"In a civil case, the trial judge's decision whether to disqualify himself or herself is discretionary and will not be reversed unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987). A judge may recuse himself or herself sua sponte without written explanation or specific findings on the record.
Atkinson Dredging Company v. Henning, 631 So.2d 1129 (Fla.App. 1994). The Atkinson Court relied upon Smith and Potashnick and made reference to Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Association, 732 P.2d 635 (Col. 1987) and In re Fiftieth District Court Judge, 193 Mich. App. 209, 483 N.W.2d 676 (1992). While a business relationship with a law firm was an issue in Zoline the court did not reach that.
" Facts are required; conclusory statements, conjecture, and innuendo do not suffice. Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987) (citations omitted). Accord Livingston v. State, 441 So.2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983); Smith v. State, 250 Ga. 438, 298 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1983).
" Although the trial judge believes in his own impartiality, it is the court's duty to ‘ eliminate every semblance of reasonable doubt or suspicion that a trial by a fair and impartial tribunal may be denied.’ " Pierce v. United Bank, 780 P.2d 6, 7 (Colo.App.1989) (quoting Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo.1987)). Thus, in assessing the sufficiency of the motion and affidavits, the judge must consider the appearance of bias, for the integrity of the judicial process is impaired when the public perceives partiality on the part of a judge.
"In a civil case, the trial judge's decision whether to disqualify himself or herself is discretionary and will not be reversed unless an abuse of discretion is shown." Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987). However, on appeal, a trial court's determination of the legal sufficiency of a motion and affidavit to disqualify is subject to an independent review.
A.G., 262 P.3d at 650 ("Recusal may result from either allegations of actual bias or allegations of a mere appearance of impropriety. …"); People v. Gallegos, 251 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Colo. 2011) (stating that "the standard for granting a motion for disqualification goes beyond a search for actual bias, and instead requires disqualification of any judge whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned"); Estep v. Hardeman, 705 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1985) ("[E]ither actual prejudice on the part of the trial judge or its mere appearance can require the disqualification of that judge."); see also People v. Julien, 47 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Colo. 2002) ("Section 16-6-201, Crim. P. 21(b), and Canon 3 set forth Colorado standards by which a judge determines sua sponte or in response to a motion whether to disqualify himself or herself from the case."); Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass’n, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987) ("When assessing the grounds for disqualification raised in a motion, the judge must consider the Code of Judicial Conduct as well as the statutes and procedural rules."). The People’s position would have us overrule this lengthy body of case law, but we perceive no justifiable reason for doing so.
364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir. 1966), the court noted that "[w]hile it is certainly the better practice to specifically rule on all pending motions, the determination of a motion need not always be expressed but may be implied by an entry of an order inconsistent with the granting of the relief sought." See also Malbon v. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 636 F.2d 936, 939 n. 8 (4th Cir. 1980) (same); Mosier v. Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 132 F.2d 710, 712 (2nd Cir. 1942) (citing 42 Corpus Juris 511 for the proposition that "the entry of an order inconsistent with granting the relief sought is a denial of the motion"); Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1994) (denial of motion, though not formally expressed, "may be implied by the entry of a final judgment or of an order inconsistent with the granting of the relief"); Cohen v. Curtis Publishing Co., 333 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1964); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Central National Bank Trust Co., 753 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985); Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Association, 732 P.2d 635 (Colo. 1987). The Court of Special Appeals has held likewise in a number of cases.
A judge must also consider the Code of Judicial Conduct sua sponte or in response to a disqualification motion in determining whether to serve on the case. Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987). Julien's challenge to Judge Schwartz's service did not turn in any way on a claim of actual bias or prejudice, or on any other basis under section 16-6-201(3), Crim. P. 21(b)(3), and Canon 3, apart from Judge Schwartz's prior association with the District Attorney's Office.
Moreover, the questioning of the judge's impartiality must not be based on unsupported opinion, baseless conclusions or rumors. See State v. Hunt, 147 Vt. 631, 631, 527 A.2d 223, 223 (1987); Maier v. Orr, 758 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635, 639 (Colo. 1987). Media reports are not a proper basis for a recusal motion.
" 193 Mich. App. at 214, 438 N.W.2d at 679 (1992) A slightly different pattern existed in Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635 (Colo. 1987), where the trial judge owned controlling interest in a bank in which the Telluride Lodge Association was a substantial depositor. The Telluride Lodge was a condominium association that had sued to foreclose liens against various owners of units.