It is firmly entrenched in the jurisprudence of Mississippi that this court must, in this diversity case, construe the written contract as made by the parties, giving the words of the document their commonly accepted meaning. If no ambiguity exists, this court must accept the plain meaning of the instrument as the intent of the parties and give effect to the instrument accordingly. The court recognizes that contracts are solemn obligations and the court must give them effect as written. Freeman v. Continental Grain Co., 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967); Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 363 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966); Allen v. Powell, 260 So.2d 182 (Miss. 1972); Roberts v. Corum, 236 Miss. 809, 112 So.2d 550 (1959); Hamilton v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 236 Miss. 429, 110 So.2d 612 (1959); Zouboukos v. Costas, 232 Miss. 860, 100 So.2d 781, sugg. of error overruled, 232 Miss. 860, 102 So.2d 121 (1958). In the case sub judice the pertinent provisions of the contract are stated as follows, to-wit:

The Chancery Court of Harrison County, Mississippi erred in overruling the motion of cross-appellants to the cross-bill. Zouboukos v. Costas, 232 Miss. 860, 100 So.2d 781; 12 Am. Jur., Secs. 229, 331 pp. 751, 887. APPELLANT IN REPLY.

The Court believes the facts and circumstances here strongly dictated the choice of decision on the sound basis of apparent conduct of the parties. The Court finds this legal basis to be buttressed by the late Kansas case of Aguilera v. Corkill, 201 Kan. 33, 439 P.2d 93, and the following cases from other jurisdictions: Mobley v. Harkins, 14 Wash.2d 276, 128 P.2d 289, 143 A.L.R. 88 (1942); White v. Coates, 17 Wash.2d 686, 137 P.2d 113 (1943); Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Kesner, 296 Ill.App. 187, 16 N.E.2d 175 (1938); Hotel Burnet & Co. v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 72 Ohio App. 453, 52 N.E.2d 754 (1943); Zouboukos v. Costas, 232 Miss. 860, 100 So.2d 781 (1958).          The intention of the parties as to the effect of these various agreements also is clearly shown by their actions. Lease payments under the November 28, 1961 agreement have been continued since the grant under the 1963 warranty deed.

The question whether or not a merger affecting a termination of the lease results depends on what will best serve the interests of justice and the intention of the parties.' 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant S 94, p. 666.Zouboukos v. Costas, 232 Miss. 860, 100 So.2d 781, 785 (1958). ¶ 54.

The question whether or not a merger affecting a termination of the lease results depends on what will best serve the interests of justice and the intention of the parties."'" (quoting Zouboukos v. Costas, 232 Miss. 860, 870, 100 So. 2d 781, 785 (1958), quoting in turn 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 94, p. 666)). In this case, James obtained a lease from Ms. Clayton, which allowed him to enter the mining lease that has generated his sole source of income for over 10 years and which he was relying upon to continue to generate income for the next 8 years. If the court applied the merger doctrine mechanically so as to terminate James's lease, the mining lease would attach to the property and James would be required to share one-half of the mineral royalties with Camden as a joint tenant.