Opinion
C23-5532JLR
07-19-2023
JOSEPH ZLOZA, Plaintiff, v. BRANDON SOMETHING, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING CASE
JAMES L. ROBART, United States District Judge.
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Joseph Zloza's amended complaint against Defendants “Brandon Something” and West Coast Training. (Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 9).) On July 2, 2023, the court dismissed Mr. Zloza's original complaint with leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (7/2/23 Order (Dkt. # 8).) In that order, the court concluded that (1) Mr. Zloza's speculative allegation that Brandon might be a “dirty Federal Agent?” was insufficient to establish federal question subject matter jurisdiction over this case (id. at 3 (quoting Compl. (Dkt. # 7) at 3)) and (2) Mr. Zloza did not allege sufficient facts, such as the date and place where Brandon allegedly spat at him, to give Defendants “fair notice of what [Mr. Zloza's] claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (id. (quoting Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. Glaser, 945 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 2019))). The court instructed Mr. Zloza that his amended complaint, if any,
must include short, plain statements setting forth: (1) the specific basis of the court's jurisdiction; (2) if he continues to assert federal question jurisdiction, the constitutional or statutory provision under which his claim arises; (3) the name of the defendant or defendants who violated that provision; (4) exactly what that defendant did or failed to do and when that conduct occurred; (5) how the defendant's action or actions are connected to the violation of his rights; and (6) the specific injury he suffered as a result of that defendant's conduct and when he suffered it.(Id. at 4.) The court warned Mr. Zloza that if he failed to file an amended complaint that remedied the deficiencies identified in its order, it would dismiss this matter without leave to amend. (Id.)
Mr. Zloza timely filed an amended complaint in which he provides brief answers to the questions listed above. (See Am. Compl.) Notably, Mr. Zloza (1) still does not specify the constitutional or statutory provision under which he alleges his claim arose and (2) alleges that Brandon spat on his face on June 1, 2020. (Id.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), district courts have authority to review IFP complaints and must dismiss them if “at any time” it is determined that a complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also id. § 1915A(b)(1); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that § 1915(e) applies to all IFP proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners). Because Mr. Zloza is a pro se plaintiff, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, his complaint must still contain factual allegations “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (requiring a pleading to “contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction,” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
The court concludes that Mr. Zloza still has not plausibly alleged facts that would allow the court to conclude that his claim “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” as required to support federal question subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; (see Am. Compl.). In addition, although Mr. Zloza alleges that his encounter with Brandon took place on June 1, 2020, he did not file his proposed complaint until June 12, 2023. (See Prop. Compl. (Dkt. # 1).) Thus, his claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations that applies to battery claims. Kumar v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 325 P.3d 193, 204 (Wash. 2014) (stating that a battery is an intentional and unpermitted bodily contact with another person); RCW 4.16.100(1) (setting a two-year statute of limitations for actions for “libel, slander, assault, assault and battery, or false imprisonment”). For these reasons, the court DISMISSES Mr. Zloza's amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
When a court dismisses a pro se plaintiff's complaint, it must give the plaintiff leave to amend “[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect” in the complaint. Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, Mr. Zloza has already had an opportunity to remedy the deficiencies identified in the court's July 2, 2023 order, but has failed to do so. (See Am. Compl.; 7/2/23 Order at 3-4.)
Therefore, the court concludes that further amendment would be futile and DISMISSES Mr. Zloza's amended complaint with prejudice and without further leave to amend.