Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3642.
May 13, 2004
ORDER — MEMORANDUM
AND NOW, this 13th day of May, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiffs' "Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15 to Request Related Damages" (Docket No. 24), Defendants' response thereto, and the argument held in open court on April 19, 2004, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on the Docket.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a party may amend a pleading once at any time prior to the service of a responsive pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). However, once a responsive pleading has been filed, the party may amend "only upon leave of the court or written consent of the adverse party."Id. Defendants have not consented to Plaintiffs' filing the proposed Second Amended Complaint.
Decisions on motions to amend are committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 772 (3d Cir. 1990). However, courts liberally allow amendments when "justice so requires," and when the non-moving party is not prejudiced by the allowance of the amendment. Katzenmoyer v. City of Reading, 158 F. Supp.2d 491, 497 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing Thomas v. State Farm Ins., Co., Civ.A. No. 99-CV-2268, 1999 WL 1018279, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 1999)). An applicant seeking leave to amend a pleading has the burden of showing that justice requires the amendment. Id. The United States Supreme Court has determined that leave to amend should be granted in "the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as [1] undue delay, [2] bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, [3] repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, [4] undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [5] futility of the amendment, etc." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ("Third Circuit") has explained "that prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of the amendment."Cornell Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)). Such prejudice exists "if the amendment substantially changes the theory on which the case has been proceeding and is proposed late enough so that the opponent would be required to engage in significant new preparation."Rehabilitation Inst. v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S., 131 F.R.D. 99, 102 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (citing Wright, et al., 6 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1487 (1990)).
Plaintiffs seek to amend the Amended Complaint to request "the full measure of delay damages and post-judgment interest from all defendants." (Pls.' Mem. at 3.) The proposed Second Amended Complaint submitted by Plaintiffs differs from the Amended Complaint in three ways: (1) it omits the names of two Defendants who were dismissed from this litigation by stipulation of the parties on April 28, 2004; (2) it omits from the ad damnum clause of each count the request for a declaration that Defendants are obligated to post a bond on Zitomer's behalf inYoung v. Zitomer, et al., March Term 1999, No. 1993, Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas ("Young v. Zitomer"), because that case has been settled; and (3) it changes the ad damnum clause of each count to request a declaration that Defendants are "responsible for paying the full measure of delay damages (prejudgment interest) and postjudgment interest presently owed to Ellisa Young under Pennsylvania law. . . ." (Proposed 2d Am. Comp. at 10, 12, 14.) Defendants only challenge the third proposed amendment (the "Amendment").
Plaintiffs maintain that the Amendment would not require the assertion of new claims or theories in this case and that they have altered only the quantity of damages they seek. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants would not be prejudiced by the Amendment because Defendants have already moved for summary judgment with respect to the Amendment.
Defendants oppose the Amendment on the grounds of delay and futility. "Delay alone is insufficient ground to deny an amendment, unless the delay unduly prejudices an opposing party."Furman Lumber v. Mountbatten Surety Co., Inc., Civ.A. Nos. 96-7906, 96-8168, 96-8352, 1997 WL 397496, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 1997) (citing Cornell Co., 573 F.2d at 823). The Court finds that there is no evidence of undue prejudice to Defendants, as the proposed Second Amended Complaint does not allege new causes of action or substantially change the causes of actions alleged in the Amended Complaint. Furthermore, the proposed Second Amended Complaint would not require new briefing on the outstanding Motions for Summary Judgment, as both parties have thoroughly addressed the Amendment in those Motions. See Downey v. Coalition Against Rape Abuse, 143 F. Supp.2d 423, 436-37 (D.N.J. 2001) (granting motion for leave to amend where proposed amendment did not present new causes of action and would require very little new briefing by nonmoving party).
In assessing futility, the Court "applies the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6)." In re Burlington Coat Factories Securities Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the court must "`accept as true all the facts alleged in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them,' and deny a motion to amend only `where it is certain that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved.'" DiCicco v. Willow Grove Bank, Civ.A. No. 02-7855, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4499 at *8-9 (quotingMarkowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990)). Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are "responsible for paying the full measure of delay damages (prejudgment interest) and postjudgment interest presently owed to Ellisa Young under Pennsylvania law" because Zitomer has been found jointly and severally liable with other Defendants for the full amount of damages awarded in Young v. Zitomer. Plaintiffs rely on Allen v. Mellinger, 784 A.2d 762 (Pa. 2001), and Tindal v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 560 A.2d 183 (Pa.Super. 1989) (en banc), both of which hold that defendants who have been held jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of a verdict are also jointly and severally liable for delay damages. See Allen, 784 A.2d at 766;Tindal, 560 A.2d at 189.
Having accepted as true all of the facts alleged in the proposed Second Amended Complaint, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, the Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint alleges a claim upon which relief could be granted for the full amount of delay damages and post judgment interest awarded in Young v. Zitomer. Accordingly, the Amendment is not futile and the Motion for Leave to Amend is granted.