Opinion
3:23-cv-306-KRG-KAP
04-22-2024
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Keith A. Pesto, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff's motion for my recusal, ECF no. 12, based on the suggestion that because Johnstown (where the division's court is located) is so small I might use services provided by one or more defendants (presumably the library, water authority, or police department) is denied. Use of services is too remote to constitute a substantial interest or financial interest triggering mandatory recusal under 28 U.S.C.§ 455(b)(4). See In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d 357, 368 (4th Cir. 1976)(vacating the recusal of a judge who was a customer of a utility company, the rates of which might be affected by the outcome of the pending litigation, on the grounds that the interest was not a financial interest and in determining whether it was otherwise a substantial interest the judge “must necessarily consider the remoteness of the interest and its extent or degree.”)
Recusal motions under the appearance of impropriety subsection, 28 U.S.C.§ 455(a), should identify “facts that might reasonably cause an objective observer to question [the presiding judge's] impartiality.” See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 (1988)(recusal proper where judge in a bench trial sat on the board of trustees of a party negotiating with one of the litigants over property, the ownership of which was at issue in the bench trial); Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir.2004)(recusal from habeas proceedings required of a judge who before taking the federal bench presided over the state court criminal proceedings). Recusal based on an innuendo of hometown bias is not sufficient.