Summary
noting that "there can only be one recovery for any damages based upon emotional distress resulting from alleged slanderous statements"
Summary of this case from Walia v. Vivek Purmasir Assocs. Inc.Opinion
June 13, 1988
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Graci, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs; and it is further,
Ordered that the defendant's time to answer the complaint is extended until 30 days after service upon him of a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry.
We agree with the Supreme Court that the allegations in the first cause of action in the complaint are sufficient to support a claim based upon slander per se (see, Kolko v City of Rochester, 93 A.D.2d 977, 978; Nowark v Maguire, 22 A.D.2d 901, 901-902).
In addition, the allegations in the second cause of action were sufficient to sustain a claim based upon the intentional infliction of emotional distress (see, Halio v Lurie, 15 A.D.2d 62, 65-67; cf., Fischer v Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557-558). We decline to reach the issue of redundancy which was not raised before the Supreme Court and was first raised on appeal in the defendant's reply brief. We note, however, that there can only be one recovery for any damages based upon emotional distress resulting from alleged slanderous statements (cf., Rozanski v Fitch, 113 A.D.2d 1010). Lawrence, J.P., Kunzeman, Kooper and Harwood, JJ., concur.