Summary
In Zimmerman v. State Board of Medical Education and Licensure, 55 Pa. Commw. 74, 423 A.2d 34 (1980), petitioner's medical license was revoked under Section 15(a)(3) and (a)(8) of the Medical Practice Act, Act of July 20, 1974, P.L. 551, as amended, 63 P. S. § 421.15(a)(3) (since repealed), after he was found guilty of violating Section 13(a)(30) of the controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P. S. § 780-113(a)(30).
Summary of this case from Gaynor v. State Bd. of PharmacyOpinion
Argued October 10, 1980
December 3, 1980.
Physicians — Revocation of medical license — Medical Practice Act of 1974, Act of July 20, 1974, P.L. 551 — The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233 — Collateral attack — Words and phrases — Conviction — Pending appeal — Right to practice medicine — Police power — Public Welfare.
1. A physician cannot collaterally attack his conviction for violations of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, in a proceeding to revoke his medical license under provisions of the Medical Practice Act of 1974, Act of July 20, 1974, P.L. 551. [76]
2. A conviction of a felony justifying revocation of a license to practice medicine is defined in the Medical Practice Act of 1974, Act of July 20, 1974, P.L. 551, to include a verdict of guilt, and such a verdict can support a revocation action although an appeal has been taken from the conviction. [76]
3. The right of a person to practice medicine is not absolute and is subject to a proper exercise of the police power by the Commonwealth to protect the public welfare when such power is not exercised oppressively, is not applied beyond the necessity of the case and is exercised by means which bear a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. [77]
Argued October 10, 1980, before Judges BLATT, CRAIG and WILLIAMS, JR., sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 2343 C.D. 1979, from the Order of the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure in case of State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v. Lamar T. Zimmerman, M.D., No. 4069-E.
License to practice medicine revoked at the instance of the Department of State, Commission of Professional and Occupational Affairs. Licensee appealed. Decision of hearing examiner affirmed by State Board of Medical Education and Licensure. Licensee appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Percy DeMarco, with him A. Charles Peruto, Peruto, Ryan Vitullo, for petitioner.
Kenneth E. Brody, Assistant Attorney General, with him Edward Biester, Attorney General, for respondent.
Petitioner Lamar T. Zimmerman appeals from a decision of the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure (board), which revoked petitioner's medical license under Section 15(a)(3) and (a)(8), of the Medical Practice Act of 1974, because he was convicted of a felony and found guilty of immoral and unprofessional conduct.
Act of July 20, 1974, P.L. 551, as amended, 63 P. S. § 421.15 (a)(3) and (a)(8).
The facts are not in dispute. On July 20, 1978, a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, resulted in a verdict finding petitioner, a physician licensed to practice in Pennsylvania, guilty of violating, among other matters, Section 13(a)(30), of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, a felony under Section 13(f)(1). Petitioner has appealed that criminal conviction to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P. S. § 780-113 (a)(30).
On September 6, 1978 the Department of State, Commission of Professional and Occupational Affairs, initiated license proceedings against petitioner before the board. On August 14, 1979 a hearing examiner issued an order revoking petitioner's license. Thereafter petitioner appealed to the board, which affirmed the hearing examiner's decision.
Petitioner's first contention is that the record in the criminal case is devoid of competent evidence to support the guilty verdict. The Superior Court, not this court, is the proper forum to review the evidence adduced at the criminal trial. Therefore, we cannot reinstate petitioner's license on the basis of that contention.
Petitioner next contends (1) that his license cannot be revoked until his conviction is final and (2) that a conviction is not final until the disposition of all appeals taken by the petitioner. We cannot agree with that interpretation in the present context.
Governing here is Section 15(a)(3), which states:
(a) The board shall have authority to refuse, revoke or suspend the license of a physician for any or all of the following reasons:
. . . .
(3) Being convicted of a felony in the courts of this Commonwealth or any other state, territory or country. Conviction as used in this paragraph shall include a finding or verdict of guilt, an admission of guilt or a plea of nolo contendere.
63 P. S. § 421.15(a)(3)
For the purpose of Section 15(a)(3), "conviction" is thus specifically defined to include a verdict of guilt. The legislature, by its language, indicates that it contemplated the various meanings "conviction" could have, and decided that a verdict alone should suffice to constitute a conviction.
For his definition of final conviction, petitioner relies on Commonwealth v. Rundle, 412 Pa. 109, 194 A.2d 143 (1963). In Rundle, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in considering retrospective application of an evidence exclusion doctrine, indicated that a criminal conviction might not be considered "final"
in the sense that the time for perfecting an appeal to the state appellate court had not expired or that an appeal had been taken but not determined or that the time for seeking a review by the U.S. Supreme Court had not expired or that a review by that court was pending.
supra at 117, n. 4, 194 A.2d at 147, n. 4.
Rundle is to be distinguished because it involved a very different issue, and no statutory definition was involved.
Thus, we hold that the guilty verdict rendered against petitioner made Section 15(a)(3) immediately operable against petitioner. Consequently, the board properly revoked the petitioner's license.
If petitioner's felony conviction is overturned on appeal, petitioner may then initiate proceedings to have his license reinstated.
We are aware of the hardship such a result could work on petitioner. However, petitioner's property right to practice his chosen profession is not an absolute right to be deferred to in all circumstances. Howarth v. Gilman, 164 Pa. Super. 454, 65 A.2d 691 (1949). Here we hold that petitioner's property right must be subordinated to Section 15(a)(3), which is a proper exercise of the state's police power. The regulatory statute, here intended to protect the public, is not unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessity of the case, and the means employed has a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. See: Pennsylvania State Board of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971). See also: McCoy v. Board of Medical Education and Licensure, 37 Pa. Commw. 530, 391 A.2d 723 (1978).
Because we uphold the board's revocation of petitioner's license based upon Section 15(a)(3), we need not discuss the Section 15(a)(8) grounds on which the board based its decision to revoke petitioner's license.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the board.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 3rd day of December, 1980, the decision of the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure is hereby affirmed.