This is an uncontroverted assertion in the bank's brief. See Loth v. Loth, 227 Minn. 387, 399, 35 N.W.2d 542, 550 (1949) (noting that "[a]n apparent exception to the rule [that appellate courts limit their consideration to what is in the appellate record] is that an uncontroverted statement in appellee's or respondent's brief or argument will be taken as true"); Zuehlke v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 538 N.W.2d 721, 724 n.1 (Minn. App. 1995) (stating uncontroverted statement in a party's brief may be accepted as true) (citing Loth). III
"This three-part test is applied with more scrutiny when the state seeks to impair a contract to which it is a party . . . [because] complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake." Id. at 751 (quotation omitted); see also Zuehlke v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 538 N.W.2d 721, 727 (Minn.App. 1995) (stating that courts should "closely scrutinize" state statutes affecting public contracts to ensure that a state is not attempting to escape its financial obligations). We first examine whether the compensation statutes have, in fact, operated to substantially impair the 1962 contract between Sverdrup and the state.
To the extent Albert's claims constitute attempts to obtain judicial review of the MDHR's decision not to pursue his case or of the rule authorizing its decision, the district court properly dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Minn. Stat. § 14.44 (2008) (requiring actions challenging the validity of an administrative rule be brought directly to the court of appeals in a petition for a declaratory judgment); Zuehlke v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 538 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Minn.App. 1995). We turn to Albert's specific claims.
"District courts should not exercise jurisdiction over matters that intrude into the policy decisions of the legislative and executive branches." Zuehlke v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 538 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Minn.App. 1995) (holding that certiorari appeal to the appellate courts is the appropriate method of challenging a school boards interpretation of a statute). The statute states that "[a]n offender assigned or reassigned to risk level II or III . . . has the right to seek administrative review of an end-of-confinement review committee's risk assessment determination."
Because both parties' briefs state that the district court continued Burnside's motion for interim relief until paternity could be established, we accept the assertion. See Zuehlke v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 316, 538 N.W.2d 721, 724 n. 1 (Minn.App. 1995) (stating uncontroverted statement in party's brief may be accepted as true).DECISION
But this court, whether or not the school board addressed the issue, would determine the constitutional challenge in a certiorari appeal. See, e.g., Zuehlke v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 316, 538 N.W.2d 721, 727 (Minn.App. 1995) (certiorari appeal holding that statute was constitutional as applied). 2. Clark's complaint also alleges defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.