426; Zugnoni v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 179 A.D.2d 1033; Triantafillou v. Colonial Coop. Ins. Co., 178 A.D.2d 925; Cohoes Rod Gun Club v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 134 A.D.2d 782, supra). Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, so that this question may be resolved.