Violations of the liquor laws do not provide an independent basis for negligence liability. See Zinck v. Gateway, 72 Mass.App.Ct. 571, 576 & n.8 (2008) (violation of G.L.c. 138, § 34 is not prima facie evidence of negligence, but can be used to support a finding of negligence), citing Bennett v. Eagle Brook Country Store, Inc., 408 Mass. 355, 358 (1990); Three Sons, Inc. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 357 Mass. 271, 275 (1970). A plaintiff must prove each element of negligence separately to recover for negligence based on a violation of liquor laws.
October 29, 2008. Reported below: 72 Mass. App. Ct. 571 (2008). Orders.
We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.Zinck v. Gateway Country Store, Inc., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 572 (2008). The plaintiff was the only witness to testify at trial.
"Where the intervening occurrence was foreseeable by a defendant, the causal chain of events remains intact and the original negligence remains a proximate cause [of the plaintiff's injury]."Zinck v. Gateway Country Store, Inc., 72 Mass.App.Ct. 571, 578, 893 N.E.2d 364 (2008), quoting from Delaney v. Reynolds, 63 Mass.App.Ct. 239, 242, 825 N.E.2d 554 (2005). The agency's argument that Adams has waived this point is unpersuasive.
Where negligence is at issue, though, the focus is on the consequences. If the actor intended the act, and the consequences, although unintended, were reasonably foreseeable, then liability for negligent conduct results. See Luz v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 348 Mass. 198, 204, 202 N.E.2d 771 (1964); Zinck v. Gateway Country Store, Inc., 72 Mass.App.Ct. 571, 578–579, 893 N.E.2d 364 (2008). If the actor intended the act and also intended consequences of at least the general type that followed, then liability for intentional, not negligent, conduct will follow. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra at § 500 comment.
Tobin v. Norwood Country Club, Inc., 422 Mass. 126, 136 (1996). Violation of either duty may result in liability to someone injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an alcohol-impaired driver, see Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323 (1982) and Zinck v. Gateway Country Store, Inc., 72 Mass. App. Ct. 571 (2008), or in an altercation caused by an alcohol-fueled aggressor, see Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 451 (1969); Christopher v. Father's Huddle Café, Inc., 57 Mass. App. Ct. 217, 224 (2003), or even by the trajectory of a drunk falling off a bar stool.Sweenor v. 162 State Street, Inc., 361 Mass. 524 (1972). "When the bar has served a potentially dangerous person, the duty may extend beyond the premises."